Friday, October 8, 2010 - 11:28 AM

Policy Review has a rambling essay on military memoirs that I found especially interesting for its discussion, at the end, of a recent memoir of serving in the Russian army. I hadn't heard of One Soldier's War in Chechnya, by Arkady Babchenko, but was struck by some of it quoted in the essay:
'This is not an army, but a herd drawn from the dregs of the criminal classes, lawless apart from the dictates of the jackals that run it.' In this 'army living by prison camp rules,' the end product is a soldier without a conscience and 'with a coldness inside [him] and a hatred of the whole world, with no past and no future.'"
Meanwhile, here is a roundup of recent U.S. military memoirs. (How can I not like an essay that says in an aside, "Ricks is even more right about that than he realizes?" Of course, he goes on to say that, "Ricks is wrong to think we can rely on ROTC instead of, rather than along with, the academies" -- but alas he misses the point that in advocating closing the military academies and war colleges, I advocated moving to a Sandhurst-like approach, rather than just relying on ROTC. And send colonels to civilian institutions to learn how to think strategically.)
Speaking of military memoirs, Mario Vargas Llosa won the Nobel Prize for literature yesterday. He isn't generally known for military writing, but his novel Captain Pantoja and the Special Service is a good farce about an officer assigned to set up a roving brothel for troops isolated in the Amazonian jungle.
More die from beans than bullets
Anyone who's read of Red Army practice in Afghanistan knows that hazing the new guy in a US unit is benign 'strange dog tail sniffing' by comparison.
During the 1995 FSR Azerbaijan-Armenia war (how the rooshuns do Russian foreign policy), draftees had a 1 in three chance of catching tuberculosis while in the service. Military medicine in all armies is focused on returning men to line service, perpetuating each era's camp fever.
Shudder.
It is rather amazing that this collection riff raff is essentially the same army that the Pentagon told us for years was a menacing and looming juggernaut about to crash through the Fulda Gap. Perhaps the Soviets faked us out or even more likely the Pentagon faked us out!
There shouldn't be much surprise here? After all, the word dedovshchina is derived from the Russian word dedushka or grandfather.
What former Young Pioneer Arkady Babchenko describes was certainly destined to be grandfathered in from the old collapsed Soviet Army into the new Russian Federation model. An army that was notorious for unprofessional conduct, and drunkenness. Further lead, mostly in absentee, by junior officers playing the role of what would ordinarily be the responsibilities of an NCO in the west, following operational level designed simple tactical missions.
A little boy found a machine gun - Now the villiage population is none.
And then there are the rooshun 'contractors'
And then there are the rooshun 'contractors' that Putin pushed thru the tunnel, for occupation duty in S. Abkhazia/ Georgia. The Georgians wish they'd never rocketed the undertrained riff-raff draftees in the first wave, creating an opportunity for the professionally nasty and overtly criminal 'private sector' caucasians.
Most of us have forgotten that the Second (1999) Chechen War, was a branded recruiting tool for AQSL, who repurposed Atta's non-rifraf Hamburg cell for 9/11 duty against the greater satan. An unintended consequence of the Chechen mess was the 'brave muj' thing got turned full about, to stampede the US into committing our cadillac troops into most distant wars, to our tactical and strategic disadvantage.
It's a mistake to misunderestimate the potential of rif-raf, or to trust judgements made while looking into the eyes of a viper. Who knew Putin could fish like TR, ride like RR, and dicker like Molotov.
JPWREL,is this an opening for a conversation about the long time failures of US intelligence services?
GSF, perhaps the lack of candor about the capabilities of the Cold War Soviet military establishment had less to do with intelligence failures and rather more to do with the propensity of the ‘national security state’ to turn its potential adversaries into Goliaths for selfish career and budgetary reasons. It is interesting that President Eisenhower intimately understood this tendency within the military to magnify the Soviets capabilities because the Pentagon’s very existence depended upon having a formidable opponent.
This is the same Russian army that was nothing but pure romping stomping destruction in WW-II. Quantity has its own quality and the advantage goes to defense. Ask Napoleon.
