Government Executive carries a thoughtful article by Katherine McIntire Peters about what is behind the spikes in suicides, drug abuse, indiscipline and other troubles in the Army. A recent Army study on soldier suicides concluded that the problem is leadership, and specifically that commanders and senior NCOs had forgotten how to lead soldiers in garrison. But this article features a strong rebuttal from retired Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, who argues that no, that this is what happens when the nation chooses to fight two interminable wars with a relatively small force. "I don't care if you've got an army of Robert E. Lees, the anecdotal evidence clearly shows the ground forces are going through an unprecedented realm of emotional stress," Scales told the intrepid Mrs. Peters. "I think it's irresponsible to blame leadership."

If Scales is correct, and I suspect he is, I don't know what the Army really can do except provide palliatives.

(HT to RD)

afahlund/flickr

EXPLORE:MILITARY
 

JPWREL

4:18 PM ET

October 8, 2010

Scales is lucky he does not work for George Marshall

Scales says: "I don't care if you've got an army of Robert E. Lees, the anecdotal evidence clearly shows the ground forces are going through an unprecedented realm of emotional stress,”

Lee’s army’s extraordinary performance was not acquired by chance but was due to superlative leadership that led from the front and established a tradition of victory against great odds. As the underdog in everything but courage and audacity the threadbare troops became animated with a belief that they could do anything. And until the late fall of 1864 that was pretty much the case.

For Scales to say that the leadership shouldn’t have to take full responsibility for the morale and condition of his troops is astounding in its combination of conceit and self-pity. All armies in the end are the sum product of what its leadership puts into them. Maj. Gen. Scales should be profoundly ashamed of himself to publically cast doubt upon the fundamental principle of all officer corps, which is to take care of your troops and give them selfless leadership. If George Marshall were around to hear Scales whining he would have had a seat on the first slow boat back to the states.

 

SOLDIERSDIARY

5:14 PM ET

October 8, 2010

the point

I think you miss the point, it is a combination of both. Leadership does play a role, but the military leaders must be provided the tools and the ability to succeed. For example, qualified mental health specialists (not the likes of MAJ Hasan), more time between deployments, and the ability to spend that time between deployments with family instead of working 16 hours a day and spending 2 of the 12 months at home at JRTC/NTC. Its more than leadership, its culture, all those AFN commercials and powerpoint training won't cut it, changing culture takes time. When the current crop of junior leadership takes the reigns (current CPTs, MAJs, LTCs) and run the army in 15 years, you will see a culture change.
Scales does hit the mark, leadership does play a role, but simply saying that the increase in suicides is due to faulty leadership is a load of crap....somewhere you have step back and say that this is what happens when you fight two wars with a small force.
@JP, you seem to ignore the fact that in the end Lee lost...was that do to his leadership...or due to other factors such as fighting a war the South could never win?

 

JPWREL

5:54 PM ET

October 8, 2010

SD, my view is that an Army’s

SD, my view is that an Army’s culture comes from its leadership. If there ever was a nations army in modern history that had tools and resources ($244 billion this year alone) it’s the United States Army! If the Army’s deployment schedule is out of whack and demoralizes its troops whose fault is that? If the Army’s training is not relevant or tough enough to squeeze out the potential problems and prepare their troops for this fantasyland experience in Afghanistan whose fault is that? If the Army can’t provide the number of qualified psychiatric counselors to its troubled soldiers whose fault is that? If the Army can’t figure out how to treat its wounded (mental and physical) after nine years of war whose fault is that? If the Army determination to remain an AVF is such that it can’t recruit the type of individual it needs in its ranks whose fault is that?

In answer to your final question, Lee’s Army lost in the end because they were a historical anachronism skilled at ‘fighting’ but inept at ‘waging war’ particularly for a disreputable cause. They also had an antagonist in Lincoln whose ‘will’ and ‘vision’ exceeded their own.

 

STARBUCK

5:41 PM ET

October 8, 2010

I am also somewhat appalled

I am also somewhat appalled that considerable blame is placed on company-level leaders, but any remorse over the granting of moral waivers is rebuffed.

http://www.govexec.com/features/1010-01/1010-01s2.htm

"The study [headed by Gen. Chiarelli] revealed a clear link between suicide and other behavioral problems, such as illicit drug use, alcohol abuse, disciplinary infractions, misdemeanors and felony crimes. In addition, tens of thousands of troops have been prescribed powerful narcotics for pain, depression and anxiety, and abuse of these drugs has spiked. Data since 2005 show about 29 percent of suicides included either drug or alcohol use; 25 percent of soldiers who committed suicide were subjects of misdemeanor or felony investigations."

Contrast with this passage (check the last sentence)

"At the same time unit leaders' attention shifted away from garrison management, the Army, to meet recruiting requirements, began issuing more waivers for recruits with drug and alcohol offenses and criminal misconduct - troops who in the past would not have been deemed eligible. In 2007, the Army began cutting back such waivers, and Chiarelli said he doesn't believe it's a significant factor in the suicide rate."

 

RUBBER DUCKY

6:23 PM ET

October 8, 2010

Three points made clear...

1. Going to war without the nation is recipe for disaster. The only way to have the nation's skin in the game is through a military draft. This report shows why - it cries out for a draft, as a theoretical fix that would have obviated this set of calamities and - more importantly - as the safeguard insuring that next wars are first weighed thoughtfully and then entered into seriously and not on the cheap. For those of you who would point out how bad draftees are as soldiers and how much more difficult it is to run an Army combined of professionals and conscripts, tell me how much worse it could be than this.

2. The leadership of the US Army is woefully deficient. It cries out for serious Army reform. This is as bad as/worse than post-Vietnam. Read this on that ***:.

3. Underpinning these manifest failures is the the concept of an All-Volunteer Force. The AVF has failed - it cannot succeed in extended combat. 1 & 2 above bear.

***http://books.google.com/books?id=dELnfOAKhHcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=crisis+in+command+savage+and+gabriel&source=bl&ots=zxpuI5T55m&sig=2zXd42e0ntgU4bCvnyJ5vz1Sbkw&hl=en&ei=YF-vTPiiHIKBlAeNoZCzBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

DMDENNIS

7:21 PM ET

October 8, 2010

The maddening banality of garrison life.

One facet of military life that seems to go unmentioned when talking about the suicide/depression problem within the military is the depressing reality of combat veterans returning to a garrison population that is, more often than not, as equally as disconnected from the realities of modern combat as the civilian population.

