I would never judge a piece of writing by whether or not the author spells the name "Elliot" or "Elliott".

Not the most important thing, but yeah, is one aspect of good writing and thinking.
Best,
Tom

My thoughts on Woodward are that he seems to think there ought to be a defined or formal process for National Level decision making, like MDMP. Maybe I'm wrong, but each of his books steer in that direction, and people are surprised that opposing opionions are put forth.

I thought all the Middle East smashing Neocons were discredited as fools. So why is this ultra-rich guy still on the government's dole writing BS?

First, were you talking about that guy from John Hopkins? John's Hopkins? Johns Hopkins?

Second. As artists refer to it---the spaces in between---that make the picture or musical composition really hum.

If the White House does not have a firm grasp, commitment, and effective control of these "Wars," then somebody does, as Cohen reminds us. The non-US actors read between the lines to the things unsaid.

What has Turkey read into all of this? Saudi Arabia? China? I am sure Mr. Cohen has some ideas....

We are obsessing over the tactical past while the strategic future is emerging by default in places beyond our grasp.

Steve
A Johns Hopkins Alumni

Everything out of his suck is a lie.

"-- The father of a lance corporal headed to Kandahar: "They're sending my son where a bomb or a bullet may tear a limb or his life away. Do the people in the White House still believe in this 'war of necessity'? And if not, can any of them look me in the eye?"

Eliot Cohen calls the above "quote" fictional. I would beg to differ. I believe that it is all too common and a very growing frame of mind for the relatively small group of family members of US servicemembers headed for the combat sandbox. Why has Secretary Gates, just recently, raised the all- to-obvious issue that 1% of the population of the USA does the military defense heavy lifting? Is he just bitching or does he smell mutiny?

I think the David Wood article on the widening gulf between America's civilian and service member societies is a salient context for this discussion. Note that Cohen's notional reactions don't include the thoughts of John Q. Public. I don't think that's a matter of oversight. Rather, there's a rather big nail there that's been stricken relatively little. He hits it smartly on the head. While I don't think the problems remarked upon by Wood or the essay written by LTC Milburn (also referred to on this blog) indicate the Armed Forces are preparing to go all "Hutaree" on us, I do think they represent perhaps the most profound issue in military leadership today, as well as one that is self-propogating.

I'm talking about confusion.

A while back, the Army Combat Studies Institute developed its first volume of 'A Different Kind of War', ostensibly what will become the Army's official history of the war in Afghanistan. I read it, and it's horrible. If you really pick through the report and find all the mentions of things like "Center of Gravity Analysis", then cross-reference with your handy copy of Clausewitz (the works of Joe Strange and LTC Richard Iron help immensely), you come to two terrifying realizations. First, the strategic analysis for the scale, conduct, and initiation of the Afghan campaign was deplorably flawed in its application of doctrine. Second, even the guys who are supposed to be some kind of wiz-kids at Army doctrine demonstrate that they don't know doctrine.

Fast forward to 2003, 2004, 2005, etc. Look at quotes by various administration and military officials with regard to catching Bin Laden. We're close. We have no idea where he is. We're working on it. We are, any moment now, about to join hands across the country of Afghanistan and comb the desert (enter Rick Moranis as 'Darth Helmet') for him. You know what? We're not actually dedicating that many resources to finding him. Why? He's actually not that important. We have other priorities. Bush thinks he's target #1. Then he doesn't. Then he says Bin Laden's not a factor anymore. Obama says we're going to rededicate ourselves to the task. Then he takes it back. Meanwhile, Gates plays it down. Petraeus says he's still a major factor, though.

I don't have a problem with people having their own opinions about something, but when we actually start applying the hard efforts and soft tissue of troops to an idea, is it too much to ask that you fellas all get on the same page about whether this really is the best idea?

We have lacked clarity since the beginning. I don't think it would have compromised our whole game plan for Bush to have come out in December of 2001 and announce the five things we're going to achieve before we can call it good. We never got it, though. Bush didn't have anything beyond "just get in there." Obama doesn't have anything beyond "just get out of there."

Our Generals (and Admirals) have failed the public under both Presidents in that they were supposed to research, study, clarify, shape and then enact the President's military objectives. In both 'Obama's Wars' and 'State of Denial', Woodward points out how people just do their own thing. In Iraq it was Bremer and Abizaid. In Afghanistan it's apparently Eikenberry, McChrystal and Petraeus.

