So you're deploying to Afghanistan: Exum's recommendations & more (II)

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, December 15, 2010 - 11:03 AM Share

Here is Andrew Exum's take on what a platoon leader or company commander might want to read before getting on the plane to Kandahar or Bagram. It is a great list, well presented, and concise. My only quibble is with whether the Kalyvas book on the logic of violence in civil wars is "fun." I usually like hard books but that one gave me a headache.

And, just so you have this all in one place, here's the item I wrote a couple of weeks ago that pulled together various documents I've flagged in this blog that might be helpful.

Meanwhile, here is Colonel Gentile's critique. He takes a coupla pops at me, but I think it is worth reading. He is right about some things (like, how do we get out of these wars?), and provocative even where he is not (like, COIN is basically BS but we were doing it all along, thank you very much). Most importantly, I think this is worth reading because I suspect Gentile represents the silent majority of Army officers, and especially of generals, who generally seem to think, Screw you, Dave, we did pretty damn good in Iraq in 2003-2006, no matter what you and your intellectual soldiers and journalistic running dogs think.

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EXPLORE:SOUTH ASIA, AFGHANISTAN

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JPWREL

5:34 PM ET

December 15, 2010

For those that are not

For those that are not inclined to read the entirety of Gentile’s article (very smart and worth the time) here is a quote that caught my eye and in my view is the highlight of his commentary.

“But we should be aware of one key lesson: we should get beyond tactics and not place our faith in the idea that improvements in techniques and methods will somehow make the problem of strategy go away. It’s just doesn’t work that way.”

Personally, I would like to see every politician and brass hat in this country be sent to detention and forced to write that on a backboard one thousand times.

TYRTAIOS

5:56 PM ET

December 15, 2010

A few thoughts JPWREL.

A few thoughts JPWREL. Indeed a flawed or early absence of strategy cannot be saved by tactical success, and COIN is tactics.

I also see Col. Gentile mentions Galula, since I gather many hold-up his observations on what worked for him in Algeria, (though he includes other insurgencies he witnessed) as possibly being the litmus test for success?

When one re-discovers the likes of LtCol David Galula, keep in mind that the French were fighting to retain a colony that was then seen as part of France, unlike our involvement in Afghanistan (or Viet-Nam), which sees us trying to exit.

Additionally, Galula's experience in Algeria, was very much different to that of. . . .let's say my Father-in-law's with the 10th para's, as many deploying to Afghanistan might find depending on their region of operation and what’s out in front of them.

I think it might be appropriate to point-out that the French military in Algeria achieved a major tactical and operational military success under the Challe Plan, and not through adopting a population-centric (COIN) approach. Rather the French Army created an innovative method for military success based on the use of major combat operations against the military power of the insurgency.

Incidentally, if anyone would like to add another book to their reading list, of which many used copies abound, I would recommend French author Jean Larteguy's "The Centurions," a book most Afghan/Iraq Vets (Viet vets) may identify with.

HAIRYSTEVE20

9:08 PM ET

December 15, 2010

Essential reading

God's Terrorists by Charles Allen is a fascinating history of religious extremism in Afghanistan and its' links to Saudi Arabia (which go back centuries). Charles Allen has family connections with the North West Frontier going back almost as long.

The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan by Robert D Crews and Amin Tarzi contains a series of essays on the Taliban from a number of different perspectives. From memory there is a particularly interesting one on the concept of ethnicity in Afghanistan and its' somewhat changeable nature.

I think anything that gives the reader some idea of the preeminence of personal relationships over legalistic frameworks in Central Asia is worthwhile.

CARL

7:15 AM ET

December 16, 2010

Mr. Ricks: I thought your

Mr. Ricks: I thought your last sentence about the "silent majority" very interesting. Do you think that difference of opinion can be viewed as between higher ranking officers and lower ranking officers? I got to thinking that when I read of the differences of opinion in the Stryker brigade in Afghanistan. Naylor's article seemed to portray a marked disagreement about how to do things between the high ranking and low ranking officers in the brigade. Is this an Army wide phenomenon?

TOM RICKS

12:39 PM ET

December 16, 2010

Yes, I think so

I suspect that the "screw you, Dave" feeling increases with rank, and is especially heavy at the general officer level.

So yes, a split of sorts. As I look back on my book 'Fiasco,' and especially at who is quoted, it was very much an account by battalion and company commanders of how they thought their superiors were going wrong.

Best,
Tom

ZATHRAS

4:09 PM ET

December 16, 2010

How have things changed?

Aren't the battalion commanders Tom Ricks knew when he researched "Fiasco" among the Army and Marine generals now?

