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Stop Griping and Take Care of Your Soldiers
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Tuesday, February 8, 2011 - 6:47 AM
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What prevents combat trauma? In the same July 1944 article from the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry that I cited the other day, Dr. Herbert X. Spiegel, a psychiatrist assigned to an Army infantry battalion in North Africa in World War II, made these observations:
"Good leadership meant good morale, and this, in turn, meant a low psychiatric casualty rate and good performance...The company commander or platoon leader...saw to it that his men got the best possible food under the circumstances; sent blankets up to them at night if it were at all possible; made every effort to keep them well supplied with water and ammunition; saw to it that promotions were fair; made certain that good work and gallantry were properly recognized; he got mail, news and information to them when possible; and he made sure that violations of rules were treated quickly and fairly. But above all, by these actions, he made his men feel they were not alone, that he was backing them up with everything humanly possible. That, plus technical ability, constitutes a good leader."
Tom again: I think that is about as good a summary I've seen. I'd like to see it quoted in our military manuals on small unit leadership. And I can't think of a more important subject for this blog.
Yet even with good leadership, there clearly are limits. Another reader, Mike F., sent along a link to an Army study of "the old sergeant syndrome" in late World War II-experienced and trusted combat leaders simply falling apart after too much. "When they were evacuated for psychiatric disturbances the matter became of real interest to all from the company commander to the commanding general of the division, for these men were among the best and most effective of the trained and disciplined combat infantry soldiers. These soldiers eventually developed abnormal tremulousness, sweating, and a tendency to be the first to get in and the last to leave a foxhole. They became useless to their unit."
Here's a sample:
CASE 27. A 29-year-old technical sergeant with 30 months' service who had been overseas 21 months and had an aggregate of 310 days of combat was admitted during a rest period after the battle of the Gothic Line. He had been thrice wounded in action. He stated that he began to have abnormal battle reactions 60 combat days previously. He said: "Now if I get in a hole I just want to stay. It bothers me more now than it ever did before. This last battle my company was ordered to take a house, and within a few hundred yards of the place a couple of my boys got their feet blown off. We withdrew and I went to the commanding officer and told him I had a feeling that I was going to get it this time, and that I couldn't take it any more. He gave me a direct order to, and it was either do that or have a bad record, so I went." This soldier had tried on three occasions to have his rank reduced to that of private. "You see," he said, "as a platoon sergeant, you are more often than not a platoon leader, and I couldn't lead the men like I did before. Under shelling I got jittery. A platoon sergeant is a leader. If he isn't out in front it affects the men."
This soldier was born on a ranch in Texas. He stated that his father was epileptic, but that he rarely worried about it and that it had not affected him in any way. His parents were harmoniously married. There were seven children, of which he was next to the oldest. He had a happy family life and had many friends on nearby ranches. No significant neurotic traits or conflicts were elicited in the history. Enuresis, nail biting, temper tantrums, running away from home, nightmares, and somnambulism were all denied. He left home to work on another ranch at the age of 14, after completing the eighth grade, and had been steadily employed as a rancher until induction. He had always been self-reliant and industrious. Single, he had no significant sexual conflicts. His Army career was characterized by steady promotion after his arrival overseas. He stated that he had been held down in the States by a lack of T/O vacancies. A letter from his battalion commander stated: "It is my opinion, through observation, that he has reached the end of endurance as a combat soldier. Therefore, in recognition of a job well done I recommend that this soldier be released from combat duty and be reclassified in another capacity." This battalion commander, incidentally, was noted for his unyielding attitude toward psychiatric casualties.
Firstly, does anyone who contributes to this site believe that a soldier’s knowledge of an escape valve out of combat for psychiatric reasons actually reinforces the propensity for combat fatigue?
Secondly, during WW2 the U. S. Army had a tendency to keep divisions on the battle line for very extended periods of time. In fact the entire logistical and personnel replacement structure of the American Army division was designed around long term persistence in combat.
Rick Atkinson has done some work on this subject in his masterpiece ‘The Day of Battle – The War in Sicily And Italy 1943-1945’. I quote from that source: “The Army Surgeon General concluded that practically all men in rifle battalions who were not otherwise disabled ultimately became psychiatric casualties typically after 200 to 240 days in combat.” General Wm. C. Menninger, states that “There aren’t any iron men, the strongest personality, subjected to sufficient stress a sufficient length of time, is going to disintegrate”.
