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Friend of the blog Paula Broadwell is knocking around Afghanistan, checking out operations, and visiting some West Point buddies, and will be filing occasional dispatches in the coming weeks. Here's the first installment.

By Paula Broadwell
Best Defense Afghanistan correspondent

It was early October and Combined Joint Task Force 1-320th was licking their wounds. A week earlier, 1-320th had just lost several KIA and WIA soldiers from heavy fighting in the Taliban-infested Arghandab River Valley. After suffering the tragic losses and the horrific daily amputees throughout week, the men were terrified to go back into the pomegranate orchards to continue clearing their AO; it seemed like certain death. The Taliban had planted IEDs in a dense pattern throughout their AO, and even the commander, LTC David Flynn, was concerned about the potential loss of life, but they could not afford to lose momentum.

The artillery unit, acting as a provisional infantry battalion, went on the offensive to clear a village, Tarok Kalache, where the Taliban had conducted an intimidation campaign to chase the villagers out, then create a staging base to attack 1-320th's outposts. The village of Tarok Kalache was laden with IEDs and homemade explosives (HME) comprised of 50-gal drums of deadly munitions. Special Operations forces conducted a successful clearing raid on the village. Then Flynn introduced the Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC), a rocket-projected explosive line charge which provides a "close-in" breaching capability for maneuver forces. The plan was for one team to clear a 600-meter path with MICLICs from one of his combat outposts to Tarok Kalache. "It was the only way I could give the men confidence to go back out."

On October 6, Flynn's unit approved use of HIMARS, B-1, and A-10s to drop 49,200 lbs. of ordnance on the Taliban tactical base of Tarok Kalache, resulting in NO CIVCAS. Their clearance of Babur, Khosrow Sofla, Charqolba Sofla, and other villages commenced October 7, aided by USSF, ABP, and an additional infantry company from B/1-22 IN. Not long after, Flynn shared one insight into the burden of command: "I literally cringed when we dropped bombs on these places -- not because I cared about the enemy we were killing or the HME destroyed, but I knew the reconstruction would consume the remainder of my deployed life."

Flynn had received immediate guidance from his chain of command in November that there was a full-scale push to rebuild the villages. GEN Petraeus had visited the site in December and told Flynn he could approve up to $1 million projects. The DCO for 4th ID, LTC Vic Garcia, was able to rally support from the PRT, USAID, district governor, provincial water and land officials, Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP), and 1-320th to discuss the rebuilding effort.

Flynn's "build" approach was an inclusive one. Flynn also wanted a true GIRoA solution, demanding that all the Afghans from the village work this issue together, led by their malik. His concern was that the Afghans would run away with CERP funding and no homes would be rebuilt with the funds they had handed over. The build and compensation initiatives required careful oversight.

Compensation for "clearing" operations is not simple. Land ownership is a complex issue in Afghanistan, especially land purchased from the government. Very few landowners or tenants in the rural areas have deeds, and the provincial ministries will not issue a deed unless there is proof the owner paid taxes in the past.

The Task Force's reconstruction team had already spent hours in meetings in October and November with the people of Tarok Kalash and on the ground staking out the property lines and garnering consensus on who owned what. "We've had all the people vetted by the District Governor to verify that they are the true landowners." Second, land valuation is another challenge across the theater. Contractors exhibit a propensity to shoot for the moon on their estimates, gouging coalition forces unless the commander is wise enough to vet those sources as well. A third constraint is that ISAF law dictates that units can only compensate up to $10K per person for battle damage. The challenge with this is that there is unequal land and property distribution across nearly all villages in Afghanistan; one Afghan may own eight village compounds, while the majority of others own one or two. Flynn sought inputs from the villagers in Reconstruction Shuras to try to ensure they felt ownership in the rebuild effort.

By mid-December, Flynn's team had also evaluated and assessed damage to the ditch irrigation, the roads, the mosques, and the homes. During the December visit with GEN Petraeus, they had discussed planting pomegranate seedlings and alternative (faster-generating) commodity crops such as saffron to replace the pomegranate fruit trees destroyed in the process. He recognized that the villagers needed to regain some form of livelihood and incorporated the crop regeneration into his overall rebuild plan.

