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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Friday, February 4, 2011 - 7:49 AM
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The well-read Ike Skelton, who recently retired as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, dropped by CNAS earlier this week for a chicken salad and a talk about what was on his mind. During his 34 years in Congress, the Trumanesque Democrat paid a lot of attention to professional military education, so I was struck by his criticism -- unsolicited -- of the armed services' senior colleges.
"I have a concern that the war colleges need to sharpen their pencils in education, as opposed to training," he said. He especially worries, he added, about whether the military's strategic thinkers were being detected, groomed, and protected. "My question to the commandants of the war colleges is this: How many students that you are graduating this year could sit down and have a serious discussion with George C. Marshall? The last time I asked that question, the answer was 'three or four.' The challenge is recognizing who they are." He also said he thought the war colleges should be more rigorous, "just as difficult as any law school in the nation." Anyone who lately has dropped by the golf course at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, knows that that would raise the bar considerably.
Some of his other thoughts:
--"You may see a real donnybrook" in the Congress over the defense budget, especially, he said, especially as the inclinations of the House and Senate seem to be diverging.
--The fallout from Egypt?: "The big winner in all this is going to be Iran." (I didn't get a chance to ask him to say more about that prediction.)
--He is deeply concerned by a lack of understanding between the military and American society. "Those who protect us are psychologically divorced from those who are being protected."
At last and for once I find myself in happy agreement with a real live Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. One little point worth making is that Tom Rick’s hero and in many ways mine Gen. George C. Marshall was always a much better administrator (note Churchill’s spot on tribute to him as the ‘Organizer of Victory’) than he ever was a great strategist. His boss Franklin D. Roosevelt’s strategic intuition was both more sophisticated and often pragmatic than Marshall’s.
Marshall was always very luckily he worked for a CIC who respected the King, Marshall, Arnold triumvirate and would leave virtually all matters pretty much in their good hands except for the very great military decisions that had an important political context. Had Marshall worked for Churchill who minded everybody else’s business he would have exploded in rage and likely demanded a transfer to the front. Easily the very greatest strategist of the western allies in World War Two never wore a uniform and sat in a wheelchair.
I agree that Roosevelt (and Churchill) were great strategists. But I also think Marshall had good strategic understanding, and was never put to the test because those two had a firm grasp of strategy, and anway the basic U.S. strategy already was developed when he took office at Army chief of staff on September 1, 1939.
Thanks,
Tom
One more thing, what do the service war colleges provide that could not be provided by our more elite university systems? It seems to me that the thinking and analytical skills taught in war college could just as easily be taught at a Stanford, Harvard or MIT where Skelton seemingly believes the academic demands are more rigorous?
Up front: I'm a creature of National, student and faculty.
Others have noted and I share this view that much of the value of the year of senior service college comes from one's fellow students: "This would be a good year if all we did was get this bunch together to think about defense."
Ike Skelton has been the Godfather of these schools for years, intruding little and allowing a measure of academic freedom unusual in what is essentially a military venue (State also sponsors National).
The graduates who have gone on to excel in their own careers made connections, developed ideas, and forged understandings of the other Services and elements of government in the open atmosphere of these colleges that served them well in higher postings. The particular mix of student backgrounds is an essential element of the experience and could not be replicated at a civilian institution. And the exposure students get to the way policy is formed and decisions made is unique.
Indeed, the entire experience is unique. Here's extract from an email I got recently from a current National student: "In the past two weeks we've had Clinton advisor Paul Begala, the executive editor of WaPo, and John Yoo (the "torture memo" lawyer); tomorrow we have David Brooks and Harry Reid!" That's the steady diet at these schools and I don't think you'll find that many other places.
Rigor is more or less up to the student. those who decide to golf the year away can figure out how to do so; those who take it as opportunity have encouragement, resources, and academic assistance to do serious work. You've got to remember that even in prestigious and elite institutions such as these ... half the students are below average (and with three years total at National I can say that the distinction between the two halves is visible and striking; perhaps I'm reinforcing Skelton's point).
Last point: there's been much lament lately that Army in particular is downplaying PME for its fast-trackers. I would note that as yet another sign that My Favorite Army is as screwed up as Hogan's Goat.
I didn't get a chance to ask him, but I was wondering if former Rep. Skelton was aware of the British's Higher Command and Staff Course which attempts to identify individuals who would make good strategic thinker's early, and if he had any thoughts on if that would be a good model for the U.S. war colleges to follow. Anyone know how successful that program is and thoughts about how it might be used by the U.S.?
It's good to see the Chairman make the distinction between training and education. I spend a lot of time making that same distinction to my subordinates (and superiors given the chance). The "what to think" versus "how to think" conundrum has been in evidence my whole career. The Army recognizes the need for both, but is much more comfortable with the former, and tends to under resource the latter.
