Let's be reasonable so let's ask for the impossible

"War means tears
to thousands of mothers eyes
When their sons go to fight
and lose their lives"

"War, huh, yeah
What is it good for
Absolutely nothing"

"The end is nowhere, man."

"If a thing is worth doing, its worth overdoing."

Where have all the young men gone? Long time passing
Where have all the young men gone? Long time ago
Where have all the young men gone? Gone for soldiers every one
When will they ever learn? When will they ever learn?

Tom:

Is this a serious question that you are posing or are you doing it with tongue in cheek?

John Lennon and flower power of the 60s as representing population centric Coin theory? Here is what actually happens when men with guns as an occupying Army practice flower power-Coin on the ground: people die and things are destroyed.

My god, if you are serious with this post it represents how population centric counterinsurgency truly has become a faith based religion.

I propose instead two songs: Ozzie Osbourne's "Crazy Train" and Green Day's "Basket Case."

Publius, ADTS, help me out here please. Am I missing something, am I being too harsh on this blog’s proprietor? Do I still not get it?

Confused…

gian

1) ADTS, blowing his FP cover (which is bad not on this blog per se - he's been relatively polite - but perhaps bad on Stephen Walt's blog, especially considering how SMW has been a mentor in the (somewhat distant) past):

1) I don't really get this either. As for karaoke or artist recommendations, I'm at a loss. Right now I've been listening a lot to Journey, "Don't Stop (Believing)" - maybe that's apropos.

2) My quibble with this post lies especially with this idea. To use the language of imperialism, who's to say that if you give the natives guns, they won't
(a) be used against you by the natives to whom they were given,
or (b) be obtained by the other side, as I think happened in the VN war (the Strategic Hamlet program, in which the Hamlets were (i) less than strategic, and (ii) quite vulnerable, at least according to some narratives)?

I think Ricks covers himself against a) and b) *somewhat* by saying, once security is provided, which implies to me, once the population is on your side.

c) But while it's not directly on point, I'm reminded of HAMAS and the elections of 2006: free elections were held, and the outcome was not the desired one. *Perhaps the same would happen if guns were given to the natives.*

3) To repeat myself (and you): I don't get it.

ADTS

The quartermaster is the least appreciated but most critical component of any military action - and that applies to counterinsurgency as much as it does to mechanized desert warfare.

If you are saying that if locals are armed, they would be able to resist foreign influences - aside from the fact they'll also need food & fuel, who then does the arming?

This quote comes to mind: "We have to continue to fight the evil of Communism, and to fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium." General Tuan Shi-wen, commander of the Kuomintang Fifth Army (based in the Golden Triangle), as quoted by McCoy.

Should we suggest that Afghan villagers threatened by outsiders turn to international opium sales in order to gain cash for weapons purchases? Don't laugh, that's precisely how Ahmad Shah Massoud fought the Soviets, and later the Taliban, all while U.S. aid largely ignored him. One blunder after another...

The focus on guns ignores the other pressing needs of the local villagers in Afghanistan - power for to run water pumps for irrigation, which means more agriculture and more jobs, power for lighting buildings, access to key items like fertilizer and tools, and the construction of roads so they can sell their excess opium production for capital - then they can buy bullets for their guns. Call it "Nicaraguan Contra Redux."

It's ironic that the U.S. refused to support Massoud in the 1990s vs. the Taliban - apparently, his reliance on opium sales for revenue made them skittish (after Contra Cocaine), as did the fact that he was a Afghan nationalist, not someone who could be controlled via ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Imagine if it was Massoud, not the Taliban, who had won control in 1997 - clearly, that was one of the greatest 20th century blunders in U.S. foreign policy.

Massoud, however, was seen by Pakistan's ISI as being too close to India. This raises another concern regarding U.S. withdrawal - it can't be just U.S. withdrawal, or it might become a Pakistan / India proxy war... UN peacekeeping force, anyone? That's what they were intended for, just such situations.

Actually, Gian, I think this is just a pretty inept stab at black humor, probably fed by some fatigue on Tom Ricks's part. No, Ricks doesn't go to war, but he does keep himself very closely aligned with this interminable and ever more bizarre edition of GI Joe Goes to War. I think Ricks may be a little burnt out. I know I am. And I don't go to war either. It seems the way a lot of us deal with a "long war" where it's clear the hearts and minds of US politicians and the US people are elsewhere is by defaulting to black humor. We did that as Vietnam transitioned from serious war to silliness. And that's where I think we're going now, with the silliness ending only when someone's got the guts to do it.

Anybody who actually believes in what we're doing in Afghanistan should ask themselves this: what if next week the Taliban acknowledged Petraeus's superior generalship, Karzai's astute political leadership and the bright smiling faces of those nice US troops? What if they surrendered? Could we then declare victory in the War on Terror (TM) and rest easy in the knowledge that there would be no further attacks on US soil? No? We couldn't?

Well, then the next logical question is: why do we persist in Afghanistan and what do we hope to accomplish? We started asking those kinds of questions in Vietnam as we came to the end of the 60s. It was pretty clear by then that when it came to the "homeland" (gotta love that Teutonic flair), South Vietnam's fate really didn't matter. Just as the end of the Taliban won't mean the end of terrorism, the fall of South Vietnam didn't mean the Commie hordes were going to invade California. But we plowed on in Vietnam. Just as we plow on in Afghanistan. Nobody'll ever call us quitters. And that may be why Ricks dusts Lennon and the Beatles off: the later Beatles, with the dark, psychedelic edge, made a lot of sense in the context of Vietnam.

One doubts Mr. Ricks would have made fun of COIN six months ago. It may be that he's starting to get it.

Publius

"I was thinking about how the great but necessary leap in counterinsurgency is to arm the locals, even if the central government opposes it. "

Yeah. It better enables them to shoot back at you when you're game plan turns brown and they see you as oppressor. Vide: Afghanistan.

"Let us win your hearts and minds or we'll burn your damn huts down!"

Not much wisdom in that phrase, but it leapt to mind when I saw this topic!

Perhaps counterintuitive on this website but it is one of the oldest of all military sentiments.

No less a writer than Aristophanes thought so when he wrote "Lysistrata." At the very least, Lysistrata is the story of the terrible ramifications on the home front of a society which is led to military disaster. All of the odes to duty, honor, security, glory, safety; all pale in comparison to the simple worry, desire, love of the partner, lover, husband, mother, father or child left at home.

In a "COIN Theory" manner it takes up the Josh Ritter "girl in the war" idea: remember the homefront because the soldiers certainly do. 5 tours will destroy a family and that, repeated many fold, will destroy an army.