On that December visit, Petraeus commended Flynn's efforts and relayed to MG James Terry, the RC-SOUTH commanding general, to take a similar approach to what 1-320th was doing on a grander scale as it applies to the districts north of Arghandab. Flynn was confident in his unit's measures: "As of today, more of the local population talks to us and the government than talk to the Taliban, who provide no services to the people," claimed Flynn. "My goal now is to ensure we rapidly show some evidence of new structures or else the Taliban will nuke us with the 'information operations gun' in the spring and we have the potential to face additional fighters unnecessarily." Reconstruction for a mosque and groundbreaking for a new house begin this month.

On January 1, Flynn spoke with his biggest doubter in the village, "Mohammad," and re-emphasized that he "will not rest until his village is built." Mohammad, who in a fit of theatrics had accused Flynn of ruining his life after the demolition, acknowledged as he witnessed the groundbreaking that he did not believe the rebuild would happen until that very moment.

Earlier this week, a GIRoA delegation led by President Karzai's advisor, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz, said Afghan and foreign forces caused unreasonable damage to homes and orchards and displaced a number of people. Indeed, clearing operations are a necessary evil to weed out the Taliban, and they often leave devastating destruction in the wake. But what Aziz failed to note is the tremendous effort some units, like 1-320th, have made to rebuild his country. As of today, reconstruction efforts are well on track for Tarok Kalache and others in his AO. Mosque construction is underway, the irrigation canals and culverts are being restored, and the local government has been an active participant in the process of assisting the people of the village in rebuilding their homes. Just last week, the district governor, Shah Mohammed, signed land deeds for all 14 landowners of the village which will set the conditions for future land titles to be issued -- something that only happens in Kandahar City now. In the coming days, the villagers will be compensated and meet with local contractors approved by the district governor to begin rebuilding the homes. As Flynn likes to say to his troops, "Time to 'getterdun.'"

Paula Broadwell, a research associate at the Harvard Center for Public Leadership, is the author of the forthcoming (Penguin Press, 2011) book, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus. She will be blogging from Afghanistan through February.

Photos courtesy of Paula Broadwell

 

RAYFIN3

1:06 PM ET

January 13, 2011

salvation from above

“Destroying the village to save it.” Have we heard this story before? And no civilian casualties! I can think of a number of small towns and cities in this country that might be amenable to this type of urban renewal.

 

JPWREL

1:14 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Paula Broadwell writes:

Paula Broadwell writes: “Indeed, clearing operations are a necessary evil to weed out the Taliban, and they often leave devastating destruction in the wake.” Firstly, I suspect our forces flatter themselves on the effectiveness of operations like this. It’s likely the Taliban were not destroyed or at least most of them weren’t and are circulating in the vicinity. Also, they probably have some brand new recruits infuriated that Americans came to their village and using 24 tons of high explosives blew it to kingdom come.

If I was a twenty-year old Afghan whose home had been vaporized by people from the other side of the planet I know what I would be doing to seek vengeance. My guess in the great scheme of things this event will be accretive to the great swelling failure of our entire effort in that land despite the well-meaning efforts of LTC David Flynn and the brave soldiers under his command. I am looking forward to more breathless accounts from Ms. Broadwell on our march to victory in Afghanistan.

 

RVN SF VET

4:37 AM ET

January 14, 2011

PLANT IEDs AND WE WILL BLOW THEM AWAY

Screw your interpretation of COIN. The locals planted the IEDs for money or permitted them to be planted. Using USMC line charges to clear paths is optimal. Not sure about the bombing, although 25T isn't that much. Why were aerial bombs used? Pockets of resistance?

It is anathema to use contractors. Are there Republicans living in Afghanistan? Why are we always seeing the word contractor? The people must only be given the necessary construction materials. They can do the building as they have done for centuries. The only people who get cash are the local laborers who would otherwise be paid to plant IEDs. If you dispense money, it lends itself to skimming and corruption. Just give the local shura 15% more than the project requires. An old AID formula. Afghanistan is not Iraq, it is Vietnam. The Taliban, all alleged 35,000 of them, are less likely to blow up structures and wells in which the people have sweat equity. Why are we buying land for local projects - more Republicans? In RVN we had manuals on how to build everything likely to be needed at the village/hamlet level. Engineer sergeants can advise on construction. No contractors.