The German practice was to fight a division until it degraded itself close to the point of ineffectiveness and then withdrew it from the battle line and removing them to the rear for re-equipping, re-manning and extremely robust re-training. This was particularly true for the best infantry, armor and SS divisions. As an example, after the battle of Kursk in which the 1st Panzer Corps was pretty much destroyed the core was removed to France for the reconstruction process. These divisions remained formidable because a core of deep experienced remained which was used to flush out a new rebuilt divisions.
It seems to me that the WW2 American Army division suffered from to distinct failings, first, pre-deployment training was not sufficiently difficult and demanding because it was a numbers game to quickly flesh out divisions. Also, Army divisions (unlike U. S. Marine divisions) were not rotated out of combat frequently to re-construct and re-train, hence an almost limitless accumulation of combat strain. Marines benefited from more demanding pre-deployment training but more importantly while their combat exposure was horribly intense is was of short duration in comparison to ETO Army divisions who were just ground down which has its psychiatric consequences.
I would point-out that under Hitler, refitting commands and reconstituting their ranks, was selectively done, giving priority to the likes of the Waffen SS, as well as a few other most favored organizations, at the expense of most panzer and motorized rifle outfits.
Additionally, unlike our TechSgt, the German soldier had no place to go as desertion or surrender to the Soviet Red Army, didn't hold much better in store for them (anecdotally, whatever happened to all the American deserters in Saigon and to a lesser degree Da Nang?)
What I think may have helped the German soldier along was the German concept of battle school, run by good combat veteran NCO's. Another motivator, no doubt (like the VC/NVA), was assigning indoctrination officers to commands.
The above idle chat-chat aside: when the author doesn’t fathom why the quoted shrink’s analogy of leadership isn’t in any military manuals. I would ask where are the 14 leadership traits, and 11 leadership principles that were the foundation for all leaders (not that everyone practiced them effectively) once upon a time? Did they go the way of the map and compass, having been replaced by something else?
JPWREL,
I tried to formulate an answer to your initial question, but I'm not sure what you are asking. Would you re-phrase for us brain-addled types?
Regarding leadership and combat trauma--at least small unit leadership in WWII--I'm thinking that this is an apples and oranges thing. No amount of clean blankets, hot chow, mail, tobacco, hot coffee, etc., is going to prevent incoming indirect fire, massive in-coming direct fire, friends gone before your eyes, gore body remains of the high explosive kind, and days wondering when you get off the line causes of PTSD symptoms. As Tom's examples show, and thousands of other anecdotal evidence occurances, it may have been but the amount of time in combat factor that causes the (majority) of PTSD injuries.
I believe that I read it in Eisenhower's autobiography of Overlord through capitulation that during the winter of '44-'45, that the US Army was losing an equivelent of a division a day of soldiers for more than wounds and trench foot; psychiatric casualties were extremely high. Was the ETO war just nothing more than an elongated battle of attrition against Germany vice sound strategy and tactics? Did the leadership of that war forge the tactics of Korea and Vietnam--that is, attrition wins regardless of tactics and firepower?
The striking thing about German combat training was the uniform emphasis on the ‘objective’, which allowed parts and pieces of disparate units to come together forming ‘Kampfengruppe’ of combined arms and fight with extraordinary, indeed, disconcerting efficiency from the allies perspective. This process was actually evident in the German Army as early as the mid-part of World War One.
Another element of German combat training that paid large dividends was the selection process for German combat officers that was more discriminating (including a rather intense psychological screening) considered by many as considerably more demanding than for allied junior officers. Such selectivity also meant that the Germans usually had fewer officers per enlisted thus increasing the importance and stature of the NCOs’ which are the heart and soul of the fighting prowess of the unit.
The 11 leadership principles have sadly gone the way of the Dodo bird.
In my day these were mandatory knowledge pieces at that "rockbound highland home," which were committed to verbatim memory.
Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
Be technically and tactically proficient.
Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.
Make sound and timely decisions.
Set the example.
Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being.
Keep your subordinates informed.
Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.
Ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.
Build the team.
Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.