I'm don't doubt that Gens. Casey and Abizaid and others at their level thought little of Gen. Petraeus' fancy ideas back when they were in charge, or that they had a constituency among higher ranking officers. Is that constituency still where it was five years ago in terms of its thinking? Or have many of the more critical and (then) more junior officers Ricks spoke to in Iraq at that time simply left the service?

WALKING WOUNDED

5:33 PM ET

December 16, 2010

Before rendering final verdict on Abizaid and Casey...

Before rendering final verdict on generals Abizaid and Casey, a fair trial would include the record of orders CENTCOM, MNFI and MNSTC-I were operating under. The commanders intent.

WIthout seeing the documents, our Iraq strategy seemed to be 'start for home by Xmas '. Which we did in 2003, and revised mainly by successively adding "next year", thru to the 2006 mid-terms. The point at which there were no more elections to win or lose seems to be the exact point at which the WH staff turned W's attention to what a disaster the defeat in detail of the Sunni was going to be, if Baghdad wasn't invested and partitioned.

CAV GUY

10:06 PM ET

December 17, 2010

Afghanistan Strykers

CARL - the article that Naylor wrote about the Stryker brigade suggests that junior officers identify with Petraeus. The brigade commander was working off the 'old' guerrilla doctrine of the 80's and was more in tune with killing away the insurgency. The younger officers were focused on COIN or at least the captain that was 'moved'. I am not sure that the silent majority of officers side with Gentile. I think his approach is more comfortable. The Army's capstone concept (looking at the threat out to 2050) sees the hybrid threat as the most likely enemy - not counterinsurgency. This shapes all our decisions today, to structure, equip and man the Army to fight that threat all while fighting a one and a half COIN campaigns. This accounts for the focus on our traditional warfighting skills to some extent. I am over simplifying a document that isn’t simple; there are a lot of other required capabilities on the fringes but it generally can explain the Army's focus. As far as population or enemy centric COIN, I think you find the intellectuals side with Petraeus and purists with Gentile. I think the smart money is middle of the road - sometimes the first thing you need to do is kill, and other times its the last thing you should do. After reading several accounts of Algeria, I think that is exactly what the French did. In my opinion, Trinquer's Modern War was the best book excepting the part about torture. He makes an ethical case but fails to include the social construct of revenge in his calculus. I’m not one to throw the baby out with the bath water. Overall, it was an enlightening read.

ADMIRAL

12:43 PM ET

December 17, 2010

The Blood And The Mud

What our soldiers need to really know.

""We" are still listening to CNAS? The chief of policy in the five sided "Mixmaster" is a former chief-priestess there? What is Woodward doing? Mocking them? Setting up quotes for his book on "how we lost in the kebab wars?""

"Petraeus knows that his place in history depends on making it seem that he was responsible for success in both places. As Dr. Brenner points out in this weeks NJ blog, that was not the case in Iraq. So... It has to be made true in Afghanistan."

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/

The above quote by Col. Pat Lang, USA (Ret) is all they need to know.

The current occupation of Afghanistan is all about torture and murder. War is below the dignity of mankind.

Peace

JAFFIR

2:46 PM ET

December 20, 2010

But they didn't win

Can someone explain to me why a hugely funded, highly trained, full volunteer western officer corps can't beat the Shabab. Oh, it's complicated? You don't get to wear multiple stars on behalf of 500 years of western Democracy in the hopes that you'll try to do a good job and, if it is too hard, then, well, you'll still get a front row seat at the JCOS table.

Perhaps the American military culture was unable to adapt to the wars they found rather than the ones they wanted. We entered Iraq with a faulty Strategy then tried to impose faulty tactics to make up the difference. TF, Abuzaid and the Casey generals were allowed to fail without disgrace.

Eventually, Big Dave figured out that quantity was a quality and that killing people and breaking things was, in itself, not working. Score one for the overly obvious brigade.

These are big boys and they failed in their profession. They had everything we could give them. Our sons and daughters, our treasure, our technology, and our unstinting support for a (near) decade and yet, they can't deliver.

As someone who ate ice cream in Mansur in 2003 and was Haji'd up in 2005, we could actually see us losing the war. It wasn't hard. When the kids at the corners stopped flipping up their thumbs and started flipping the bird, you know it was not going swimmingly.

Best, Jaffir

JAFFIR

3:10 PM ET

December 20, 2010

Just a point

I want to separate my comments from anything Admiral says. The men (and increasingly women) and the mission are/is superb. The generation of young Americans who volunteered and came to the wars, will contribute disproportionally to the Country for the rest of their lives. My question is why we tolerate the failure of command to deliver victory. If Halsey sunk the fleet, the world would be a poorer place and we would probably revile him.

Best, Jaffir