Our Battalion and Brigade level commanders aren't idiots. They have eyes and ears and brains. How many cases have we seen of Commanders stepping completely off the reservation because they figured they could appoint themselves sheriff? From egregious assertions of power to gross acts of atrocity, we rightly blame them for asserting the role of the Spartans in the Melian Dialogue. Milburn's pathetic attempt to codify it in some kind of warped manifesto is the equivalent of popping a star cluster to warn us of a nuclear detonation. If you needed him to demonstrate just how bad the problem has become, you've been oblivious to the problem.

From Abu Ghraib to Mahmudiya to the new "kill team" platoon that ran amuck, the incidents of American Soldiers and Marines committing acts beyond the pale are legion. Stack those up against disasters like the death of Pat Tillman and Wanat, and you can finally identify the coin by looking at both sides of it. Probably the best illustration occurred when 60 Minutes profiled McChrystal last year and taped him trying to explain the ROE to a platoon of troops that had just lost one of their comrades. Watch the footage and decide if McChrystal actually succeeded in convincing any of those boys that 'courageous restraint' is the way ahead.

We have no idea what we're doing in Afghanistan. We never have.

As a result of this, our fielded forces have developed a sense of being abandoned. There is a great deal of confusion, and when there's no clear light at the end of a tunnel except for incoming tracer fire, people start to blunder in every direction. People will follow a leader until he or she demonstrates they don't know how to lead. I think the myriad of incidents we've seen in the last few years indicate the erosion of confidence is accelerating. Still, as Wood indicates, retention remains strong and troops go back into the fray four and five times. Leaders change, and they give the benefit of the doubt to the new man holding the guidon. Instead, it's the American public they hold in greater contempt.

I believe at the root of Milburn's convictions, if not explicitly stated in his arguments, is a belief that the highest echelons of American political and military leadership have been mistakenly appointed. That mistake was committed by the appointing authority-- the voters. If the officer on the ground is the supreme authority on moral issues by virtue of his commission (which stems from military education and training) and his proximity to the fight, then it follows that the American citizen who has "excused himself from the fight", as Wood puts it, is the most contemptible persona to assert the role of judge by virtue of his distance and ignorance. It goes beyond the fact that the officer knows that which the public does not. Rather, it assumes that the officer knows that which the public refuses to know.

The sad thing is that Milburn didn't write his paper with a pogo stick and a jump to conclusions mat. It's fairly evident that the American public has checked out on the intricacies of Afghanistan and serious attempts to demand strategic clarity from the government. By and large, we've become stupid on Afghanistan because, let's face it, right now it's the economy, stupid.

There was a small ballyhoo over major shifts in management at CNN in the wake of declining ratings last week. I don't see what the big deal was. "American Idol" pulls about ten times more viewers than any primetime news show. If Ahmadinejad and Netanyahu are true students of American politics, their comment isn't that Obama's weak, it's that the American public is soft. Adjust the mindset to this:

"I know Obama is smart, but he cannot impose his will. Furthermore, I can get away with murder if I do it on the days Paris Hilton and Lindsay Lohan are in court."

Ultimately, I'm not cynical about being an American. I love my country. But both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz discussed at length the role of the people and the impact of time on achieving victory at war. The population always has been and always will be fickle, and always gives up the fight before the people actually fighting it. I believe most of our commanders in Afghanistan know this fact as well, and so their frustrations are compounded by the knowledge that they're trying to make it through the round even as the folks in the corner are throwing in the towel. If the military leaders truly felt, as Woodward and Milburn indicate in their own ways, that their elected leaders are the enemy, and if people who read the book believe the military leadership positioned itself as Obama's adversary, then the problem is reaching critical mass. We are slouching towards Athens and Sparta at the same time.

It is the duty of the nation's military and political leadership to clearly define the mission, the victory conditions, and the plan to achieve them. But it is the duty of the people to hold their leadership accountable for those things. I believe history ought to show that our relative measure of success or failure in Afghanistan will indicate the resolve of the people to do just that.

