Successful? By what timeline, by what measure, and by whose perspective? It seems ironic that both sides apparently think they are winning.

Paula Broadwell as usual seems to go to great lengths to create an image of progress in Afghanistan while at the same time in today’s ‘Washington Post’ Greg Miller (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/26/AR2010102606571.html) pretty much blows her theses out of the water. Additionally, this morning on ‘Morning Joe’, Scott Atran, author of ‘Talking to the Enemy’ generally backs up Greg Miller’s reporting.

What I would really like to know is if Broadwell is allowing herself to be used as a faucet for the American high command to spew forth their narrative or does she sincerely believe the stuff she writes? It would seem that a rough consensus of both American and European reporting from Afghanistan cannot seem to find the bullish scenario she does.

I was on the edge of writing what Don Bacon just did. Amazing.

As my new BFF Don says, the WaPo's current lead suggests that that Broadwell spends too much time in the poppy fields: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/26/AR2010102606571.html?hpid=topnews

The test for COIN is in the years ahead, and anyone who thinks we will be engaged as at present 'in the years ahead' has either greater insight than most observers (a Burning Bush, perhaps, though I think any Bush with views on this war is suspect) or an even more cynical view of how little this war means to Americans in terms of blood and booty. And by the way: what IS the timeline to success? Tell me in decades. Rough guess is fine.

The military leadership involved with this mess should say what they think best. But when the Commander in Chief says 'get our folks outta there' next year, as he will, they better also learn to say Aye Aye Sir and get on with as graceful a withdrawal strategy as they can put together. My guess is that our gear going out will cross paths with the Iranian cash coming in.

It is stock Coin narrative stuff; the idea of armies and reinvention (aka finally getting coin after screwing things up for so long).

Nothing new here, reads just like the Coin literature from the 80s and 90s (and continued with essays like Con Crane's that Tom posted a few days ago). Goes like this:

British in Malaya: stupid conventional army is turned around by a few fair haired innovators at the bottom but mostly by a better general named Templer who carried out a classic hearts and minds coin campaign that defeated the insurgency.

Americans in Vietnam: big stupid conventional army is turned around by a few innovators at the bottom but most importantly a better general named Abrams who radically transformed the army toward pacification and either won, or almost won, the war.

Iraq 2003 to present: big stupid conventional army is turned around by a few innovators at the bottom but most importantly by a better general named Petraeus who turns his army around on a dime on the ground, they finally get it (thanks to the writings of people like Tom Ricks, et al) and because of their reinvention things get better as a result

Afghanistan 2002 to present: big stupid conventional army doesn’t get coin, doesn’t do it right until the better general comes in (McChrystal) and replaces the old school non gets it general (McKiernan; read just like Briggs in Malaya, Westmoreland in Vietnam, and Casey in Iraq) then, finally, with the right "inputs" in place progress (as Paula reports on in Kandahar) seems to be finally happening.

Nothing new here, same old stock Coin learning and adapting stuff.

Unfortunately for the purveyors of the stock narrative, it is all nonsense.

gian

ISAF faces a similar backlog of happy news skepticism in 2010 as Odierno/Petraeus did in mid 2007. Other parts of the public info offensive dynamic are similar, in terms of 'omigosh, we might lose this' and ' 'we'll have to settle for what we can salvage' messages.

Managing expectations down, then exceeding them sounds crazy, but it just might work again for Team P. As one who was proved too pessimistic and skeptical in 2007, I'm reluctant to tar Ms Broadwell for innaccurate propaganda. She's there with the troops, and we're not.

It would be helpful if she/BD would link a map for reference, as I try to build a geographical frame of reference for her description of a pretty complex human terrain facing the Strike brigade. I'm puzzled by the naming of the 'Cooperation' op in Dari, and talk of Iranians operating against us in Pashtunistan.

Some specificity on enemy order of battle and frequency of contact ought to be insisted on by any BD reporter claiming access to brigade intel assessments. A full US brigade and 8,000 ANA troops must have been tasked against some pretty solid assumptions re the opposing force.

The Taliban might just be regrouping in Pakistan for the rest of the year, waiting until the American "deadline" passes next summer to push back in full force embarrassing the by-then-retreating Western armies and sealing Afghanistan's future with that of militant extremism.

