Wednesday, July 28, 2010 - 10:01 AM

This was posted yesterday by Jim Gourley in response to Blake Hall's guest column. Like Blake's terrific essay, this comment really struck me as thoughtful. I told my wife about the cave analogy over dinner.
Of lepers and caves
By Jim GourleyI'm going to say quite a few things that I can't immediately qualify, because the views build on each other. I wish I could give you a clear line of reasoning, but if I could then PTSD wouldn't be a problem. So I'm going to do this the only way I know how -- create the ball of twine and then unravel it. Bear with me.
I am an expert on PTSD. So is every other Soldier/Sailor/Marine/Airman (avoiding diatribes against the all-inclusive "warrior" here) who has felt and/or suffered (because feeling and suffering are distinct from each other) from PTSD. I know we are all experts because no one else does, or can, understand the condition without having gone through it. Army psychologists and counselors who have not felt it or suffered from it only scratch the surface of the problem.
PTSD is very difficult to deal with for two reasons. One reason is the misconception that it is a psychological condition. It's not. It's a spiritual condition. Yes, I know that you cannot anatomically identify the human spirit or sedate it with valium and that, for all its complexities and mysteries, we find the brain much easier to "treat", but I'm telling you right now that trying to understand PTSD under a psychological paradigm is like trying to conduct an ACL surgery at an auto-body shop. I've met David Grossman, and even he speaks about it in metaphysical terms on a frequent basis. If you don't believe me, I'll go dig up the quotes from all the shrinks-in-chief that declare the cause for spikes in suicides in 2008 and 2009 and 2010 was "due to the weather." I give all due respect to the shrinks and counselors. They're doing their best. But with all due respect, their best is nothing but best guesses. Because this isn't scientific. It's spiritual.
The second reason it's difficult is that, even when we acknowledge the spiritual nature of this condition, we are woefully inept at dealing with it. Blake Hall hits on all the things we do wrong -- ridicule, ostracize, and ignore those with the disease. Treat the guy like a leper.
You want to know why we do that? Because deep down underneath all that type-A, testosterone-driven, state-of-the-badass-art Spartan warrior bravado that we exude, we are scared to f---ing death that we'll catch it. PTSD in the Army is like cooties in a third-grade classroom.
If we want to treat PTSD, we've got to do exactly what Blake did. We've got to learn how to hug lepers. We've got to get past the condition and see the man or woman we've always known. We've got to embrace them and hold them tight, tell them that we're here and we're not leaving them. And we've got to mean it. We have to be there. At the office, on the steps of their house, on a swollen riverbank out back of a Chili's on a Saturday night, on the floor of a living room where there used to be furniture at 2 o'clock in the morning. These people don't need us 24/7, but when they do, we've got to answer the call. And we've got to be the kind of leaders and peers that instill enough confidence in them that they'll pick up the phone and call us.
Hotlines and VA administrations can't help. They weren't there in the s--t with you when it was all going down. They don't know. They didn't see. And they don't really care. Yes, I know that many of these people really DO care, but I only know that now. When you have PTSD, you DON'T know that. You certainly won't believe it. Let me back up.
Here's what PTSD is like, and why people kill themselves over it. Think of life like a cave. If I send you into a cave with a lantern and tell you there are no bears in the cave, you feel safe. You will walk around the cave and enjoy yourself. Now what if I give you a lantern and a gun and tell you that there is a bear in there? You can still go down, but you'll be careful to look for the bear and ready to run or shoot if you see it. Now, what if I send you down there with a gun but no lantern and simply say "bear" to you? Pretty soon, you're in there, you can't see the way out, and every rock you bump into feels like a bear. After a long enough time being down in the cave, you realize you don't have enough ammo to shoot everything that might be a bear. It has nothing to do with running out of food or water or feeling like you're fighting some unwinnable battle with the bear. You just get sick and tired of the uncertainty. Are you going to live through the night? Are you going to wake up to a bear gnawing your intestines? You get to the point where you just wish the bear would come along and end it. And when he doesn't come, you decide to do it yourself.
Suicide isn't a surrender, it's a reassertion of power. These guys' lives have spun out of control, and the decision over whether they live or die is the last thing they have the power to determine. Think about it. You ever met a Soldier that wasn't a "take charge kind of guy?" That's my warning bell. I've seen lots of "cries for help" where a guy said "life is meaningless." I don't put much stock in those. But when he says "life is scary"? That's the guy that's going to do it.
So, back to the moment of choice. You've got that gun on your bed or your car keys in your hand and a good cliff in mind. What's going to get you out of that? Some slick-sleeve doc you've never seen before asking you how many times you've been deployed, or a buddy putting his hand on your shoulder and saying "you alright, bro? you look like you're hearing bears."
