I was critical of LTC Flynn's original post, but this one did a much better job of getting his point across.

I LIKE this 2-track give and take, anchored by Broadwell and Flynn.

I would appreciate a map locating the places mentioned in relation to each other, the river and the Kandahar road. And if the photos are specific in time and location to the discussion (as opposed to the usual FP/BD file shots) a descriptor sentence is called for.

Carry on.

Lt. Col. David Flynn’s response was a sincere effort by a professional soldier to bring some light to what he and his men are doing. I thank him for that and add that he is also a pretty darn good writer for a gunner.

While I will agree that a vast majority of the American people strongly support the welfare and interests of servicemen and their families I believe that he is dead wrong in assuming that support constitutes support for the war in Afghanistan.

I would like to ask the LtC and knowledgeable commenters whether the use of working dogs is catching on with the local forces his team will leave behind? As with other war zones (Bosnia, Lebanon, Africa), mine clearing and counter-infiltration/terror tasks will go on for years after we leave.

I've heard from other US war vets on this blog that dogs carry cultural baggage (unclean), and of course the improper use of dogs for interrogation is something America's image is now stuck with. That said, if our troops find dogs valuable, to detect explosives transportation and caches, and to secure outpost perimeters, how are ANSF facing a different threat environment?

In Iraq, gov't forces were heavily and repeatedly targeted, to prevent their maturing. I've also heard that dog handlers, like translators and intel sources, were specifically targeted. I assume the Taliban employs similar strategies, and that locally trained K9 security could save the men we are enabling, and protect their people.

Teach a man to fish...

The only way we will get near the truth is to have this whole affair looked into by an International War Crimes Tribunal. We all know the Army lies about everything. The Army has no credibility, and Flynn should watch his statements, because they can be used against him in a trial.

Anyone read Foust's article in The Atlantic?

I've got a long way to go before I'm a battalion commander (if I make it that far), but I'm starting to think that getting into a war of words with an analyst/blogger was a baaaad move. Is the name LTC Flynn becoming synonymous with village razing? The Atlantic article certainly isn't helping his case...

"Tarok Kolache is the kind of horror story that always accompanies war. "This is not the first time this has happened," a platoon leader who served in Kandahar recounted to me. There, the destruction of mined villages is common. Last November, the New York Times reported that demolishing unoccupied homes and towns had become routine in several districts in Kandahar. Because the war has displaced an estimated 297,000 Afghans, many of whom will flee during extended violence and later return, homes are often empty. In October, the Daily Mail quoted this same Lt. Col. Flynn as threatening villagers with their town's destruction if they did not report Taliban activity to his soldiers (the village in that story, Khosrow Sofia, was later burned to the ground much like Tarok Kolache). In neighboring Helmand province--even more violent than Kandahar--Marines have explicitly threatened villages with destruction if local civilians didn't volunteer the locations of near IEDs."

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/how-short-term-thinking-is-causing-long-term-failure-in-afghanistan/70048/

Another lucid case of precisely arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. I'll bet a six-pack of beer that Tarok Kalache is back in enemy hands by this time next year. Remember the Restrepo!

I've just read Mr. Foust's Atlantic article: http://tinyurl.com/5wjx5jw .

He directly contradicts several key to include the issuance of weapons to self-defense force personnel and whether they are being properly vetted. The issue of weapons issuance is a simple matter of fact. The issue of vetting is somewhat ambiguous as no one says when the legal vetting process began as opposed to when the recruits commenced training.

The most disturbing fact is that a subordinate of LTC Flynn;s, a Captain, directly contradicts his commander by saying that villagers (plural) were angry over the bombing of their village. Personally, I see destruction the only alternative by a completely mined village devoid of civilians. LTC Flynn is clear that he confirmed the absence of civilians using several sources to include human sources. Various sources of aerial surveillance would be hard-pressed to distinguish between Taban and civilians unless they are walking around with crew-served weapons and RPGs. He did say they used pattern analysis and that is plausible. What we do not get, from anyone, is a BDA suggesting Taliban bodies and weapons (no, I'm not talking body count.

However, once he announced his intentions to include the District Chief, I must assume that the Taliban were informed and that they unassed the area carrying the weapons that they could. Compromise is pretty much guaranteed in a country like Afghanistan - maybe anywhere There appears to be a little naivete pervading Army thinking.

Lastly, focusing on one village in a District (or AO) does not give us an accurate picture of the situation.. In a situation this complex with so many actors, such an appraisal is difficult at best and likely to be grossly inaccurate. This is like Alzheimer's, you can't diagnose it authoritatively until the patient dies. Here, we may not know until we draw-down or leave.

As a retired United States Marine who proudly served with the 5th Marines in the An Hoa area of Quang Nam province of the Republic of Vietnam until a grenade and an SKS round ended my service, I would like to salute Lt. Col. Flynn and his troops for their service. And a salute to RVN SF VET whom I assume is a fellow Vietnam vet, although I don't necessarily agree with all of your perspective. Lt. Col. Flynn and his troops are fighting in a truly nasty war, against Taliban, al Qaida, and of course against the arm-chair stratigists/civilians of the US and her allies as well as those who oppose us.

RAYFIN3, Tarok Kalache may indeed end up in the hands of the Taliban down the line, although for the sake of those who once called it home I hope not. However in the grand scheme of things that isn't important unless the place is of strategic value. The priority is killing as many of the enemy as possible. I know that sounds terrible, but that's what war is about. One can always rebuild a village, but if you waste enough Taliban you can't "rebuild" them, especially if the Afghanis fear the consequenses.