One of the more positive aspects of a deployment is that generally most of the "bullshit" aspects of military life go away due to that actual requirements of fighting a war. Much has been written about the experience of war, but exposure to combat and combat conditions generally seems to awaken an intense understanding of what is actually worthwhile, not just in regards to military operations, but also in life. Returning home and having some rear-guard Sergeant berate you for a uniform infraction or for being late to a useless formation can be absolutely maddening. I've seen very few senior officers that seem to be able to relate to the life-changing experience of combat, and adjust the command of their units to that new reality. As an example, this quote stuck out at me when I was reading an article about the recent suicides at Fort Hood:

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7230100.html

"After last weekend's deaths at Fort Hood, Maj. Gen. William Grimsley, the post's senior commander, ordered health and welfare inspections of soldiers' barracks and private cars on post as well as soldiers' homes off-post."

Nothing boosts morale like having your personal space invaded and rummaged through by the Army for some completely unknown benefit. What the hell are they looking for? The only health and welfare inspections I went through when I was enlisted were hours and hours of boredom and rage punctuated by having some asshole first sergeant toss stuff around my room and question me about my personal belongings.

It seems like a lot of the realities and lessons of deployed life never seem to make it back to the garrison and support personnel who often make life hell for those weary of dealing with Big Army bureaucratic nonsense. It fosters a sense that you are completely helpless; the institution that sent you off to fight is completely uncaring and ignorant of the emotional and and psychological cost of that experience. Add in the feeling of being "trapped" in an enlistment or at a installation like Fort Hood that is in a crappy town in the middle of nowhere, and it really isn't surprising that soldiers are offing themselves more and more. The light at the end of the tunnel can seem too far away to be worth fighting for.

 

HOKIEFAN

8:28 PM ET

October 8, 2010

This might be a scandalous comment...

Did armies 50, 100 or 150 years ago (during Lee's era) really even care about a slightly higher than normal rate of military suicides? This seems to me to be a new phenomenon reinforced by the strategic barometer that "battlefield" casualties represent.

Suicide is not some evident battlefield objective. Blaming generals for a psychological trait that even medical doctors do not understand is incredibly harsh and a diversion from other more productive avenues of investigation.

 

MALICEIT

8:49 PM ET

October 8, 2010

RE:

Maybe because army's standards are behind ?...
Besides with leadership like showed below maybe its only time when America had some kind of victories...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUc62jD-G0o

 

CAV GUY

9:59 PM ET

October 8, 2010

Leaders and wars create a complex problem

Leadership in garrison is extraordinarily difficult these days. In combat, it’s relatively easy to know what you need to do. Army officers generally know the 'hard' skills of shooting, moving and communicating. You execute mission orders, lead by example, and have a captive audience. Free time is limited. Think of it in these terms, at any level of command in combat you have the opportunity to be with your soldiers most of the time, certainly your direct reports but you can arguably get down several levels. Back in garrison, that is not the case. When off duty, soldiers want to be off duty – so do you (and your family). This may sound selfish but they’ve spent a lot of time in green and want to decompress. The environment went from extremely constrained to completely free. Good leaders – maybe the term should be effective leaders – continue to check on their soldiers in garrison but soldiers often want to distance themselves from their profession during their off time. My wife recently told me that many of the wives she knows look at the Army as their husband’s job, not a lifestyle. This distance from the job creates a ‘dead zone’ where leaders, peers, and subordinates no longer interact. This lost interaction is why the signs are missed and it is a result of poor leadership and the possibly the need to distance yourself from the stress of the organization. There is a feeling that you can leave
I am not excusing the leadership problem but it is certainly exacerbated by the repeated deployments. I recently had a discussion with a 28-year retired Ford executive who does executive leadership consulting for a living now; we came to the same conclusion about Army suicides. Leaders at every level have to care but they also have to create an environment where soldiers FEEL cared about. It is a perception battle which is not easy to beat. Caring leads to trust. Creating the feeling of family in a unit is an art - there is no surefire way to do it. I was part of a unit that did that once, I hope I can replicate it the next time but units are made from people, and people are inherently complex. If someone has more insight, I am all ears.

 

J.D

12:25 PM ET

October 9, 2010

"Caring leads to trust" - CAV GUY clearly gets it

I love your post...."leaders at every level have to care but they also have to create an enviornment where soldiers FEEL cared about. Caring leads to trust"....leadership, at its core, is a human to human interaction.....at the "tactical" level..... blaming Bush et al for the sucide problem/issues, although "strategically" corrrect, does nothing but make people feel better by venting.....

when PFC John Doe kills himself, blaming Bush/Cheney/Rumsfield etc does not help (even though there is truth here)....Doe's chain of command, family (if he has one), friends, battle buddies - these folks who have had human to human contact with him - need to ask themselves about warning signs, what ifs, what else could I have done, etc.....

this is about CARING - which leads to trust.....which in my mind is "leadership 101"...leadership at its most basic level.....

If Doe's ENTIRE chain of command had NO IDEA that he was "hurting" - is this a leadership failure?

 

JIM GOURLEY

10:20 PM ET

October 8, 2010

Go Back To The Roots of Doctrine:

Sun Tzu: "Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack their strength will be exhausted."

Clausewitz: "The moral elements are most important in war."

I like Nickelback as much as anyone, but Elvis is still the King. Clear, Hold, Build, Awaken, convince and cajole as much as you please, but don't try to remix the classics-- it always winds up sounding bad. That's why a surge, regardless of its level of success, doesn't wind up being that successful.

Ultimately, I kind of do and kind of don't agree with General Scales' point. I'd say he's correct that the folks at the top rung screwed the pooch on putting together the campaign plan for Afghanistan and then stirring the hornet's nest in Iraq. However, is that really a consequence of "politics?" I humbly submit that, as Commander in Chief, Bush is a leader. The paradigm seems important to me. Maybe if folks at the top had conducted themselves as Company Commanders with one year to do it right instead of a bunch of politicians trying to do what it takes to get another 4-year term, they might have actually come out better in the long run.

Of course, on that issue, if Obama looked at things that way he'd have embraced the "when in charge, be in charge" ethos, told Gates and Mullen to begin the withdrawal and punctuated his orders with a "dismissed." It doesn't matter whether you agree with either guy, it appears they each lacked the cajones to fill the oval office chair in their own ways.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

10:44 PM ET

October 8, 2010

"as Commander in Chief, Bush is a leader"

My aching ass! One of the essential traits of leadership is getting the job done.