They've been replaced by the craptacular Army Values card, LDRSHIP, which is a terrible mnemonic...redundant in nature and offering little to a soldier/leader to rely upon. I do not know if the old 11 leadership principles are still required at USMA.
The Army has a mildly decent manual for Leadership 6-22 (and an older version 22-100). They both have some excellent examples embedded in them (similar to the Tunisia excerpt), but the material itself is a bit dry and lifeless. (Proving again that book learning only can get you so far).
I've found the old 11 leadership principles to be a great start. Keep em in mind and you can only go half wrong in any endeavor, fail to and you're almost guaranteed to blow it.
Higher quality recruits helped
IIRC, Omar Bartov in his 'Hitler's Army' stated that the German tended to assign higher quality--specifically, more intelligent-- troops to infantry units, which both increased their combat effectivness and helped reduce psychiatric casualties. The US practice was to assign the higher quality draftees/recruits to more technical units, especially the Army Air Corps/Force, with the Infantry getting the majority of the CAT IV/V's.
I have no idea how the IDF handles front-line PTSD now, but it had an excellent program in 1973. My brother, a front-line armored-infantry halftrack gunner in the first IDF battalion to breach the Suez Canl, became a psychlogist solely on the basis of his observatrions of IDF front-line psychologists in action.
As the war of movement in Egypt, around Suez City (I believe) died down, the IDF became embroiled in a medium- to low-intensity war of attrition. Combat units rotated up to the lines and back. When resting in reserve, the troops had access to decent food and mobile canteens. My brother also noted that officers from some headquarters echelon circulated among the resting troops, striking up friendly and apparently random conversations. From time to time, this soldier or that one was given a week of home leave. While taking part in such a conversation, my brother (a corporal) asked what was going on. The officer answered that he was a psycholgist and was routinely screening the troops for signs of "combat fatigue." The leaves were therapeutic in nature.
As I said, my brother found his calling in this. He returned to the States in around 1978 and finished his degree at Penn, then went on to a PhD in psychology at Columbia. While at Columbia, he did his internship at a VA center in Brooklyn. Many of his patients were middle-aged Italian-American bachelors who showed "combat fatigue" symptoms beginning with the death of the mother with whom they were living into their own middle years. From this, my brother came to specialize in--and to help define--what eventually became known as PTSD. As I mentioned, he specializes in it as well as the psychlogical effects of chronic pain (which generates PTSD).
Not to claim a great deal of credit, I find that I, too, have been "treating" PTSD since I ran my first interview on a retired Marine general in 1961, when I was fifteen. Over many years and many books that have validated the travails of combat for veterans who felt no one understood, I have had to stand back as an overload of PTSD in others produced it in me.
I just finished reading Robert Graves's Farewell to All That, a memoir of World War I in an elite British infantry unit. For our purposes, it is a case history of the advent and endurance of PTSD, which Graves describes--and experiences--in all its phases and calls neurasthenia. Especially telling, because it is so rare, is his description of PTSD-induced post-war experiences.
EH, is quite right in that Graves recollection of his time with the Royal Welsh Fusiliers produced something that today's soldiers would quickly recognize irrespective of it’s setting in World War One. This matter of fact narrative is honest in its depictions of battle in that most horrific of wars and definitely does not celebrate the notion of combat in the manner of Ernst Junger. Also, having read just about everything EH has written I can also see how he could never have been unaffected by his innumerable interviews with his veterans.
GST, I was only wondering if allied soldiers having knowledge that a path out of combat exists in the form of psychiatric stress somehow would encourage them to access that route? In the Red Army of WW2 where there was no such avenue the soldier had no choice but to either continue fighting or be shot for cowardice.
As I noted in another PTSD discussion last week, a disease or condition or syndrome doesn't effectively exist until it is defined and named and its symptoms are broadcast. The U.S. Army had no name and thus no policy or treatment for "battle fatigue" until July or August 1943. "Shell shock" existed in the face of unremitting artillery barrage, but "battle fatigue" or "combat fatigue" did not exist in the face of all the other pressures of combat. Graves's neurasthenia, a WWI term, is defined as "nervous breakdown (not in technical use)," which also meant not officially sanctioned by the British Army. (Graves found comfort with a clinician attempting to find a medically accurate definition and treatment.)
If the Red Army never defined or never sanctioned a "combat fatigue" casualty category, the syndrome never existed.
