Why COIN is hard (part CXVIII)

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, September 29, 2010 - 9:57 AM Share

Here is a great exchange between an American officer and an Afghan elder recorded by the estimable David Wood:

. . . Instead of answering directly, the old man burst into a tirade. "We are in the middle!" he cried. "We can't say anything to you, and we can't say anything to them." What he meant: Americans push education for girls. The Taliban forbid it.

Biggs handed him a stack of cards, each bearing the location and phone numbers for the local police. "If you have trouble, call these numbers," he said.

Nabib reacted with alarm. "But what if they ask about these?"

"Hide them," said Biggs.

"But they search everyplace -- more than you," said Nabib.

Aha, said Biggs. "So there are Taliban in the village!"

"Being really honest, yes, definitely they come sometimes. But we can't tell you where they are," the old man said. "After sunset they come. We don't come out of our compounds. We are living in fear."

"We have no power to face them or you," he complained. "We are just like a soccer ball being kicked by both sides."

"We are not here to kill insurgents or anyone," said Biggs. "We are not here for you to join our team, but just to deliver government and security to your village."

The old man snorted. "They are also telling us this same speech, that they are here to protect us," he muttered.

No one-trick pony, Friend Wood also recently did a good piece on the relationship between the U.S. military and the society it protects. He began, "The U.S. Army now begins its 10th continuous year in combat, the first time in its history the United States has excused the vast majority of its citizens from service and engaged in a major, decade-long conflict instead with an Army manned entirely by professional warriors."

He concludes with this quote from a soldier in Afghanistan: "The Army has become home for a lot of restless souls who can never really go back."

Ed Jones/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:SOUTH ASIA, AFGHANISTAN

(6)

HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE

TYRTAIOS

4:41 PM ET

September 29, 2010

Good Luck

Well this is déjà vu all over again. "After sunset they come. We don't come out of our compounds. We are living in fear." Well I guess Captain Biggs could try living in the village after sunset - but things do go bump in the night.

I’ll admit counter-insurgency does have its challenges, the manpower notwithstanding, operating and owning the night is one of them. . . .again it would seem, on our second decade long conflict.

Anyway, this BUDs for you Captain Biggs - good luck.

GIANGENTILE

5:52 PM ET

September 29, 2010

In strategy Coin is not just hard, it is impossible

When viewed through the angle of rational American strategy that considers cost and benefits and alternatives relative to the limited political objectives set out by the President, Coin in Afghanistan is not just hard, it is impossible.

Unfortunately the American Coin Army, even with its highest ranking senior generals (and some retired ones too) can't think beyond counterinsurgency tactics.

Folks should remember that counterinsurgency is NOT strategy. Counterinsurgency as the American Army practices it nowadays is a set of tactical and operational methods to do militarized nation building. The term "counterinsurgency strategy" often bandied about by military officers, experts, and policy makers is actually a misnomer. The term implies with regard to Afghanistan that strategic thinking has gone into the employment of the tactics of counterinsurgency. Yet with such limited political objectives in the place it seems that our strategy there with its maximalist adoption of militarized nation building is out of balance.

Think of it this way the next time you hear the term "counterinsurgency strategy." It would have been like having Ike in summer 1944 when giving a speech on the strategy for the defeat of Germany saying that we have a "hedgerow strategy" to defeat Germany.

JPWREL

6:47 PM ET

September 29, 2010

GIANGENTILE, points out a

GIANGENTILE, points out a very interesting aspect of COIN. The general public can be excused for confusing COIN as a ‘strategy’ when it is merely ‘operational technique’ but that mistake is less excusable among those more familiar with military affairs and history. The real irony here is that as we proceed into our second decade of war in Afghanistan it is becoming ever more difficult to discover what our strategy for the region actually is? I don’t know if this makes Obama or Petraeus uncomfortable but it sure makes me unsettled.

CARL

10:26 PM ET

September 30, 2010

Gian: I don't quite

Gian:

I don't quite understand how your comment is germane to the story of the village, Nabib and Capt. Biggs. I don't think a discussion of flawed American strategy is going to help Mr. Nabib, nor will cards with phone numbers on them. What probably would help him is an American squad living in the village and a lot of night ambushes being set and a few of the villagers going out to help on the ambushes. Capt. Biggs and his men I am certain know that, but for reasons the story doesn't make clear, they can't do that.

Strategy doesn't seem to make much difference at the level of endeavor depicted in the story. Staying overnight in the village so the soldiers can be there to whack the killers when they come in the darkness does. Why Capt. Biggs and his men can't do that, you are in a better to know why than I. I can only guess about the usual suspects of risk aversion and lack of confidence in subordinates.

I much dislike the many terms that are used and prefer to use small wars. And in this little piece of the small war, what needs to be done isn't. I would like to know why you think it isn't.

ADMIRAL

9:08 PM ET

September 29, 2010

COIN Carnival of Horrors Continues

Mr. Ricks puts his carni barker hat back on and makes pretend about COIN again. Can I play nation builder like you? I love to play pretend. Can we go to the Afghan town and play clown?

OTHER RANKS

4:28 PM ET

September 30, 2010

Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this meme!

"the first time in its history the United States has excused the vast majority of its citizens from service".

The US has always excused the overwhelming majority of citizens throughout every war by reason of age or gender or simply not drawing their draft number. Even during WWII, that supposed standard of universal servitude, only 12 million were in uniform at the height of 1945 out of a population of 130-134 million. Shrinking down to the workforce population, the armed forces still comprised less than 20%. Accounting for casualties and every other reason, only about 16 million served at some point during WWII out of the entire population.

Clearly the numbers of those who have served presently is lower but not all that much-- about 4-5 million since 2001. So about 1-2% vs. 12%.

Another quibble is Wood's assertion that soldiers aren't returning to civilian life but rather reenlisting. BLS number show just under 2 million who have served at some point since 2001 but are no longer in the service. Someone is getting out. Wasn't it only a couple of weeks ago that Tom had another post on junior officers leaving? So is it the enlisted that are hanging on? I know the Army has been making mission on retention, but it's been doing that prior to 2001 also.