As TYRTAIOS illustrates there is a world of difference between ‘containment’ and ‘deterrence’. Our experience with the Soviet Union proves that ‘deterrence’ is not necessarily the same as ‘containment’. The nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union worked by making the cost of the use of nuclear weapons prohibitively and disproportionately expensive relative to the potential political gain. The regime in Moscow, which like Iran was arbitrary and brutal, still possessed the powers of rational risk assessment. However, at the same time under the cover of a ‘plausible’ use of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union participated in roughly four decades of global mischief making.

While the odds of the Soviets launching a nuclear strike were remote it still seriously complicated the United States calculations in responding to the Soviets overt conventional threats via proxies. The Cuban missile crisis and the arming of Syria and Egypt in order to intimidate Israel and indeed strike at her both in 1967 and 1973 are examples where we successfully deterred escalation to a nuclear exchange but still had to ‘contain’ Soviet adventurism done under the umbrella of nuclear arms.

JP, plot the Cold War location of offensive US nuclear forces around the Soviet Union: Alaska, Korea, England, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Iran. U-2's overflying Moscow from Pakistan, plus boomers and attack subs in the Pacific, Arctic, Med and maybe Baltic.

Now, plot the locations of Soviet nuclear forces deployed around the US perimeter. Soviet boomer doctrine kept their offensive subs within the Soviet maritime air umbrella, unless things got so tense as to warrant a breakout. The full Cuba story is still classified, and probably still contains a few surprises.

I've no love for commie Rooshuns. I've lived with my family very near a probable ground zero military target my entire life. But a map shows that we were nuclear forward deployed vis their homeland, not vice versa. Yes, i know their are other factors, differences in the use of strategic depth.

A map of forces arrayed around Iran today might help to inform this discussion. No one needs to be on the Ayatollah's side; it still helps to get real with a map, and look at it from the oppositions POV. If Zbignew was advising Khameini, he would have to tell him the strategic situation would improve if the Twelvers had nuclear sovereignty.

I acknowledge your point Double W and I will also acknowledge that bringing a nuclear device on line does not equate to a deliverable nuclear weapon (though outside state technology might accelerate that). Allow me to further acknowledge that even with a deliverable nuclear weapon, I would agree with most analysts that Tehran, save for a rogue IRGC commander and unit, would not launch a first strike.

However, containment demands we have an understanding of who controls and has custody over a nuclear arsenal, which we did with the Soviets, but we would probably never have with Iran, nor a hot line to the definitive Iranian authority.

My second issue is that a nuclear backed Soviet Union felt secure enough they wouldn't face direct consequences from us that they challenged the U.S. through proxies, which given Iran's history to date in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and maybe Palestine, a nuclear Iran would feel even bolder to ratchet-up this activity, to the possibility of limited conventional intervention (which they have on a limited basis despite some individuals' claiming otherwise).

Now having mentioned the aforementioned concerns of mine, let me say I am not opposed to containment. But, in order to credibly - credibly in the eyes of Tehran: the U.S. would have to spend a great deal of resource and treasure - resource and treasure we may not actually have, along with bringing Gulf allies on board, to include long term basing in countries, countries whose governments are seen as illegitimate by their citizens (the Turkey issue?) to keep pressure on Iran (oh yea, it is also sure bet, other ME states would go nuclear as a result of Iran presenting themselves as having a nuclear weapon under the guise of deterrence - again, the issue of command-and-control?).

Can we do what is necessary to contain Iran? Maybe (though our recent experience in Iraq has made us look a bit more vulnerable), but will we? And let’s never forget about the mitigating factor of have the necessary help from the EU, China, and your favorite Russians, who secretly delight in seeing our fixation with what George Marshall called “theateritis" (I think he said that?) and our resources stretched (don’t forget the Soviet Union’s economy imploded in part, because of their military expenditure).

What is my solution? Iran thinks they need nuclear deterrence against Israel and the U.S. Without presenting Israel and the U.S. as nuclear antagonists, the Iranian clergy and their IRGC henchmen have no power. Our nuclear arsenal is a given. But Israel's remains a state secret. The U.S. should find the moral courage to go against the historical grain of the Jewish lobby and require Israel to sign-on to the NPT, thereby taking their nuclear ambiguity out of the equation, which would take some of the wind out of sails of Tehran's rhetoric which fuels Israels concerns and thus ours, specifically among the neo-con crowd.

