We've had these Karzai problems before

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Tuesday, September 7, 2010 - 10:49 AM Share

I was surprised to see in reading about the Korean War that South Korean President Syngman Rhee gave the United States government the same kind of fits that Afghan President Hamid Karzai does now.

At one point in the spring of 1951 Rhee was demanding that the U.S. give him enough weaponry and other gear to equip 10 divisions -- which, by coincidence, was approximately the amount of equipment that the U.S. calculated South Korean troops had abandoned in running away from North Korean and Chinese forces. At the same time Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, then the senior U.S. commander on the ground in Korea, wrote this (quoted in Clay Blair's terrific The Forgotten War) about local security forces in that war:

The primary problem in the Republic of Korea is to secure competent leadership in their army. They do not have it, from the Minister of Defense on down, as is clearly evidenced by repeated battle failures of major units. This is the chief and basic responsibility of the President of the Republic in the military field. Until we get competent leadership, there is little reason to expect any better performance of ROK troops, or any higher degree of confidence than presently exists....

Until competent leadership is secured and demonstrates its worth, there should be no further talk of the U.S. furnishing arms and equipment for additional forces.

A few months later, in an internal cable, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea accused President Rhee of trying to "blindly.... sabotage" armistice talks.

wikipedia; JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:EAST ASIA, AFGHANISTAN, HISTORY

(11)

HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE

ALESIA

3:37 PM ET

September 7, 2010

This is an interesting

This is an interesting observation that Tom’s delivers us this morning. It is terribly difficult to raise and train effective combat forces (particularly from a different culture) during active operations in wartime. We saw this in Korea and again in Vietnam with the general underperformance of the ARVN (some special SV units were quite good). However, the post Korean War development of the South Korean Army turned it into an excellent and reliable force and in Vietnam were renown for being the best combat troops in that country.
Americans should not be too smug about the early Korean performance problems because with less excuse the U.S. Army’s own performance was pretty abysmal particularly during the autumn Chinese counter-offensive. In contrast to the Army’s performance (2nd ID virtually fell apart) was that of the U.S. Marines 1st Div. which was outstanding both in the defensive battle in the Pusan perimeter and of course from Inchon to Chosen.

ZATHRAS

4:30 PM ET

September 7, 2010

Rhee: Karzai

I agree the Truman administration had problems with Rhee and that the Obama administration now has problems with Karzai, but resemblance between the two cases is coincidental.

The concern in Washington about Rhee before the war was that he might use American military aid to try reuniting Korea on his own. Thereafter, he maintained an exaggerated idea of what his army was capable of. Concern that he might sell out to the enemy while mortgaging the American war effort to protecting the right of his family and political allies to enrich themselves -- the concern today about Karzai -- was not what the Truman administration worried about where Rhee was concerned.

JPWREL

4:44 PM ET

September 7, 2010

ZATHRAS, makes the key point

ZATHRAS, makes the key point that at no time did the Truman White House worry about treachery on the part of Rhee perhaps cutting a deal with the NK’s. He was also correct in stating that Rhee was by intellect and experience unprepared, indeed, incapable of evaluating SK military potential, its needs and requirements.

However, to Rhee’s credit he was an ideologically reliable partner and the US could have done much worse in choosing the fierce Rhee to combat NK Communist aggression. Karzai, on the other hand is an ingrate, and an unreliable mafia chieftain whose only philosophy is to loot his country for personal gain and likely has few qualms about treating with the enemy at his sponsors expense.

ZATHRAS

11:02 PM ET

September 7, 2010

Some perspective

We're certainly in the soup with respect to having a reliable Afghan partner in Hamid Karzai, but we shouldn't forget that his shortcomings, now so evident, have been fermenting for a while with effective encouragement from Washington.

Karzai is what he is on a personal level: clever, shrewd, not great in pressure situations, and weak. Few would have suggested at the beginning of 2002 that American place all its chips on him and leave them there for the next decade. Fewer still would have advocated doing this while pouring into a wretchedly poor, backward, ethnically fractured country like Afghanistan resources on a scale that practically invited the growth of a political culture based on corruption -- or of doing it while paying Afghanistan attention only on the rare occasions when the war in Iraq wasn't sucking up all the time of the American foreign policy establishment.