"I strongly suspect this was part of what seduced Tom Ricks into David Petraeus’s bedroll. Ricks likely also grew big eyes for the chance at Woodward-level journalistic stature, as well as a shot at becoming something of a latter-day Sir Julian Corbett, the British naval historian who became a renowned geostrategist and warfare theorist. That worked out for Ricks in a bush-league sort of way. His books on the Iraq war did pretty well, and NBC fops like Chris Matthews and David Gregory kissed up to him on camera. Ricks also got himself made a war-knowledge scholar with one of those start-up garage bands that call themselves national-security think-tanks. But at core Ricks will never be more than a once credible journalist who turned slut-puppy for the Long Warmongers."

“Senior Pentagon correspondent” Ricks no doubt reaches for his blood pressure pills every time he considers how decisively Woodward has clobbered him in his own métier. The Washington Post gave Ricks’s 2009 book The Gamble the Woodward treatment: several days’ worth of promoting the book with feature articles that, as paid advertising, would have eaten up Ricks’s royalties, movie options, advances on his next book, and at least a year’s worth of Ivy League tuition for any kids he may still have hanging around who need that sort of thing. But Ricks couldn’t buy his way into Woodward’s league if he hocked what’s left of his immortal soul, and neither could anyone else on the war beat."

"To this day, when you see a story that cites numerous anonymous officials and supports an administration agenda, you can bet a shiny new Missouri quarter that you’re being hum-buggered. And don’t be fooled by one or two quotes from named sources that are already in the public domain. That’s a standard deception tactic. A variation on this look-over-there gimmick, one that Ricks used extensively in The Gamble, is to interview a whole bunch of people willing to go on record as being in favor of whatever scheme the journalist is supporting. Ricks and others who use this method typically throw in one or two counterpoint quotes for the sake of appearing (heh) fair and balanced."

"Woodward does give us two bits of vital information that most likely nobody else could have delivered. First is that both Obama and Petraeus know the wars we’re fighting now can’t be won. Second, and even more crucial, is Woodward’s account of Petraeus saying:

“You have to recognize also that I don’t think you win this war. I think you keep fighting. … This is the kind of fight we’re in for the rest of our lives and probably our kids’ lives.”

"Great Caesar’s Ghost, Bob! The morning after you heard that little tidbit from King David, this should have been screaming at us in Fire Alarm font from the front page of your once-great newspaper: “Top General Says We’ll Fight for Decades, Still Won’t Win.”"

Jeff Huber

I'm going to print Huber's comment, then use it as the final paperwork necessary to send an Admiral out to sea.

... Bob Woodward had never written a book before, giving us all the gory details about how the sausage gets made.

But he has. And the Republic--somehow--still stands.

How can that be? Maybe because all these foreign leaders are big boys too, and know a similar book about them would be a good deal less pretty?

Just free-verse hypothesizing here.

Cohen's experience buys him a listen, with the caveat that he was a Wolfowitz acolyte, and a proud PNAC plankholder in the Iraq debacle.

In this WaPo op-ed, he's doing sarcasm, the lowest form of humor, with no reference to his own real-world experience near the wheel-house. Y'know, back when the must-do second war was going really bad, and the first one was being ignored, before going really bad, both to be continued in the next admin.

Mr. Cohen, how did solid storytelling and tight message management work out for Team Bush? For the country? Wasn't there a Rumsfeld riff about democracy being messy?

Let's hold Mr. Cohen accountable to talk about the real events he participated in. This op-ed came off as trash-talk from a political operative, not inside dope from an experienced S. Asia / Washington hand.

Well, now, hold on a sec', pardner! Sarcasm has a long and storied history. It can go wrong, of course, but so can knock-knock jokes.

At its best, sarcasm is a generous and democratic form of humorous criticism. It invites the person you are criticizing to think along with you, by coming at the issue from an oblique angle.

Instead of approaching them head-on, with a "You're wrong, and let me show you why," it approaches the topic indirectly.

Done well, it's a beautiful thing.

Sarcasm may be the lowest form of humor, but it's the highest form of criticism. And so misunderstood.

Sure wish I could jump in with a brilliant one-liner, but that's the whole of this saga--disconnected and fleeting one one-liners.

My Dad was with the Brits in India in the wake of WWIi. Wanted to go through the Khyber. Too dangerous.

Come on. These places have often been too dangerous, and only have brief periods or relative stability.

What is the commonality between Iraq and Afghanistan? They are both bridges or frontiers between "Persia" and what lies beyond, or what is playing through or around it.

