Prinzeugen --I couldn't agree with you more.

But not only "translators" are needed. The Army does a piss poor job of getting the right skill mix into these positions. When I was in Iraq, you saw everything from: Interpreters (GLS) , Linguists (L-3, SAIC), Advisors (OSS, McNeil Tech) and Atmospherics providers (SOSI, McNeil).

99% of the officers up to 3-star general had no clue what the difference was. Yet, there is a HUGE difference between your averge terp and your average advisors. Requirements for all of them were radically different. Everything from your 18-yr old terp that just happened to Arabic, to your 55-yr old Electrical and Mechanical Engineer/PhD that knew 5 languages

Commanders used them interchangeably and generally had no idea what the difference was.

These guys were all paid widely different amounts of money. By different companies. It wasn't uncommon for an 18-yr old terp to make twice as much as the engineer, depending on the company and time they were hired. You can imagine the resentment.

In general, they are treated like crap by the military. Imagine how your average civilian fits into your typical Army unit. Now add the additional cluelessness brought on by English being a second language. It was like watching a comedy...only it wasnt' funny.

These contracts generally had no standards across the board for weight, age, religion, etc. Female advisors assigned to all-male combat units and outposts. Overweight advisors assigned to combat units. Shiia interpreters assigned to units in predominately Sunni areas.

In general, these guys 1 or 2 weeks of training in CONUS before being assigned to their units. Imagine your average civilian getting 1-2 weeks of training before being embedded with an Infantry unit -- TO DO ONE OF THE UNIT'S MOST CRITICAL JOBS.

There was no vetting process to tell guys are loyal to the U.S. or the insurgency.

With the importance of language skills necessary run successful COIN ops, the US Army's repeatedly ad hoc approach to this was shameful, ignorant and a huge waste of taxpayer dollars.

Although I'm thanking you for providing one more reason (a big one, I think) to be cynical of COIN. I need that like I need a hole in my head.

All MOS skills are frangible. If you train a kid on a 155mm howitzer and use him as a convoy guard or checkpoint jockey for a tour or two, his skills on the 155 will evaporate, guaranteed. Ditto tank crewmen, armored infantrymen, and other specialist combat armsmen whose "combat experience" cannot translate as =combat experience= appropriate for a conventional battlefield setting.

Are our ground and air forces capable of carrying off the combined-arms doctrines employed for the 2003 drive on Baghdad? In the face of a real artillery defense? Could they secure Palmdale, California, after eight years of doing what they've been doing in Iraq and Afghanistan--which is to say =not= doing all the things the army of a great power ought to have been doing to prepare itself for the types of relevant contingencies we should all be worrying about?

Was the vaunted IDF capable of invading Lebanon after a lost generation of serving solely as a pool for door kickers, home demolishers, and checkpoint goons? The IDF's Lebanon fiasco should instruct us that lip service to doctrines doesn't cut it once the commissioned and non-commissioned leaders rising to middle management and beyond have no longer come up living and breathing, testing and retesting the essence of those doctrines day in and day out, tour in and tour out.

What do we have in reserve to send in a hurry if the government fails in Iran? Pakistan? Mexico? Or for war in Korea? And if we do send troops into a hot place, can we reasonably expect better than Israel last reaped in Lebanon?

I enjoyed your comments but do not necessarily agree with all. The Israel/Hezbollah conflict of 2006 has become cannon fodder for the I-told-you-so conventional military enthusiasts. However, I would ask you to drill down a little deeper when using this case study as an example to reinforce your conventional perspective. Yes, your right, on surface the most common tactical perception is that the common IDF Soldier lost their core competencies. However, if you peel the onion back you will find there is so much more to the financial state of the IDF, who the IDF leadership was at the time (hint- Air Force, Halutz), the complete restructuring of military doctrine and what effect that had on the military (i.e. EBO and SOD), and the military environment and immediate focus of the Gaza Strip. If you are short on time, I would suggest perusing the Winograd Report. Regardless please be careful of using this example unless you are aptly familiar some details of the conflict, because it makes your argument less credible. Good luck.