The methods depicted by the author are devised by fools who cannot read history. Because a war was lost does not mean that all its tactics and methodologies are invalid. We are not training our officers and NCOs for this rebuilding task. More fools in TRADOC, FORSCOM, and DOD? Being Gung Ho has never been a replacement for being wise. We must get our heads out of our 4th point of contact and this includes unduly self-confident 4 star generals.

 

JONESGP1996

12:49 PM ET

January 16, 2011

Contractors

Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, our definition of the word "contractor" has morphed beyond recognition. In this case, I think the author intends contractor to mean what it used to mean: an independent businessman who does work. The term we use when discussing the Afghan engineering firms that do CERP projects for us is "contractor." It's just easier to use, and it has nothing to do with BAE, KBR, or any of those other kinds of "contractors."

 

JAYLEMEUX

12:39 AM ET

January 19, 2011

Necessary indeed

Did the people not have sweat equity in the homes that were destroyed?

Does the chain of causation allow for consideration of why the IEDs were emplanted or whether they will be replanted after the village is rebuilt at our expense? Or does our military analysis just start from the assumption that evil is responsible and end with the certainty of that evil's destruction given sufficient resources?

Do we care about Afghans and human rights or not? Do we assume that they will be grateful for our leveling and then rebuilding their bomb-laden every worldly possession or is this just an acceptable side effect of shielding Americans from the misfortune of a couple terrorist attacks per decade (since it is just to be taken for granted that the end will follow from the means)?

Both of my grandparents on my mother's side died from smoking-related diseases (emphysema and lung cancer). Over 440,000 Americans are killed from the same every year. Have we announced our campaign to raid and bomb Phillip Morris headquarters and to convert Southern tobacco farmers to pomegranates?

 

GEO FRICK FRACK

1:18 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Have SNOPES check this one

A blog post by the credulous for the credulous. If the kinetic ops and the reconstruction ops really are this easy, then the view on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan would be different.

 

ADMIRAL

9:07 PM ET

January 14, 2011

••• Flattening people’s homes

••• Flattening people’s homes creates reconstruction jobs in Afghanistan. Now, this might seem abhorrent, but “what would become of the glaziers if panes of glass were never broken?”
http://www.warisbusiness.com/features/bullet-points/pictures-from-afghanistan/

 

HAIRYSTEVE20

3:44 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Doublespeak

Does this woman write speeches for Sarah Palin?

 

TYRTAIOS

4:16 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Lieutenant Colonel Flynn may

Lieutenant Colonel Flynn may see a new town rebuilt. . . .maybe even before he rotates. I’ll also give Flynn some credit, as he understood the destroyed orchards, if replanted , would take time to mature, and in the mean time, he thought about an alternate, faster maturing crop.

However, we probably had a several thousand years old town and cultural microcosm wiped-out with 24.6 tons of aerially delivered ordnance. A small cultural slice of Afghanistan that once earned a livelyhood, handed down from one generation to another as traditional pomegranate producers, and now America is going to have these Afghans become saffron farmers

This episode of LtCol Flynn’s endeavor of leading cannibalized artilleryman turned into a provincial infantry battalion as described in Mademoiselle Broadwell's breath taking account sounds like everyone took a page out of the old Soviet-Afgan War manual instead of the COIN colonial field manual?

 

TYRTAIOS

8:30 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Slow down KUNINO, this

Slow down KUNINO, this doesn’t fall into the category of a war crime. To be clear, Broadwell brings us into the narrative without all the background details and complete time-line, but we must assume the inhabitants were warned and given adequate time to evacuate along with their belongings (along with the Taliban also is my bet).

My real point is if we are going to conduct a counter-insurgency, than we should plan on a slow long slog where results will be dawdling to materialize. My sense of it is Gen. Petraeus is under pressure to show results, and is now willing to sacrifice his sacrosanct COIN tactics for more immediate results involving combat power.

I would have liked to have seen them move in and isolate the village, letting the same ethnicity of Afgan Army personnel do the dirty work at a minimum who would be seen as the culprits, if in fact this village had to be destroyed, which my distant experience tell me is never a good idea in the long run.