Admiral, terror is a weapon, one that the Taliban employed first, and the Marines are turning that weapon back against them, if what you say is fact. I hope it is because that is the only way to fight this kind of war succesfully. I would employ the strategy of the Mongols - tell us where the Taliban and the IEDs and weapon caches are, or we will destroy your village and kill every last one of you.

The greatest weakness our military has is that it is dictated to by politicians who've never seen combat. The president & congress should have the authority to make the decision whether or not to go to war: after that the military or combat veterans should call the shots. We should study the tactics and campaigns of the best warrior this nation ever produced, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and adapt them to the particulars of Afghanistan. We've screwed around enough, its time to go all out, like the Marines in Helmand only take that to the 5th power.

Oh yes, nearly forgot: the first and most important action to take is to throw out all the journalists in the country. All they ever seem to accomplish is dead and wounded Americans (and our allies).

Afghanistan has the second most corrupt government on the planet. Lt. Col. David Flynn seems to have a totally unwarranted faith that the local Karzai appointed governor will not distribute huge sums of U.S. taxpayer cash to his kinsmen and cronies rather than the actual displaced villagers,

Isn't that guy super sketchy? Aren't we supposed to feel bad about enabling some drooling mafiosi? Someone help me out here and explain why making the United Streetz Dopeboyz of Afghanistan even more indispensable to our COIN ops doesn't constitute failure.

Foust yet again chooses a target for criticism, but does not provide any insightful analysis or alternative solutions. LTC Flynn should not take his article seriously. Just another blogger trying to make a name for himself with not much new to offer.

You're simply not going to win in the eyes of the public. The American people have been lulled into a trance-like state in which we think of soldiers as akin to priests. They can do no wrong and any criticism of them is verbotten. Thus, this blogger--no mater how convincing his arguments might be--is never going to win. If we stop worshiping our military, then he might have a chance. However, I don't see this happening in the long run. Americans have no clue about the realities of the wars they supported, and they like it that way.

Conclusion =

- Foust has the most credibility, provides the most insight, and makes the most sense. He may not have all the detail, but his big picture is more honest than the others. (to me... and we're all subjective here)

- Broadwell says the most while informing the least; information sans substance. (i've made this complaint about her before; she seems to put a lot of words together while avoiding making any particular argument or point)

- Flynn: justifies his own existence. But ultimately is looking though a pinhole at his own objectives. He has every box ticked , lots of CYA material. Did his homework, made sure the forms were filled, the people consulted. In the context of his mandate, he did his job, if you have a problem, talk to the judge. You can't argue with his work. No one's charging him with anything. It's Par For Course. Omlettes, Eggs, etc.

In the end, it's just a story of how Afghanistan has turned into a process of diggin holes (or bombing them) and filling them back in. (with money!).

Meaning, in LtC Flynns story of 'defining success', there is little actual thought or perspective on how these particuar engagements/events add up to some larger, longer term strategic objective; he did his job for his tour, now he can turn it over to the next guy for the summer. We've made "progress". Thats it. No interest as to whether this has any contribution to long term situation in Afghanistan. "progress" is a euphamism for "shit happened; we did our job". They wasted some Talibs. They cleared a village. Checked off the boxes. Made sure land deeds were established and monies distributed. This is not the preferred approach. We'd rather not blow your entire town up and then pay you for it afterward. However, given the circumstances, that's what we'll do. Get over it. This is the reality of the conflict.

Despite appearances maybe, I'm not bitching. I'm not surprised. Nor do I think its fair to expect much else given the state of affairs. I think Foust gets the core of it right in his headline =

"Sort-Term Thinking Causing Long-Term Failure"

Broadwell: ""... razing villages is not high on the priority list. It is not common." However, when in the field, "Commander's (sic) have to make a calculation about the risks""

I am not sure subtle understatement works when discussing wholesale destruction of people's villages. Meaning, "not high" is maybe not as clear or comittal as saying, "We dont ever intend to do that". It seems what she's actually saying is, "shit happens"... Villages will be destroyed. But we compensate people. Its not either willy-nilly or done off the cuff.

General Stanley McChrystal told the troops in Afghanistan that "Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family - and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our demise."

This should be clear to all. Yet, its still on the menu. Not "high priority", but its still happening with relative frequency.

To some degree it seems like we're pulling ourselves in 2 directions. We have generals making strategic determinations about the long term approach; but what happens on the ground every day ultimately isn't at all harmonized with those objectives.

Watching Restrepo ... there was a moment where this broke through the film and the viewer just goes, "oh, @(#*$ There goes the whole effort"

It's when the (*Capt?) officer is in a meeting with the locals, gets tired with the process, and just goes, "I dont give a @#(*&$ what you think"

You wonder if that was actually translated. You wonder how that short term stalemate will result in more IEDs, sniping, etc for the rest of their tour. How his burst of frustration will probably cost an American soldier their life, eventually. How their failure to pay cash ($400?) for the dead cow will mean they just created a new enemy. Etc.

Again, I'm not bitching. I feel a great deal of empathy for the officers who have to make decisions under the constrains they do, with limited choices and specific objectives. They find a way to get it done with the least loss of life. Ultimately thats the goal. So they blow @#&*up. Big whoop. These are cinderblock/mud structures. It's not like its downtown tokyo (which we have burned to the ground in the past without regret).

My only point is, we're not winning a war. We're maintaining one. We're playing a 10yr wack-a-mole. Flynn is a good mole-whacker. We shouldn't complain. But - more broadly - we should ask why we're doing what we're doing, and whether it actually helps anything at all in the end. Are we making Kandahar province more likely to be pro-government? Pro American? Anti-taliban? .... or no, are we just 'clearing' the area? To let the next unit come and do more clearing and handing out checks...

It Takes a Village To Raise a Child; It Takes a Child To Blow Up a Village