It is not just armor or infantry, it is other branches as well. SSSC is what is needed to command a Brigade, and there are BDE commands in most fields (Artillary, MP, Logistics, MI, etc...). Believe it or not, these branches also fill GOFO slots and staff slots at the strategic level. There are more non-Armor/Infantry Officers than there are Armor/Infantry. Perhaps an analysis of how many BDE Command slots are allocated for IN/AR against the rest of the force, and look at the percentages. Also, the War College is not the only SSC; can you tell us how many more are attending other service SSSC, a foreign school, ICAF, etc?
Perhaps another solution may be to send more junior officers to the War College as the Air Force does. Prep some leaders for work at the Strategic Levels earlier and keep them at the COCOM, JS, Serivce Staff Level for multiple assignments, as the Army does with the 59 branch.

I like that this article comes the day after Sullin's piece about how change can't be accomplished from within. That's exactly what COL Allen says MUST happen. Then again, if 96% of USAWC graduates are "prepared to address and plan for the future while executing in the present and prepared to address problems with no clear-cut solutions", why is Sullin experiencing these kinds of brick walls in the first place? I think there needs to be a "+/- 46%" margin of error placed on that number.

The Army's never been a huge fan of that thar book larnin'. I've found the worst Commanders are the ones who make a problem more complicated than it really is. However, in my experience, there's no direct correlation between your ability to find the lowest common denominator and whether your educational experience was at Harvard or Hardee's. I believe Tom picked Mattis ahead of Petraeus for the Afghanistan job. They have vastly different approaches, separated by a gulf of academic stance. Mattis is a smart guy, just a different kind of smart. Or should I say "dif'rent".

Marshal, Powell, Schwarzkopf-- all graduates of USAWC. So were Franks and McChrystal.

Similarly, it's not like these guys don't read when they're not in school. You don't have to go to war college to get smart. Turn around again, and even though a mind is a terrible thing to waste there are plenty of people who do it.

I think what Allen endeavors to find here is the strategic academia version of Plato's guardians. Ultimately, how shall they be chosen and who watches the watchmen? The system we have is flawed and change is good, but I doubt the War College is a silver bullet solution.

The author's point is that more officers need to go to AWC, not less.

One cause of deferrals may be that officers don't want to stay in to make GO. If they don't want to make GO, they don't need to go to AWC.

Also, we are sacrificing future leaders by using them in today's fight (deferring AWC) instead of letting them prepare for the future.

If we get rid of war colleges, we will go the way of the State Dept. State does not have its "war colleges." This deprives State of academic debate and growth as compared to the military war colleges and their journals. Accordingly, State has atrophied over time while the armed forces grow in capability and prestige.

BTW Powell went to National War College, not AWC.

Actually they do - State is a co-sponsor of The National War College, providing faculty, students, and budget support.

Yeah, more attendees, not less. But I refer again to all the complaints about high-ranking officers beginning at the O-5 level who are completely inept. Are these guys that deferred? Guys who attended? I'm guessing the answer is yes. So that magical 96% that Allen refers to seems suspect to me.

I like his historical reference of our failure in WWII. Probably a historical example of success would be Germany's development of a general staff and PME system prior to WWI. Then again, when you have a guy like von Moltke driving the bus, it's a sure bet it's going places. We can only put Petraeus in charge of so many things at one time.

Maybe a holistic view of things might help. What does an officer spend most of his time learning about (if he's smart) prior to LTC? Property. For infantry units, your PLs and PSGs accomplish most of your individual soldier training, and your 1SG helps you organize the company level stuff ordered by battalion. You have some genuine professionals there. But I think most guys will agree that the "typical" supply sergeant is a football bat who's overwhelmed by the 150 Joes pilfering his cage all day. Nothing will get you relieved faster than losing items of equipment valued over $100. You spend more time trying to figure out your monthly ten-percents and ULLS-G than you do the intricacies of Clausewitz.

And if you do ILE as a correspondence course, odds are you're immersed in that company command experience or so busy with staff work that you kind of blow through the course work. It's only a lot of reading if you do it.

Perhaps the best time to establish a solid foundation in doctrinal/strategic thinking isn't at the advanced schools, but the first schools. We've heard arguments here before about the curriculum at the Service Academies. I myself often wondered why I wasn't given more "military schooling." After all, I went to a military school. I got half a semester of Walzer in Philosophy 101, and maybe about 60 minutes of Clausewitz distributed throughout those four years in odd increments. Shouldn't I have come out of that joint with a dog-eared, highlighted copy with copious notes filling the margins?

I'm not saying USMA's curriculum should be AWC's, but it could certainly set up tomorrow's officers to become the day after tomorrow's officers. Set them on the path, and most of them will follow it. AWC is a good place to start, but leaders are the product of a lifetime of experience, so we probably need to take a more holistic approach to that experience if we want the end product to improve.

I am not saying it was your fault, but if property was your primary concern; well something was sorely wrong in that unit.

Oh I paid attention as a CO CDR to what my Supply SGT was doing. But after the first month or so I recognized he knew what he was doing (I had the unwelcome task of being a BN S4 as a 2LT so I had enough knowledge to be dangerous). We did our mandatory inspections every month and he did his job and beyond that - no problems. I left command with no report of survey and a handful of statements of charges against soldiers who should have known better. Training soldiers is what CPTs and LTs should be focused on.

Back to the subject at hand: I also don't know how you came away from USMA without learning a good bit about the military art....maybe the Corps has ; - ). We had plenty to learn and do while there, and even my engineering courses (my field of study) were all directed towards military applications. We didn't build bridges or robots, we designed combat vehicles and gun tubes. But your mileage may vary.

Finally, I am always unnerved at the rampant misuse of military terminology...esp as it relates to tactical, operational and strategic. In this regard the accepted theory is that tactical extends all the way into the Corps level of command, where the (mostly) operational and (little bit) of strategic start to mix in. My pendatic point is that LTs reading Clausewitz is good, but not required.

The Army CofS maintains a good reading list that is experience-based and appropriate for specific officer ranks. I don't always agree with every choice there but on the whole it is appropriately aligned, and good reading material. (Book learning may not be the best, but I still have a problem with officers who don't read at all - seems they must be missing something).

Having said all this, Every Army course I have been to since AOAC and CAV Leaders has been damn near worthless. CAS3 was largely a slidemaking and MDMP factory (which I assure you I got enough of at Knox). CGSC-ILE was a joke. They actually went back to the Fundamentals of the Offense and Defense in Ph III? Even had I not had to commit those to verbatim memory as a cadet at USMA, I would think we would learn those before making MAJ somewhere in the force?

Based on what I have seen from Army PME (and its hidebound irrelevance to the current fight), I don't have very high hopes for the AWC...I am hoping for a Fellowship thank you.