CGSC was supposed to be an educational experience, and there was far more open discussion and cross-fertilization of ideas then I had yet experienced in any other Army setting, but the formal curriculum was still very much of the "this is how we do it and you should to" school of thought. Of course in 2004, the one thing that almost everyone agreed with was that we had no idea what we were doing, but we still learned how to staff a plan for a river crossing operation.
I didn't do SAMS, but my peers tell me they were very much required to think through problems, and yes, they actually had to read the classics. However, when I was a planner, I watched my SAMS peers get regularly ridiculed for over thinking problems. I was ridiculed as well, but that was because I am an MI puke and we are contrarian by both nature and doctrine.
If I had to sum up the single biggest problem with the mid to senior level officer corps, it is that we often lose sight of the fundamentals and keep coming up with new and excessively complex substitutions for what amounts to very simple ideas. Instead of “Duty, Honor, Country” we now have the “7 Army Values” which happen to spell out “LDRSHIP.” Instead of “Mission First, People Always” we know have ARFORGEN and resiliency training.
Even when we know the fundamentals, we don’t take them to heart. Instead of “Know the terrain, the enemy and yourself,” we have the MDMP process which, as generally executed (if at all), foists the terrain and enemy onto the “2” and the rest of the staff gets on with coming up with a plan in a vacuum.
Many of these problems are holdovers from the pre-9/11 Army. Downrange, Intel really does “drive operations” in a way that was only lip service 10 years ago. Having said that, nobody gets promoted or selected for command based upon their knowledge of the terrain or the enemy. They are selected for command based upon their ability to lead and manage an Army Organization.
Army Force Generation is not a slogan, its a process. It changd how we used to have a tiered level of readiness of units (82nd/101st at tier 1, random NG unit at tier 5). Now all units have aspecific window of when they will be ready for deployment, be they a BCT from Fort Bragg or a Support Battalion in the reserves. ARFORGEN also assists with how units are manned, when they will be at 100% strenght, etc...
I guess my point is your analogy is way off, or you don't understand what ARFORGEN is and how the army works.
On MDMP; first we don't have the MDMP process, we have MDMP ( the last P is for process, much like its not ATM Machine, its an ATM). MDMP, or JOPP if you ever get to the joint world is a way to solve a problem. To quote a former boss of mine "Regardless of the complexity, however, combat is simply a problem, and the MDMP is a method of deciding how to use available resources to solve the tactical problem at hand."
Decision making is solving problems, and right now the best/most proved method we have is MDMP/JOPP. Thatr being said, MDMP is as useful as you make it. Staff inexperience with it can combat its effectivness. Your right, a good JIPOE is not just a 2 problem, but I would argue that is more of a problem of tht staff that just puts it on the 2.
Finally, I would add that as you move up in the military (levels of command, not rank), and get to work on COCOM or JTF staffs, you will learn that when time is minimal, and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) is the flavor of the day, MDMP/JOPP provide the structure to work with to solve the problem at hand.
Soldiersdiary usually you and I agree. What you say about ARFORGEN is technically correct. But ARFORGEN hasn't and won't function correctly. It's broken and will remain thus probably until we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan. A broken process is no process at all.
I was not defending the ARFORGEN, just describing it. Your right, as of now it does have its problems, but that is more related to the sheer number of deployed troops. When we draw down OEF, we are going to have a system of readiness, and I would argue that the ARFORGEN system is better than the tiered sytem of readiness that we used to have.
Asa NG Soldier, perhaps you can tell us how under the tiered system, when it came to equippong and training, you would rarly recive what active duty units would get (from M4s, NTC/JRTC rotations, etc), and now as we operationize the Reserves and Guard, the reidness levels are much better than they were. Perfect, of course not, but better.
SD- the NG experience varied of course, but for a pre-ARFORGEN enhanced readiness brigade, both CTC rotations and M4's were available. My personal observation is that equipment was often issued to NG enhanced brigades before it was fully issued to active units. The non-enhanced units on the other hand were a different story.
...about USAWC, the less excited I am to go there.
Each class is 300 students at Carlisle and you're telling me only 1% of that is capable of carrying on a worthwhile conversation with Marshall? That tells me you really aren't preparing the GOs you need for the future, or you're sending far too many people to the school (which is probably true anyway).
I aspire to a fellowship at one of those rigorous universities mentioned by JPWREL (yes they exist) where I'll actually learn something. Since I have to leave my civilian occupation and my family for most of a year I want it to be a worthwhile experience. [BTW I bet they aren't that rigorous either but they offer that opportunity for those that want it.]