 

TYRTAIOS

7:42 PM ET

January 14, 2011

KUNINO, peace be upon you.

KUNINO, peace be upon you. You offer-up far more questions than you answer. Please allow me to ask you two questions:

1) Do you think LtCol Flynn, upon rebuilding the village, will install advanced secondary combustion system EPA certified wood stoves in each home?

2) Is Steely Dan a guy or a Band?

Feel free to call me anytime 24/7 at 812-473-PRAY. And remember, Jesus loves you!

 

ADMIRAL

7:51 PM ET

January 14, 2011

The whole war is a crime

Just another example of a war criminal justifying their fellow war criminals.

"To keep our honor clean"

 

GIANGENTILE

4:37 PM ET

January 13, 2011

in what capacity (role) does she write?

I am just trying to figure out in what capacity is Ms Broadwell writing:

as a scholar
as a think tank analyst
as an embedded reporter with a us unit
as an operational scribe
some combination of all of the above

what?

gian

 

HUNTER

5:06 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Almost totally offtopic

COl Gentile,
Along the lines of your question of Ms. Broadwell. When last we blogged here I asked you how you bylined your articles etc. Thanks for the advice back then. My paper was accepted for publication (likely in July). I took your advice and annotated it similarly to your method and added the standard Army disclaimer "these views are my own and...blah, blah, blah." My boss is also reading it so I think I will have covering fire if I need it. Finally, I'll be heading to Carlisle this summer for more book learning.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

6:26 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Carlisle

Hunter-

Whatever gas I've given you times past, I wish you the best at Carlisle. I'm a creature of National, but regardless of the school, the five senior service colleges are the jewels of PME. Best advice for your year are statements made by two presidents of NDU, John Pustay LtGen USAF when I arrived as a National student, and Brad Hosmer LtGen USAF who was there when I was on faculty:

Pustay: "Shake some steeples!"

Hosmer: "Never be afraid to take risks with ideas!"

Break a leg, shipmate. You have a great year ahead of you.

 

HUNTER

8:13 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Thanks COL G

I appreciate the fine words and advice.

I am still hoping to parley for National/ICAF or a fellowship. I already have the Post-Hole Digger so I might be able to make the case. But if not I'll be content and happy to join the long line at USAWC. You should know by now that shaking steeples and taking risks is well within my repertoire. No matter where, I am sure it will be fun.

Good news is I'll be much closer to USMA, I'll stop in and rattle your office for research materials.

 

RVN SF VET

4:43 AM ET

January 14, 2011

HOW DOES IT MATTER?

And who cares? She is either accurate or inaccurate, biased or unbiased, right or wrong. She does not matter, it's her competence or incompetence that matters.

 

HUNTER

3:41 PM ET

January 14, 2011

Speaking for COL Gentile

I think his concern is like mine that Ms. nee MAJ Broadwell seems to be wearing multiple hats when she is writing - which is ok as long as there is no conflict of interest, or loss of perspective.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

8:40 PM ET

January 13, 2011

Ah, ICAF...

...the government's senior spot-welding institute...

 

HUNTER

3:38 PM ET

January 14, 2011

Gosh Rubber Duck

I just can't win with you, can I? Here I am trying to get my "jointness" on and you're still throwing rocks. Just kidding.

The fact is, I already have a PhD, so getting another Masters from USAWC may or may not be useful. ICAF would directly support not only my military job but also my civilian one. Since my employer is going to be doing without me yet again, it's nice to take them into consideration.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

5:30 AM ET

January 14, 2011

Enemy explosives are still there for salvage, along with metals

The destruction looks biblical in its finality, quite a breathtaking example. It seems unlikely that all the enemy ordnance described was destroyed, as opposed to buried and scattered by the bombing.

Metal has been scavenged from ruins, as part of the cycle of war, since both were invented in central Asia. If the alternative is slow freezing malnutrition, salvaging metal and marketable explosives might seem worth the risk of a few teenagers.

I suggest that Ms Broadwell's journal be accepted for what it is, gratefully. Without attacking a messenger who's gone where I cannot. My active duty family tell us that interaction with the locals, even on base, is rare to impossible, prohibited and unwise for most.

We get one side of the story, or none at all. I do wonder how 'no CIVCAS' is warranteed, with full confidence.