After the 1943 U.S. Army definition was set down, efforts were made to treat it, but the definition was constantly refined and the arrival at a definitive course of treatment shifted with it. As Patton famously demonstrated, combat commanders apparently resisted the diminution in fit-for-duty numbers a defintion and course of treatment imply. They did so during Vietnam, and still do.
As Graves's uncannily sef-aware experiences and descriptions show, the educated officers of his day knew absolutely all anyone ever needed to know about neurasthenia by about 1915, but the British Army had no use for bleeding itself of cannon fodder that wasn't actually bleeding. By late 1916, however, neurasthenic officers were seen as a liability and given leave of the front lines if they felt so inclined and could stay together as trainers and administrators. Enlisted men with gross symptoms remained at the front unless sympathetic and aware officers could arrange transfers to or at least grace tours at depots, etc.
From Organization of the Psychiatric Services in World War II
Colonel Frederick R. Hanson, Medical Corps, USA
"This treatment organization (Battalion Aid Station to Regiment to Division) is based upon the principle that early and continuous treatment of the psychiatric disorders of combat is mandatory if maximum therapeutic efficiency is to be achieved. It must be the aim of the psychiatric services not only to return as many men as possible to effective combat duty, but also to provide the optimum type of therapy for those who cannot be returned to combat duty, and thus minimize the effects and duration of the neurotic process in such patients."
"...With the assignment of psychiatrists to the divisions in combat (October 1943), the percent of combat neurosis cases returned to full combat duty rose to 60, and afterward varied from 45 to 70."
LtCol Grossman: "During World War II, 504,000 men were lost from America's combat forces due to psychiatric collapse--enough to man 50 divisions. The United States suffered this loss despite efforts to weed out those mentally and emotionally unfit for combat by classifying more than 800,000 men 4-F (unfit for military service) due to psychiatric reasons. At one point in World War II, psychiatric casualties were being discharged from the U.S. Army faster than new recruits were being drafted in."
Possibly (only) 21,000 US deserted in the ETO so going through the medical system, was the avenue off the line.
With what unit was Spiegel located?
Not to sound too narrowly focused, but given my current research interest in all things 34th Infantry "Red Bull" Division, but I wonder if anyone has any insights as to the unidentified (from what I can tell) infantry battalion with which Spiegel was located in Tunisia?
Hopefully, my question goes beyond Red Bull Trivial Pursuit, and potentially toward contrasts/comparisons with the respective WWII and OEF/OIF National Guard experiences regarding PTSD resources.
After a couple of hours of digging on the Internet, the 90-percent answer is that Spiegel was likely part of the 1st Infantry Division's assault into Oran, rather than the 34th Infantry Division's movement toward Algiers. It was the "Big Red One," not the "Red Bull."
That said, Spiegel's career is rather fascinating. Turned out to be a prominent researcher and popularizer of hypnosis. Even touches on the book and movies "Sybil," which centered on an apparent sufferer of multiple-personality disorder.
More info collected here, for the good of the cause:
http://www.redbullrising.com/2011/02/sometimes-you-get-bull.html
This unusual WW2 docu-drama covers a lot of ground, ought to be required viewing, along with 'Best Years of Our Lives'
I was never in the military (and yes I know it shows). But I learned this from watching Band of Brothers (then reading the book by Stephen Ambrose). The difference between the leadership capabilities of Captain Winters as opposed to Lieutenant Dyke.
Here is an aspect of PTSD induced by long immersion in combat. Or life. Call it PTSD+.
Someone close to you dies and your brain takes you directly to the human grief cycle, an invariable continuum of anger followed by denial followed by bargaining followed by depression followed by acceptance. To endure the cycle is to be human.
A soldier in your unit is killed, but you cannot lay down your pack for the human grief cycle, because your attention is focused on survival. Days pass, then weeks. Others die or are evacuated. You're scared most of the time, but you cannot even begin a grief cycle to deal with that fear, or personal injuries or bad food or not enough sleep or unremitting danger.
It adds up. Your unit is rotated for a rest. Maybe your leaders give you a little leeway to act out. But you're still under military discipline; there are limits. It isn't manly to cry or express grief. Everyone around you is on edge, but no one breaks omerta, no one dares to risk his manhood for a visit to people who can help empty the hurt locker. Then it's back to the field. String it all together for a year and get home to find that your wife has come undone, has ruined your credit, has forgotten how to be a mother much less a wife. You need to stand down, but your duty is to stand up and stand in and stand tall.