I need another degree like I need another hole in the head, and I loathe golf and softball (which appears to be a mandatory event) and most other things that pass as 'officer pasttimes.' [Note: I am physically fit and exercise regularly, just not much for team sports and other mandatory fun. Never have been, never will]
So I'll go out on that limb again and say - sure shut half of them down. 4 x WCs is probably 2 too many. Expand the 2 left and send the overflow to universities. Gets more fresh ideas in the force, and cross-pollinates across that civil-military divide we keep groaning about.
I volunteer to be the first to try this experiment.
[P.S. Skelton didn't retire, he wasn't re-elected. Damn shame that, he had lots of experience at HASC]
“He is deeply concerned by a lack of understanding between the military and American society. Those who protect us are psychologically divorced from those who are being protected."
As a Marine Reservist who served in Iraq and is currently deployed to Afghanistan, I have a different perspective than Congressman Skelton. I would argue that “those who are protected are psychologically divorced from those who are the protectors.”
The divide concerns me as well. The sheepdog always seeks to understand the flock he protects. The protected flock rarely seeks to understand the motives of their protectors.
I can relate to all the everyday issues of the “average American”. How many “average Americans” can say that about a service member? Not many and those few who can are likely to have served or have family members who have served.
Perhaps Mr. Skelton’s comments are directed at our senior leadership. Someone with eagles or stars on their shoulders maybe more removed from Joe Citizen than those of us with chevrons on our arms.
That being said, I don’t see a “lack of understanding” from company level, field grade officers, NCO’s or SNCO’s. I am not sure how much expose Mr. Skelton had to junior officers or enlisted service members.
Monk.
P.S. It is late here. Please forgive any typos.
Bald Monk,
Referring to yourself as the sheepdog, and the rest of society as the flock, only reinforces Mr. Skelton's point about the divide between the military and the rest of the nation. The military is a job that we volunteered for, and we should not raise our nose at others who do not understand what military service is like. You only get that from experience. Unfortunately, this is the dominant POV in the military today.
The onus is on those who serve
“those who are protected are psychologically divorced from those who are the protectors.”
No business ever made progress by blaming its customers and, in a democratic country, no military does well attacking the citizens being protected. But if one wanted to illustrate the grandiose and arrogant isolation of those serving from those served, this statement could start the discussion.
Hunter: 5 senior service colleges, not 4.
I must respectfully disagree with you. I too am/was a Marine Reservist, though I'm retired now. I think reservists like you, coming from the civilian community, of course do have an understanding of the civilian society. But from what I have seen and experienced, the professional military (the "regulars") are so removed from society (living on self-contained bases, shopping at the Commissary, sending their kids to school on base or in the garrison town, etc.) that they definitely feel themselves to be in a separate world. And many think of themselves as the noble warriors protecting society despite the unappreciative and undeserving civilians and politicians, the low-life. Certainly it's true that in the AVF world that we live in, the civilian world by and large doesn't understand the military, though they have heaped praise and monetary benefits on the AVF (when I joined the Marines as an E-1, my pay was $78 a month). But the isolation of today's AVF threatens, in my opinion, to give rise to a separate military caste that our ancestors used to accuse Prussia of having.
But that doesn't change the facts
Trying to find a news story in the media about the military these days, unless you go looking is nearly impossible, except the negative stuff. The civilian world can not understand what it is told nothing about.
I keep trying but I can't count to 5
USAWC, USNWC, USAFWC, and NDU (which I suppose you could split into two National and ICAF) is that where you got 5 or am I really missing one?
Hunter: several schools and other activities comprise NDU. The 5 senior service colleges are Army, Air Force, Naval, National, and ICAF. T'were ever thus...
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/Pages/MCWAR%20New.aspx
War Pig Skelton Bought and Paid for by War Industry
Top 5 Contributors, 2009-2010, Campaign Cmte
Contributor Total Indivs PACs
General Dynamics $60,900 $50,900 $10,000
Lockheed Martin $44,000 $34,000 $10,000
Northrop Grumman $30,660 $20,660 $10,000
Boeing Co $28,900 $18,900 $10,000
Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP $22,576 $12,576 $10,000
...view more data
Top 5 Industries, 2009-2010, Campaign Cmte
Industry Total Indivs PACs
Lawyers/Law Firms $227,986 $134,085 $93,901
Defense Aerospace $159,350 $62,350 $97,000
Misc Defense $137,561 $47,561 $90,000
Defense Electronics $125,900 $61,400 $64,500
Lobbyists $96,430 $87,570 $8,860
"While this Subcommittee will not propose revolutionary changes as the Skelton Panel did,the current PME system should be improved to meet the country’s needs of today and tomorrow.Twenty years ago, the U.S. military was educating officers to engage Cold War adversaries. Clearly,
much about our military and our world has changed since then, and we know that much will continue to change as we look to the future. PME, therefore, must remain dynamic. It must respond to present needs and consistently anticipate those of the future. It must continuously
evolve in order to imbue service members with the intellectual agility to assume expanded roles and to perform new missions in an ever dynamic and increasingly complicated security environment.