Internationally he started two wars, one of choice on false pretenses, and could not conclude either, even with ever-diminishing goals. He alienated nations and peoples around the world with his arrogance and bluster. And he left our military worn down and unready, the Army broken, the Guard and Reserve lost for a generation,

At home, let's see: monetary surplus turned into record deficit; the worst economic decline since the Great Depression; civil liberties curtailed and infringed upon; a final grade by many as 'our worst president ever.'

Helluva leader, sport. Next time, aim a bit higher...

 

JIM GOURLEY

10:58 PM ET

October 8, 2010

It's not my aim...

I was simply saying that he occupied a leadership position. I didn't say he did a good job at it. It's the job of the people to keep the bar high for their elected leaders. Of late, though, we've been reduced to picking either the lesser of two evils or the greater of two dimwits. Keep in mind he didn't exactly run against heavyweights in his bids for office. Let's face it, in both elections our choice was either George W. Bush... or a guy who couldn't win an intelligent debate against George W. Bush.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

11:12 PM ET

October 8, 2010

I'd swap what we ended up with for a bale of rags

Gore went to Vietnam. He was a successful vice president. He won the Nobel Peace Prize. And an Oscar.

Kerry went to Vietnam. He served in the Riverine Force. He was awarded a Silver Star. He's a serving US Senator.

George W. Bush weenied his war away in the National Guard, under clouded circumstances. His business career was at best spotty. His reaction to the worst terrorist attack ever on US soil - it happened on his watch, remember, after warning - was to continue reading My Little Pet Goat.

Tell me which one of these guys had the potential to be a good national-defense president.

 

BILL KELLER

11:49 PM ET

October 8, 2010

The thread on how we value a life...

Rubber Ducky, you are running thread among his comments here that bears emphasis! We can't place a monetary value on someone's live without making it of a finite and quantitative value. The AVF concept is designed to do that - to put a dollar value on a life and someone's other than mine to go into harms way so that I can engage in the pursuit of happiness without consequence. So when a AVF member realizes that he or she is the sucker or loser in this deal and what has been set as value for their none recoverable loses is but a small bit of crumbs from the winners. Despair and its consequence may be an appealing end game. Dick Cheney pretty much set the standard by stating that he had other uses for his life during a draft period. Think the Swift Boaters were doing the smears on-behalf avoiding hawks to demonstrate how among those who avoided risk deep contempt existed for the ones who did.

We have no real ethical way to repay the AVF members. It is not just but justice is a rare earth metal not held in the strategic reserves.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

12:02 AM ET

October 9, 2010

In plain language...

We owe our military better leadership and a better strategy than they've had. And our military owes us something more, something better than the AVF - that's a pretty thin reed to support the defense of this nation. A proposal: that we resolve to better bring our nation to the military. And the military to our nation. A draft in time of peril does that.

 

OTHER RANKS

1:55 AM ET

October 9, 2010

Everyone makes decisions on the value of their time & life

"We can't place a monetary value on someone's live without making it of a finite and quantitative value."

Absolutely right in that "we can't place a value" or rather, shouldn't, which is what a draft does. It is quite right & proper for individuals to make their own choices on what their own live is worth, which is what individuals do every day. Individuals choose to work in hazardous occupations such as working in the oilfields, mining, logging, farming, etc. They choose to buy or not buy safety features in their cars. They choose levels of life insurance. All are valuation choices, whether or not the individual is explicitly aware of it. On the other hand, a draft subsititutes the choice of the individual for the judgement of the state.

Every day there is a need for police officers, firefighters, construction workers, & fishermen (all occupations with actual or perceived high risk of death or injury). Yet somehow those positions get filled and people show up to work the next day without coercion. If there's a shortage in numbers or quality, no one calls for a draft to "solve" those problems. Yet somehow that's the solution for the military?

 

RUBBER DUCKY

11:06 AM ET

October 9, 2010

The solution a draft provides...

...lies in the constraint it puts on political actions by the national leadership.

As I've said elsewhere, if you give an imperial president an army he can use without political cost, well by golly he will use it. We did that with Bush and by golly, he did ... badly in Afghanistan and foolishly in Iraq.

War is serious business. Though quick response in time of crisis is an essential, the decision that follows - whether to commit to full-scale war or not - needs involve the people and not just some megalomaniacal Commander in Chief. The draft (and the political considerations that attend it) ensures the peoples participation in that decision. Had we had that, no Iraq war and no free pass to screw up the Afghanistan in the thoroughgoing way Bush did.

As to volunteers, it is historical fact that the recruiting offices were swamped on 8 December 1941. But we still needed a draft. The point of Peters' article is that the Army has not had sufficient people to properly prosecute two wars. My point is that a draft guarantees support of the war (and withdraws that support if the leadership can't lead or the war is unwinnable; vide Vietnam).

There may be other systems that could work. This one does. It's called The American Democracy. We the People fight our wars, not a standing army, not some band of mercenaries.

 

TYRTAIOS

2:46 PM ET

October 9, 2010

Draft beer not people

Your views on the draft, or perhaps conscription by a better term are well known, and I admit logical. However, I should point-out the pitfall involved in our past draft experience using the example of Project 100,000, better known as McNamara’s 100,00 (the Moron Corps).

You are aware that the program was part of LBJ’s Great Society to give training and opportunity to the uneducated and under privileged by recruiting upward toward over 350,000 which in reality was simply a way of providing the necessary cannon fodder to help the privileged obtain student deferments, and not calling up the reserves or guard, which were in themselves sanctuaries, i.e. for one noted individual you cited earlier.

This is what bothers me about bringing back a draft and my sense that it will never serve as a deterrent to politicians venturing into potential military quagmires in countries we know little about, nor would it ever be fair and equitably administered by a federal government guided by special interests.

My concern (not outright objection) to the draft stated, my observation during the later stages of, and during post Viet-Nam, is similar to what I’m hearing about today, and I am curious if this is really a new phenomena or if this issue has been with us before and is at the forefront as a result of better tracking, documentation, and information sharing, and the senior leadership simply can't ignore it as they once did?

 

RUBBER DUCKY

3:44 PM ET

October 9, 2010

Vietnam and the US Army

Man, you've really got to read Gabriel and Savage, noted above: Crisis in Command. Blaming draftees for the Army's woes in Vietnam is like blaming the passengers for a train wreck.

