By Col. Lawrence Sellin (U.S. Army Reserve)
Best Defense guest columnist
I was assigned to the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in Kabul for
the last two months. Since arriving in Afghanistan my job had changed twice and
in both cases I had no clear duties. Twice I asked my superiors for a more
substantive assignment. Once I provided a high-level overview of proven
management methodologies that I offered to the command as a means to address
the quite apparent organizational issues at IJC. Nothing happened.
That frustrating situation was one of the triggers for
writing my now infamous article "ISAF
Joint Command -- Power Points 'R' Us."
The second trigger was more serious. Last autumn the US
government announced that after 8 years and $27 billion, the Afghan Army
training program was being declared a failure. Despite the fact that symptoms
of failure were already appearing in the press years earlier, apparently no one
in the chain of command spoke up. I wondered how much American, coalition and
Afghan blood was shed while the program was heading toward failure. I wonder
how much blood will be shed before the Afghan Army is ready.
With that in mind and after two months of observing the IJC
function and speaking with people from all the sections, I decided to write a
tongue-in-cheek description, an obviously over-the-top and sarcastic article
hopefully containing threads of constructive criticism woven into the text. I
largely succeeded in those aims with the very slight exception of how
my superiors might react.
One of the main themes of the article involved the use of
PowerPoint. I don't hate PowerPoint. In fact, I use it often. I do object to
its use as a crutch or a replacement for serious thinking. Also, the overuse of
PowerPoint can give the illusion of progress, when it is really only motion in
the form of busy work. It can confuse the volume of information with the
quality of information.
A second theme was the way in which organizations function
and why they don't e.g. stovepipes, ad hoc or absent processes, run-away egos
or adding bodies as a solution to every problem.
My favorite IJC "idea" was a senior officer's
recommendation to install steel girders in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) so
he could build a booth 10 feet off the floor where he could oversee operations
on the JOC floor. Of course, the JOC floor is already supervised by the JOC
director. So, there is nothing to oversee. It sounded more like he was building
a throne room.
In any case, after the article was published and after a
helpful colleague slipped a yellow-highlighted copy under his door, my major
general supervisor politely and professionally asked me to leave Afghanistan.
Another major general, who I had never met, but who had a previous unpleasant
experience with an article-writer, ordered me behind closed doors so he could call
me names. A case of projected anger, I suppose.
Seriously though, I think it is time for the American
people to hold the senior military leaderships' (colonels and up) feet to the
fire. When they make their reports to Congress, one can be sure that it is the
best possible scenario that they can justify without lying. The phrase "progress is being made" should not be accepted as an answer. It is
like saying "the check is in the mail."
Everyone should remember that these are military
careerists. War provides the opportunity for testing their skills, getting
medals and promotions. A compromise peace without their definition of
"victory" might be considered a failure. They all want to march down
Pennsylvania Avenue like General Norman Schwarzkopf. Likewise, the contractors
want to continue making their huge profits. It is the common soldiers, however,
who are providing the sweat and shedding the blood.
We must stop treating the Afghans like children. They are
not. It is their country and for better or worse, they should start taking
responsibility for it. There is little reason not to begin turning over
responsibility now. Regional Command West is possible because it is the most
peaceful part of the country. That could be followed by Regional Command North.
Between now and next July, the coalition can concentrate on Regional Commands
East, South and Southwest.
After that no more blank checks. In my opinion, time's up.
Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a
colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Until recently he was serving his second deployment to Afghanistan.
The views expressed are his own and definitely do not reflect those of the U.S.
Army or U.S. government. He was not compensated for this article.
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