 

ADMIRAL

8:15 PM ET

January 14, 2011

Never forget that everything

Never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was legal.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

 

OLIVER CHETTLE

10:48 PM ET

January 14, 2011

If foreigners came and blew

If foreigners came and blew up my house here in England, I would hate them even if they rebuilt it better. It wouldn't be the home I had known, my security and dignity would have been destroyed, and presumably I would have lost most of my possessions of sentimental value. I strongly suspect that Paula Broadwell and David Flynn would both feel the same way. So why do they expect Afghans to be different?

 

ADMIRAL

1:14 AM ET

January 15, 2011

So why do they expect Afghans to be different?

Because it was the Americans that killed them and their children, and they should thank the Americans for making their lives a living hell. And when the Americans kill your family, you should feel good about it. If you don't, then you will be taken to a secret prison and tortured until you do.

 

BILL KELLER

10:35 AM ET

January 15, 2011

Had it not been for the color in the picture..

this could be misidentified as a post surgery pathology review. Was it misidentified? Do we do reviews or self evaluation any more?

 

TIM GI

3:58 AM ET

January 16, 2011

Victory through sycophantic journalism

When I first saw this article I thought the photos had their captions reversed. In my world and my understanding of our goals in Afghanistan, I thought that the vibrant green village was the end state we were looking for. However, I guess bombed out, flattened, dust bowls are our actual goals. As with all articles by Paula this one fails to not disappoint. (that's exactly as I meant it to read).

Keep in mind that she has been chosen by Petreaus to write his biography. She has unlimited access to him and it seems that someone who is looking at making a lot of money off this access is reluctant to say anything other than the positive. She seems to have exchanged her West Point track uniform for a Petreaus cheerleader uniform.

Her other agenda seems to be not painting herself into a corner for a post-war political job. If you notice she doesn't ever take a firm stance on either side. She rolls right down the middle being careful not have any strong opinions that might hurt her in any future job interviews. Her articles are like non-fat, unsweetened, frozen vanilla yogurt. It looks like something good and takes up space, but in the end you're completely un-fulfilled and un-satisfied.

 

DONNA

3:24 PM ET

January 16, 2011

Success story

The fact that someone as educated, experienced and close to General Petraeus as Paula Broadwell actually considers the story described above a success that is suitable to justify the air-raiding of villages and to describe the progress of our troops in Afghanistan is highly alarming and another indication that this war was lost a long time ago.

 

DOMNULEDOCTOR

5:12 PM ET

January 16, 2011

Propagacademia from Petraeus Peanut Gallery of "experts"

I don't know if Paula Broadwell is anything special or just another Kimberly Kagan, a Petraeus Peanut Gallery propagandist; but the following statement: "We've had all the people vetted by the District Governor to verify that they are the true landowners," leaves me wondering. After all, it was her beloved Petraeus who defined the Afghan Gov as "a criminal syndicate" and the claim it officially made that:

"Earlier this week, a GIRoA delegation led by President Karzai's advisor, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz, said Afghan and foreign forces caused unreasonable damage to homes and orchards and displaced a number of people. Indeed, clearing operations are a necessary evil to weed out the Taliban, and they often leave devastating destruction in the wake. But what Aziz failed to note is the tremendous effort some units, like 1-320th, have made to rebuild his country."

is sort of the "criminal syndicate" explaining that Petraeus had to destroy everything these people had in order to save them for a future life under Aziz’s "criminal syndicate."

Tom Ricks seems to have undergone some weird convolutions and I don't know why. But I would suggest he reads some of his own stuff before endorsing the wondrous Petraeus Peanut Gallery.

"Rebuilding" in one man's eyes may be insult on injury in another's-- especially if the destroyer is a foreign infidel and the victim a person who lost everything tying him to his own past. I'd love to see Braudwell's thesis defense; will it be as perfunctory as that at Princeton for Petraeus's appalling thesis? This piece all sells like a lot of Petraeusisms saying that these Afghans were so glad we bombed their village in order to rebuild them a brand new one. Well, Broadwell wasn't in the village or of it, like the victims of the bombing. She's reporting Flynn's “unbiased” account....that a way to go girl, reeeeeal scholarship!