The litany for Afghanistan? Khans, Tsars, Queens, Greats, Buddhas...all playing with and through the locals. Anyone for a game of polo on Bactrian Camels?

The general public seldom knows or cares except when things go really badly. GW found the same thing as his soldiers froze at Valley Forge. What's new about that?

The question on the general public's table is now, perhaps inappropriately, whether we stay or go (blood and treasure). But it is drawn that way through circumstances, media (Yellow or otherwise), and politics. Bad framing.

The challenge for the professionals now is to articulate a reasonable strategy and compatible tactics for long-term patient engagement in areas that require permanent attention over generations, and where the concept of rapid accomplishments of any measurable things are meaningless.

The professionals have failed, in my view, to articulate a case, strategies or tactics to the public for the real answers to the real questions.

General Petreaus' commitment level is economically and politically unsustainable, but, as Woodward confirms, there was no reasonable Plan B presented except by the VP. If Biden's Plan B isn't viable, and Plan A is unsustainable, what else is left?

I am reminded of the "Sky Is Falling" scenarios for Iraq of a few months ago. Reality is that Iraq always had strong regional identities, each with their own trans-national associations over generations. That's why half the occupants of the "Palace" have had their heads rolled down the street...

From a nation-management standpoint, Iraq is a sloppy and bewildering place full of folks who all have different "big picture" ideas, and no real interest in supporting a common one. But there are some basics that, hopefully, they can all come together on before Desertification fills the Land Between Two Rivers with dust.

So here we are with no central Iraqi government, and/or the risk that that central government, once appointed, may be adverse to regional interests and sub-groups. Did the Sky Fall?

Alright, but what if the North builds strong associations with Turkey, and the central government has strong associations with Tehran, while Saudi Arabia grimaces on the edges? A sort of chaotic stalemate where a central government's role is limited, and regional and sub-populations each have their own adjacent backers and spheres of influence.

It all sounds so Ottoman, so Iraqi, and so-pre-Western, but isn't that a "stable," if unexpected, Plan B for Iraq?

What, in real-life is the Plan B for Afghanistan? Taliban or not Taliban is far from the only question, and that one alone produces a range of possible answers which are not inconsistent with actual US interests (protection from direct attack). What about Pashtunistan vs. Non-Pashtunistan? How does an Afghan Pashtun "country" effect the stability of flood-ravaged Pakistan?

I thought the Bush agenda, although poorly articulated, was to just screw around in Afghanistan once we got there, but keep the pot from coming to a boil again while the the US public was juiced up with delusions of purpose and success. Obama came along and actually tried to accomplish the pablum (big mistake).

Where are the US professionals with the serious non-sound bites?

I'm tracking the inland Silk Road re-emerging while Turkey and China play from either end. Why? Because it is needed. If it can't link through the Hindus Valley to India, it will find another way there.

Does anyone actually watch the "big picture?" I seriously don't think so.

That's what will, over decades, stabilize these forgotten wild wests, by linking them to the modern world (perhaps brutally at times).

So, what is the US Plan c. 2050 to engage these places and routes that will be important then?

Surely the footnotes of Karzai, Holbrooke and Petreaus will be nothing in the dust of that short history.

Steve

Contiguous allies, like the Iraqi-Iranian Shiites, or Anbar-Jordan Shiites are more exception than the rule. Kurds would love to relate North to their kinsmen, and the Turks are determined to prevent it, to the extent of allying with Iraqis of almost any other stripe; Iran and Syria feel the same about Kurd expansion. Basra Shiites are at political odds with Arabs in Arabia and Kuwait.

The Tajiks of Afghanistan relate to the Persians, who relate to (some) Syrians and Shiite Lebanese, Karzai's pashtun faction is pulling juice from over in India, and both are at war with Pakistan. An so on. Even after 60 years together in the Soviet Union, the FSR central asian republics are at odds with each other and neighbors to the South.

Checkerboard patterns, diagonal zig-zag routes to link the silk road, or gas pipelines. Energy is today's gold, silk and tea. Petro-dollars speak all the languages fluently.

Some of your piece sniffed at the 'connected/gap' theories of TPM Barnett, who(?) is something of a pariah at this site.

Cohen's imaginary musings are strikingly similar to the White House's reaction to the printing of the Pentagon Papers forty years ago. Not surprising given that both (to different degrees) show the gulf between public statements & private knowledge.