Thursday, January 20, 2011 - 8:25 AM

Paula Broadwell asked Lt. Col. David Flynn, star of a guest column earlier this week, to respond to Registani Josh Foust. (And here is an XM/Foust discussion of Paula's files.)
Ms. Broadwell corresponds, "I thought I'd ask LTC David Flynn, the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force 1-320th in Kandahar Provence, Afghanistan to clarify the Afghan Local Police initiative skepticism and punditry on one blogger's mind. Here's what Flynn had to say in response to Joshua Foust's blog.":
Tom comment: No matter where you come down on this, I am impressed to see Lt. Col. Flynn respond in real time -- very unusual for an Army that still likes to move 2.5 MPH in media engagements.
So, duck and cover, and here goes:
Flynn: It has been with great pleasure that I've had the opportunity to read the orator Joshua Faust report from his desk in the U.S. via Registan.net. It seems, unfortunately, Mr. Faust lacks the context to editorialize in a way that enables his readers to ascertain an objective view. My name is LTC David Flynn and have been operating in the Arghandab District since June 2010. This is my second deployment to Kandahar and have over 20 months of experience in the Arghandab. Allow me to explain the nascent ALP in one of 4 villages that we have stood up in my Area of Operations in response to Foust's punditry.
Foust: LTC Flynn decided to give one elder in a district the power to build his own militia, which that elder liked. The men he chose for that militia could not be vetted by the Ministry of the Interior quickly enough, so the LTC decided to abandon General Petraeus' orders and the legal restrictions on arming militias and give them weapons and training anyway. LTC Flynn's trainers are having a hard time convincing these men not to beat people in the street, but are hopeful they can be "smarter than the TB."
Flynn: The men chosen for this particular ALP were vetted by senior Afghan Police Officials, who are subordinate to the MOI, and vectored my way to begin a training process that is led by some of my finest infantry NCOs and mentored by an ODA Team operating in my AO. The ALP members have been approved also by the village Shura and are led to training by their Malik. We will issue them weapons to operate on their own after they have completed background checks, biometric screening, medical checks, District Chief of Police and District Governor vetting and final approval by the MOI. I expect this process to take a few more weeks before we are ready to issue weapons. The weapons are issued by MOI officials and at that time the District government will issue identification cards with the serial numbers matching the weapon issued.
Foust: Thanks to the "VSO-ALP Backburn," whatever the hell that means, we're now expanding a policy of building unaccountable militias across southern Afghanistan, and hoping they won't sell their weapons to the Taliban like they have every single other time we've tried to do this. (Even Andrew Exum thinks we need to be much more cautious about this program.) It's like we kept all the bad aspects of the AP3 program in Wardak, and chose to forget all the lessons we learned from it. Like the accounts other COIN cheerleaders, it seems to represent a rejection of evidence and experience, rather than a considered embrace of it.
Flynn: We have U.S. Forces and ANA forces co-located in a combat outpost INSIDE the village where this ALP will operate. The ALP is accountable to the District Chief of Police who is extremely effective and aggressive in his duties. The long term objective is for the ALP to assume responsibility for the security of their own village but will be supervised by ANA and U.S. Soldiers in the interim.
Foust: In 2008, the Arghandab was not like this. We made it this way. And our continued refusal to think beyond six months from now -- starting with General Petraeus demanding unrealistic results by the summer and moving down the chain of command -- is creating bad decisions, inspiring LTCs to break the law and use short cuts to try to eke out progress for a good OER, and, ultimately, ruining any chance of a long-term success in this area. We are doing this deliberately, though perhaps not knowingly. And the people like Paula Broadwell, who are bragging of the tactical genius of it all, don't seem to realize this sort of thing is the foundation of our eventual, humiliating defeat.
Paula's writing on the Arghandab is not analysis, or reporting. It is hagiography -- a particularly ignorant kind of hagiography. How foul.
Flynn: The Charqolba ALP has been directed by the Afghan Government thru the local police; again, an MOI institution. We are executing this program in concert with our Afghan partners. It's not possible to do this in every one of the 38 villages in my AO. We are very selective about how we raise this program. All four of my ALPs exist in villages that we maintain a permanent presence -- it's a pre-condition for effective mentorship. There are certainly risks associated with such a venture but the status quo alternative does not bear the potential high reward.
We have made significant gains in the District in the time we have been here. The vast majority of Taliban fighters were defeated and forced to leave the district before the change in foliage and onset of winter as is normally the case here. We now live with our ANA brothers in the sanctuaries occupied by the Taliban this past summer. The people of these villages, once terrorized by the Taliban, are beginning to return to their lands with cautious optimism of the future. The ALP is part of our overall strategy to prevent the re-emergence of the Taliban in the District in the upcoming Spring. We too are cautiously optimistic that this District will return to the favorable conditions not of 2008 but of 2007 prior to the untimely death of the Alikozai tribal elder whose loss created the power vacuum for the Taliban to wreak havoc for the local population for the past 3 years.
I've never read this Foust fellow in the past and I probably won't in the future after seeing how quickly he turned things personal and catty. Good on the LTC for maintaining a professional detachment after someone basically accuses him of being a criminal in order to get a good OER.