Good points, T. Containment isn't a first choice policy, if the genie can be kept bottled. And I would never gainsay a US Marine's righteous grudge against the Iranian Revolution.

As you say, relative superpower parity didn't stop the proxy wars in the Med, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A Bomb trumps external invasion or conquest, but doesn't guarantee against foreign attack on peripheral interests, or even the internal survival of a regime.

Whatever Iran does with their enriched-U, Arabia and Turkey are planning to match. Which is to say proliferation programs are ongoing in both security states, and dreams being dreamt in Egypt.

How is it possible to prevent the reach for nuclear military sovereignty by moslem states much larger and/or richer than Israel? 'Nuclear opacity' has protected the Dimona project from US NPT sanctions so far, but the diplomatic loin-cloth covering their Bomb is getting a bit threadbare and careworn.

Re Israel and NPT. Lifting the veil on Team Perez is bound to be contentious.

There is credible talk that Israel has traded on their nuclear secrets, first partnering with France, then with India, apartheid S. Africa, and even a joint missile development project that figured into the Shah's ambitious nuclear persian plans.

It's also likely that a lot of US personalities, including our current SecDef, know that the US security state knew about some of this, and looked the other way. Get's messy, and violates the magician's creed to never wise up the marks

I don't have a cite at hand, but I'm pretty sure that the Saudi's have stated that if Israel declares their nuclear capability (as some on the Israeli right have advocated) then Arabia will go nuclear. Which I take to mean that they're already there, in all but name, as part owners of the IRPak program.

I agree in the importance of having clear command and control of the weapons is a necessary requisite to being able to have a containment policy, but I think there's something else missing from the discussion. Colby states that for containment (or what seems in this case to be more deterrence) is "A regime whose behavior can be substantially influenced by credible threats..." and a "threat is backed by real capability and will."

In the rest of the piece, Colby fails to demonstrate that any threat by the US or Israel to Iran would be seen as credible and backed by the will to implement it. Even if its conceded that Iran is fully rational and that the command and control exists for a comprehensive deterrence policy, if Iran doesn't believe that the US will act, the policy is empty.

So far the US has drawn 'red line' after line on Iran - don't start a nuclear program, don't enrich to a given level, don't enrich above an amount to that level, etc. In response there have been sanctions, which while not for naught, aren't so biting that Iran is falling to its knees. Political will to engage militarily doesn't appear too strong from the Iranian perspective.

We come full circle here, and have to keep the 'options' talk tied to specifics, name the sort of targets, and specify the proximity and nature of threat that justifies the threat now, and the attack when we launch it.

Preemptive strike or retaliation is years in the future, presumes offensive Iranian capability which by all intel today doesn't exist. We can't claim existential pre-emption against something that doesn't exist. In war-law context, the word pre-emption can't cover major lethal action 'disarming' distant future threats. Only a preemption of an imminent and growing threat is the sort of 'option on the table' that can claim a just war casus belli. We can't demand that our gov't rhetoric and behavior assert the credibility to just shoot first and ask questions later.

What the neo-hawks are advocating IS a war of choice, a punitive attack on nuclear facilities, scattering and incinerating tons of super-toxic stuff, so that it can't be mined from the rubble. Not even at a few hundred (HEU) parts per million. Conducting such an readioligical attack is totally without precedent, and would properly be regarded as an indiscriminate dirty bombing, a WMD crime against humanity under international law of war. Here again, the term 'indiscriminate' is used properly, in a 'law of war' context. Even criminal negligence is implied in the scenario. Indiscriminate negligent wars are not things best allies in a special relationship should be egging each other into.

Credibly threatening a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, while our countries are 'at peace', is itself an aggressive act, the international equivalent of simple assault. Which raises the question, is Iran really at peace with Israel and the US, and vice versa? It's more of a cold war bounded by brush-fire proxy fights, isn't it?

Shut up, me.