I went through boot camp with Navy draftees. The difference between them and volunteer boots: the draftees were a talented and mature crew, the owner of a family bakery, the Detroit lawyer, the school teacher. The draft in WW-II brought in many college graduates, many experts from all walks of life, and they served with honor and valor. The officer corps brought in by the war and the prospect of a draft leavened a military grown stale and stodgy in garrison. And the comment about an earlier program to bring in conscripts not meeting normal standards is not one scrap different from the relaxed recruiting and retention standards that Peters chronicles.

Again: how could an Army of regulars and draftees perform worse than the AVF is now?

 

TYRTAIOS

5:51 PM ET

October 9, 2010

Naw, you didn’t find me

Naw, you didn’t find me playing any blame game, having lived and breathed Viet-Nam far more than most, and paying for it now. I don’t need a primer, nor any jonny-come-latelys or revisionist spin on where to place the blame in crises in command during that conflict.

Though I agree that in theory, a conscripted force would or should motivate Congress to better exercise its war powers, Korea and Viet Nam show me otherwise, and I’m skeptical anything would change in the future about sallying forth militarily, driven by special interest and ignorance.

However, what I think you may have not thought about is: making the Army and Corps an even smaller force, but far more professional and competent, while the reserves and guard would be larger and aimed at mobilization. Unfortunately, it's sure bet that this wouldn’t be politically acceptable to either Congress or the senior uniformed leadership, but that's my prescription.

Bluntly, success by spreading the joy of serving around, would only see the upper class using political connections, bogus medical deferments, spending money on legal representation, or whatever else to avoid service if they don't want to serve.

Where as now, we do have people that want to serve, and besides, I get the impression there is far less social pressure to conform today than in the 1950s, and wonder how many would report for induction?

 

RUBBER DUCKY

6:24 PM ET

October 9, 2010

And how???

And how do you square a no-draft stance with the deep abhorrence the Founding Fathers had for a standing army? How do you square it with their well-founded reasons? How reconcile with the black-letter phrase in the Constitution: "raise an army." Not maintain. "Raise."

National defense outsourced to an AVF augmented with contractors is a pretty solid definition of a mercenary force substituted for the traditional US military. Were the AVF restricted to purely defensive roles and called into action only on threat and as augmented, it might pass muster - barely. But standing as a permanent and full-scale offensive force used globally - Iraq - makes it the kind of imperial army the Founding Fathers feared. Plus it really sucks at the kind of conflict we've undertaken.

BTW, the distinction between the guard and reserve as it has been abused these past years and a conscript force is largely academic. With repeated calls to active service and stop-loss orders, these folks were dragooned in service as surely as they would be in response to a draft notice.

Success can cover a lot of sins. But the AVF has been an utter failure.

 

TYRTAIOS

7:42 PM ET

October 9, 2010

How do I square the deep

How do I square the deep abhorrence of the Founding Fathers had for a standing army? I recognize Jefferson, as an example, was always concerned with a concentration of governmental power in a centralized government, one that might, among other things, establish a professional army superseding state and country militias.

I didn't research it, but I believe the constitution was written so that it would pay for conscription for only two years when necessary. Events today move much quicker and folks like Jefferson might see the need for an amendment, in light of that.

I wonder what he would think of a draft, and the infringement that would be to the rights of citizens by mandatory conscription in creating a contual standing army, rather than voluntary service, if he were to view the world and America's place in it today?

As you say, academic isn't it?

 

XENOPHON

9:28 PM ET

October 9, 2010

The Draft

One thing I’m sure of: There will be no draft—at least not until the US becomes a more authoritarian country. There is absolutely NO current or foreseeable consensus to support such a move. The Civil War and World War I drafts were in response to lack of enthusiasm for enlistment and a waning of public support for the war. The USG has embarked on unpopular wars under both conscription AND the AVF. The 1940-1973 draft was self-evidently no political barrier to US entry into the Vietnam War, as Tyrtaios points out. And, in any event, how could you really crank up the cumbersome draft machinery to meet our conceivable military needs unless you plan on perpetual conscription.

Our founding fathers WERE concerned about standing armies, and quickly did away with the Continental Army after the Revolution—BUT ONLY FOR EIGHT YEARS. After a few notable military disasters in the Ohio Valley at the hands of the Indians, a new standing army was established in 1791. So, Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison ALL had standing armies under their presidencies. And, of course, West Point was established on President Jefferson's watch. What was nice in theory didn’t work—even for the theoreticians—in practice.

The mechanism that will restrain our political leadership from embarking on future foolish wars is COST. The economic foundation of our military power is cracking; the dollar as world reserve currency is slowly losing its dominance. The corporate class that owns this country is waking up after a decade of allowing the neocons to lead them down the garden path and looking in horror at what has been wrought. It seemed at first like such a good deal—the bogey man of militant Islam to keep the masses occupied, but with the bills coming due in the context of our financial disasters, the morning after doesn’t look so good to our CEOs. Gradually, they are edging away from the current complex of wars. This awakening will naturally entail the screwing over of veterans and retirees in the process, but the upshot will be a less bellicose American state. I wouldn't spend much time hoping for or worrying about a draft.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

9:53 PM ET

October 9, 2010

Two responses to two pretentiously named correspondents

Xenophon: "The 1940-1973 draft was self-evidently no political barrier to US entry into the Vietnam." No. But it got us out. And it would have kept us from our current debacle in Iraq.

Tyrtaios: "(a draft:) the infringement that would be to the rights of citizens by mandatory conscription." The legality of a draft has been tested as high as the Supreme Court; no ruling has found it an 'infringement of rights.' Every court has found it legal.

It always bothers me when individuals so knowledgeable of military matters are so ignorant of the basic affairs of democracy. That may be the best reason for leaving military decision to the common people, which a draft does.

BT/AR

 

TYRTAIOS

11:20 PM ET

October 9, 2010

Rubber Ducky, when I squeeze you, you make noise!

The draft was no barrier to getting the U.S. into Viet-Nam as you acknowledge, but abolishing it really played little part in getting us out. LBJ’s peace plan proposal offered to Hanoi was the same as Nixon’s, who had Kissinger sabotage it. It was political maneuvering on Nixon's part in the end that saw us exit conventionally from Viet-Nam, just as it will be in Afghanistan.