Other requirements are enduring and must be preserved."
Extract: U.S. House of Representatives • Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations April 2010
Link to the Report: http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/SACS1/PME/HASC%20PME%20Report%202010.pdf
This report caused some angst in the world of PME. NDU commissioned another study at the Joint Forces Staff College that had some critical findings and recommendations. (retired 3 star and civilians on the panel) As expected the school rebutted this report quickly.
Might be worth looking into faculty recruiting and hiring practices. Some of the faculty are getting their "Joint Credit" while serving as faculty....no previous joint experience.....many of the Title 10 civilians are hired directly from the retiring faculty base. This can not be healthy in the long run
Skelton's Bread is buttered in Blood
Top 20 US Defense Industry Congressional Donees, 2010
Ike Skelton (D-MO) $365,011
Richard C Shelby (R-AL) $279,850
Howard P “Buck” McKeon (R-CA) $274,150
Daniel K Inouye (D-HI) $197,750
Patty Murray (D-WA) $166,650
Jim Moran (D-VA) $162,450
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) $153,000
Richard Burr, (R-NC) $149,200
War pigs Skellton should move to Iraq and work in Iraqi hospitals cleaning bed pans of those he mutilated. A pure war criminal.
An odd choice of words for the lead paragraph
"Recently retired as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee"? Voted out of office or failed of re-election would be more accurate.
Mr. Skelton seems to me a thoughtful man, but his retirement was not the voluntary one implied by the post. His constituents showed him the door. Like most defeated Congressmen and Senators, it does not appear his future involves going back home to his home state.
Congress has long been derelict in many aspects of its oversight role for the Armed Forces. This bipartisan failing suggests to me that one ought to take with a pinch of salt whatever any senior, defeated politician says about how to reform the services. If what he says now is such a good idea, why wasn't it accomplished on his watch, which ended only last month? It's not like he didn't have a chance to get things done during his 34 years in Congress.
There is merit to what you say.
. . . .and, the congressman's line about Iran coming out the big winner in all this is a no brainer, and I doubt Tom Ricks could have gotten much more had the opportunity arisen to ask. Lastly, and for my amusement, as I purposely haven’t looked at Skelton’s voting record, but I’ll bet apples to oranges, the guy voted to invade Iraq - tell I’m wrong?
Incidentally, that list that included "The Art of War?" Anytime you see it listed exclusive of "The Seven Military Classic of Ancient China" be suspect as to someone else adding it in.
Maybe obvious to those with expertise Mr. T, but life has lots of turnovers. France was the big winner in the American Revolution, but lovely Marie Antoinette lost her head to the French follow-on, and surviving nobles took refuge with English enemies. So let's not stop hoping that the little guy gets his smile adjusted.
I did hear that the bloody Iran regime executed more in Jan. 2011 than any previous month, by a large margin. 70 or so, mostly 'enemies' on trumped up charges. They're using the distraction of int'l media and govts towards Egypt to terrorize the Iran opposition, without international approbation. Iran, like the revolutionary French, have been quick to kill and imprison former leaders from their own movement. Winners become losers.
Bani Sadr led and died early on, and Ayatollahs have been killed and tortured, by both Khomeini and Khameini. Khomeini even killed the guy who once promoted him to ayatollah-ship, that rank effectively saving his life from the Savak's final solution. Kinda DQ's both of them from saint-hood, in my book.
We often lose sight of the fact that the lead opposition candidates and major supporters that were 'cheated' in the 2009 Iran election kerfuffle previously held top positions in the revolutionary gov't.
@KRS
I am not sure why you construe my comment about sheep dogs and sheep as arrogant that was not my intent.
The point of my post to point out that most people who haven’t served or had family member in the military have very little understanding of the issues facing our military.
As service members we are citizens first and Marines/Soldiers/Sailors/Airmen/Coast Guardsmen second. All service members can relate to the everyday issues most American deal with but the reverse is not true.
@FG42
I agree with you there is a greater degree of separation between some Active Duty folks and the general public than there is between those most of us serving in the Guard or Reserve. However I don’t believe that separation is all that great. Where it does exist it is mostly among the long serving careerists.
Most folks in the military serve only a single enlistment and not a career. The vast majority of those few who do make it a career spend only 20 or so years in the service. That is a not a life time. Whether it is a single 4 year hitch or a 20 year career, our time in the service ends. I don’t believe that living on base or shopping on the commissary leads to isolation from the general public.
Yes, our service does entitle us to a few special benefits such as limited job protection during our service (Reserve/Guard only), additional hiring considerations for certain federal jobs (post career), and health care for service related issues. Many public sector jobs have better retirement benefits than the military and none those jobs will send a person to Iraq or Afghanistan. None of those service related benefits come close to make using a special or protected caste of American society. I believe the very nature of our AFV ensures that our military will never become a special caste in society.
