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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Tuesday, February 8, 2011 - 6:28 AM
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By Paula Broadwell
Best Defense wandering reporter
Two years ago, a small team of female Marines -- drivers, engineers, cooks and other specialists -- began conducting "female engagement" initiatives with women in southern Afghanistan. If winning the hearts and minds of the local population was the goal, they thought it behooved them to amicably engage 50 percent of the population, women to whom American soldiers had virtually no access because of cultural and religious boundaries in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Since then, the Marines expanded the program and formalized their training linguistic, cultural, and tactical training in advance so they weren't left learning on the job ad hoc, sometimes painfully and with the begrudging support of a commander. Their rapport-building efforts, which included medical outreach and the establishment of micro-finance projects to help women generate income, were soon recognized by Gens. Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, both of whom pushed for the Army to officially adopt the Female Engagement Team (FET) program over the past year.
Engagement with Afghan women over the past nine years has not been non-existent. Initiatives include outreach through existing organizations, such as Agri-business Development Teams, Human Terrain Teams, Civil Affairs Teams, and Female Treatment Teams. In addition to these engagement platforms, FETs are another enabler within the toolbox. One representative in a Special Operations Unit here says they should not be viewed as an independent capability, but rather a complement to other enablers.
These and other outreach programs have benefited the ISAF mission, but the engagements vary by command and individual leadership and are sometimes sidelined by a commander who may not have the resources or feel the women's initiatives are a priority. This may be one reason the big Army has been slow to show progress in streamlining and institutionalizing the training effort in the United States. The Defense Department has yet to assign troops specifically for the mission, as opposed to carving the teams out of existing units, or institutionalize the pre-deployment training. Gen. McChrystal issued his guidance and intent for the engagement efforts last March, but there had been little momentum to help units preparing for deployment as well as those deployed to delineate the standards, until a recent push from Gen Petraeus. His Counterinsurgency Advise and Assist Team hosted FET shura, or community meeting, here in Kabul two weeks ago to debate frameworks for the program.
The debate at the recent FET shura highlighted that there are very successful FET programs in Regional Command (RC)-East, RC-Southwest, and RC-North and although each is unique from the other, they are most often tailored to meet the needs of the commander and the area. "There are 34 provinces within Afghanistan and to standardize and institutionalize a capability by big Army, or create a FET-in-a-box as some would like to do, would not do justice to the commander who knows his battle space best," according to an advisor at Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command -- Afghanistan. ISAF Joint Command recently issued an order which dictates the minimum training, capability and employment of FETs. Although the advisor cited above feels the big Army should not dictate more specific training or employment, and that instead the commander on the ground should determine the need for additional capability and associated training and employment, others with FET experience argue that it may not be wise to trust that a commander will use this resource wisely without more explicit guidance.
While coalition forces have currently decentralized these choices in the field and the big Army is contemplating whether to set establish official programs and more explicit guidance, an interesting development has quietly occurred within the Special Operations Community: the rapid institutionalization of the women's engagement concept, which they have dubbed "Cultural Support Teams" (CST). The idea was then accelerated last spring by a directive from Admiral Eric Olson, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, who noted growing interest in the Navy and Marines and a growing number of successful vignettes from the frontlines.
Last May, the Army's elite Ranger Regiment also issued a request for qualified female troops to support their mission in Afghanistan. The operative word there is "qualified." The qualifications requirements for these women are critical, given the austere nature of the mission. They would have to be physically and mentally fit and agile, surpassing the average Army standards for fitness and aptitude. "We are identifying soldiers with extreme capability to deal with stress, solve problems, build rapport, and deescalate tense situations. They will undergo rigorous physical demands and tests of mental agility," said Clair Russo, a former Marine officer who spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan and helped with the startup of the Marine's female engagement program in southern Afghanistan. Russo now assists with the CST training at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.
