Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

Mookie is back in Iraq.

Relevantly, Joel Wing analyzes rumors that Maliki promised the Sadrists the governorships of four southern provinces in Iraq. "On the other hand," Wing notes soberly, "he could renege on his promises as he's done with others in the past."

Move along, nothing to see here, says the vice president. Joe Biden assures the Wall Street Journal's hard-working Gerald Seib that, "The really untold story here is the Iranians had virtually no influence." That would be good news if it were true. But given Biden's multi-year track record as a counter-indicator on events in Iraq … I mean, wrong in '91, wrong in '03, wrong in '07.

Let's see what comes out of the Iranian foreign minister's visit today. No slapping!

Here is Wing's told ya so, Joe.

Jayel Aheram/Flickr

EXPLORE:MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, IRAQ
 

STEVE358

1:20 PM ET

January 5, 2011

Yes

Tom:

Of course it is.

I have the maps and history.

Iraq is becoming what it was in the past. City-states, shifting spheres with competing influences from Turkey, Iran, and the Kurds straddling each to maintain hegemony in their sectors.

The Sunni speaker is from Mosul, while the other Sunni provinces (created and/or substantially recarved by Saddam, give way to the old system similar to the Ottoman administrative structure.

Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and the Kurdish areas. Each with their own districts (10 total districts). Each district (and even the provinces themselves) had its own hierarchy and line of organization, which changed from time to time.

Varying degrees of autonomy, and varying degrees of power within shifting provinces, districts and sub-districts. The Ottomans changed the structure about every 10 years or so to address shifting influences. Post-Ottoman Iraq only did it every few decades or so.

Sammara was under Baghdad, as was Tikrit, although influences played back and forth at the margins between Mosul and Baghdad regions.

The central government's role, even back to Ottoman days, was limited, except for intermittent "inspirations" of administrative re-organization and investment (reopen the canals, built the Baghdad Railway to Berlin to bypass the British P&O steamer monopoly on trade.

Always, always, the country was a boundary line between Iran and the West, and the lines shifted, so the residents had to play along.

What's new here?

Ultimately, Iraqis will continue to sift and resift this sand to suit any combination of imperatives, as they emerge and change.

Any competent review of the administrative histories of these areas would understand immediately that our notions of stable internal political administration through clearly defined provincial structures of constant and equal status is just foolishness.

Ottoman systems were, at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, managed and directed by a complex and sophisticated system of local "notables" and ministerial "technocrats" who created various checks and balances of their own dimensions for every major initiative.

Iraq must emerge, evolve in its own ways, and they will not look like what the US structured.

Same lessons not learned in Afghanistan, with a similar, but unique, administrative history. You can't administer these places in the same way as Cedar Rapids, Iowa. They are not the same thing, and our misguided efforts will continue to be unravelled.

That unravelling our "thing," has nothing to do with the fact that they will, in their own ways and with their own processes, find their way into the future.

Stephen Donnelly
Former Senior Urban Planning Advisor, Iraq Reconstruction

 

JPWREL

1:29 PM ET

January 5, 2011

One of the more insightful

One of the more insightful and realistic responses I have ever read on FP concerning the evolution of post-Saddam Iraq. Excellent!

 

STEVE358

1:41 PM ET

January 5, 2011

PS

1. Wings' Administrative Map is incorrect as to provincial boundaries.

2. Salah ad Din's power and existence as a province independent of Bahgdad was solely a Saddam thing. No Saddam, no juice. Down the road, Tikrit and its surrounding sphere will, in all likelihood, return to its old status as a district of Baghdad. Maliki is actually not doing anything except, in effect, recognizing the pre-Saddam status (a district, even if the bumper sticker says otherwise).

3. Salah ad Din might look like it is being controlled by political parties, but it is not, and never was. The influence and control is elsewhere (notables). The question for Maliki, as with old time Ottoman appointments, is whether his appointee (or another substitute) can maintain control by support from the people of that district (and the notables).

4. Functional re-mapping would create, more or less, the same hierarchies, and spheres of influence in the south, too. If true, there is substantial historical precedent for it. Sounds like the old Shia alignment that was always in place back to the 1600s.