I suspect the typical service member relates better to the Joe Citizen than your average Congressmen but that is just a catty comment and not germane to this discussion. :-)
Hopefully that with the repeal of DADT, the ending of separation between the academic world and the military will be an important first step to the rest of American society gaining a greater understanding her military service members.
Yes, I agree with you that there is need for more mutual understanding. Certainly if more Americans served in the military, there would be more understanding in both directions. And I think the Media can do better. There is a lot of media coverage of the military, but too much of it is simply more PTSD stories and naive articles of the "everybody is a hero" variety. Anyway, I'm starting to ramble. Good luck on your tour, and don't forget to duck. Semper Fi!
...and check 6.
Thank you for your well wishes. I am not a grunt this time around so I am pretty safe. My job as a Personnel Retrieval and Processing (Mortuary Affairs) liaison is a sad duty but it is not a dangerous one. I do get a great deal of personal satisfaction being part of the team that returns our fallen to their families.
Gold Star Father, nothing I can say will lessen your grief but I would like to assure you that all of us treat all of our fallen brothers and sisters with dignity, reverence and respect.
While I disagree with Mr. Skelton's premise I do think it is a topic worthy of some thoughtful discussion and open dialogue. Perhaps Mr. Ricks will follow up on the Congressman’s comments in a future post.
Monk
An Army War College grad's thoughts...
I graduated in 2010. I must say it was the single best year of thinking I've done in the military. I often told civilians who asked that it was best viewed as a "highly programmed sabbatical." The seminar discussion with a wide variety of U.S. national security professionals and international senior leaders NEVER arrived at a single position. I learned that the easy problems are solved well before they get to us and often, our challenge is arriving to the least bad/risk/etc...often thinking of 2nd, 3rd order effects of our decisions. I tell people this totally changed my paradigm of thinking from the operational to the strategic and one example here in Afghanistan bore this out.
Sitting with a visiting VIP in Afghanistan were several AWC COLs and as many SAMS grad MAJs. As our VIP pondered how this might be "won" , the SAMS grads kept talking campaign design, how to achieve end-state...they were totally convinced they could come up with the right combination of inputs to derive the desired outcome for the military. The AWC COLs, allowed an open moment of candor with the VIP, wondered aloud if this effort was even worth the strategic effort, given the potential outcomes, risks to our nation.
What did I get that I wasn't getting at the Harvards and MITs...I've had dialogues with the CIA Director and members of Congress, visited numerous combatant commands and the State Department, researched and written papers on topics ranging from profiles of national service to the threat of the national debt. Most importantly, I developed professional and personal relationships that have already helped me solve problems here in this theater and I'm sure will help me (and this country) well into the future.
So while I recognize that a AWC graduate is not the best person to defend his own education, I can say I left with an extraordinary appreciation of the problems this nation will face if we don't think of the challenges as part of a wider, integrated problem-set that cannot be solved through individual piece-meal solutions.
Thanks for the explanation Stromhawk
Both timely and informative.
I figured the networking was going to be of great value - ( I dislike the term because it has a perjorative connotation now - but it remains appropo).
I'm going to be there mostly alone, so warrior monk will be my mode of operation. Like CavGuy I was greatly disappointed in CGSC-ILE, so I have my fingers crossed here. I recognize I will get what I put in to it, but stories of golf and softball just raise my hackles.
Don't waste tax dollars educating those that don't want it
Kudos to STROMHAWK60 for embracing his AWC experience (and I agree that the SSC curicula are good), but I think he missed the point of Ike Skelton's comments.
If 50% (I'd venture far more) of AWC class simply attend to improve their golf game; why are we sending them there? Let's seek out the deserving few with the right mentality to be DOD's leading thinkers / future senior leaders and send ONLY them. Those that choose tough fellowships already self-select into a tough educational experience; lets not allow others to opt out by selecting the golf elective at AWC. Rigorous grading is one way to ensure you get the right candidates to the War Colleges (vs fellowships).
It would be cheaper to send the 50%+ on a one year paid golf retreat than to send them to the War College(s). Liken them to Napoleon's donkey - immersion in the environment does not equate to learning and education.
Under the current system all grads, including Napoleon's donkey, get the SSC-coded jobs which are the most important staff and leadership positions in the military. Do you really want Napoleon's donkey as the G3 in an ASCC, Chief of Plans or Strat in a COCOM, etc.?
The message of a rigorous criterion for school is this: Selection for SSC is a sign of potential; if you're not serious about the education, then you don't get the opportunity to progress in the Military and to have undue influence/input in a senior staff position. Same could/should be said for CGSC.
