In the larger picture the Germans may have bitten off too much in the last two world wars but they knew something about fighting, tactics and leadership. A study of the Wehrmacht’s Army Group B’s approach march to Sedan in May 1940, the crossing of the Meuse, the establishment of a bridgehead and the exploitation phase is a perfect study of ‘small unit’ commanders taking charge, improvising, and making momentous decisions on their own initiative. This was all done as a result of discriminating officer and NCO selection, and intensive training on common doctrine with an emphasis on mission tactics. To this day I doubt that we can match the definition below of ‘Auftrastaktik’ largely because senior officers have the mean to interfere with subordinates decision making.

--Auftragstaktik – Mission tactics and scope for junior officer initiative. Simplified mission orders giving latitude for execution depending on tactical circumstances.
"The concept of Auftragstaktik or "mission tactics" … made it the responsibility of each German officer and NCO … to do without question or doubt whatever the situation required, as he personally saw it. Omission and inactivity were considered worse than a wrong choice of expedient. Even disobedience of orders was not inconsistent with this philosophy."--

Tom,

I enjoy your pieces, but you display a bit of elitism here that drives this former Marine infantry NCO nuts. As General Kroesen himself said:

"There is no more effective way to destroy the leadership potential of young officers and NONCOMMISIONED OFFICERS than to deny them opportunities to make decisions appropriate for their assignments." (emphasis mine).

Yet, your headline expressed only a concern for officers.

I can tell you, it was always nice to have a good officer in the outfit, but it was imperative to have good NCOs and SNCOs. And those officers who were indeed good officers would be the first to agree with me.

I believe it was Mark Shields who pointed out that the greatest gap in our society is not between the military and the civilian policy makers/opinion makers (which is the CW), but between the civilian policy makers/opinion makers and the enlisted ranks of the military.

Please try to keep that common bias in mind in your reporting.

Other than that, keep up the excellent work.

BTW, glad to see you are reading up on the Chosin campaign. Being a Marine I'm a bit of a "homer" on the subject so my view is biased, but I consider it one of the most under-covered campaigns in US military history and O.P. Smith one of our most under-appreciated Generals (Howlin’ Mad Smith of WWII being another one; what is it with these Marine Generals named Smith getting no respect?).

Ever think of doing a "Top 10 Most Underappreciated/Underreported Campaigns in US [or World?] History" and/or "Top 10 Most Underappreciated/Generals in US [or World?] History" and seeing what your readers come up with?

I’m sure the debate would be quite interesting.

Best,

Paul

Maybe I should try to play poker against you.

Looking forward to the piece. I recommend The Gentle Warrior if you haven't read it yet. It seems even the Corps didn't appreciate him at the end of his career.

I second the comment on NCOs (and note that you have adjusted the headline). Having been a few places in the world - including the former Warsaw pact countries and the Middle East - it is quite easy to see the differences in militaries and connect them quite directly to their presence or absence of a professional NCO corps.

Smart Os recognize which NCOs know their stuff and then go all in on supporting them (and or making them better as they can). I have fond memories of my first Platoon Sergeant and both of my First Sergeants - and my CSM too. My first First Sergeant trained me, and quite frankly even though I knew the second First Sergeant as a LT (when he was a PSG of a separate unit) - I trained him. (It was his first time as a 1SG).

Indeed, one day he came back head low after pissing off the CSM (which was pretty much our Company SOP), and said "Sir, I'm gonna get myself fired eventually." I told him, "That's okay, I'll train me another 1SG." He thought that was the funniest thing ever, but he had to admit that I did my part.

One of my proudest moments was when he whispered to me before I left command, "Sir I don't want you to go." I had to ask "why is that?" He replied "because you never get two good commanders in a row." I get goosebumps just thinking about it. I'm not trying to gladhand myself, just highlight what a good O/NCO relationship ought to be.

Contrast that with my HQ in Iraq, who used Blue Force Tracker to check convoy speeds, or told me specifically that decisions on the convoy security team actions were to be made by Field Grades in the TOC. Indeed the BDE CDR threatened to have my company TOCS close their TOCs - even though they were virtually co-located with the BN-level TOC.

Pogo said, "we have found the enemy, and it is us."

Perhaps this situation is indicative of wars that drag on too long, with commanders trying to make something happen to catch the eye of their superior?

Though no helicopters with commanders buzzed over my head, the Marines in I Corps Viet-Nam somewhat impoverished in that asset category. I did note on my second tour there seemed to be an increase in advice and “motivational innuendos” over the radio from the S-3 and most startling to me, occasionally the old man himself, whereas before, the company commander conveyed intents and requests.

And the war dragged-on. . . .just as it does now, and there you have it.

Hello Tom,

Don't you think the biggest reason for the turn around in Iraq was encouragement of initiative by the higher ups? In fact reports suggest that the civilian bureaucracy in Baghdad was not happy about this.