5. The US was so fixated on creating new National Symbols (Constitutions, Stock Market regulations) that it neglected the fact that much of the internal conflicts were embedded in the internal structures created during Saddam times. Rolling those back, and helping people to re-organize, would have been easier than trying to change them once again. Maliki's path, and the emerging realignments are solidly anchored in precedent.

 

JWING

10:07 PM ET

January 5, 2011

Problems with Iraq Map

Steve,

Can you tell me what's the matter with the maps I used? One was from the Univ. of Texas, the other from Wikimedia. Comparing them I can't tell any difference. I also looked at maps currently up on U.S. Forces-Iraq website and I can't tell any differences there either.

 

STEVE358

10:59 PM ET

January 5, 2011

That's right

Compare all the maps from the same source, and they will all be the same.

Look at that little pipsqueak "province" of Baghdad. That is Baghdad, the district, not Baghdad the province. Taji is in Salah ad Din. No? Abu Ghraib is in Al Anbar. No? (At least on these maps, but not in real life).

Where is the disputed Ninewa district of Mahkmuhr? (the one with the standoff by Ninewa's Governor and the Kurds last year). In Arbil. Right?

Anything wrong with that?

Drill these lines down through GIS to actual real estate, and the closer you get, the worse they fit. The errors are most pronounced if you go down to the district levels used in these same maps.

Tuz Hormatu, for example, extends east of the Hamrin mountains to an undefined place in the middle of desert country which is actually part of Ad Dawr district in Salah ad Din. This so-called "ungoverned space" became a safe haven for many unsavory characters; it became an ungoverned space only because the US distributed inaccurate maps. Go figure?

In 1992, the US created these maps for provinces and districts (as best they could), distributed them widely, including to the UN, all of whom distributed them to Iraqis, who have rather different maps (excuse me?) that come, for example, from the Census Maps and official sources. Same country, two different maps.

Maliki and the Iraqi ministries have the actual official government maps, which are different.

They also have the older still (Pre-Saddam) boundary maps that everyone but the US typically carries around in their heads. Tuz Hormatu as part of greater Kirkuk (not the insulting At Ta'mim.

Maybe Tom would like me to send him the map of pre-Saddam Kirkuk? Colorful graphic, and explains a lot of where disputes continue to fester. Actually, I have a power point showing, for each province, the various stages of change.

The kind of political gerrymandering that went on in Iraq under Saddam was intended to oppress, reward, and force the authority of central government. Crush Kirkuk, reward Tikritis, etc...

Separate Sammara from Baghdad. Lock of Karbala from its historic religious and trade routes across the desert to Mecca.

Mandali district (on the Iranian border) was crushed by the Iranians, then by Saddam (for possible alignment with Iranians), so it was downgraded from provincial capital to lesser district (of smaller size and stature), with the gains shifting to Balad Ruz. That's part of the Diyala story before we got there.

Having said that, though, anyone who has trod these dusty grounds knows that Saddam did not really reward "the people" of these winning provinces and districts, just his cronies.

Bottom Line: US understanding of Iraq's administrative structure and systems was inadequate, as evidenced by these maps. Distributing them just created more confusion and disputes.

Been there, done that.

 

JWING

12:03 AM ET

January 6, 2011

Source for better map

Thanks for the details. Would you happen to have a source or link for better maps of Iraq? Always looking for resources.

 

STEVE358

10:27 PM ET

January 6, 2011

JWING

Happy to get some to you if I can get your email (through Tom?).

Couldn't punch through your blog to an email address.

Steve

 

STEVE358

12:41 PM ET

January 7, 2011

Jwing

Tom hooked me up.

Now you have the start.

Thanks, Tom.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

2:41 PM ET

January 5, 2011

Where is Iraqi air power in the political equation?

If the US continues to comply with the 2008 Withdrawal/SOFA agreement, we'll leave Iraq with the smallest air force of any country in the ME. I've seen no reportage of offensive or close support combat by the IA, or even UAV surveillance ops. Is the air over Iraq still our exclusive AO?

