I've been reading a terrific (and massive) new book edited by Lewis Sorley, The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnam's Generals, and a passage in it provokes me to return to the issue of the literacy of local security forces. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, who had been a senior South Vietnamese intelligence officer, wrote in 1978 that:

Only country people had a natural affinity for night operations. ARVN officers and noncommissioned officers were all urban dwellers. They were chosen for their educational backgrounds; high school graduates were sent to officer candidate schools and junior high school certificate holders to noncommissioned officer schools...Rural peasants almost never had this opportunity. Even most enlisted men in the National Army were not rural peasants but urbanized peasants and worked to had had contacts with the machine age. (Pp. 117-118)

Tom again: Who would you prefer protecting your village while you sleep -- someone who grew up in that environment and isn't afraid to patrol at night, or someone who can read a field manual but wants to be behind closed doors when the sun goes down? It seems to me that who you recruit and how you train them depends a lot on where and what the fight is.

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EXPLORE:HISTORY, MILITARY
 

WALKING WOUNDED

6:13 PM ET

February 1, 2011

Tajik or Pashto literacy?

TR's VN-AfPak connection relates to how urban vs rural survival skills relate to night patrolling, an interesting and important question. But the major local/ethnic divide in the human terrain has to be kept in the foreground in this (mostly) Pashtunistan war.

Perhaps someone will inform us whether written orders/instructions in the ANA are issued in Tajik, the persian/farsi dialect of the traditional officer class?

As an aside, literacy has always been a problem among US boots, who aren't screened in the same way as our many foreign recruits. Decades back I got clued in by a woman who's specialty was ab initio literacy classes at Pendleton.

 

TYRTAIOS

7:22 PM ET

February 1, 2011

Fight your comfort level

I am not completely sold on Lung's analysis. The American military trained the ARVN to mirror its own image and with that image comes some of America’s own military deficiencies. One of those deficiencies, with exceptions of course, was by in large the American military hunkered down at night and ceded the darkness, which was neutral back then, to the enemy.

Is a rural Afghan more likely to have a better comfort level operating in the dark than his urbanized counterpart? Perhaps, but if I were moving around in my own backyard, knowing the terrain, as well as the comings-and-goings like the back of my hand, I'd feel pretty comfortable too.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

1:46 AM ET

February 2, 2011

Correct me if I'm wrong here Tyrtaios...

but part of the deal in VN was that our gear mix was heavy, a disadvantage to quiet night movement. Our patrols often set up command mines, perhaps in ambush, and a pre-planned artillery fire plan, to see us thru a bad night to the dawn.

The CAP night patrol/counter-patrol described in "The Village" was done with fatigues for body armor, with rifles, grenades, nerves, and the primary reinforcement from the team itself. Not air / art'y, unless the fort was attacked.

There was a lot of collective defense going on in Iraq 2004-5, and a great deal of tragic trouble deconflicting police and militia from what a US unit perceived as their battlespace. Without common literacy, language, tactics and goals, command and control suffers. From what those that were in the mess tell me, one of them a nightcrawler unit, it was tough enough keeping our guys apart and maintaining trust between American units.

 

TYRTAIOS

5:02 AM ET

February 2, 2011

A minimalist reply Double W

Again, I'm not sure how Lung qualifies his statement except with anecdotal evidence, or the proverbial: country boys are better in the bush than their city counter parts? The reason I mention it, is because in the grand scheme of things, the Popular Force militias weren't really integrated into the overall war effort, and were generally looked down upon by the ARVN commands.

Hell, anecdotally, on several occasions I can recall seeing a string of little lights moving down a trail at night, they were NVA - maybe from the big cities up north, uh?

In the end, I believe it is how you are trained, how well you know the area you're operating-in, mindset, and of course, some types of people are just better and more comfortable in chaotic surroundings than others.

Incidentally, you may like to read our poster below, former U.S. Marine aviator, Quang Pham’s autobiography, “A Sense of Duty: Our Journey from Vietnam to America.”

 

RUBBER DUCKY

9:04 PM ET

February 1, 2011

One answer...

" Who would you prefer protecting your village while you sleep -- someone who grew up in that environment and isn't afraid to patrol at night, or someone who can read a field manual but wants to be behind closed doors when the sun goes down?"

One answer would be someone who actually has a stake in guarding that village. That would not be the United States. All this tactical horseshit evades the strategic questions of why we're there and when we're leaving. We've spent enormous amounts of time, money, and effort to figure out how to do this Afghan thing but close to zero on why.

Class project: define the vital national interest that keeps us in Afghanistan. Extra credit: describe in detail the opportunity costs of being there.

 

TYRTAIOS

3:06 PM ET

February 2, 2011

Heave To:

To stop a boat and maintain position (with a bit of give or leeway).

So "my favorite navy" guys concentrate on the strategic do they? Well, I suppose when there is nothing hostile out in front of one, one has time for such deliberations, and forethought.

The original question wasn't about national end game strategic clerity which admittedly, and importantly, doesn't seem to have been asked for by anyone in the military. The question or statement was simply about who owns the night.

Just try'en to stay on topic - oh silly me!

 

OKIE

12:11 AM ET

February 2, 2011

Past Post ...

Tom, I'm trying to find a past post of yours on Non-Iraq War Books to read to help understand the Iraq War. Can you post a link to it? It's on Amazon.com, but I'm interested in reading some of the comments that that post garnered. Many thanks from an Oklahoman under a record snowfall ...

 

TOM RICKS

2:38 AM ET

February 2, 2011

I don't think so

I think it ran only on Amazon, never on the blog.
Safe digging,
Tom

 

CARL

12:26 AM ET

February 2, 2011

Isn't this more accurately

Isn't this more accurately viewed as matter of training and leadership? The leadership decides that night work is important, makes a training program and then makes sure that the thing is done. The Japanese liked night work and they trained for it. I'm not sure the bulk of their forces came from the farms. I don't understand why literacy or farm life has much to do with it. Nobody can see very well at night, and few civilians have much experience moving around in coordinated groups at night.

 

QUANG

12:50 AM ET

February 2, 2011

These ARVN Generals Fled

Here is the summary of a 1978 Rand Report that included ARVN generals and civilian leadership, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2208.html

Bob Sorley's work is masterful but keep this in mind. These generals did not enter hard labor/re-education camps and endure suffering. They were three years removed from the Fall of Saigon and were extremely bitter when they were interviewed. The comments by civilian leadership was more telling, in my opinion.

The VNAF flew plenty night with their Skyraiders and C-47 flare ships.

 

TOM RICKS

2:40 AM ET

February 2, 2011

Bitter?

QXP,
I actually was struck at the apparent lack of bitterness, more just a sober, wrenching attempt to figure out what the hell happened. Not a lot of blame, just a sadness over how it all went down.
Best,
Tom

 

QUANG

2:00 PM ET

February 3, 2011

Maybe it was in the Rand version

TR - these leaders gave interviews to Rand and the Army. The ones from Rand sounded bitter and remorseful. I have not read Bob's book yet but I saw highlights from the Army interviews years ago. Jim Willbanks referenced some of these interviews in his book, "Abandoning Vietnam."
QP

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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