Most long-term untreated PTSD cases have at least an element of impacted grief--of never having completed only one grief cycle, much less accumulated grief cycles to include every situation for which a "strong" person has not cut himself appropriate, which is to say mandatory, slack.
PTSD is a virus that is carried in everyday events. Impacted grief is what happens when you don't or can't allow nature's own medicine to heal even everyday traumas. It's accumulated, unresolved PTSD.
PTSD and impacted grief are treatable. The success rate is extremely high in this day and age. But treatment is not to be taken at home.
I agree with all you have stated, but please explain or elaborate on your last sentence. My personal experience hasn't followed that course for the success in treatment that I have encountered, if I understand your meaning.
All I'm really saying is to seek treatment at the hands of a pro who's up on what works best.
BTW, a quick and dirty test for the presence of a PTSD is simply being honest about whatever you might be unreasonably avoiding, and the degree to which you're avoiding it. If, as happened to a lot of people around San Francisco after the big 1989 earthquake, you suddenly can't drive across a bridge you've always crossed without being nervous, you are probably in the grip of PTSD. If you suddenly must drive from San Francisco to Oakland via San Jose, it's definitely time to see a pro.
I think you have hit on some very good points, maybe unintentionally. I understand the Oakland Bay Bridge scenario. PTSD, as I've stated in previous posts needs to be documented as a diagnosis by those who are trained to do so. Psychology is difficult; the symptoms of a condition need to be fully analyzed to render a diagnosis. But even professionals make different diagnostic determinations. Hence people like me exist to fight the war of legal words with the VA to provide the benefits that a veteran needs to receive. I have read thousands of medical records in my work since 1987--there has been so much change since then in diagnostic interpretations and labels confounded by what the VA can and will do in the claims and appeals process.
There are far too many in the psychiatric/pschologic realm who haven't had the "in-the-trenches" experience to fully understand what veterans have experienced. I respect the education that they receive to get the diploma but experience trumps. Your brother, with his combat history, is an extreme asset to the field. Prior to 9/11, there were not many combat vets turned school trained psychiatrists in the VA system. I remember one in particular, a Vietnam Marine combat veteran psychiatrist, who worked at the Albany VAMC, that made the most sense of 'what it is' than anyone I had encountered to date. Today, with so many psyche wounded troops that have come back, the system is breaking down, too many patients, not enough trained professionals to analyze, and far too few who are veterans themselves. I hope for a positive outcome of the combat zone veterans returing. and the new post-9/11 GI bill, that more field experienced veterans will enter the profession.
But in regard to treatment, and with my own situation in mind, I'm still convinced that the best therapist of a vet in trouble with a psyche injury, is another veteran. I don't believe that I have PTSD myself even though while on active duty I lost in an aircraft carrier deployment (so called peace-time) 24 of my compatriots--a percentage that might have caused a combat unit to be pulled off "the line". That year tour pain stayed with me for years, but I existed on. When my son died in combat, it took another Marine--not the 5 psychiatric dudes I saw over a 3 year period--to screw my head back on. I can look back and laugh a bit; when I was a young Marine Captain, I never had a clue that my best friend would be a Marine Sergeant Major who started out as my CACO but became part of my family. The best help a veteran can receive is that of another veteran, I'm convinced. Its a practice that I do in my daily work. Match up vets with vets. No appointments, no psychotropic meds (beer in hand is allowed if warranted), no stress, no BS--just vet and vet venting in their own lingo.
Stay tough Eric and keep telling the good stories that you do.
SF
I wrote about this a few years back:
Combat fatigue is an important topic mostly ignored in professional military education. Units involved in serious combat can expect to lose as many men to combat related mental problems as from physical injuries. Just a few minutes of intense combat make many men dysfunctional, especially if they already suffer from a lack sleep, rest, warmth, or food. While fleeing toward the rear is one symptom, others include uncontrolled shaking, crying, or jumping up and down and screaming. Some soldiers turn into unresponsive zombies, which became known as the "thousand yard stare" during World War II (below). Sergeants yelling to "snap out of it" does little good.
