Even if we had the type of country-specific focus the author talked about, American flag officers would have had their professional development when our strategic focus was on the Soviet Union, not China. America's global military involvement doesn't allow the luxury of focusing almost exclusively on one or two opponents. There's no guarantee that our orientation will be on the right region when a conflict arises. By contrast, China can tailor its efforts to Russia and the United States - which because of its alliances is conveniently applicable to a host of other militaries.

The article is extremely insightful, but I could see this particular problem as one of the hazards that must be accepted when you're a global power. Resources, especially people, are limited.

Not a problem COW COOKIE (on paper at least). The Marine Corps has broken down the world, where they think Marines may to eventually be deployed to operate after leaving Afghanistan, into 17 micro-regions under a newly established Career Marines Regional Studies Program, and will assign officers (and later NCOs) a region to study for the rest of their career.

Obviously this article should be of concern to the U.S. Navy, and I bring-up the Marine Corps’ example because though a separate branch of the armed forces under the Department of the Navy, albeit, the men's department, the Navy should be on the same sheet of music in likewise implementing such a program. After all, the Navy will certainly screen, deliver, and support Marines into one of those 17-micro regions in the future.

The key phrase is, "where they think Marines may to eventually be deployed to operate after leaving Afghanistan." First off, there's the "where they think" part. We live in a world with imperfect information and America's position increases the number of options for which it must prepare.

Then there's the part about leaving Afghanistan. There have always been Afghanistans and likely always will be. We just don't know in which part of the world. Consider the countries we've been involved in just in the past three decades - everything from Iran (Persian) to Lebanon (a melting pot) to Central America to Iraq (Arabic) to Somalia to Afghanistan. Even if the Marines manage to focus on one of the microregions, we've already diluted our force far beyond the scope that the article describes for the Chinese.

Consider this description: "PLAN “America” experts spend an entire career developing a deep understanding of the language, culture, history, strategy and current significant personalities of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps combat team, while U.S. Navy personnel are rarely able to focus on one area for longer than a single tour. China’s effort has built PLAN foreign affairs officers who are fluent in English, have studied abroad, possess an intimate understanding of U.S. Navy issues and are trusted advisers to PLAN senior leaders. The PLA’s research and evaluation of U.S. strategy and operational art is shockingly deep and broad, and often shapes war-fighting doctrine."

That is a career path in and of itself. It is not simply a regional focus during an officer's otherwise normal career progression as the microregion plan is. That's not to say it's worthless. But I think the global situation and strategic stance we've adopted in response to it dictates breadth over depth.

Additionally, I'm skeptical about how closely Marines will be able to focus on a region when that focus inevitably clashes with the needs of the Corps. Admittedly, I don't know the Marines well at all. But the Army doesn't do such a great job getting its Foreign Area Officers into the areas they actually studied. I have a feeling the personnel system will struggle with balancing the need to fill slots and provide opportunities for career progression all while developing this regional expertise.

Generally speaking, the Chinese have only a handful of PLA(N) personnel stationed abroad in embassies, on fellowships, and in U.N. peacekeeping operations and in all actuality lags behind our uniformed presence in may areas, but also supersedes us in other areas, because one must count their technicians that are in actuality members of the PLA(N). There is a point here - you figure it out? : )

I agree, the Corps’ new program will need much support and mentoring at lower command/unit (battalion/company) level, and cannot be turned into a chore by higher headquarter, seen only as one more step to, or impediment for, promotion and/or duty assignments. But it is a start in the right direction.

Anecdotally, you didn't see a three ship ARG (amphibious readiness group) off Pakistan flying the Chinese flag providing disaster relief for the recent flooding now did you? But, of course, the U.S. Navy/Marine Team can't rest on its laurels - time waits for no one.

Toujours Fidele

I should have mentioned the Aussies and New Zealanders as member of the 'skeptical on China' naval/intel brain trust, as well as considerable strategic depth in the Fijian Marines and Samoans that don't make it in the NFL.

The emergence of China as a Pacific power, when it happens, will be one of the longest-anticipated events in US history.