I'm out with a buddy a while back. We're talking about brands of beer. He hears a car backfire, and suddenly he's scanning ridgelines. He's not here anymore. He's all the way in Afghanistan, and he takes me halfway back to Iraq with him. I think about saying something, telling him that he's here, not there. That I'm with him. That everything is okay. But that would be the wrong thing to say. A couple of minutes pass as we walk. He keeps scanning, I just stay by him. After that, we go back to talking about beer. We don't mention anything about the event.
A couple of days later we're walking along and he says "you know, I really freaked out the other day." I tell him that I know, and I was right there with him. That's all that needs to be said. He knows my story. We don't need any elaborate cathartic rituals or long discussions about it. It's no different than strapping on armor and walking outside the wire. I trusted him to be able to take care of himself, and he trusted me to catch him the moment he couldn't. We're Ranger buddies, not baby-sitters. Giving him dignity and letting him fight the battle on his own is just as important as helping him get up when he gets knocked down.
Our best therapists are our brothers and sisters. The medicine is the very spritual bond of the profession of arms. But you've got to give that medicine in a heavy, constant dose. I'm talking about full-on morphine drip here. When you're in the cave with that bear, you're aware that something is wrong with you. You can't help but feel that. Because of that, you become acutely suspicious of EVERYONE around you. You begin to hate yourself. You have very good, rational reasons for hating yourself. You don't understand why everyone else can't see these reasons and why they don't hate you. Or maybe they do. Maybe they're secretly drafting personnel action memos to move you somewhere else. Maybe they're talking behind your back. It seems like the only people who don't hate you are your wife or kids or parents. Well, it's obvious why. They weren't out there with you. They didn't see. They're all idiots. You start to hate them for not understanding you and not hating you. They keep telling you it's going to be okay and to calm down, and if they say that one more time you're going to scream and wring their necks because it's just not true because so help-me-god-i'm-down-inthiscavewiththisbearandit'sgoingtogetmeAAAARGH!!!
"Jim, where's your furniture? Where's your wife? What's going on?"
"I've ruined my life, Sir."
A Lieutenant Colonel sits down on the tile floor of an empty house beside a sobbing Captain. He's a Brigade XO who's had a long week and only has about a month before he takes Battalion Command and goes to Iraq. His wife is waiting outside in the car and his kids are waiting for him at home. But he takes time for this guy, because he's been down in the cave. He knows this guy is terrified of bears right now, and the Captain might not make it through the night if he doesn't show him there's no bear. He doesn't just refrain from ridicule. He starts telling stories. Stories he'd rather not remember. Stories told in confidence that probably won't be told many more times in his life, but will never be forgotten. That Lieutenant Colonel says lots of things, but it all adds up to one important message.
"There is nothing wrong with you."
He doesn't mean that in a "you ain't hurt, drive on", Patton way. He means it in a very genuine, spiritual way. There is nothing wrong with that Captain because EVERYONE feels that way. We are either all lepers or we're all fine. Either way, there is no reason for that Captain to feel like he's untouchable, outcast, damaged goods. The Lieutenant Colonel chooses to believe we're all okay. On this night, he's successful in convincing the Captain that this is true.
"Is there a gun in the house?"
It's the right question to ask. There isn't one. But the Captain is holding his car keys in his hand and has a bridge in mind. That the Lieutenant Colonel cares enough to ask is all it takes to remove the notion.
"I'll see you at work tomorrow. We'll figure this out-- together."
And that's how my long, slow crawl out of the cave began.
That Lieutenant Colonel said all the right things in all the right ways. You can't train a doc to do that, or write it down in a field manual. You can't teach it to Cadets at West Point or illustrate it on a power point slide. How do you get more leaders to be like that Lieutenant Colonel? The answer, sadly, is that we've got to save as many people going through it as possible, and keep them in the fight. They're the ones who are innoculated against it. They can recognize it, acknowledge it, and help others to fight it. They possess a compassion and empathy no one else can. How do we save the ones currently dealing with it when we have so few who are innoculated? I don't know, but I wish to God someone figures it out. In the meantime I keep watch over my buddy while he watches ridgelines. So much for the extent of my PTSD expertise.
I know how people here feel about Sassaman's memoir, but there was one passage in it that is worth reading the whole book to see.
"A part of me will always be a broken-hearted 40-year-old Battalion Commander."