We seem to repeat the past. Why would going forward with a draft play-out any differently in the future, were such a far fetched thing to occur, theory aside Rubber Ducky,. I too am always amused when individuals so otherwise worldly show naivety.

I think Xenophon is correct, what will control our military adventures abroad may very well be the costs for such, that even the hard right neocon will see can no longer be borne, or at the least will be weighed much more carefully by our Congress.

Either way it is a fronte praecipitium a tergo lupi (precipice in front, wolves behind).

 

WHISKEYPAPA

3:08 AM ET

October 10, 2010

WWII Draft

"But we still needed a draft."

We needed a draft because so many guys showed up to enlist early on there was no place to put them, no uniforms for them to wear and no food for them to eat.

The draft got men into the military at a pace in which the military could assimilate them. In that sense, yes we needed a draft.

I won't open another box to say that Bush was not just a bad president. He violated many U.S. and foreign laws.

No way should he be kicking back in Texas.

Walt

 

ADMIRAL

1:18 PM ET

October 10, 2010

More than most?

"...having lived and breathed Viet-Nam far more than most...."

Than most of the Vietnamese people? Since you went back for seconds, you must have enjoyed the feast. Finger lickin good!

"To keep our honor clean"

 

WALKING WOUNDED

11:58 PM ET

October 8, 2010

Attrition over time impacts leadership

By hard count (a sample of 100 sequential KIA's in 2005) I found 45% to be corporal rank or higher. Mostly sergeant, and company grade officers. When you factor the high fraction of non-fatal concussion-TBI casualties in the same rank grades, so many junior officers opting out after one tour, the specialists that might have made military a career, if they hadn't fallen casualty...

One former division commander estimated our composite attrition rate was effectively a battalion a month for 2005-7. We've worked back up to that 2/day rate in September 2010.

GIven the high percentage of PFC suicides that occur before during or after a first tour, and the reduced combat tempo in Iraq, recruiting and leader retention do seem to be as important to look at as individual/physical over-stress. Psychiatric meds and steroids, both pre and post-enlistment, are another place to look. One wonders about a lot of 'accidental' death brought on by high-risk behavior, and how it all relates to suicide attempts that are clearly accompanied by calls for help.

Starbuck and others make good points above, but it's important to understand that a positive correlation doesn't establish cause and effect. Pain and drugs, for instance. As we perform war-time experiments that a human subjects committee would reject outright, research will eventually grind the numbers to show a broad spread in the paths leading an individual to suicide.

Past mismanagment of VN PTSD, agent Orange, Gulf War Syndrome and TBI research indicate to me that military epidemiology should be conducted without the Army being allowed to front-load the study design- if we really want answers.

 

RECON RUNNER

1:37 AM ET

October 9, 2010

I couldn't agree more with

I couldn't agree more with DMDennis. Garrison life is the pits. The difference is now we(combat vets) have seen what the "other side/combat." Nothing pushes up urges to kill yourself like spending 10 hours of work/admin paperwork for every one you're out at the range or training, or doing risk assessments to drive your car to a town that doesn't suck for the weekend, having your car inspected, having your room inspected, asking your boss if its okay to go outside of the 60 mile radius for the weekend, sitting through your pre/post deployment health assessment, sitting through power point suicide prevention classes, "reunion" classes, etc. Nothing beats mass punishment too. You have to love being called in after a 90 hour work week on your weekend b/c someone else got a DUI.

Here's the bottom line; nothing is going to get solved, but the Army/Marines will add another semi-annual requirement for some class/power point. What would really solve the problem is friends taking care of one another and leaders taking care of the Soldiers/Marines. Like one of the other posters said though, you want to be involved with your subordinates but you need some time and space to maintain you own sanity. I've got over 36 months deployed; many other leaders have many more months and leaders need that space and those weekends/nights with their families.

.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

5:00 PM ET

October 9, 2010

Agree with 'agree'

RR, at least you're not bitter about it ;)

Something I'm learning in a very different context is that the caregiver (a caring person that is taking concrete actions to help and be available) needs support, self-care and community, or we become part of the problem, casualties ourselves. It's a lesson life keeps presenting over and over until we start to get it. The first time a friend responded to my woes with 'so what are you doing about it' was an eye opening moment, that oh yeah, it is up to me to track and take action. Unfortunately, I'm a slow learner.

Thx for your service. And empathy/compassion that it's still a moment/day/week/month at a time back here. Nil illigitimi carborundum, time wounds all heals. Breathe, seek dog pets and human hugs when and where we can find them.

 

HUNTER

2:38 PM ET

October 9, 2010

WTF is leadership?

No one seems to know or care anymore. Leadership is a dimestore word with no meaning anymore. What the nebulous word leadership means in this discussion is "someone other than me is responsible for this problem". Someone higher than me in the food chain is responsible for this suicide problem.

Guess what? All that is bullshit. Leadership can't solve this problem (I question whether leadership solves any problems after 8+ years actively studying that worthless field). Everyone has to solve this problem.

Scales response is bullshit too. He's looking for an out. But this is everyone's problem to solve. I find it amusing as hell that the Army commissioned a 5 year 5 million dollar study and the end result is that Scales and Chiarelli still come back with their shitty anecdotal evidence. The study said that soldiers engage in high risk behavior - that's about as enlightening as the cow shit methane studies that say cow shit stinks. Even soldiers who haven't deployed and had their life repeatedly jeopardized engage in high risk behaviors.

As I have stated numerous times before no amount of suicide brieifings is going to solve this problem.No amount of leadership will either - it is waht the "leadership" does that matters. In this case they need to do some pro-active mental training before soldiers go to war to mentally prepare for the rigors of combat. The chain of command (which is a much better, clearer definition of who the "so-called leadership") need to provide classes on what physiologically happens in combat (tunnel vision, high blood pressure, auditory exclusion, evacuation of the bowels etc.). They need to provide real moral/ethical training that explains just war theory and justice in war theory. They need to actually prepare these soldiers for the adversity they will face.

It doesn't matter who sent them to war, doesn't matter whose war it is now. The soldiers are the bill payers. So instead of continuing to squander scare resources of time and money on what to do with a soldier once they are damaged (witness the Army's current Resiliency training push) maybe we could take the ounce of prevention method, instead of the pound of cure.