Junger, one of the two documentarists, is interviewed at length by Paul Reickoff. Many of the issues raised by commenters are addressed, and some answered. In broad strokes, Junger thinks our ISAF economy of force mission isolated a company that could be attacked at will, rather than a battalion blocking force securing a known infiltration route.

http://www.booktv.org/search.aspx?For=Restrepo
After Words: Sebastian Junger, "War"

A film, a book, an editorial, a think piece, the musical comedy adaptation. Each presentation is expected to be complete unto itself, complete within its four corners, unless something in the title or subtitle explicity warns the patron that it's incomplete or otherwise dependent on another presentation. That is a matter of fairness, but it's also good for enhancing profits by upselling to pleased patrons.

If Junger calls his documentary film Restrepo and his book War, how in hell am I supposed to make the connection on my own? Beyond that, do I care to subject myself to yet more depression at Junger's hand?

Eric, I find your comment totally bizarre. How can you as a military historian discount the interconnection of a film and a book, both that study the same action through different mediums? Tim Hetherington has the top billing for 'Restrepo' and Junger basically solo wrote 'War'. They are distinct but integral analyses of the unit involved in the Koregal fights.
And, you don't wish to view 'War' because Junger is making you more depressed? You miss the superb pychological analysis of the soldiers who fought. Junger's entire book leads up to the very last paragraph--the essence of the whole experience for those who served there. Your loss if this "depresses" you enough to avoid a very tough subject.
How did you ever complete"Fire in the Streets"?

My books speak for themselves, and I speak for myself. I'm here because I have an interest in, but not a fetish about, some of the topics that come up. And I truly admire the man who had the balls to call his book Fiasco.

That said, I don't feel I need to justify a difficult personal decision to a commenter who hides behind a handle, or in a place where that is the overwhelming norm. But I'm also not sure I would be so inclined if I knew everyone's real name. Would you have written a different post, or posted at all, if I was as anonymous as you?

I'll illuminate my precipitating comment only by saying that I worked on the side for many years as a developmental book editor and writing coach. As such, I have used the four-corners/complete-unto-itself doctrine--the bedrock of any good storytelling--scores of times to motivate unwilling or clueless authors to write better books. As a professional writer and long-time publisher, I'm extremely well aware of space and time limitations--which is to say financial considerations--but I find that forces me and the authors I hang out with to get to the point and stay there. I believe that filmmakers are obligated to buckle under to the same discipline.

Sir, I do not belittle your work. I have read many of your books and I have been a long time fan. Your quality of research and presentation is just superb. I was absolutely baffled however by your "depression" comment. I had gathered that you would just avoid reading 'War' because of what you saw in 'Restrepo'. It didn't make sense to me from an author of your caliber. In this case, I would most definitely agree that one needs to experience both 'War' and Restrepo' to gain the full picture of that operation and in particular, the minds of the troops who participated.
Yes, I guess I do hide too much with the GSF moniker, but not with any great intent.
My name is Derek Davey. I'm a former USMC officer--in a past life. I have been interested in your type of product as well as Tom Rick's and I profess a love of country. I look for ways and ideas to restore some sanity in our relations with the rest of the globe. Hence, I come here often.

As a former shooter-editor myself, we accept the audience reaction in all its variations, as the audience takes the movie in thru different filters. Raising questions is as valid as posing answers, and often more honest.

But there is a multi-dimensional conversation going on, between media, authors and audiences, over time. Take it or leave it.

Both movies and plays are incredibly restrictive, in terms of how much content can be included, or even inferred. A few hundred words each minute is all that fits. Every second of picture included shortens and forces others onto the cutting floor.

If I could figure out how, I'd condense my BD moniker to WW, since my initials tell you as much about me as my rather common name.

This stuff about hiding behind a moniker is BS. People use anonymity to protect their own interests. The internet is a dangerous place.