He says that in reference to the death of Captain Eric Paliwoda, an event that shook him to the core. I suppose it resonates with me because part of me will always be a broken-hearted 26-year-old Captain. I've learned how to keep that part of me from causing the great suffering that nearly destroyed my life, but I still feel it. I feel it every time I see a friend scan ridgelines, or listen to someone talk about watching another human being bled out and die in some godforsaken wheat field that no one will ever remember or care about. I feel it, and by feeling it I'm able to relate. And while we relate to each other and share the heartbreak, that person is able to breathe easy in the cave, because there's one thing in there that they can be sure isn't a bear. It's another leper holding onto them. Life isn't scary, and it's worth living another day.
As someone who has pushed through PTSD and is now sorting through the lingering effects of TBI, I appreciate your last two guest posts. The authors are quite correct on the spiritual condition as the crux of the matter.
When Solomon wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes, I think that he spoke directly to this issue.
"Yet when I surveyed all that my hands had done
and what I had toiled to achieve,
everything was meaningless, a chasing after the wind;
nothing was gained under the sun."
Small wars do that to men. We attack seeking to help, fix, and win, and we sometimes return unnerved with our own limitations to fix the problems.
I'd also offer my favorite song on the subject. O.A.R.'s "Warsong."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZj6QXm4hp4
Thx for bringing TBI back in, MF
Last time I trolled for info, MEDCOM/DVBIC was estimating a quarter to a third of war PTSD cases include TBI co-morbity. It's a moving target, with lots of opportunity for mischief and mistreatment: Psychotrauma and neurotrauma are both routinely misdiagnosed, and blast effect diffuse axon injury (DIA) is a poorly understood area of intense research. Injuries are unique, patients respond so differently, and often do self-sabotage, just like the rest of us.
Having layered ortho-muscular and neuro injuries certainly makes me testy and prone to depression, and mine has nothing to do with bad people meaning me and my loved ones harm.
I found both Hunter's and Jim G's exposition on war PTSD illuminating and humbling. Bless them all.
Someone asked about overdeployment. The last 15 month deployments only ended last July, and 12 months home is still the minimum promise, isn't it? We have about the same overseas ground combat troop numbers as during the surge, with Af-Pak casualty counts creeping towards Iraq 2007 levels. 3 KIA's/day in June, if you include coalition euro-anzacs. It's not so much 'rode hard and put away wet', as it is not put away at all.
Sun Tzu and Daniel Bolger Said...
"Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities their strength will be exhausted." -- Sun Tzu
2,500 years later, and he's still right.
The immediate reaction many in the public will have is "nine years and counting, no wonder this is getting worse." But that's a gross misinterpretation. We need to learn the right lesson. I'm not sure, but I'd lay big money that there are a lot more vets out there who pulled one hitch and then got out after the first or second deployment (depending on whether they got stop-lossed) than we have seasoned troopers still in uniform after their fifth round.
The takeaway is that the problem of fatiguing a force occurs a lot faster than we think. With regard to "riding them hard", I'm sure there's a cumulative effect, but as a mentor of mine once told me "you don't have to practice being tired, cold, hungry, and wet. You always get that right the first time." The second (or third) deployment doesn't suck any worse than the first one. We shouldn't think that a guy who "only" made one trip is any less damaged than a guy slogging through his third one. The Army's recruiting campaign suggests that each Soldier is an Army unto himself. I once read a remark by a senior commander in Afghanistan regarding the level of consistency in regions as units rotated in and out. He said "we keep fighting the same war over and over, one year at a time." It seems that each deployment is an entire war unto itself.
As I responded to a Lieutenant who wrote on here once, your frustration with combat is exponentially proportionate to the number of rounds fired at you. Anger approaches infinity at n=1. So I'm pretty sure you're "overdeployed" the first time your unit gets lit up. They tell you at Air Assault school that the repel tower is 30 feet high because that's the height at which you'll show fear. It doesn't matter how much taller they make it, that's the mental threshold. Is 12 months the threshold for deployment length? Advocates for keeping units in theater longer might say it's only mental. Well, yeah. That's kind of the point.
Then again, this is why I think a lot of guys recovering from this kind of thing take up endurance events. They want to engage in something where you get to a point where you can't see the finish line ahead or the starting line behind you. You have to operate on faith that, if you persevere, you will reach your objective. Spiritually, you get to do for yourself what none of your commanders could-- assign a difficult mission where fate might visit obstacles on you, but victory is based solely on how you deal with those obstacles. I refer back to McChrystal's conversation with those troopers in the Rolling Stone piece. Those guys didn't believe the General himself knew where the finish line was. They certainly didn't like the rules of the game. The leadership owes Joe a simple, understandable outline of how we get from point A to point victory. There's a reason 2/2ID changed their motto to "Kill the Enemy." When Dan Bolger was the Brigade Commander there, he became furious with his staff over the JRTC OPORD they were writing. It was something like 100 pages and way behind schedule. He told them to start over, hand-write it and use carbon paper to make the copies. Talk about a "forcing function." When his ops officer asked him for his Commander's Intent, Bolger walked the walk and talked the talk all at the same time. He issued those three simple words.