The mission of the women's teams is to support the warfighters engaged in everything from the non-kinetic governance and development initiatives inherent in Foreign Internal Defense, Village Stability Operations, and other capacity building initiatives that "white" special operators perform, to support of more kinetic special operations activity. The primary focus in all of these endeavors remains non-kinetic engagement with Afghan women in their respective area of operations (though they will not be restricted from interaction with male Afghans). Their missions might include efforts similar to the conventional force's medical civic action programs, humanitarian assistance, and civil-military operations. These women, just over two dozen trailblazers, aren't organized or authorized to "go commando" and kick down doors, but greater tactical proficiency is understandably identified as a critical skill because of the isolation, and often higher-threat environment, of special operations units. Somewhat different from the conventional-force FET missions, this elite group also has to demonstrate more advance skills in the areas of tactical questioning, negotiations, analysis of human behavior, marksmanship, tactical movement, basic medical training, combat lifesaver, and other essential skills. Like other military engagement initiatives, such as the conventional forces' FETs or the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands initiative, the CSTs are schooled in Afghanistan's physical, cultural, and religious landscapes. They, too, are trained to understand the nuanced roles of Afghan village shuras, tribal politics, district and provincial governors. And eventually, women in the Afghan National Security Forces (a small but growing number) may assume similar engagement roles as coalition forces transition to an Afghan lead, so some of the CST efforts might eventually include partnering with and mentoring the few women in these positions.
The first CST tranche arrived in Afghanistan early this year. The commanders of the major special mission organizations that own them are tremendous advocates of the initiative - true believers. But one inherent problem remains: supply does not equal demand. So, all you athletic, determined ladies out there, here is where you can go to sign up. CST information is also available on Facebook. There are opportunities to join the CST for active duty, reserve, and national guard officers and senior enlisted women.
Thinking beyond the current battlefield in Afghanistan, Special Operations Command has widened its lens and will eventually send CSTs to its other theaters of operation as well, such as Africa, where similar conservative indigenous environments limit a male soldier's ability to interact with women. As the program continues to evolve, each Special Forces Group will have approximately a company size element of women trained for such endeavors. "CSTs were created to meet the needs of the SOF community. This is our commander's answer to our needs just like the RCs have developed models that meet their needs. Although we have a solid program with growing potential, it is by no means the end all answer," according to the SOF CST Advisor.
Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command stated that this endeavor is a "landmark moment" at the women's graduation ceremony in December. He was correct. And given the roles these women have played in the last near-decade of war, and will endeavor to do on the frontlines of other conflicts, could the next landmark moment be a call to overturn the ground combat exclusion policy?
TEDxPentagon featured Female Engagement Team Member
Check out Marine MSgt. Julie Watson as she spoke at the inaugural TEDxPentagon about "Why Women Matter in War" http://bit.ly/hoKS2x
So this quote got me wondering, alot:
Last May, the Army's elite Ranger Regiment also issued a request for qualified female troops to support their mission in Afghanistan. The operative word there is "qualified." The qualifications requirements for these women are critical, given the austere nature of the mission. They would have to be physically and mentally fit and agile, surpassing the average Army standards for fitness and aptitude. "We are identifying soldiers with extreme capability to deal with stress, solve problems, build rapport, and deescalate tense situations. They will undergo rigorous physical demands and tests of mental agility," said Clair Russo, a former Marine officer who spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan and helped with the startup of the Marine's female engagement program in southern Afghanistan.
I want to know how they are evaluating these women's "extreme capability to deal with stress, solve problems, build rapport, and deescalate tense situations. They will undergo rigorous physical demands and tests of mental agility."
Will they undergo those tests in theater, or beforehand? What is the means by which they identify these women? How do they evaluate their ability to "deal with stress, solve problems, build rapport, and deescalate tense situations?" Seriously.
Because I would think those are skills you want to find and cultivate in all of our soldiers. And I don't see enough evidence that it is happening.
I'm guessing their evaluation consists of "You want to be in a FET? Can you pass the PT test?...right you're in."
(None of my comments are intended to disparage women in the military or combat - I happen to be a big supporter of both - they are intended to disparage a system that pays lip service to training people and properly preparing them for combat. This situation smells of that).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Hunter is on target with his assessment of the evaluation process for FETs. While I can't speak for Regiment, I can tell you that while serving as an O/C at JRTC, I witnessed one light infantry division's technique for training FETs...basically, if a soldier was identified as having two X chromosomes, they were deemed qualified to interact with Afghan females. A technique, perhaps...but not the preferred technique.
I think the FET is a good concept, but combat multipliers are only beneficial if employed properly. Even if this unit had done something other than pairing a female mechanic with a female supply clerk and designating them a FET, instead of using them to TALK TO FEMALES, they had these two young ladies manning a guard tower. With a M240B. A weapon system that neither of them had ever qualified with. Again...not the preferred technique.