The best treatment is to evacuate such soldiers to a rear area where they are fed hot chow, allowed to sleep in a warm bed, then allowed to shower and shave and eat hot chow again. This cures most problems if they are quickly returned to their unit at the front. If they are allowed to linger in the rear longer, they begin to feel guilty about failing in combat and fearful of being called a coward if they return. They also begin to recall horrible experiences and may refuse to move. Therefore, idle time must be avoided: eat, sleep, clean, eat and then a brief consultation with a medical officer who assures them that combat fatigue is common and a truck is waiting to take them back to their buddies at the front. There may be some reluctance, but with assurances from a medical doctor and maybe some stern words from a sergeant, back the front they go, less than 24 hours after they became dysfunctional.
While combat fatigue affects some soldiers quickly, it will affect most all soldiers over time. Competent brave soldiers with years of combat experience often break down from accumulated stress. This was illustrated by the character Sergeant Olio in the great movie "Go Tell the Spartans" and by the chief mechanic in the great movie "Das Boot." Most all soldiers feel they are special and will survive untouched, but soldiers involved in months of heavy combat eventually realize they will die or end up maimed for life, usually after one of their buddies suffers that fate. This is why the US Army Air Corps promised bombers crews during World War II that they only had to fly 25 dangerous missions before returning home.
One study during World War II showed that after 90 days of combat action, 98% of soldiers showed signs of combat fatigue, the other 2% were sociopaths. This is why it is important to pull entire units off the line for a couple days or a couple weeks depending on the combat intensity and hardships associated with food quality and weather conditions. During World War II, the US Marine Corps developed a rotation technique so that frontline infantrymen spent no more than 48 hours in direct combat with the enemy.
The problem with sociopaths is never discussed within the US military because it is not understood. Sociopaths have a mental condition in which death and destruction excites ... http://www.g2mil.com/fatigue.htm
And here are more thoughts:
....the US Army encountered difficulties during World War II in close terrain like cities and forests where offensives stalled because frontline soldiers were left in close combat for days. Mental casualties became as common as physical injuries as most grunts eventually stumbled to the rear. They were replaced by new grunts who arrived to find a mixture of other confused green troops and veterans in near shock, known as the "thousand yard stare." The Army eventually pulled units out of the line to regroup, but most divisions never developed a method of maintaining a grinding offensive momentum.
In the Pacific, US Marine Corps assaults into island fortifications taught them to develop a rotational system. The basic model is the infantry battalion square; two companies forward, two behind them, with the battalion headquarters and support elements in the middle. Two rifle companies fight and advance for 48 hours, then the two rear companies move forward to relieve them in place. The two fatigued companies move to the rear to eat hot chow, "use" toilet paper, receive medical care for minor injuries, hopefully get a few beers, then sleep. The next day its more hot chow, weapons cleaning, bathing and more sleep. These rearward companies also provide the battalion with defense-in-depth should the enemy mount a counterattack and punch through a forward company.
http://www.g2mil.com/infantrysquare.htm
And let me add that one of the biggest mistakes our military made in recent years was to eliminate messmen and go to MREs and civilian run mess halls. This is okay for light COIN duty, but troops need hot chow once a day in combat, and Paki messmen are not going to haul hot chow up to forward areas in combat. Today's Generals just send up MREs, and say "suck on this." Civilian messmen will not pick up rifles to fight commandos or help repel an enemy offensive either.
When I was in the game, I pushed for the Corps Prep-po ships to include half Class A rations (canned foods) rather than just 30 days of MREs. The bean counters (or now MRE counters) rejected the idea. Another problem with civilian mess halls is that when large units deploy, the mess halls back home stay open, and hundreds of civilians are still paid to sit around until the troops return.
Again CMEYERGO you have no frame of refrence...all BCTs and Line Battalions have cooks along with MKTs (google it) assigned to them. On COPS, FOBS, etc... that are away from the main FOBs have these cooks actually cook (along with other tasks such as slingload operations). I am guessing you have heard of Mermites, yep, they are still used to deliver hot chow to the troops at TCPs and so forth...any good PSG or 1SG will ensure that this happens if as you say "the Generals just send up MREs."