The common comment from the intelligence community during the '80s was 'the Russians aren't 10 feet tall.' Students of the Soviet military in this time period (I have in mind Alana Kass as a primary exemplar) were seeing that even the Soviets acknowledged they had problems and advocated military reform. But the Soviet military was still formidable: there sure were a lot of them and they had some decent gear, interior lines of communication, and a history of successful homeland defense. Oh, and a gigantic arsenal of nuclear weapons.
I'd say about 6'2".
Ilana Kass
The hazing there is completely ingrained into the system and there seems to be nothing they can do about it because the officers either participate or don't care and the Russians don't have anything resembling an NCO corps. It's horrifying, the stories are similar to what you hear happening to new inmates in prison. Look up poor Andrey Sychyov.
JP, you mean I spend all that time chasing Soviets--4 continents, 2 oceans and a bunch of seas--just to keep the lights on at the Pentagon?!
"JP, you mean I spend all that time chasing Soviets--4 continents, 2 oceans and a bunch of seas--just to keep the lights on at the Pentagon?!"
Sorta.
In the 1960's, both MacArthur and General David Shoup (Commandant in that period as well as CMoH winner) warned about militarism for the sake of militarism. Gen. Shoup wrote an article called, "The New American Militarism" in 1970.
Walt
But they’re on a mission from God
I wouldn't carry a comparison of the two armies too far, but we should remember that the US re-took Fallujah in al Anbar by using pretty much the same approach that Russia used to re-take Grozny in Chechnya, i.e. by unleashing enough ordnance to “make the rubble bounce”. Both treated their adversaries – insurgents who employ terrorism and act in the name of Islam – as unlawful combatants who possess no rights and are deserving of torture and extrajudicial execution.
There is a divergence between the two examples Watson. Had the Marines been allowed to do it there way, there may not have been a need for an assault on Fallujah - at least they knew of another way - the Russians didn't and don't.
Incidentally, the body of Yuri Ivanov, former deputy head of the Russian GRU, was fished out of the Med, off Turkey back in August. This is the guy that directed the assassination attacks by Russian agents against Chechen leaders living abroad - my source in Constantinople, or is that Istanbul, doubts Yuri drowned.
Cheers,
Boris
The other source of Russian strength...
The KGB and GRU were formidible opponents. Our nation's intelligent agancies (including the FBI domestically) had their hands full. Add that to the numbers the Russians and their satelite states had in troops and equipment as well as the nuclear arsenal and one would have been foolish to discount such an enemy.
I don't think herd is a good description. As my D.I.s used to point out, a herd has a leader. Looks more like a mob to me.
The Sandhurst model already is used in the U.S.
Re: your comment about using the Sandhurst model in the U.S. I am quite certain the author of Making Marines knows very well that the finest officer corps in the country already eschews the Service academy cabal-producing model and has a Sandhurst-like institution already running on all cylinders... at Quantico. Yes, Naval Academy grads do become Marine officers, but they all go through the same training at Quantico as the officers from other sources. And fortunately for the Corps, it doesn't make one squat of difference for one's career what college an officer attended. As an example, take a look at the heads of the services. The CNO is a boat schooler, the Army Chief of Staff is a West Pointer. Same for the Air Force. But the Commandant ? the current one went to Southeast Missouri State. And the Corps' other most prominent officer, Gen Mattis, went to Central something or other U in Washington state, way off the beateb path. The Corps doesn't care one wit whether someone is a ring knocker or not, and is the better for it. Additionally, the shared origin of every officer in the Corps is a little appreciated source of strength. That every single officer, whether lawyer or pilot or aviation supply, trains to be an infantry platoon commander before doing anything else, and all together in the same place, yields an immeasurable cohesion to the Corps' officers that is not understood in the other services.
The US military has its own horror stories both in times of peace during war. Such as soldiers shooting journalists from a helicopter as if they were playing a video game, or dropping a puppy from a bridge, etc.
From my understanding, during the Cold War, especially in the 70s, the USSR had the better army, US better navy, and the airforce was about the same.
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