If you choose to share your name so be it. If you choose not to, so be it. It's helpful if you don't act like a child when relying on a pseudonym, but all of us fall prey to that sometimes (guilty as charged).

Regardless GSF, you don't owe anyone an explanation, and reveal far too much. There's too many crazies out there - plenty right here on this forum.

Kinda think I am one of the Crazies.

Eric Hammel I agree with you. I thought the CPT came off as arrogant and I didn't get the feeling he gave a damn about the Afghanis or had the time to show them proper respect as HUMANS. He just barges in with no sense.

What he appears to be clueless about is that the Afghanis have seen this all before. They don't give a crap that this guy is new, what his name is that is is different from the last guy. He's going to be gone in 12-months and then they'll have to deal with some new arrogant piece of work from the US Army.

This CPT is punching the ticket as well. I'm sure he doesn't want to be there. Its looks to me they are all in survival mode, counting down the days until the tour is over. The Army isn't fostering ingenuity -- it looks like you can't even fart with out the BTN and BDE giving you permission first.

So you do your time. Punch the ticket. Get your medal. Make your daddy proud. Next.

Its as though the US has created an assembly line for war.

The troops do look cool in their body armor, dangling accouterments, and sunglasses, but they have the same combat awareness as a tank without its crew aboard.

In seminars I've run for Marines I use the example of the Crusades. Armored knights on horseback live in invulnerable mountain fortresses but must come down to patrol the conquered land. Unarmored natives, play the role of cowed bumpkins, but they watch and they wait. When a handful of them are able, the cull a knight by taking down his weapons system's most vulnerable component: his horse. Then they gang up on the man trapped in his heavy armor. When the knight is on the ground, as agile as a turtle on its back, the attackers rip off certain pieces of his armor, assault his person, and leave as he bleeds to death.

That is exactly how the Tenth Century men we sneer at in Afghanistan kill so many of our young: They use anti-Crusader tactics a thousand years old to cull, knock down, and bleed our armored knights on ground that gains us nothing to hold.

So Eric Hammel, besides pissing and moaning, has anyone found out why unit SOPs such as evidenced in the movie were de-rigueur? Are commands risk aversive to allowing small unit leaders to peal-off body armor as appropriate to the situation. Was skills training halted just because they were in country, etc?

Possibly the camera crew only filmed selective scenes that were more in the nature of a goat-roap, to depict the turmoil and toil of small unit IW, and don't show the full story?

I think there might be something inherent in the outlook of a modern army (whenever "modern" is; it could be a Roman legion or older) that leads to delusions of grandeur when that army is far abroad among less-well-developed people. Something called hubris. Whatever it takes to send and support an army far from home, in a land less developed than home, seems to induce hubris. History is full of examples.

I only mentioned the Crusades. But what about the drubbing the ancestors of today's "11th Century" Afghan fighters meted out to Alexander's modern army?

Twenty years ago we were crowing about our clever strategy for impoverishing the Soviet Union through its war in Afghanistan. Do we still listen to news of our own impoverishment, right now, via our current wars of choice? Do we no longer look back over a forty-five year event horizon to see the futility of a guns-and-butter society supporting another generation of innocents abroad? Will passive-aggressive Chinese and Russian (and maube EU) leaders crow when we have broken our own bank?

What to do beyond pissing and moaning. If the generals don't learn the fundamentals when they are young, don't renew their knowledge or upgrade their skill sets, if they exempt themselves from the possibility of hubris or stupidity or delusion, if they don't train their young, and if they lie, lie, lie in the face of stark universal truths, what the hell can anyone do beyond attempting to divert them and the unschooled political class they gleefully serve as long as the baubles and honors flow? As long as the nation doesn't slip too much farther into the abyss while they are on watch.