9/11 is the only time her country suffered demolition bombing. Is she happy alQaeda did that so those two buildings-- proving to have been a real estate bust-- will be replaced by a shinny new glass structure?

Yep, Americans have reached such a level of anomie toward Afghans that, as opposed to during the Vietnam War, they can believe such hokum since they can say: "ah well, ain't my kid going to war.". Alas, my dear, we as a people have just been had by Wall Street and your tune sounds too much like what so recently screwed us all real bad. Of course, Petraeus's concern is how to keep his war going until the Taliban dies of exhaustion. In his mind Vietnam was lost because we didn't devote the decades necessary to outlast insurgents (read his PhD thesis), hence his pathetic Peanut Gallery propagandists since his first surge.

LTC Flynn might note that he's the foreigner in Afghanistan, not the Taliban; and, he's killing and destroying to get even for the suffering of his expeditionary corps, not that of Afghans; and then justifies it as to serve the "legit" Karzai Gov. I only want to ask if the Koolaid at the Pentagon is so slow release, making it sooooo long lasting that he can keep believing this stuff instead of realizing that there is no other rhyme of reason for what he did than delay the inevitable Vietnam repeat, departure with tail between legs.

Given that our national leadership can't decide whether it wants to go after the Taliban and nation-build Afghanistan in our image or just to destroy alQaeda, I would say Flynn destroys senselessly for there is no national strategy to all this, just careerism for guys who might otherwise be pink-slipped as after Vietnam. Note that this is not some civilian notion and not new:

http://forum-network.org/lecture/iraq-beyond-boston-review-ideas-matter-event

Petraeus's war toys were, like all the imported American trinkets we enjoy, bought on loans from China. Imagine they foreclosing on the debt and leaving Petraeus toyless. Meanwhile, he enjoys continuation of the Bush-it Pentagon that spent for his war off-budget as if nobody pays. Someone way up there, not just Ricks and Broadwell may be smoking something strange. Imagine that your son or daughter were in combat risking life and limb for this clueless strategy-less now decade running chaos.

 

RVN SF VET

10:45 PM ET

January 17, 2011

Each Village Is Unique

There are ambivalent villages that cherish there independence and support neither the government nor the Taliban. We could reinforce their independence and help train a self-defense force. If they are llike the folks in the Korengal Valley, they depise anyone who enters their area and almost tell you to your face that they will fight you. Perhaps they should be bypassed? Do they permit Taliban activity and passage? Should they be relocated?

There are villages where you can feel the hatred and they support the Taliban. Do what they did in Malaya - relocate them into a virtual prison rather than blow them up. Then fight the Taliban in that space where they have lost local logistical and intel support.

There are villages where they are accepting of development efforts and do not want the Taliban in their area. Welcome to COIN land where you can help them defend their village and dig wells, etc.

During the time when you are determining the villages orientation, there will be fighting and IEDs. If these are "bad" people, why bomb them into oblivion or destroy their homes? Move them out to a village inside wire far away from there homes. Kill the Taliban in the area if they stay around.

If we use conventional tactics while the people are there supporting the Taliban, we will become the Russians and flatten the village and kill the people. These tactics will poison the well and the word will get out that we are not different from the Russians. This will consolidate all types of Afghans against us and we will either kill them or be forced out.

In RVN most villagers wanted everybody to leave them alone, but would accept aid and the creation of self-defense units. The only other type of village was where they despised you and the government. In the Delta, we were usually able to to just bypass them and/or search for caches and move on. Elsewhere in RVN, conventional units often destroyed the structures leaving behind people reinforced in their VC support.which certainly does not fit thye broad spectrum of situations they face. Ironically, they have been exposed to these variables on the ground. What they need is to discuss case studies led by other experienced leaders. Yes, they must t5ake an unconventional warfare approach complement by *some* area studies. Has the incomplete memory of the Vietnam experience so blinded the military to those few things that worked in RVN? We are deploying uninformed leaders. They are intellectually unarmed.

Although I did not provide shades of gray, that's pretty much the landscape and the contrast with RVN. Now, do our commanders treat each village as a unique challenge or do we use one alleged COIN template? Everyone is not going to come out and play and they certainly are not going to look to the mirage of a central government. Frankly, many seem naive or cynical in their efforts. Are you doing COIN -Yes sir! No one appears to be asking, "What can we do in this particular village?"