I finished CGSC in December...the 50/50 rule that JPWREL mentions early on describes this course too. The problem is expectations - if you want to play golf and just get by...you can easily. I dont know how many times I heard, "Its only a lot of reading if you do it." and "The best year of your life." While many in the course are coming from deployments, it sets the wrong conditions. (I attended immediately following a 1 year tour.) Some here have mentioned a CGSC 'way' to do things...well, that would have been nice. In each small group of 16, there are usually only 2 or 3 combat arms guys and maybe only a third of the rest have any experience in a brigade or below. The remaining folks have almost no experience in general operations planning. Having 'a school way' would have made understanding planning processes better. It was a disappointment.
There are two opposing 'themes' here since 100% of Army majors attend CGSC. (The Army is the only service that requires 100% of its O4s attend mid-level in-resident officer education. It used to be the top 50% of majors attended in-residence and the remaining did it thru coorespondence.) On one side, Army majors, as a group, are better educated. There is less dispersion between the top and bottom. But on the other side, the overall level of education is down. We dont get to the really hard stuff because we continually revisit the basics. What I got in my captain's course was much better than much of what was taught in tactics (which includes brigade to JTF levels).
Sorry for the rant. These deficencies really fire me up.
long-winded take on Sketlon, etc.
In my opinion, the service academies are relics of Enlightenment thought. Give me a mustang any day, for any reason. Groupthink was fine, I suppose, when the better drilled ranks won battles. To persist with this into the 21st century seems sentimental and counterproductive.
With all respect, since Vietnam only a tiny fraction of our most talented have entered the armed services. We might debate why, but I think its pretty clear that our best minds have been avoiding career government service of any kind going back at least thirty years. Oh, the revolving door swings as smoothly as it ever did... but actual service? I don't see it.
Personally, I think this is the fall-out from the idiotic and self-defeating "Government is the Problem" line that has been repeated ad nauseum for three decades. That, and the incredible money that can be made our recently financialized economy.
Of course, the language and philosophy of business and finance has polluted the services. When in the hell did the Army start having "customers"? When did government agencies start referring to the American people as "customers"? This is neoliberal nonsense at its worst.
And I cannot help but think that there must be some connection between the steady stream of initials and acronyms in this discourse and Skleton's lack of Marshalls. The only one I ever found utterly superior to actual english was FUBAR.
But the biggest reason, I think, for the absence of strategists is the absence of clearly-defined national priorities. And this involves public debate and trade-offs.
What would Marshall say? Is securing oil supplies more important than spreading democracy? Is border security along the Iran/Iraq border more important than border security along the Rio Grande? Do we stand by England/Israel/Saudi Arabia/South Korea at all costs, or do we throw them to the wolves when that is in our best interest? Do our priorities change, or are they fixed?
Without priorities there can be no objectives. Without objectives there can be no strategy, grand or otherwise.
While I am no fan of the academies, I think it is unfair, under these circumstances, to fault them for failing to produce a stream of Marshalls. I've read would-be Grand Strategists from the think tanks ask
What Would Bismarck Do? with regards to this or that particular area. My guess is that Bismarck would ask for a clear sense of national goals, and then a free hand to pursue them.
So here's my priority:
Cut the military. You can't make the case that all this spending is necessary when 20 determined a-holes with box-cutters did more damage to the nation in one day than the Soviets did in seventy years. And while the effects of "military Keynesianism" - that is, government spending - might have played some role in the post WW2 economic boom, that day is long, long past.
The US position is declining in relation to the emrging multipolar world. This is the inexorable result of both the failure of authoritarian socialism and the success of the neoliberalism that we have pushed. Our fat war budget will not prevent this. Indeed, it will only hasten this inevitability. We need to cut now and we need to cut deep. I believe that Marhsall might well agree.
My back of the envelope solution: halve the surface fleet. Even if China builds a mongo bluewater navy, I don't see any Jutlands on the horizon. Reduce the Marines to a single corps, no armor, with helicopters, but no jets. Unilaterally reduce our ICBMs to around 100, and start closing bases all throughout the Silo States.. I don't even know where to begin with the army.
I do not want to encourage certain commentators here, but there is a point to be made so far as military contractors and campaign contributions are concerned. And so while the above wish-list might go some ways towards righting our affairs, I expect it will be impossible to effect.
You've misread Skelton's commentary
...he's talking about Senior Service Colleges...not military academies.
I like some of your other suggestions here, but at some point maybe someone might want to recognize that defense is one of the only major industries we haven't fully outsourced around here.
I always like to hear people say cut this or cut that, but unless you have a viable replacement what do you actually expect all those people to do? I'm not suggesting a state of perpetual war is the right idea for job security - far from it since I and my family are grist for that mill.
I'd love for our nation to return to a manufacturing focus where we actually build our own stuff, beyond the defense industry. That is a major security risk right there! We're losing that capability to be self-sufficent daily. (Guess the good news from last night is Steel workers have a reason to go back to work).