Another thing - why is the 75th using FETs? I was under the impression that they don't own any battlespace and therefore have limited interaction with the locals. Indeed, my friends that are PLs in Regiment insist that their deployments are "hollywood," ie. GTL all day and raiding the hell out of everything all night. Schlubs like me (conventional infantry) are left with the unenviable task of conducting consequence management. Even if they are taking FETs on raids to do TQ on the objective, that would require serious expertise on the part of said FET to extract information useful to the 75th. What am I missing here...can anyone fill me in?
Unfortunately that has been the policy in the past. It was a knee jerk reaction to the need for FET teams, and they just grabbed whatever females happened to be around and threw them at the problem. This is a practice that is going to make it harder on those who come after them to prove their effectiveness and worth.
The program discussed in this article is the answer to the realization that perhaps they should put a little more thought and effort into this concept. If they stick to the prerequisites stated of having no Jr Enlisted, requiring a better PT score, timed ruck, and assessment, then I don't see any reason this program can't succeed.
From the assessments I've heard of previous FET and CSTs, there has been a great deal of variation in the quality and training of soldiers and Marines involved. If you snag an 18 year old E-2 supply kid out of the S-4 and throw them into an ODA team house, yes you are going to have a problem. If you assess and train an NCO with a valid skill set that's useful to the mission, who chose to do the extra work to get there, you will have a different result. Not all women are created the same.
The bottom line is that female soldiers should be afforded the chance to be judged on their individual merit instead of the merits or demerits of the women before them. This more deliberate selection and assessment is a step in the right direction.
News about non american ISAF forces
Reading Ms. Broadwell posts I assume she is having contact with non american ISAF forces. Since reporting here in Spain about our troops performance is really non existing, does she have any news of how spanish troops interact with american leadership and how they receive this kind of doctrinal development - CST? This thought comes to me because I believe spanish female soldiers could do a great job in CST - like operations. Thanks again for your reporting.
Unfortunately, I feel like Clint Eastwood as ‘Harry Callahan’ in ‘The Enforcer’ when he is arm twisted into a partnership with a woman largely because it was the ‘fashionable’ thing to do. It is difficult to see how a gun bearing American female soldier who can’t speak the language and is basically ignorant of Afghan history and culture is going to have much influence on Afghan women any more that their male compatriots have on Afghan men.
This sounds like something the high command is doing to get the feminist monkey off their back. If I am wrong and this stuff really works then God bless them and go get em’. My suspicion is that like ‘Dirty Harry’ commanding officers have run into something far more formidable than the Taliban and that is good old American political correctness.
I agree with you that this might be political and ideological, and yes Western women being ignorant of local mores is a major liability. But to interact at all with local women, one must have women along. I've known locals from the south who worked for NGO's and they told me, as males, that in order to even question a man in the most innocuous way about his female relatives they had to pose as relatives of those women and even then it was tense matter; after all, cousins often marry so coed cousin interaction isn't viewed as non-sexual.
If one is to clear, hold and BUILD Afghan society (the idea being a boondoggle aside) one must involve women. But this basic problem of female absence from the public sphere, even in conversation, only dawned on the movers and shakers in DC relatively late, which shows they are there to lead and not to read, to paraphrase the Simpsons. Ethnographers in the Islamic world have always had to split the workload between men and women.
Regarding DADT, I can think of one interesting example, the name escapes, where an openly gay man was given access to conduct ethnographic research with Saudi females. The idea was that he didn't pose a sexual threat.
in the first line that this is a perfect example of how COIN theory suits the current political climate in the US. I'm not sure what is in the driver seat, in this instance, I'm not so quick to agree with JPWREL that a feminist lobby is behind this. Although the Pentagon and "Conservative" interventionists have shown a willingness to carry the banner of feminism and female empowerment when it suits their agendas.
What is clearly needed here are large numbers of Afghan girls or women from the diaspora, hopefully conversant in Pashto or Dari. Even then there is the problem of potential tensions, already seen in one press account, between Afghan-American women working for the Army and local Afghan soldiers.
LITTLEMANTATE, yours is a great response to my supposition and I thank you. When it comes to the agendas of organizations I tend to be a cynic so it is refreshing to read your take on things.
Cynicism is often justified, JPWREL
particularly when even the most altruistic or kindly acts are accompanied by moralizing posturing and sermonry. That's why my favorite saint, St. Nicholas, would have made a horrible politician or leader, he did good deeds but did them anonymously.