Thanks,

Sundar

The US was founded with an explicit distrust of a strong central army, which is, I think a good thing, as we have seen in Germany's case what kind of damage a country-wide enthusiasm for military service can do. On the other hand, it made their officers true warriors and leaders of men, and fervent students of the science and art of warfare. The typical field grade officer in the US Army is more concerned about looking good to his superiors than putting together an effective fighting force--because, quite frankly, that is what is, institutionally, expected of him. It was like this in the 1930s, and it's like this now.

One solution, once we are out of this current conflict, is to create a small, 4 division (one mech/one armor/one light/one airborne) all volunteer cadre of provien combat veterans and leaders that commits for a minimum of 10 years, with escalating six figure bonuses awarded for 10/20/30 year careers. The lowliest private should be selected, and trained, as if he will someday become a Captain. These cadres would become the Officer/NCO corps of an expanded army should another war arise.

by 1st Lt Jason Haag -- An Egregious Leadership Trait

A quote here: --If unit leadership continues to micromanage NCO's, SNCO's, and junior officers, a resulting absence of initiative amongst small unit leaders will cause the overall capability and functionality of the larger unit to suffer.--

And in honor of your homage to the SecDef take a gander at the short article The Bureaucrat Safety Complex right behind it.

Sorry, its pay only.

With regard to junior officers, we're extremely confused about this. Ask any USMC or Army officer the point of being a 2LT, and they'll tell you it's to make lots of stupid mistakes and gain the experience required to be a company commander. Fine and well, but how does the Platoon get run in the meantime? I know the NCOs all want to thump their chests that the PSG does it, but you can't be in the support by fire position and the assault line at the same time. Someone's got to do the thinnin' around here, bubba-louie. At the same time, it seems a little inefficient to give a college grad thirty-six guys to burn through on a mulligan so that he can keep 150 fellas alive later on down the road.

On this issue, all our talk here focuses on how we manage new leaders in the field. If we're so unsure of them, maybe we need to discuss supervision in the context of the schoolhouse. Hey West Point Commandant, why are you sending us these guys so wet behind the ears they scare the crap out of us? There's also a full-bird running things at 11th Regiment at Benning. Feel free to ask him that question as well.

Of course, the FORSCOM guys don't get a totally free pass. When was the last time they communicated to the schoolhouse their complaints with said curriculums and demanded they be redressed?

With regard to NCOs, I saw a radical reduction in the quality of NCOs between 2003 and 2009. Whereas I could trust a newly-pinned E-4 with an infantry squad manning a traffic point in the northbound lane heading out of Mosul the day Uday and Qusay shot it out with SOF, I literally had an E-5 in 2005 tell me he had no idea how to lead a same-size squad through a PT session. I ran chow, laundry, and mail for my platoon for three months in Iraq because my PSG wouldn't. That experience was the final straw that turned me from a true believer in the power of the NCO to a guy who just ran roughshod over them. I'm speaking in anecdotes, but in my own way I'm my own anecdote. For any NCO who's ever wondered how officers get that way, well, there ya go. Thank the guy wearing chevrons who came before you.

I know there are great NCOs in the Army. I believe they're getting outnumbered by the bad ones. I hope leadership can change the course of things, because we all know it's the Warrants who are the real threat. That's a joke.

A bit of historical perspective to finish. In 1861, a Colonel led his entire Regiment or Battalion across the field holding his saber in the air. The officer stood out front with the colors as a symbol of courage to his men. He led from the extreme front. As I understand it, though, more than one Army instructed its officers that their service revolver was primarily for deserters and cowards. So maybe we had the same standard of higher-level oversight. The benefit was that bad commanders got themselves killed more frequently, thus culling the chaff from the wheat.

With exceptions like Hal Moore, Gods and Generals have moved progressively further to the rear since that time. Overseeing the battlefield from helicopters is amateur stuff. Cutting edge commanders stay in the TOC and watch the UAV feed. Even real generals are armchair generals these days.

We've moved these people farther from the battleground, and imbued them with the false belief that they still know the ground truth. Even worse is the ever-increasing reliance on technology to make up for those above-mentioned shortfalls in the lower leadership. We're trying to make up for human error with technology. What we need to be doing is making better humans.

Why is it that an E-6 can have six years in the Army, two combat tours, and possibly a Ranger tab, or a LT can have four years of ROTC education, a year of IOBC/Ranger/Airborne training, and both of them still not demonstrate enough wherewithall to earn their leaders' confidence?

Where does this problem occur, where can it be fixed, and what is the solution method?

i didn't learn a damn thing. everything i learned came from PLT STX, JRTC, and iraq. it's a useless, useless course that does nothing but marginally prepare you for ranger school. a total revamp isn't out of the question.

Try reading Clay Blair's "The Forgotten War." Exhaustive study of what went on.
Also "America's Tenth Legion" and "East of Chosin."

The problem of micromanagement is obviously a long term problem that certainly will not go away anytime soon at any level (officer/NCO). The proliferation of information has both caused an increase in micromanagement as well as a huge improvement to it.