The United States did all of these things, and Karzai adapted to them. This doesn't make him any better as a local government partner now: far from it. I mention the role played by American policy in placing Hamid Karzai in the position he is now because too many commentators, and some policymakers, seem to believe Afghanistan has a "reset" button -- we did things wrong there for seven-odd years, but have learned our lesson and will retrieve the situation now by doing things right. Karzai is a leaving, breathing rebuke to the reset button school of Afghan policy thought.

RUBBER DUCKY

11:41 PM ET

September 7, 2010

Rebuke

Yes, and to the diplomacy and military policy set by the Administration in charge for nearly the entire period. Our current Commander in Chief got handed a stale omelet and the charge to turn it back into whole eggs. Can't be done. Mugs game. Sometimes 'no' is a valid answer. Afghanistan is unfixable and no longer in our vital national interest to try.

And to future historians of this debacle, start with the judgment that George W. Bush was the worst president of the modern era and served by the worst advisors and you will be a goodly distance towards explaining our failure. For further insight, google "morass."

RUBBER DUCKY

7:43 PM ET

September 7, 2010

The fundamental problem with Afghanistan

Basic premise of COIN: it takes two to tango. We await development of the concepts and theory of COIN in partnership with a kleptocracy.

STEVE358

9:38 PM ET

September 7, 2010

Au Contraire, Duck

Mixing COIN with a kleptocracy is the same thing that Molotov developed---a volatile device with only one inevitable result.

Iraq was not a kleptocracy, and like one Iraqi governate official reminded, there were plenty of Concerned Local Citizens there.

Everybody had a stake in the outcomes, and there were various factions in contention to provide some check or counter-balance. Even US military elements were constantly advocating for and against competing ideas, projects, activities. There is an argument to be made that by not providing a firm hand in the post-conflict stage, too much democracy and participation interfered with a logical evolution.

Where is that counter-balance in Afghanistan? If we support everybody that is on our take, what options do the opposing interests have except to wait with knives drawn???? One after another, after another.....

COIN requires a unity of effort, but to some legitimate end.

TYRTAIOS

9:49 PM ET

September 7, 2010

More coin?

Unfortunately, when we said apply more COIN, some in Kabul thought we meant coin.

I read that Karzai’s brother who by shear coincidence holds a seven per cent stake in the Kabul bank, rushed back from Dubai (probably upscale Palm Jumerirah) and stated, “if the U.S. Treasury Department will guarantee that everyone will get their money, maybe that will work."

I guess that's unity of effort with more coin?

STORMWALKER

12:08 AM ET

September 9, 2010

Paik Sun-yup

Actually, in the first year of Korean war, there is one outstanding army division commander among South Korea army. He is still young and around 25 years old or so, but his division defend ???, foot march hard during counter-offensive, and enter Pyongyang first among allied forces.

As there happens to be no South-Korean around here, so I have to mention:)
Though I must admit it is very chaotic, and even several times before war, army units revolted against SK governments, and among them several NK spies that have to be ferreted out, but in some cases, SK army fought bravely and did some outstanding battles.

And some of SK Air Forces ace pilots are trained in IJA Air Corps( no political intention here), they can easily adapt to P-51 Mustang, and ride back to Korean Peninsula while practicing a little bit.

By the way, ??? is really good at COIN too. He has written book on COIN or rather counter-guerrilla on his own success during Korean War.
And he is still alive and healthy. The last time I have read about is when NK torpedoed SK naval corvette. He speak Korean, some English (surely better than I), and Japanese.

STORMWALKER

12:35 AM ET

September 9, 2010

chinese character

Sorry for several ???

First one is about his division's defense at Pusan Perimeter. The place is Tabu-dong, famous for Battles of the Bowling Alley.

Second one is his name, Paik Sun Yup.

SEOADDICTION

7:22 PM ET

October 2, 2010

Well, thank you very much for

Well, thank you very much for useful stuff for my paper on Korean War. I have already read any free papers on War but your materials helped me so much!