Finally, government isn't the problem, but they are part of it. Our biggest problem is a lack of personal responsiblity and accountability. Everything is always the 'other guys' fault. High time we all put our big boy pants back on and get to work instead of finger pointing.
Ok, I'll get on my soapbox again. Given that even 1% of the graduates of the senior service colleges are capable of kicking ideas around with G. C. Marshall, where do they get assigned to maximize their value to the republic? There is no place, except perhaps the National Security Council, where a colonel-level strategic thinker can impact strategic policy. Where is the military (or military/civilian) agency charged with providing the President (and SecDef if he/she must be in the chain of command) with strategic advice?
strategic thinking and strategic policy are different
I'll go back to my original post: I beleived it was year to think outside the box and recognize that volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous challenges require a level of thinking beyond the typical tactical problem. There are no simple answers. Strategic thinking is a tool to think more broadly, recognize one's own mental "roadblocks" to making smart(er) decision. I still think of one reading and it counsel that the more complex and new a problem set is, the less one needs to "use your intuition. sounds simple, but to me that now translates to me asking, "when is the latest I can make a decision" so I can collect all the info I can before I cause other problems.
But what about strategic policy. Although few of us will work the NSS, many of us write the info papers, talking points, etc that our very senior leaders need to inform the deputies committee meetings, and the combatant commanders that everday are a huge component of our foreign policy.
As for 1% able to talk with Gen Marshall...all I can say is that I have no doubt I now have the skills to work on any staff: COCOM, OSD, interagency...I think a larger percentage of my fellow Colonels feel the same.
VUCA indeed.....seems you got just what you needed there. (Just kidding, that acronym seems to be THE WC catchphrase, I haven't even gone yet and I think I am tired of that one).
@Hunter:
I stand corrected re: Skelton. I've thought about the matter with regard to the academies for a long time, and I read this into his comments. My bad and thanks for pointing it out.
I stand by the comments in general terms. I think the basic points about strategy hold for anyone in the officer corps or in the government or the academy generally.
While generational welfare and esteem-based education are travesties, I mostly disagree with the "personal responsbility" argument, except insofar as the citizen is encouraged by the example of his "betters."
I see no evidence that my "betters" believe in "personal responsibility" for themselves - from Abu Ghraib and Iran-Contra to Kobe Bryant and Lloyd Blankfein. This Great Recession was clearly the Other Guy's fault (the other guy being our financial sector)- and yet the bill has been presented to all of us.
While there might be some personal satisfaction to be gained from behaving responsibly, our political economy is geared against it. I wish this weren't so, but it clearly is.
I completely agree: we ought not simply to throw people out of work. Yet this has been, and is being, repeated across the world, over and over. It is inherent in the globalized capitalism which our political classes have pushed and which our military is being used to further.
Right now city and state governments are throwing people out of work to balance their budgets. The argument I hear is that they need to bear their share of the "pain." For years, Coal, steel and auto workers have been thrown out of work without any provisions made for them. Why can't our defense-workers (whose jobs are the creation of government spending) bear a share of this "austerity"? Personally, I'd much rather see aerospace engineers idled than cops and firefighters.
I'd also love to see defense-sector workers put to work building something a little more useful. But, absent a real revoution in thinking and politics, the re-industrialization of the US economy is a fantasy.
Get back to work, you say? I wish we could. But I ask you: where are the jobs?
Well now this gets back to that whole...what's our strategy argument right?
You know that in addition to a National Security Strategy our WH is supposed to develop a National Economic Strategy? Yeah I didn't either but it's true, it's just no one has ever done it before.
My, I'm of the opinion that Bush failed when he sent the American people to the malls to counter the 9/11 attacks, and Obama hasn't done much better since taking office.
The answer to this problem was right there waiting for us in our history. WWII as the exemplar and the New Deal before it. A national call to arms to fight a Total War on (Terror - an unacceptable term but the one that was used and therefore recognized). Tied to an economic plan of re-industrialization into green technologies...and all that wonderful stuff. Stimulus bills directed at work projects to hire workers and recreate a failing infrastructure instead of bailing out bad behavior. Akin to the CCC, TVA, etc. I mean if you're gonna blow taxpayer dollars you might as well do it...hiring taxpayers to do much needed work.
Yes the cutting continues because the entire system is tied together, property taxes drive the funding of municipalities, housing is in the crapper, blah, blah, blah. You're 'why can't the defense workers bear the austerity' argument is another downward spiral towards dissolution. Not because they are special, they aren't ,but work needs to be done and some work (defense work) needs to be done in house. And the more people you put out on the street the more government workers will go with. Because it takes lots of taxes to fund those important public workers, esp. the ones we all agree we need the most cops, firemen, etc.