With all the new information systems, sensors, and databases the visibility is far greater than it used to be. No longer are you able to hide your location (or relocation) by an impromptu radio malfunction. No you are an icon on a computer screen and big brother is watching. This does indeed help with situational awareness and is definately a combat multiplier, especially in the case of CASEVAC and ability to quickly navigate to a situation.

Does this lead to the natural propensity of officers and NCOs with greater experience to "assist" the younger less experienced with proper positioning? Yes it does, but it also is encumbent on that junior officer and NCO to justify their position and establish sound reasoning for the tactical emplacement. Bottom line, sound tactical emplacement is sound tactical emplacement and usually won't be over ridden by anyone watching a CPU screen.

Commander's and staffs in todays environment additionally have too much to deal with to micromanage these days. The exponential growth of databases and variables that seem to provide tactical or operational significance has led leaders and staffs to delegate more and more.

As a Div Cav Troop commander in Baghdad (2004-2005) I was "helped" about every three days with my SQDN commander as a ride along on almost every raid we did. He was very much in my business and he certainly shouldn't have been, but that was the only area he meddled because he was too busy trying to figure out what everything else meant.

On the flip side of the coin, if a soldier doesn't have a flu shot, the CG will certainly know and has (in my experience) inquired as to why there were 25 people without flu shots in the SQDN...... Needless to say he got the answers at the expense of a disruption in planning for training prior to deployment.

So I see the issue getting much better in the GWOT environment as the leaders truly have their hands too full to micromanage anything, but much worse in garrison where they have plenty of time to look through the weeds in the forrest of trees.

I think the problem has a solution, but it is unpopular and would result in 'unfair' treatment of soldiers. If the leaders had the ability to pick their team, they would pick other soldiers that they feel they could trust (right or wrong) and reduce their need to micromanage. But then...... what happens to the guys who aren't selected for command, or PSG, or squad leader..... Do they get to develop into leaders? Maybe we bring back the SPC5-9 ranks....

Todd Napier
MAJ, AR
Military Analyst

“The views expressed in this BLOG are those of
the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Army, Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”

We continue to move down the road towards embracing the Mission Command mantra and philosophy based upon the concept of decentralized execution resultant of mission orders, commander's intent, subordinate initiative, and resource allocation from higher. It seems that all of the above is predicated upon trust.

Can I trust my subordinate leaders, officer and noncommissioned officers alike, to execute what I wish them to do in a manner of their own choosing under the assumption that what they're about to do falls inside the boundaries of tactically and technically proficient and morally and ethically suitable? If the answer is "yes" then we, as leaders, have adequately done our jobs in fostering a command climate where initiative, ingenuity, and responsibility are honored and valued leadership traits within the given organization. In this realm the Mission Command concept will work.

If the answer is "no" then it begs to ask the question of "why not?" Is it a function of environmental factors? Is it command climate? Is it upbringing? Is it that we have an ethically or morally corrupt element taking on leadership roles? Is it a function of poor mentorship? Is it a failure of empowerment at the lowest levels? Whatever the reason may be, if the answer is "no" then we need to evaluate our leadership training doctrine yesterday.

I do not believe this is the case, however. I believe our junior officers and noncommissioned officers are perfectly capable of leading from the edge with the responsibility to exercise initiative within intent vested by the trust of their chain of command. We have a responsibility to maintain their skills, continually train, educate, reward and reinforce successes.

We also need to recognize not everyone is cut out to be a leader and that trust must be leveraged judiciously. Understanding and knowing the capabilities and strengths, as well as the weaknesses and shortcomings of your organization and your people is essential to successfully decentralizing. You must know which tools are required for which jobs. A butter knife can be used as a screwdriver, but a real screwdriver is a hell of a lot easier to use.

Ryan T. Kranc
MAJ, AR

“The views expressed in this BLOG are those of
the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Army, Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”

Probably since Bosnia, maybe before in Desert Storm, the rise of micro-management in the Army has occurred.

As commanders micromanage their subordinate unit commanders those commanders are naturally less experienced and less able to make their own decisions. This vicious cycle ensures that the next cohort of officers/NCOs is less capable of doing what they really must. As they then grow into the next level of commanders they only know what they have learned under the micromanaging hands of their prior commanders.

The expectation is that they then have to micro-manage their subordinates 1) because they went through the same experience 2) because they don't know enough themselves about what 'right' looks like AND 3) because they simply aren't capable of using experience they never got to make decisions they never made, so naturally they are fearful of what their subordinates will do.

Add in the nature of a mostly zero defect environment, where honest mistakes are not endorsed by higher commanders. Finally add in the fact that many, many, many, many, call it mosty, of the junior officers and NCOs have vastly more "boots on the ground" combat experience earned in OEF and OIF then their HHQs commanders who cut their teeth in Desert Storm or Bosnia (and other PKO missions like it). Well that is how we got to where we are.