This is just a fortuitous instance. The statements about the need for proper training, in addition to just being female, reminds me of an article by Ann Jones "Counterinsurgency Down for the Count", which can be found on numerous sites, I'll quote the relevant anecdote:
"It’s only in the last year or two that the Marines and the Army started pulling a few American women off their full-time non-combat jobs and sending them out as Female Engagement Teams (FETs) to meet and greet village women. As with so many innovative new plans in our counterinsurgency war, this one was cobbled together in a thoughtless way that risked lives and almost guaranteed failure.
Commanders have casually sent noncombatant American women soldiers — supply clerks and radio operators — outside the wire, usually with little training, no clear mission, and no follow up. Predictably, like their male counterparts, they have left a trail of good intentions and broken promises behind. So when I went out to meet village women near the Pakistan border last week with a brand-new Army FET-in-training, we faced the fury of Pashto women still waiting for a promised delivery of vegetable seeds.
Imagine. This is hardly a big item like the “government in a box” that General McChrystal promised and failed to deliver in Marja. It’s just seeds. How hard could that be?
Our visit did, however, open a window into a world military and political policymakers have ignored for all too long. It turns out that the women of Afghanistan, whom George W. Bush claimed to have liberated so many years ago, are still mostly oppressed, impoverished, malnourished, uneducated, short of seeds, and mad as hell."
I repeat the problem is being addressed, and Ann Jones is a controversial, some might argue hostile observer. But the point still stands. It shows an inexcusable lack of foresight on the part of political and higher military leadership.
JPWREL
Check out the video of MSGT Julie Watson at TedXPentagon and I think you'll see the point.
long on jargon and staff churn sagas...
...but short on details that would illustrate actual operational success. Does anyone else wonder if too much military energy is expended on pushing through good ideas for improving self-licking ice cream cones? Sounds like reports of success are designed to make the brass feel good about their support of FET and CST programs.
Kinetic ops averted? Insurgents found? Taleban commanders captured? Weapons caches destroyed? Villages converted to support the governmenet? Did anyone think to use these female soldiers to train a few more Afghan security personnel?
I'd also add that there's a whole 'nother story in this about how the spec ops units operate outside the purview and hindrance of the theater commander....
Nice if this sort of stuff leads to authorizing all qualified personnel for all combat jobs. Bad if anyone believes these FET programs are good ideas just because the commanders navigated the bureaucratic churn to field these units.
Be on the lookout for subsequent stories on training workshops and economic give-away programs like looms, dairy cows, and whatever.
A bit of a rant Frick Frack. I always found that once you build-up the self-confidence of a Marine, give them a job, along with the training, and tools to do that job, leaving it up to them a modicum of their own devices, while not neglecting general supervision and support, you'll be amazed at the results.
Last year, I had an opportunity to speak with a former female Marine that participated in the Corps’ earlier Lioness program in Iraq (some earlier FET members drawn from this). She was awesome, as was the her description of her fellow Marines that participated.
This isn’t my war physically, I’m too old, and I’ve learned how to say the word no! But I did gain valuable insight into counter-insurgency as a participant in our last long adventure, and as an observer in S. Africa. And one think, among many, I came away with that has held me in good stead was that when complex, sophisticated plans are not producing, try something simple. It will generally work if you’ll give it a chance and set a positive tone for its support.
Simple plans with achievable goals, subsequent to careful observation and thought would be awesome. The LIONESS program is the essence of simple: cultural need met with simple, respectful solutions that result in better security for all.
Half-baked and complicated is what you get when earnest, mission-oriented, short-term, promotion-conscious, risk-averse Americans confront cowed, traditional, stubborn locals and slippery, effective insurgent forces. Iraq and AFG are littered with expensive and inexpensive examples of good intentions that foster resentment and complicate eventual governance and sustainability.
This CST/FET enterprise appears to be neither simple nor based on careful observation or planning. Nine years into Afghanistan, have the human terrain teams or the PRT's or civil-military teams or any other bright idea made any real difference? How many Afghan districts have been handed over to Afghan forces? How much sustainability is there? The great successes for any of these efforts thus far appears to be staffing them through the chain-of-command to roll out. All promise and hope at this point.