Sure the chain of command has to be involved, sure they have to care...this is baseline expectation stuff. But has some have already noted here there is a fine line that can't be crossed. health and welfares and constant chain of command presence in the barracks etc....doesn't let a soldier live a life outside the military.

in the end, every soldier, every peer, every superior and subordinate, every unit is in this fight. Ill-defined leadership isn't a panacea for anything.

Finally to the person who questioned if this is much ado about nothing - re: the suicide rate. I refer you to these numbers.

77 67 85 102 115 140 160

Those are the total Active duty soldiers who committed suicide each year from 2003 to 2009. That's 746 or about the equivalent of an Infantry Bn. Attempts are about 5 times those numbers. So I would say we have a significant problem that better get fixed soon because the numbers keep climbing - regardless of the post-trauma activities that have been put into place in the last 2-3 years, once DoD started getting serious about this.

But leadership ain't gonna solve this problem. Caring soldiers at every level will.

 

HUNTER

2:48 PM ET

October 9, 2010

And another thing

This is America's war. I think Bush is an idiot, I think Shinseki is a moral coward for not resigning in disgust when the neo-cons didn't listen to him. I had higher hopes for Obama, and have thus far been disappointed.

But in the end it doesn't matter. 20/20 hindisght is great and all but it is still hindsight. Bush wanted to invade Iraq and ignore Afghanistan. He was allowed to do that by our elected officials in Congress. He was re-elected after already demonstrating a high level of (to be kind) ineffectiveness.

Our elected officials and our elections of Bush and re-election of him means he was our duly designated official acting on behalf of the nation. So look in the mirror and blame each and everyone of us for what happened if that is the way you feel, or blame your neighbor. Doesn't fucking matter.

America did this, it is America's war. I wish more of America was involved (not by draft, but war tax, victory garden, conservations, privation, anything to take the focus of Dancing with the Stars and more on what we are doing in the international realm). But stop blaming anybody but ourselves for what we have done. THIS IS AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN AMERICA'S WAR. It is on;y that less than 1% of America is actually fighting it.

BTW this goes right back to "blaming leadership" for our problems. Get over it. "They" ain't ever gonna fix anything....but "YOU" sure can.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

12:18 PM ET

October 10, 2010

The dog that didn't bark

Near the top of this thread I posed three theses flowing from the original Peters article. One, that we need to reinstate the draft, attracted much comment and argument, as it always does. But the other two - that the Army leadership is a failure and Army thoroughgoing reform called for and that the AVF is an utter failure - went largely without comment or rejoinder (the anti-draft arguments might be seen as pro-AVF, but in truth offered nothing other than keep-the-failed-status-quo).

This is noteworthy. Time past (and not so far past), criticism of the Army would have attracted much counter-battery. And highlighting the failure of the AVF the same, those in argument conflating that contention with a failure on my part to understand the bravery of our troops and the wondrous efficacy of various (and constantly shifting) tactics being substituted for actual strategy.

It's tough to start a fight in this bar, but let me try again. These are important points:

The Army is broken, its leadership failed, and the only fix is top-to-bottom military reform.

The AVF is an utter failure, a pretty parade-ground force in peacetime but unable to prevail and win in extended combat. Hate the draft if you will, but the AVF is not a successful substitute for a cadre professional military backed by citizen soldiers.

 

TYRTAIOS

2:29 PM ET

October 10, 2010

Indeed it didn't bark

Yea, it's me again Rubber Ducky. You are correct, criticism of the Army should have brought a TOT (time-on-target) response from the readership, and this is certainly a worthwhile debate.

Though my past uniformed service was in the Corps, it isn’t lost on me that the AVF is still set-up on a conscripted model, though I would point out that any comparison of the Army (and Corps) of, say 1967or 68, and that of 2003, which originally went into Iraq and onto Baghdad, is no contest - the AVF was better.

It was never my intention to disagree that the AVF was ill-suited for the mission it found itself in after Saddam's statue fell, and it continues to finds itself in now - conflicts designed around changing goals, and operational tactics vice any national strategy, which is as much to blame on military leadership, is it is our national security team (past and present).

However, as a fix I don't see national service even remotely over the horizon, and I am convinced the AVF was "adequate" in 2003, but it isn't now, and hasn't been for too long, and having experienced post Viet-Nam in uniform, as a Viet-Nam veteran, I think things will get worse before they gets better.

In closing, and I'll guess you would disagree, I think the AVF has potential, but we will never realize it as long as our nation utilizes the AVF for specious missions for which it is obviously ill suited - and that is also a debate that should occur at the national level.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

2:56 PM ET

October 10, 2010

Noi too far apart, but...

The problem with the AVF is that, without serious augmentation (and for that the only source is a draft), it can't ramp up without simultaneously tearing down the Services' abilities in other vital mission areas and without simply shattering the Guard and Reserve (want to see the Guard's gear? Get a ticket to the Middle East, where you will see it rotting in the Iraqi desert and the valleys of Afghanistan).

It's a quantity thing: the AVF is not scalable! And the kind of leadership the propers in a peacetime environment has proven clueless in these two wars, one our longest in history. And against what? We're not fighting the Wehrmacht, not going against the Imperial forces of Japan, not executing the SIOP or defending the Fulda Gap.

Some have noted an order-of-battle problem in dealing with the Iraq insurgency and the mess in Afghanistan. That's because there ain't no order-of-battle, just a shimmering collection of ragtag irregulars: these cats are too fragmented, small, ill-equiped, and disconnected to be worth one good OOB .ppt slide.

If you take our goals as originally stated, all thought to be well within the grasp of the AVF, we have failed as fully and absolutely as if we had signed a surrender document (though to whom is also unclear; just who has defeated us?). I wish I were revealing a subtle and easily missed tiny little detail hidden obscurely in the fog of war. But it's as plain as a casket: the AVF has failed. That's worth a national discussion.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

2:59 PM ET

October 10, 2010

"...the propers in...

Naw. "...that prospers in..." Geez I miss that correction feature....

 

RAY GIBBS

12:54 PM ET

October 10, 2010

Why so many suicides?

Too many tours. A moderate "draft" needs to be instituted.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

5:48 PM ET

October 11, 2010

'too many tours'

Certainly a factor, but as much in a unit and institutional sense, as in terms of a specific family experience. The trend line includes an increase in attempts before/during a first deployment, guys who volunteered for infantry. So the epidemiologists are looking at a complex matrix; the deployments degrading recruitment, training, and morale, which are leadership issues. Trickle-down malaise?