The crap masquerading as prudent leadership in Central Asia is an old story, as old as armies on the move through other people's land. Certainly as old as ambition and vainglory. Do I need to cite the Varusschalct of 9 AD, the first comeuppance of Rome's vaunted legions in the wilds of what is now Hessia in Germany? If you comprehend that locals under occupation invariably watch and wait and learn before they spring, then there is something instructive in the fate of the Roman proconsul Varus.

It's all there to see, to use, to guide. Here's a clue: In an impoverished, war-ravaged nation, self-sufficient men living on nature's bounty--alongside what must be highly disciplined environmental planning--in a largely isolated mountain valley have been able to prevail against human predators for so long that they still speak their own language, still live by their own rules and doctrines, still prosper within their own standards. Without giving up much in the way of that prosperity, and certainly in no danger of selling their souls, they are able to wage their own private valley-wide war against invaders from as near as Kabul and as far as Kansas, able to force the invaders into hiding on most days. We shouldn't be at war with them; they embody our own heroic dreams of rugged individualists living on a frontier, providing for family and neighbors, praying to their god their way, giving their all for the sanctity of the next generation. They =are= what we only fantasize we could be. These are the people we fight? Whose bright idea was that?

ERIC HAMMEL provides us with an interesting historical brief from Publius Quinctilius Varus’s defeat at the hands of Germanic tribes. I won’t get into the details of the battle in the Teutoberg Wald (9 AD) near modern Osnabrück (Kalkriese Hill), Germany, but add that the defeat, indeed, utter obliteration of the XVII, XVIII & XIX Legions was masterminded by a Romanized German by the name of Arminius whom Varus implicitly trusted.

What is interesting about this whole bloody affair is that Rome had more than sixty years of experience in dealing with the Germanic tribes and frequently used them as auxiliaries to their own Legionary forces. Mix hubris, complacency and intelligence failures (in this case Varus was warned of treachery before hand by Segestes a Romanized noble German Chieftain) and you have complete catastrophe.

There is a lesson here. Armies that are full of themselves, preening and arrogant, are often fatally vulnerable and eventually humbled by opponents who may not enjoy elaborate sophistication in material and technique. History is replete with such examples.

the CPT's stuff isn't going to stink. Check out the family history.

I think a few of the commentators above could benefit from the book before judging everyone on select shots from the documentary.

This unit was the tip of the spear for quite some time and produced the Army's most recent MOH awardee.

Read the book. The cow was compensated for in a nearly Solomon like decision that even the locals understood.

"there is a heavy emphasis of the warrior mentality that seems to place leaders like Major Kearney as the prime example of the kick ass commander who makes sure all of his guys are safe regardless of what happens to the outsiders"

Which is why we will never win the war in Afghanistan.

I'm fine with military leaders being critizied by civilians who have and haven't served in the military and Afghanistan. Everyone has the right to their own opinion and many civilian military commentators are much smarter than I.

A COIN observation: it's easy to stand on the moral high ground that you are going to "hug" the locals regardless of any actions they are or aren't taking (and be that leader the posters above admire). I agree to a degree as I grew up under GEN Mattis's, "No greater friend, no worse enemy" view on COIN. The real issue comes when you are trying to gain the trust of locals while minimizing force employed(in situations that might effect locals) while your men are dieing. Some men/leaders can stomach more of their own men's blood being spilled for the greater good of the mission than others can(which I'm pretty sure Nate Fick listed as the reason he left the USMC, among other reasons). If you can make it through the initial pain/sacrifice, things get better(hopefully). Many experts, such as Bing West, argue that a key COIN won't ever be successful without continued application of force on the enemy.

Many leaders, for good reason, are sickened at the sight of their men dieing and decide that they are going to focus on killing the enemy, which will provide space and time for the ANA/ANP/govt to establish control(hopefully).

If you think the locals in Konar gave a F*CK about what MAJ Kearney did say, didn't say, or could have said, you have never been to that valley.

Finally Tom in regards to your concern about MAJ Kearney not spending enough time taking the fight to the enemy, I would venture to say the enemy never lacked for attention when MAJ K was there.