Thursday, December 9, 2010 - 11:35 AM

Tom R.: An American soldier was killed by a sniper near Kut, south of Baghdad. I can't remember the last time we lost someone down there. Meanwhile, here is a report on something Americans haven't paid much attention to:
By Capt. Michael Cummings, U.S. Army
Best Defense deputy IED correspondentIf Americans are still paying attention to Iraq -- and far and away most of them aren't -- they know about the political deadlock that crippled the Iraqi government for seven months. Or they know about the gigantic explosions that semi-regularly rip through Baghdad.
But in my opinion, that violence isn't the biggest threat to a democratic and stable Iraq. Over the last two years, violence in Iraq has transformed from attacks on American troops to attacks on political rivals. The weapon characterizing this change is the "sticky bomb," or Magnetically Attached IED (MAIED in Army-acronym-speak). Most Americans have never heard of these killers, and probably never will. Yet this weapon will affect the future of Iraq for years to come.
A sticky bomb is a simple concept: take a few pounds of homemade explosives, attach a heavy magnet, then attach a detonator. At night, an insurgent bikes or runs by the target vehicle, then with a quick movement places the bomb underneath it. Sticky bombs can be placed discreetly, easily and anonymously. Unlike traditional IEDs, the sticky bomb only hurts the person inside the vehicle. Whether by remote, timer, or movement sensor, when the target gets in the vehicle, the bomb explodes.
If the occupant is lucky, he dies; if he is unlucky, the bomb maims him, thrusting him into the virtually non-existent Iraqi health care system.
Though it has been in Iraq for years, the MAIED is becoming the tool of choice for political killings. (If you know your warfare, sticky bombs aren't anything new. For years the Irish Republican Army used these devices to kill British soldiers, police and bureaucrats.) Insurgents use sticky bombs on everybody in the Iraqi government, from the traffic cops to the highest elected representatives. MAIEDs are easier and cheaper to assemble than a full blown IED, and deliver a more precise result, while avoiding collateral damage. Because they are easy to place, sticky bombs can go many places IEDs can't, including Iraqi government parking lots.
The expanded use of sticky bombs makes sense for the Iraqi insurgency. When insurgents tried to blow up US soldiers, it required complex explosively-formed penetrators (EFP) or gigantic IEDs to break through the heavy armor. To target Iraqi vehicles, especially civilian cars, an insurgent only needs a few pounds of properly placed C4 and a magnet.
Sticky bombs have already killed over a hundred people this year. Probably twice that many sticky bombs have been disarmed or prematurely detonated. Assassinations keep the government services from functioning, keep the police from investigating crimes, and keep Sunni insurgents in control of swaths of Baghdad. The majority of attacks target Shia politicians, and are probably placed by Sunni criminals, insurgents and terrorists -- a fact that continues to hamper Sunni and Shia reconciliation.
The Army needs to step up to the plate to stop this. While U.S. forces have a shrinking mission in Iraq, as long as troops are on the ground we need to help Iraqis. American forces still care primarily about stopping indirect fire attacks against their own bases, not political violence threatening Iraq's long-term stability. Even worse, the British have left from Iraq, and they had the institutional knowledge of how to fight this weapon, including the use of simple devices that can tell if MAIEDs are on vehicles.
Iraq is much safer now than it was in 2007, especially for U.S. troops, but we aren't out of the woods yet. If the use of sticky bombs tells us anything -- think Northern Ireland -- then we still have quite a long way to go. A stable and prosperous Iraq is in the United States and the Middle East's interest. We can't give up, not while MAIEDs continue to wound, kill and maim men, women and children in Iraq.
Captain Michael Cummings writes for www.onviolence.com, a blog on military and foreign affairs. He is an active duty military officer who deployed to Afghanistan with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and recently returned from a deployment to Iraq.
What exactly is the U.S. military supposed to do about this problem? Northern Ireland is a terrible example - it was huge population-centric counterinsurgency/policing operation in a territory that legally belonged to the armed force. That's how they helped stop sticky bombs. We're not in the business of doing that in Iraq anymore.
Otherwise, noted and the Iraqi police need to get on this. I don't see what we're able to do about this at this point in time.
Right now many people in Iraq don't even acknowledge MAIEDs are going off. That is the core problem. So US troops don't know anything about them and they can't teach Iraqis anything about them, and that is the business of six brigades in Iraq right now in addition to our Special Operations troops. So here is what the military can do:
1. Start tracking them and using our intelligence assets on sticky bombs the way we do for force protection threats like IEDs and IDF.