Among the most overdeployed, those who remain in service, there is probably something of a 'survivor effect', guys who've already shed unhappy spouses by tour 2 or 3, and are pretty tough. Never can tell when that sort of 'right stuff' will wear thin, the knees wear out, years take a toll...

 

RECON RUNNER

5:24 PM ET

October 10, 2010

Failure

The AVF struggled through the first few years of both wars b/c:

1) We under funded the Pre-GWOT AVF; under funded professional military education, under funded officer advanced degrees, under funded training, and ended up with a stagnant force that was proficient in only humanitarian relief and Desert Storm type missions unable to quickly adapt to COIN during the Iraq post invasion period.

2) The drawn down Army leadership (officers) became a zero defect/risk adverse mess with the exception of a few maverick officers who ended up being the successful and innovative leaders of OEF/OIF. Packets for officer promotions were screened for a lack of mistakes versus leadership potential and the ability to think outside of the box.

3) We spent the years leading up to the GWOT focused on junk-on-the-bunk inspections, putting a Sharpie to the metal portions of our pistol belts, and infusing bureaucracy into all aspects of training instead empowering/mentoring junior NCOs and junior officers to train their men to be adaptive and to think outside of the box.

When the post GWOT draw down occurs (see articles at SWJ about plans to get the Marines back to pre-GWOT levels by 2020 and the Army losing 100k by 2020) and we start screening officers for promotion again (yes, officers actually competed for promotion b/f the BN CMD board) and not every NCO is guaranteed reenlistment (yes at one time you competed to stay in the military and w/o a bonus for most MOSs), let's make sure we keep the best and brightest and give the AVF a chance to succeed.

 

SILENTSHWAN

5:49 PM ET

October 10, 2010

My experiences.

1. Standards - If we recruited soldiers who weren't mentally deficient/unstable to begin with, we wouldn't be having this problem. In the rush to get an army fielded we drafted CAT IIs CAT IIIs and even allowed CAT IVs (my god these are people who can't even get a 30 AQFT on the ASVAB!). I don't buy this Garrison BS one bit. If a soldier can't handle Garrison life then maybe he should kill himself off because obviously he's not a soldier. Garrison is 75% of being a soldier. To train and stay vigilant to deploy for that 25% of your job which is to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in Close Combat. I'm pretty sure Ft. Hood is beating out Camp Casey in suicides, and All Area I Korea consists of is "garrison".

2. Leadership - Many others have hit the head on this nail so I won't go into it. I'll stick to the Non-Com side since Mr. Ricks frequently talks about the Officer Corps Woes. Frankly, when this war started many Senior NCOs saw how the Army was going and left, forcing everyone up one Grade. Then these guys saw how desperate the Army was getting and they too left. This leaves us with Third Rate NCOs. Did you know the Warrior Leader Course (PLDC) is now 15 days long? Did you know Land Navigation is now no longer in WLC? Did you know now that you no longer need to pass a PT test for ANY NCOES school? This goes back to standards. We have substandard NCOs training new soldiers a new pretty weak standard. Complete leadership breakdown in the NCO support chain.

3. Present Conflicts - If soldiers don't understand the nature of the conflict then this is what happens. Time ago when I heard one of my soldiers call this a war I immediately corrected them, and gave a reading assignment from FM 7-98 Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict. personally after 2007 how do you tell a soldier to me motivated when all they do is just drive around in a convoy waiting to get blown up? giving a soldier a simple culture brief is not enough to get them to understand whats at stake.

 

RECON RUNNER

6:02 PM ET

October 10, 2010

Does anyone have the suicide data by rank/age

If I had to guess, I would say that most suicides occur before/during/after a Soldier's first deployment and on the most mental complications would occur after a Soldier's third deployment.

Ray- I don't think the biggest contributing factor to suicides is the number of deployments, but rather is the frequency and duration of the deployments. For an example: A Soldier who has three 12 month deployments over ten years(12 months deployed/24 months back) is less likely to have issues than a Soldier who does three 12 month deployments in 6 years. Again, this is just my opinion from anecdotal evidence which is suspect.

You don't necessarily need a draft to fix that problem, just better personnel management. Why don't we reallocate those Senior officers and NCO from the combat higher HQs who are formalizing Power Point slide standards and augment the handful of officers/NCOs that managing tens of thousands of Soldiers assignments. Maybe if we did a better job of personnel management, we wouldn't have a SGT MAJ with 29 years of service, who is in charge of the SGT MAJ Academy, w/o a single combat deployment.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

7:42 PM ET

October 10, 2010

You don't fix the AVF...

...by chamfering the edges. In fact, you don't fix it at all.

The calls above for changes in training, values, and the military culture itself are all good, but no amount of tinkering is going to turn the fundamentally flawed AVF concept into something wonderful ... even if every emendation were spot on and even if it were carried through perfectly, neither of which will be the case. And you certainly don't fix the leadership by asking that same leadership to somehow bootstrap itself to goodness.

No, this is a situation calling for profound insight and deep change, a paradigmatic shift in military organization and function (and perhaps roles and missions) of tectonic proportions.

My instinct is USMC stays the same (and amphibious), a whole lot more SOF, a lot less Navy and Air Force (the latter perhaps by joining it back into the Army), and a shattering restructuring and retraining of the US Army, rethinking the Guard and reserve along the way.

And for all the military, a readjustment of major size in its relationship to the society it protects, inducting the later's young people into its ranks as an element of citizen service and ending the cultural isolation caused by living apart in company towns - we call them bases - and the archaic, anachronistic system of benefits in kind (vice cash) that we have now.

YMMV, but it's of this scope, not 'do better what we're doing now.' This is worth a national discussion.

 

XENOPHON

12:48 AM ET

October 11, 2010

Draft, AVF, etc

Rubber Ducky,

I am waiting for you to make the case that the draft army is as superior as you say it is. I haven’t heard you make more than the assertion that AVF doesn’t work and therefore a draft must be the solution. What, in your view is the difference between our defeat in Vietnam and stalemate in Korea with a draft army and our stalemates in Iraq and Afghanistan with a volunteer army.