Just as in Iraq, it's way too soon to tell whether the strategy will work in the long term. We can't be sure such a resilient enemy is finally on a crashing course when they still have major "untouchable" safehavens in the other side of the border.

And just as in Iraq, the only true sign of "stability" will come when the Afghan national army can stand on its feet against all criminal forces in the country and the Afghans can go on their daily lives with some sense of normality. When the ANA leadsand succeeds in a major operation on an important Taliban or Haqqani hotspot (Just like the Iraqui Army did in March 2008), then we'll know that the chances of an extremist takeover of Kabul have significantly diminished.

I see young enthusiastic Paula Broadwell understands in the end, that evidence of security of a route or area, doesn't necessarily imply our forces control the area - though it might.

Perhaps the new money flowing-in is too good to pass up and the Taliban are allowing this, to give the locals some pocket change before winter comes on, while taking a slice themselves?

I would like to hear more on this. Hopefully Broadwell will continue the series before anyone ties a can to her tail and sends her down the road, and Tom will post it for us?

We will see whether next summer, if we can actually consolidate any and all tactical successes and sustain this momentum when we turn-over these gains to the Afghan army? Of course the downside of success might be giving the wrong people the idea that our military is cut-out for these prolonged low intensity conflicts?

""How does he define "advancing the ball?" "It is not about the number of insurgents we kill. It is about the number of Afghan people we protect with our Afghan partners,"""

Why does this sound strangely like Obama's, "job growth" being changed into, "jobs created *or saved*"?

The most striking aspect of this post is that the author gives no real indication of being in a position to analyze the local tactical and operational situation independent of the interviews with various members of the Brigade leadership. Of course, one is aware of all the obstacles to doing anything but relying on the BDE CDR, S-2, PAO et al, but there is a hollowness about it.

It's a contrast with--for example-- the interviews with the company commander in Restrepo. He's motivated and competent, but, as the film reveals at the end, his optimism is not borne out by events. When the Restrepo film crew accompanies him to a meeting with locals, they camera is able to convey an independent judgment about the local US-Afghan relationship and its wider implications without any commentary at all. I get no such feeling of analytical depth with this story. Not precisely the same mission, of course. Perhaps with more time will come a surer grasp.

I agree with XMaster4000. The insurgent groupings have every incentive to go slow and synchonize their next major efforts with the resumption of the global econcomic crisis in 2011, possibly divided government after the upcoming elections, the run-up to the presidential election of 2012, and the intensification of tensions in Iraq. Certainly, they are not attuned to all these specifics, but probably have a general sense that the next two years will produce an array of crises to distract the US, amplify disenchantment with the war, and strengthen their position. No need to rush things and waste resources. Time is on their side.

You know, when I read the post, then read the comments, I often wonder whether the commenters (sic) read the same story I did. Miss Broadwell wrote a story about how one BCT feels is having some success at what they have been doing over the past few months. She reports mostly about what the people she talked to in the Brigade think they have done. She expresses some hopeful sentiments but the story is also filled with cautions and qualifications about what it all means, if anything.

Then I read the comments and they are observations anticipated in the story, what the inside the beltway intel types are thinking about the country as a whole or yea but what about the long run or Gian's stock "Coindinistas Blaspheme!" narrative; the actual story serving as a launching pad for comments on the big picture or the bigger picture. Geesh, you guys sound like the broadcast fairness doctrine types-every time "conservative" is uttered it must be immediately followed by "liberal" and vice-versa.

Thank you Brucer for making a comment directly related to the story and one that added to it.

Tyrtaios: regarding your writing "Of course the downside of success might be giving the wrong people the idea that our military is cut-out for these prolonged low intensity conflicts?"

I would say the American soldier can do the job whether or not the institution can.

Trytaios: Very valid and well stated.

Don Bacon: I didn't know Miss Broadwell was a commissioned officer. That should be noted in the byline. Mr. Ricks, perhaps you could clear up her actual status.

I disagree with you about the money quote. The quote you cited is followed by another that states the ANA unit is just starting to take "steps" after crawling, so it it puts a qualifier on the progress made so far. It is minor disagreement about emphasis.

Nobody likes to be conned. Maybe that is what they are trying to do. I don't think so but maybe. I think mostly things are so mixed up nobody knows exactly what is going on.

It all just seems so Stalinest these days. The propaganda of the American Military Empire is reaching feaver pitch. The Red Army was never this good.