If you think my models are simplistic, look at what some of our untrained commanders are doing. What school do we send our leaders to before commanding in Afghanistan? None. We need a school environment in which leaders discuss these issues prior to what is now redeployment. They have not had this chance. All they appear to have is a COIN bible

 

RVN SF VET

10:48 PM ET

January 17, 2011

Each Village Is Unique

There are ambivalent villages that cherish there independence and support neither the government nor the Taliban. We could reinforce their independence and help train a self-defense force. If they are llike the folks in the Korengal Valley, they depise anyone who enters their area and almost tell you to your face that they will fight you. Perhaps they should be bypassed? Do they permit Taliban activity and passage? Should they be relocated?

There are villages where you can feel the hatred and they support the Taliban. Do what they did in Malaya - relocate them into a virtual prison rather than blow them up. Then fight the Taliban in that space where they have lost local logistical and intel support.

There are villages where they are accepting of development efforts and do not want the Taliban in their area. Welcome to COIN land where you can help them defend their village and dig wells, etc.

During the time when you are determining the villages orientation, there will be fighting and IEDs. If these are "bad" people, why bomb them into oblivion or destroy their homes? Move them out to a village inside wire far away from there homes. Kill the Taliban in the area if they stay around.

If we use conventional tactics while the people are there supporting the Taliban, we will become the Russians and flatten the village and kill the people. These tactics will poison the well and the word will get out that we are not different from the Russians. This will consolidate all types of Afghans against us and we will either kill them or be forced out.

In RVN most villagers wanted everybody to leave them alone, but would accept aid and the creation of self-defense units. The only other type of village was where they despised you and the government. In the Delta, we were usually able to to just bypass them and/or search for caches and move on. Elsewhere in RVN, conventional units often destroyed the structures leaving behind people reinforced in their VC support.which certainly does not fit thye broad spectrum of situations they face. Ironically, they have been exposed to these variables on the ground. What they need is to discuss case studies led by other experienced leaders. Yes, they must t5ake an unconventional warfare approach complement by *some* area studies. Has the incomplete memory of the Vietnam experience so blinded the military to those few things that worked in RVN? We are deploying uninformed leaders. They are intellectually unarmed.

Although I did not provide shades of gray, that's pretty much the landscape and the contrast with RVN. Now, do our commanders treat each village as a unique challenge or do we use one alleged COIN template? Everyone is not going to come out and play and they certainly are not going to look to the mirage of a central government. Frankly, many seem naive or cynical in their efforts. Are you doing COIN -Yes sir! No one appears to be asking, "What can we do in this particular village?"

If you think my models are simplistic, look at what some of our untrained commanders are doing. What school do we send our leaders to before commanding in Afghanistan? None. We need a school environment in which leaders discuss these issues prior to what is now redeployment. They have not had this chance. All they appear to have is a COIN bible

 

MODERATE

7:26 PM ET

January 19, 2011

Misleading Author Description

To give the appearance of objectivity and scholarship perhaps, the article describes Paula Broadwell as a researcher associated with Harvard. In fact she is a career military officer and counter terrorism employee. In other words, she is one of the fine mercenaries our military system has developed in the absence of a draft. You can see her bio here:
http://wiis.georgetown.edu/about/eb/#Paula_Broadwell

Saying she is merely a researcher associated with Harvard is deceptive, dishonest journalism. She clearly has a bias, based on the industry in which she works. This would be like an executive of Dow Chemical writing an op-ed piece about the EPA, identifying himself as a "concerned parent."

 

HEARTPRIVACY

11:15 PM ET

January 20, 2011

And Americans wonder why the world hates us

And Americans wonder why the world hates us. This is why. This flippant, dismissive attitude towards those pathetic people's "mud huts" as if we were a child kicking an ant hill rather than destroying human beings' homes. It is appalling, disgusting, shameful, and horrifying.

It must be nice to be Paula Broadwell, to laugh at poor people's sad lives and then go home to her posh, well-appointed house in an expensive DC suburb. It must be nice to make a fortune off the misery and misfortune of other human beings. I don't know how she sleeps at night, to be honest.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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