If the IA isn't flying daily ops in Jan 2011, it's unlikely that Maliki's military will have the operational air capability to secure even the capital belt by the end of the year, or even next year. If I can see this now, an airborne commander like Petraeus had it mapped years ago.

I'd love to see some expert commentary here on the Mosul/Balad/Baghdad/H3 airport handover plans. Hundreds of helos, transports, strike jets, thousands of pilots, tens of thousands of aviation support personnel can't be pulled out of a hat, when our flags come down. Showing us the door doesn't grant Maliki instant lethal force sovereignty over his own airspace and frontiers.

 

JPWREL

4:32 PM ET

January 5, 2011

WW, yours are good perceptive

WW, yours are good perceptive comments worthy of an answer. But it must be remembered that Saddam was basically even worse off than Maliki in that though he possessed some rotary and obsolete poorly serviced fixed-wing he could not control his own airspace, the RAF and USAF controlled that for him. The northern and southern no fly zones extended almost to Baghdad and only permitted a narrow commercial corridor supervised by us. Which of course means that Saddam was hardly the grave risk to the peace of mankind that the nitwits in the Bush White House (along with Pentagon connivance) made him out to be.

 

STEVE358

9:12 PM ET

January 5, 2011

My understanding is that

My understanding is that Speicher (Tikrit) is already (or soon will be) returned to US control. That was the Air Academy.

The big airports are all turned over, with civ/mil capabilities at any time.

Either they will buy their own planes, or negotiate agreements with neighbors for protection.

Key questions: Who are the allies and who are the threats??????

Define the threats, and you will define their Air Power needs.

My guess is that---down the road----they will end up in the same position as Saddam. Worried about water losses upstream, oil/port/border incursions by Iraq, Kurdish interborder mischief, etc...

 

JWING

10:00 PM ET

January 5, 2011

Iraqi Air Force

Iraq's Defense Ministry said that their air force wont be ready until 2016 at the earliest.

The Air Force has 115 planes most of which are trainers and transports, along with 19 surveillance and 3 ground attack planes. They also have some Huey's, some larger Russian transport copters, and just bought 22 Mi-17 attack copters. They have no jets.

The U.S. also donated a radar system for northern Iraq, and are suppose to give one for southern part as well, but Iraq needs two more for central and western Iraq. There are no missile defenses.

Baghdad is currently in the process of buying F-16s from the U.S. Those probably won't arrive until the middle of this year.

Basically the U.S. is Iraq's air defense.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

12:45 AM ET

January 6, 2011

The obvious need is for internal security Close Air Support

At least I should think that the primary need is for internal defense Close Air Support, given the 24/7 CAP used over US units and bases. The insurgency and sectarian conflicts (sometimes between ministries, IA/IP units or furloughed partisans) take place among mixed populations. It's an incredibly sensitive CAS mission, requiring integrated ground-air command/control/comm centers and night strike skills.

It's hard to imagine the KRG sitting still on the air power issue, or ceding the airspace over Kurd borders, Mosul and Kirkuk to armed Mil-17's directed by Baghdad generals.

Once the US withdraws our ground intel and analysis capability, the half-life clock starts on our being the air wing for their COIN effort. If they even let us base our lethal air assets under their flag.

In sum, no air power, no durable national sovereignty for Iraq, making the 2008 Withdrawal agreement hollow. Yet the stand-up of an operational and lethal IqAF under Maliki will be divisive and contentious with Kurds and Sawa Sunnis. Much more than artillery or armor, and at a higher cost, requiring greater lead time.

 

LITTLEMANTATE

4:18 PM ET

January 7, 2011

$, ideology, and power in no particular order

"In sum, no air power, no durable national sovereignty for Iraq, making the 2008 Withdrawal agreement hollow."

WW, I suspect even if this wasn't part of the plan, it is boon to Americans and American Institutions and Corporations determined to remain in Iraq.

 

EARCONDICIONADO

5:00 PM ET

January 23, 2011

One of the Best

looks for sure this is one of the deepest and most realistic responses I've read about the evolution of post-Saddam Iraq. very good! I really liked it!
lingerie
ar condicionado

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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