Let’s stop the generalizations and get down to empirical cases. BTW, if you want to know the truth about what Joe thought about his officers in the WWII draft army, leaf through Sam Stouffer’s five-volume Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier published in 1949 by Princeton University Press. Stouffer went to Europe and did a half million interviews with soldiers. It’s very ugly reading; the soldier view of officers is VERY negative. The truth is that, in some sense, the Army has ALWAYS been broke. That is to say, the Army tries to take the mass of the US population, officer this huge, disparate group and turn it into some semblance of a cohesive, effective fighting force. Are you expecting this is going to be a work of perfection? Maybe on some other planet.

So what is this imaginary utopian world of a highly effective, caring, ass-kicking draft army that you have in mind? Because I can’t, for the life of me, figure out what you are talking about.

Let me ask you this question: Why did the draft army fail in Vietnam? Or how about this: Why did the draft Red Army fail in Afghanistan? Yeah, that’s right, we have instances of both draft and volunteer armies achieving sub-optimal results in Afghanistan. So what’s the common denominator here? Armies—draft or volunteer—are failing when they are tasked with IMPOSING a new social model on Afghanistan (or Vietnam, Algeria, etc) Stop obsessing about the AVF. The real issue is the idiocy of “counterinsurgency warfare”. People—Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Montagnards, Vietnamese, Iroquois, Shawnees, et al— HATE the yoke of the foreigner whatever “good” intentions that foreigner CLAIMS to have.

Unless you are willing to take a Roman approach—or the Russian approach in Chechnya or the American approach to the Indian tribes—that is, unless you are willing to wage a war of genocide or quasi-genocide, then don’t attempt to fight a “counterinsurgency”. There is once exception to that rule; if you can find a surrogate—one that is the majority or dominant group in the area—then you can win by supporting them. For example, the British won in Malaya by supporting the Malay majority against the hated Chinese minority who formed the core of the Communist insurgency. (That doesn’t work with a minority like the stone-age Montagnards against their hated Vietnamese enemy.)

Draft and volunteer armies both have advantages in certain circumstances. The main advantage of the draft army is to mass huge numbers in attrition warfare. With well under 10K dead after 9 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are not in that mode. So I would say that the AVF is probably the best option going forward. More importantly, it’s the only politically viable option, so let’s not waste our time discussing a draft army that simply WON’T happen.

The real issue here is strategy: When and how to commit US forces—draft or volunteer—so that we can bring our strengths to bear and minimize exposure of our weaknesses. When we supplied the Afghans in their struggle to throw off the yoke of the Soviets, we were fighting the RIGHT war. When we took the role of the Soviets and tried to impose “democracy”, we put ourselves in the same position as the Soviets with similar results. Neither a draft army nor an AVF is a panacea for our strategic incompetence. It remains to be seen whether we can retrieve our position and the extent to which China will be able to benefit strategically from our mistakes.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

1:03 AM ET

October 11, 2010

Draft armies are committed to war by the people

The AVF was committed by an imperialist twit.

Korea turned out ... OK. South Korea, which we rescued, is a vibrant nation with a thriving population. Vietnam turned out ... sorta OK, after we ended the silliness in '73 and left, after the communist ideology had runs its course and capitalism made its mark.

Wish I could see anything good ahead for either Iraq (where we should never have gone and wouldn't have were there a draft) or Afghanistan (where we could and should have prevailed but now will leave with nothing to show for the effort).

But the argument doesn't hinge on military outcome - it has to do with the other end of the timeline, the start (or non-start) of war. I want a draft to bind the people to war and the decision for it, not for greater military efficacy (though that case can be made: WW-II). War is politics, and the opportunity to bring war without political burden is anathema to our democracy.

Many seem to think that military considerations are paramount (though if they truly were, we'd not be in the fix we are in our two wars). I argue that politics are paramount and that a draft brings those politics to the local level, to dinner tables across America and not just those at Ft Benning or Pendleton or Camp Drum. It's unfortunate that many who write here about military affairs never had a course in civics. It's unfortunate that many think military efficiency matters more than democratic ideals.

 

XENOPHON

1:18 AM ET

October 11, 2010

Re: Draft Armies Are Committed By the People

When have draft armies EVER emerged from the wellspring of "the people" The draft is ALWAYS imposed by the government. The people may CONCUR with a draft, but it is NOT a product of popular sentiment. In WW I, when the draft was imposed when voluntary enlistments were insufficient. In large swathes of the country--especially the upper midwest--there was NO enthusiasm for the war or the draft. Did the draft in the USSR come "from the people"?

And who are the people anyway? The majority of Americans supported the war effort in Vietnam up to 1968--but NOT the college students. So when we withdrew, was the will of the people fulfilled or thwarted?

 

XENOPHON

1:25 AM ET

October 11, 2010

Civics Lesson

RD,

You're the one who needs a civics lesson. If you don't find the notion that our broken economy will restrain our political leadership from embarking on aggressive wars in the future sufficiently appealing, then instead of wasting your time with endless blog posts about the draft that won't happen, get out and organize a third party with a non-intervention, anti-neocom platform.

 

OTHER RANKS

4:35 AM ET

October 11, 2010

Xenophon, you're right on

Xenophon, you're right on target. The the overwhelming majority of the population never served in any war under a draft or AVF. Only 12% served at some time during WW II. 92% of the population was not in uniform at the end of WW II.

I would add that the indifference of the undrafted extended after 1968 to those with high lottery numbers.

Also, not much remembered now is that until the 1972 elections those under 21 were disenfranchised by law in 46 states yet still subject to the draft. Brings to mind that old saw about democracy being two wolves and a sheep voting on what's for dinner. Except the sheep doesn't get a vote.

 

WHISKEYPAPA

10:40 PM ET

October 10, 2010

Contrast

Ya'll may or may not know that at the start of WWII, Marshall was jumped over like 150 generals to be made CoS.

He made a rule that no officer over age 54 would go overseas. Hyper-active Patton was an exception.

Ike relieved something like 40 colonels in Normandy.

Thing is, none that could happen today.

And it is the civilians who run our government who bear a lot of the blame. It is axiomatic that the officers who do well in peacetime do crappy in war time.

Floyd Fredendall comes to mind.

And so does vastly underappreciated (SO THERE!) Gen Frank Andrews who was sent away to a sunset post until he was tapped for successively more important posts in WWII.

And crazy George Patton had a career going nowhere under the ancien Regime.

Walt

 

RUBBER DUCKY

9:48 AM ET

October 11, 2010

Draft bad...

Mercenaries good.

People bad. Military elites good.

Democracy bad. Imperialism good.

AVF bad. ??? good?

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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