Lots of boxes get checked with this sort of program, and it would work better in a setting where the US forces are not viewed as occupiers, or at least immense complicators of daily life. I bet Filipinas or Haitians or Cubans would do great with female-to-female engagement. Patriarchal and ultra-traditional cultures where the Americans are the intruders challenging tradition? Places where US forces are trying to impose ineffective govenance? Not so much.
It's a bad sign that the combatant commanders are talking about adding this sort of capability, as if AFRICOM needs to augment the IO and NGO and local efforts. USAID and NGO's have been producing mixed results at development and reconstruction for years, and it's a delusion to think that the US military can somehow do a better job at this sort of stuff. Makes perfect sense only if you know that U.S. military personnel are conditioned to never give in when charged with a mission, or to admit that some problems can't be solved by Power Point, and "improvise, adapt, and overcome".
Best for all concerned if Marines and soldiers would get back to doing what they're good at: serving as a deterrent force, training for their kinetic missions, closing with the enemy, killing the enemy, securing objectives, ambushing, etc.
If what you are saying is, we will look upon the Corps’ efforts with its FET program the same as we now look upon their implementation of CAP long, long ago . . . that it had some measurable success, but in the end made no difference in war that saw tactics employed in war with no national strategic end game, I will agree.
However, the reality is we are were we are: commanders are confronted with what is in front of them. I can only hope a good commander wouldn’t call for a FET attachment for only politically correct reasons, as opposed to see an actual value of employing them within their capability, which incidentally is not that of human terrain analysis.
As for the Army? They willprobably find a way to lower the standards, and screw it up - they can’t help themselves, though Army has surprised me, and does good things too.
Marines seemed to abide less nonsense than the Army, though they still have a hard time figuring out the civilians. ;-)
While this pointless war drags on toward ever deeper insanity, and since PTSD and suicidal tendencies continue to escalate, recommend another enabling device for the military toolbox: the Suicidal Help Inclusion Team (SHIT). Soldiers (male or female) who are on the verge of losing it, could be outfitted with special vests and inserted deep within enemy lines. Such a team could be a landmark moment to achieving victory!
Haven't we been talking about the importance of talking, teaching, understanding and general rapprochement with the population of Afghanistan?
This is sound and solid, and different; I cannot possibly see how it could hurt the current situation.
Hi Tom
Can you please repost the address of where to apply?
Thanks!
http://www.soc.mil/FET/FET.html
Good Luck!
There is a superb article on this subject along with a pictorial essay in a recent NY Times. There are candid interviews with the NCOs and their officer, a Captain. One surprise was the warmth of their welcome by the men of the house. You can think on that.
You will also learn the reaction of some of the women to direct combat and seeing Marine buddies hit. I'm sure we were seeing the best team available, but it shows the rapport they can achieve. What I saw was brains and guts. Like any Marine, they might have appeared relaxed in their host's home, but their rifles were always within arm's reach.
Tom,
Can someone change the link in the article please?
SOC is calling them FETs now vice CSTs (for whatever reason) and the link has changed as someone else pointed out. At least it will help people find the right page w/o wandering all over the net.
Before I get into the meat of my comments I want to say that I'm not anti-FET or opposed to this kind of work here in Afghanistan.
It's needed, long long past due and I support it.
What is irritating is the fluffish and shallow reporting in this piece.
"Engagement with Afghan women over the past nine years has not been non-existent." Certainly not! But marginal and extremely ad-hoc at best.
"The Defense Department has yet to assign troops specifically for the mission, as opposed to carving the teams out of existing units, or institutionalize the pre-deployment training."
We would do well to take a good close look at the Adviser mission (ETT's, MTTs, etc). This is how it's still being run for the most part. If you doubt me check out the criticism levied by former advisers on SWJ and in the COIN Operations forum on https://forums.bcks.army.mil. They never receive an ASI, no one tracked their skills and their promotion/progression potential is jacked up because of loss of rated command time...
Paula writes, "...greater tactical proficiency is understandably identified as a critical skill because of the isolation, and often higher-threat environment....this elite group also has to demonstrate more advance skills in the areas of tactical questioning, negotiations, analysis of human behavior, marksmanship, tactical movement, basic medical training, combat lifesaver, and other essential skills..."
The website lays it all out when it says that selection is only five days long and the actual training period is between four and six weeks...
No female soldier is going to get greater tactical proficiency and all these advanced skills in four weeks (or even six). This is enough time to get a common baseline of basic skills to help them survive the tour and be at least a bit more than marginal effective.