As far as chow halls staying open, depends if there are units still in the rear...and yes, most units have rear-detachments that must feed Soldiers that have not deployed. Feel free to visit a post and see how it actually works...you say you were in the game, but it sounds like it has been a long time, the rules have changed. Its great to have an opinion, but an informed one is always better.
Your BCT may vary; "Cooks Not Included"
I'll not argue that I know How It Is In the Army Now, but I can comment on things I've seen recently in the field. My former colleagues in a National Guard IBCT were explicitly called up without cooks on their manning documents. In other words, their units did not deploy with the capacity to feed and cook for themselves.
Post-mobilization, meals at National Training Center were contracted. When commanders attempted to exercise ration-cycle flexibility, they found themselves burning through MREs faster than forecast, without the ability to increase/shift hot meals due to the constraints of the 2-hots-a-day contracts locked into place. See the "pirate" story at: http://www.redbullrising.com/2010/11/more-notes-from-logistical-battlefield.html
In this veterans opinion, I'll agree that small, practical measures such as hot meals would anecdotally seem to support mental or emotional wellness. I'll also observe that "cold" meals--or hot meals promised and not delivered--would seem to drag down morale and wellness.
That said, however, I'd love to see more quantified/qualified data on the topic!
This is mission dependent. Many units are able to get by using the contracted services in country. This carries with it significant loss of flexibility, but as always good planning can usually alleviate that problem. Sometimes they had more flexibility than 'normal cook' operations.
Who can't remember the days of linkup at the Logistics Release Point and the importance of making sure everyone makes it back to the LRP in time to cart mermites back to the field trains etc. Sigh.
Anecdotally, my unit took our cooks and then hid them. Many had to be cross-levelled to man gun trucks as were Support Platoon members, mortarmen, etc. - and they were trained accordingly from the outset. Upon arrival in country we were told, give em up. Their respective duties were to supervise and assist the contracted staff in the chow halls, but not actually cook themselves. We gave up a token NCO and kept the others hidden because we had to fulfill the guntruck priority.
I thought the messhall mission was a bit of a waste of resources, but I ultimately recognized that "hey that's what cooks do. And they like it." Later we allowed one of the cook/gunners to return because things weren't working out on the road for him. Consulting with each of them we determined that most preferred gunning on the road to sitting in a chow hall but not cooking. Like all things, they varied by soldier and personality.
In the end for my mission I would have preferred to have had a requisite number of trained scouts/infantrymen and not filled the mess mission at all, but we did what we had to with the resources available.
I'll note also that in about 9 months of BOG I think I ate exactly one MRE. I think, but don't know, that my boys probably didn't eat many more than I. They were stocked to the gills everytime they went on the road with gatorade, rip-its and water, they had a operational reserve of MREs in their load plan. But the ready availability of mess hall food, and prepackaged junk Jimmy Dean-type meals (that was free) and PX fare (which was not free) made up for anthing they lacked.
Again mission dependent, because every day (we operated at night) these guys were hunkered down on a FOB somewhere.
...I forgot to mention the absolutely obscene (but much appreciated) amount of junk food received in packages from home.
I'm serious when I say we had more than we could ever use. A full-length table in our HQs dayroom was literally covered from the day we came to the day we left. And this was just the stash for the field grades and our drivers. Crystal light, Gatorade, candy, etc. etc. Just crazy amounts. We tried our own Influence operations by giving stuff away to the Iraqis, their kids. Seemed to work out well.
I never drank a Rip-it, but my guys seemed to have exchanged their blood for the stuff. If I never have another Gatorade I will die happy. (It is a necessary evil). I mostly resorted to the sugar free Crystal Light - or my waistline would have exploded commensurately.
Final war food story. My soldiers and I were ecstatic to return home to our Demobilization station and find eggs to order (with runny yolks) available. In theater you can get an omelet or fried hard. Sometimes it's the little things you miss the most.
Back on topic, yes chow is important. Always has been always will be. But there's lots of options that go beyond the hot A or MRE continuum. T-rats? Joe rarely goes without these days.
To this conversation of Leadership and PTSD/Mental Health of veterans is the blog entry of "Michael C.", his blog "On Violence. This is his story published in VAntage-the VA blog:
http://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/?p=1339
The comments at the end are extremely pertinent to Tom's post. Worth the read.
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May/June 2013
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