Your conclusion reeks of "woe is me, we can't do anything about this"...that's BS and down that road lies ruin. Where are the jobs? Everywhere you look...Where are the jobs where someone will hand you a mundane task that you can muddle through daily and score a sweet paycheck? Well that's harder. You're right those days may be over and a fantasy never to be found again.
We've dealt with far worse than this in the past.
National Economic Strategy? News to me. But I know most of our friends in the East have them.
Strange: I am down with your ideas about New Deal-style spending, but with little else.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – I’m talking the first days here – I don’t think Bush had much of a choice. Credit, and the NYC-based financial system, froze due to fear. Do you understand what that means? I’m not talking about a teenager with a charge card, I’m talking about things like chlorine deliveries for municipal water supplies. I’m talking about making payroll. You don’t deal with that… And there was no apparatus in place to deal with this. As far as I know, there still isn’t (even though nearly the same thing happened again seven years later after 9/15). I hate that this is the way we’ve arranged ourselves, but that is the way of things right now.
I agree that, in a larger sense, Bush (whom I loathe) might have zigged when he should have zagged, but I think in a direction far, far away from the one you suggest, at least with regard to terror.
The global marketplace and the diffusion of weapons-technology ensures that, so long as there is a motive, terrorism is never, ever, ever, going to go away. Better to get angry with the sun for setting if this bothers you. Even in the half-hearted manner in which we are prosecuting it, the GWOT/GCOIN is bankrupting us – while our competitors move forward. This is where I think the WW2 example falls flat. In WW2, all the major economies were involved. At the end, US industry was supreme – not from any inherent superiority – but because everyone else was digging theirs out from the rubble. In the world we live in, the US is the only economy involved in a significant way in this strange, poorly-named conflict.
No, my conclusion, though gloomy, was clear and not hopeless: without a revolution in thinking (and politics), we are ruined. Given that the entire system is “tied together,” as you say, it is going to require nothing short of systemic change to move it forward in a manner that can avoid another major crisis in the next decade. Thinking we can somehow replay the 1945 to 1970 golden age without major structural adjustment is, in my opinion, to not think seriously about this. The conditions that gave rise to all that are gone. My reading of history suggests that the surest sign of decline is when a nation or people starts looking backwards to some gauzy past that is gone forever.
I would like to have the opportunity to speak with GEN Marshall, though he would probably not remember my name as he was wont to do. As a former Army War College professor, I was impressed by the intellectual abilities of a great many of my students. I was fortunate to be able to select a group of 8-10 students each year from all services and federal agencies and visit college campuses to discuss current events with faculty, student and community audiences. We were typically well-received, though there were times after the invasion of Iraq when discussions got quite lively. Most of those students went on to further success.
The truth is the military senior service colleges don't select students as do civilian graduate schools, on academic merit and potential. They're selected based on roughly 20 years of performance in a broad range of assignments. Many are brilliant; some are simply good leaders and skilled military professionals. We could probably add more academic rigor to the senior service colleges, but I think the emphasis on taking time to read, talk, and think is correct. To an extent, what they take away is what they put into it, but most are conscientious. The services do, by the way, send senior officers to civilian universities on academic fellowships, and that too pays dividends for the services. The foreign students and civilians from State, CIA, etc., add an invaluable element to the educational process at the war colleges. Comments that we train, not educate, at the senior service colleges misses the mark, in my opinion.
Different schools have different objectives. I taught at the Army JAG School and that was probably the most rigorous of the military schools I've attended. But that's focused on eduating legal professionals at the rank of major. I now teach for the Army CGSC. Both the intermediate level schools and senior service schools have unique educational missions. Comparing them is like comparing apples and oranges.
What is the role of CGSC-ILE in PME?
I know the preponderence of dialog in this blog post is related to senior service colleges (typically colonel or lieutenant colonel selected for promotion as well as select civilian representatives), but there has also been mention of CGSC-ILE.
ILE shapes mid-level officers (majors with generally 10-14 years of service in) who will become senior leaders. Of course, it is not just ILE. Experience in previous assignments, previous leaders and mentors, life's experiences, etcetera also shape these leaders, but ILE is one of the key PME milestones for Army officers (each service has their unique "equivalent").
Previously, ILE (or CGSC) was a competetive program with only about 50% of each year group (cohort) attending. It served as an "unofficial" discriminator of performance and potential, identifying those 50% who were recognized as going on to bigger and better things.
What is the impact on the relatively recent decision to allow all majors to attend CGSC-ILE and continue forward in their career paths essentially on a level playing field?
The instructors I have spoken to remark that the academic rigor diminished to accomodate a greater breadth of officer experience and capabilities. Does this truly allow the Army to shape and mold its greatest mid level leaders to prepare them for future opportunities?
I am interested in thoughts and experiences.
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