I applaud LTC Flynn's willingness to engage a blogger, but he still didn't answer some of Josh Foust 's questions. For example, in the first section Flynn quotes, Josh raises the question of the legality of Flynn's arming of the militia. Flynn answers with a lot of blustery brouhaha about their process for arming the militia, but never actually says if all of this is in keeping with General Patraeus's orders and legal restrictions, which is what Foust was getting at. We are still left to wonder. And are they just straight up beating people in the street? No answer there either.
Foust's style was certainly inflamed and could be toned down, but his questioning of the strategic benefit to razing operation still stands. (More here: http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/01/18/talking-tacitcs-with-andrew-exum/ ) And LTC Flynn's response could probably do without all the belittling of Foust. (e.g. "Orator at a desk in Washington") There are a lot of well meaning and thoroughly knowledgeable "orators" at a "desk in Washington." Foust has lived and traveled extensively in Central Asia and has come by his right to an opinion the hard-earned and honest way. Exum and Foust touch on it in the above link, so there isn't much else there to say.
I saw the same thing -- an attempted swipe at Josh that might be convincing to those unfamiliar with his work, followed by a lot of non-answers and evasion. I don't see how LTC Flynn's comments constitute a response to Foust's post.
You know I am certain there are a few careerist officers who only care about their OER, but I would measure them in the gross minority. In any effect anyone who has made it to the position of Battalion Commander has already all but secured his 20 year retirement. Ever since I have known of such things completing a successful Battalion command - esp a combat arms command - has been the very mark of a career well-done. In today's Army I don't see much compelling beyond that, though I suppose there are some with stars in their eyes looking for stars.
Regardless the notion that every Battalion Cdr out there is looking for a byline in the next Fiasco book or just looking out for their OER is stupid and offensive.
While Flynn didn't answer every charge he was far more diplomatic than I might have been in dealing with a guy who basically accused him of multiple crimes in the book. But let's let no good deed go unpunished.
LTC Flynn's responses are not comforting nor do they really address the questions and issued posed by Foust.
Yes, Foust may ave been unnecessarily snarky, something I was complaining about just yesterday on this blog but really, these sort of techno-speak acronym-laden answers remind me of what professional officers justifying inane projects in Vietnam sounded like.
None of this makes me any more sanguine about our prospects in Afghanistan.
Sowing the Seeds of Your Own Destruction
The analogy would be levelling Washington DC or Tel Aviv to kill all the terrorists that operate and reside there. Not only is it incredibly inhumane and disproportionate, but many more terrorists would be inspired by such an event. The war is over, you lost. Go home. Save your cannon fodder for another hopeless war of aggression.
I read a determined officer who sees the way to complete his deployment by making progress on the mission right in front of him. He is on board with, if not rigidly following, his commanding general's counterinsurgency doctrine. He thinks of Afghan army troops as his brothers (by inference, as his own soldiers' brothers as well, an assessment I'd like to hear them confirm themselves), and he is cautiously optimistic that his Joint Task Force will end up serving as a kind of cast or splint on the Arghandab District of Afghanistan until the injury inflicted on the area by the death of a Alikozai tribal elder has healed.
Boy, are we ever in the soup. Col. Flynn is just putting one foot in front of the other, doing the best he can with what he has got until his deployment ends, and he thinks that is good enough. He has men under his command at risk while his Task Force burns through ordnance and supplies like a blowtorch, all to restore the tribal balance of power in one valley in southern Afghanistan.
I don't expect someone in his position to wonder in print if the strategy to which he's being asked to contribute advances American interests; that kind of question is above his pay grade. Nor do I expect a serving officer to publish comments even suggesting doubt about whether his mission makes any sense. But my goodness: the description Col. Flynn has given about what his Task Force is doing in the Arghandab manages to generate all manner of questions and doubt about whether the American command in Afghanistan is pursuing objectives valuable to us.
I don't like the personalization of the policy
Mr. Foust. If you think there is a problem, set it out and describe it. Don't suggest someone is doing something for the sake of getting a good Officer Evaluation Report. Assume good faith. As soon as you accused your target of doing this for the sake of an OER, you lost me.
LTC Flynn: As for the "legalities" of the situation, you aren't a JAG, and you shouldn't be tripped up by a bunch of pettifogging barracks lawyers sitting 8,000 miles away. Get the job done and use your best judgment to execute the mission. That's why the taxpayers (should) pay you the big bucks.
Signed,
-A non-pettifogging former barracks lawyer sitting 8,000 miles away.
LTC Flynn's response took big ones. I'm very glad he responded and disappointed that many had trouble reading his response objectively.
He pointed out that the recruits will not be issued weapons until what sounds like too many bureaucrats chop on their clearances. In such a society, only the elders and his neighbors can vouch for him. The addition of so many others sounds like opportunities for graft. In addition, the police are *said* to be the most corrupt element in Afghan society. (See Wanat.)
He appears to be making the most of the resources in his AOR.
He chose not to comment upon the bombing of the village and that would have been helpful. Of course he is irritated when someone calls him a criminal after he has devoted 20 months of his life in that part of Afghanistan! As befits his position, he controls himself well.
One observation, however, is that this is happening in only 4 of 38 villages. That's not his fault, but it shows that there is a long road in front of us - too long a road.
Please tell me that not all 38 villages need a self-defense force.
Finally, Foust uses more acronyms than Flynn. If you want to communicate with the public, you need to either toss them or use standard US government style standards and follow the full spelling of a term with (its abbreviation in parenthesis) the first time it is used. Thereafter, you can just use the acronym. Mr. Foust probably uses them so liberally to show that he belongs.
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