Unless someone comes into this program with the language skills already they will still need a civilian female with Dari/Farsi or Pashto skills (US contractor or local hire) to help the FET soldiers do more than just "pointy talky".
"ISAF Joint Command recently issued an order which dictates the minimum training, capability and employment of FETs."
IJC cranks out jingle truck loads of stuff daily that most everyone downtrace simply ignores. (Ahh... the perfumed palace! I spent almost two weeks there last fall... What a joke! If the Taliban ever want to cripple ISAF HQ and IJC they will hire the Chinese to write a virus that corrupts any .ppt and pptx file! Oh but I love their chowhalls, the Thai restaurant and the cozy brick dormitories they have there! But I digress...)
"They, too, are trained to understand the nuanced roles of Afghan village shuras, tribal politics, district and provincial governors."
Please enlighten us as to the role of women in relation to village shuras, tribal politics as well as in regards to district and provincial governors.
As far as local women in vast majority of these its, "Get in the kitchen and make us some chai..." It will be rare that FET soldiers are involved in shuras and tribal politics.
In all these years, I can not recall one photo or video on DVIDSHUb or anywhere on the .mil photo sites that showed a female Afghan OR American/Coalition member involved in a shura.
Just to be clear, I HAVE seen a few women from female HTT's or CA units in photos where they are visiting villages but they were outside playing with the kids or in another room or building chatting with the women about their weaving or what not.
"...according to the SOF CST Advisor..."
Who exactly is this unnamed adviser? Is it Ms. Russo? If so then just say it.
The article goes on: "They would have to be physically and mentally fit and agile, surpassing the average Army standards for fitness and aptitude...So, all you athletic, determined ladies out there....there are opportunities to join the CST for...officers and senior enlisted women...."
The published CST/FET prerequisites and requirements state they must be "in grades of: E-4-E-8, O1-O3 or WO1-CW3" and have a "current Army Physical Fitness Test score of 210 with at least 70 points in each event; no profiles, no alternate events"
http://www.soc.mil/CST/Prerequisites%20and%20Requirements.html
Ummm.. SPC, SGT are not exactly senior enlisted... there are quite a few SPC right out of AIT. And 210 aint exactly "studly"... even for the womens APFT scale.
Also Tom could MAJOR Broadwell at least start including some kind of disclosure about her current military affiliation? As Mr Bacon and others have pointed out back in Oct 2010, she is a MAJ in the USAR (MI) and according to her profile on AKO (us.army.mil) she is assigned to one of "those agencies". If you are part of the military and writing or "reporting" about the military it is commonly accepted practice and at provides context to your readers.
Hey, COL Sellin had the decency to include a standard disclaimer: http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=upiUPI-20100823-112700-2345.
But then again he was criticizing IJC's processes and was not on what seems to be a PR campaign for ISAF. Look where that got him.
Being a commissioned officer grants her access to things over here in Afghanistan that other writers and academics don't have a snowballs chance at.
I'll bet you a a large Latte a the Green Bean when she breezes into some TOC somewhere she is sporting a TS/SCI badge and not one that says "PRESS".
While I'm sure she's a great human being and a fantastic MI officer... her failure to openly disclose her military ties in these pieces raises more than a few questions.
I'm find it unlikely that a commissioned officer is going to write an objective and intellectually critical piece that would raise any doubts about the war effort, our progress over here or decisions by certain star wearing leaders.
Tom, the FET teams are needed and going to be helpful but in reading her posts all I can say is your forum is being used as a mouthpiece for these puff pieces.
My units PAO puts out more objective articles (and this almost reads like what the USASOC PAO put out http://www.army.mil/-news/2011/01/22/50679-course-trains-cultural-teams-to-work-with-women-in-theater) and I've seen more balance in Fox News reporting on DADT.
The good MAJ is no "wandering reporter"... she is likely there on the DOD's dime and obviously has some conflicts of interest.
Lets be clear, things are not all that peachy keen over here in our efforts.
MAJ Broadwell would you please:
- include a disclaimer stating your affiliation on future articles,
- and dial down the "happy smoke generator",
- be a little more objective and not just reprint the stock Army Public Affairs lines?
Or would this hurt your chances for LTC and future assignments in the beltway?
If no change then at least stop trying to pass yourself off as a reporter.
You aren't.
You answered your own question about why does the 75th need FET's.
Raids.
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