2. Figure out technological fixes we can cheaply provide to Iraqis--instead of say buying them F-16s.
3. Use our special ops troops to eliminate MAIED networks the way we pursue other networks in Iraq.
4. Use diplomatic means to get some British ex-police and soldiers to provide their experience to the Iraqis.
I'm still not with you on this
My first question is how prevalent are these things? You said a hundred deaths this year, far less than car bombs. Are they causing as much turmoil as large car bombs that kill dozens of civilians? I get they're targeted killings, but that's a force protection issue for the Iraqis. Before USF-I starts making this priority 1 or even 20 in Iraq, I'd like to know the answers to those questions if I were them. As for your points:
1. I get tracking these events. But you said yourself all it takes to make these things is a bit of C4 and a magnet. These are two things that I would imagine would be nearly impossible to track down like we did with IDF and IEDs - which were large and difficult to hide in transit, etc. I'm not seeing why this needs more attention than other forms of violence.
2. Developing technologies, sure. Instead of F-16s though? I don't know about you, but I don't want the U.S. to be the guarantor of Iraqi security indefinitely. They'll need capabilities to defend themselves - another war with Iran would be much more detrimental than 100 assassinations a year that include traffic cops. We could both.
3. Can't argue with this too much. I still question the priority of this over other things, though.
4. I don't have much of a problem with this either, but I still question how much the Iraqis will get out of this. I think you're conflating the people doing these assassinations with insurgents. The best tactics the Brits used to defeat this and other terrorism threats in NI was by treating it as a criminal problem, not a military one, and tying that to a political reconciliation program. That's probably what your bobbies-for-hire would tell the Iraqis, and somewhat negates the need to use increasingly finite U.S. military resources.
Interesting report and certainly under reported, but I'm not sure this fits into Tom's "Iraq Unravelling" thesis.
I think the IRA comparison is apt, and that is no bad thing. During the Troubles, there were always rumors of war, civil or otherwise, but nothing became of it. While I have the utmost respect for my Brit mates, all their time in the Northern Ireland Battalion didn't translate too well in Basra. I think a more apt comparision might be Colombia, where assasinations are more commonplace and they have deep seated problems with militias and ungoverned spaces.
Still, 20 little bombs killing 20 specific people is quite different than one large bomb planted in a market that kills 20 people indiscriminantly. The later invites large scale, indiscriminate retaliation, probably along sectarian lines. I'm more concerned with those, thankfully more infrequent attacks than this. Insurgent violence follows a cycle and I think this shows the cycle is getting better, not worse.
Iraq is still a festering sore of a foreign policy problem and will be so for some time, but I don't think this particular report shows it is getting worse.
World class health care in Iraq?
Sorry to say but Iraq's health care system had been destroyed by the U.N. sanctions so I don't know where you get the idea that Iraq had "world class" hospital care pre-2003. When the Oil for Food Program was started it allowed more supplies to enter Iraq and recover somewhat, but the health system never returned to the level it was pre-1990 before the U.S. invasion.
Post-2003 Iraq's health care system still has major problems. Lots of professionals fled, the Sadrists ran the Health Ministry for a while and used it for death squads and patronage, etc. However, if you look at some things like infant mortality rates Iraq is finally back to what it was in the 1980s
Infant Mortality Rate
1970s 80 deaths per 1,000 births
1980s 40 deaths per 1,000 births
1984-1989 30 deaths per 1,000 births
1990-1994 50 deaths per 1,000 births
1999 101 deaths per 1,000 births
2004 32 deaths per 1,000 births
2006 35 deaths per 1,000 births
JWING, where did you get your numbers for infant mortality? According to your numbers, which I don't buy, the 2003 invasion of Iraq kept babies alive. I don't buy it. And according to wikipedia your numbers aren't true, and the wikipedia numbers are based on the CIA World Fact Book. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_infant_mortality_rate
infant mortality rates in Iraq
McGeary, Johanna, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time, 3/10/03
Government of Iraq, “Iraq National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008,” 12/31/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Sorry, got a little mixed up in my notes. You can scratch the Hard Lessons book as a source for the infant mortality rates.
Here's the latest numbers I have on it however
2010: 41 per 1,000 Births
Source
United Nations Country Team – Iraq, “The Millennium Development Goals In Iraq,” August 2010
which would still make it a better mark than during the sanctions period of the 1990s.
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