Now, I know things are a little more complicated in Afghanistan, but if Petraeus could explain to Joe (and the American citizenry while he's at it, if he wants to be especially helpful) in 250 words or less what the dickens we're doing there and how we win, I think that 12-month paradigm would become significantly less severe. Think of it as a mental Fosbury flop to get over an obstacle built of perception.
Yes, TBI is a mechanical thing that will have to receive real therapy. It's a good point we should remain aware of. Study and treatment should be funded and pursued. In that regard, I actually trust the docs will succeed over time. But leadership can do a great deal to prepare our troops for the spiritual blows that compound the physical injury. Doing that will make the docs' jobs infinitely easier.
Do you think it is possible for anyone to explain to Joe in 250 words or less what the dickens we're doing there and how we win?
spot on....now we are getting a dialogue started on leadership in a "complex environment"
I think if you can't explain it in 250 words or less, then you don't know what you're doing and you have no right sending troops on missions. Combat is complex, but it ain't rocket science. For all our UAVs, techno-tronic communications on hi-fi backbones, and tangram stealth planes, Sun Tzu and Clauswitz still work after 2,000 and 200 years, respectively. The more things change...
I think the mother of all powerpoint slides proves the point. Nothing is simple at first glance, but the job of leaders and staffers is to make it simple-- not more complex.
The Army Combat Studies Institute published the first of two volumes of their assessment of the Afghan war a few months back. The New York Times put it online. It's titled "A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM." In my view, a critical reading of the early pages discussing what planners determined were the enemy centers of gravity reveals just how much more complicated we made the problem than it really was from the get-go. The abysmal failure of our strategic planning was masked by the fact that our forces went out and did what they instinctually knew to be the right thing. However, if you look specifically at what planners identified as the Taliban and Al Qaeda Centers of Gravity, then compare it to how we prosecuted the campaign, you see that the two are entirely incongruent. So, were the planners or the SF teams wrong? Well, that depends on whether you believe financial or logistical networks are Centers of Gravity. If you read enough works by Joseph Strange and Richard Iron, you're forced to say the planners messed up.
Those planners got down into the minutiae of tribal and ethnic politics before they even figured out what it was they had to do. We still get lost in the weeds. If there existed a 250-word "rules of the game" paper, you could never do that. Are we building enough schools? Have we ensured equal rights for women? What's the status on this new road-paving project? How many poppy fields have we burned down?
I don't think you could include all that stuff on a 250-word plan for success. That probably means they're not the essential elements for success, and as such you shouldn't worry about them until you've got your essentials covered.
Everyone's going to have their own ideas about what the essentials are. Victory requires getting everyone on the same sheet. Not sheets. Not 300-page Annex A to Appendix 1 to OPORD 2010-5-3v2.0. Sheet. One. Uno. Joe's got enough room in his ruck for his Ranger Handbook. Whatever you give him has to be able to fit between the pages of that. Your Doctoral dissertation of Just War Theory in a COIN environment doesn't make the cut. You want to be a General? Here's your essay test. "In 250 words or less..."
Final justification for this. When was the last time anyone who reads this stood up before a room full of O-6-and-highers and spent longer than two minutes explaining a slide before someone yelled "okay, I get it, next." If we're supposed to give the commanders the utmost courtesy of boiling it down to short-and-sweet, and commanders are supposed to place the premium on the troops, then shouldn't the commanders extend that same courtesy of simplicity to the troops?
New question, are there too many troops in Afghanistan right now?
This is a top Af-Pak hand who resigned, who was offered tops jobs with Eikenberry and Holbrooke:
"American families, he said at the end of the letter, “must be reassured their dead have sacrificed for a purpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept. I have lost confidence such assurances can be made any more.”
Links at:
http://kylydia.wordpress.com/2009/10/29/on-the-resignation-of-michael-hoh/
....my point on complex environment is how well (or not so well) is our leadership dealing with Soldier issues back in the states?......DUIs, drugs, domestic violence, assaults, alcohol,etc etc.....all the homicides from Ft Carson based Soldiers a few years ago is one data point.... ..
The Problem with Points and Environments
I see what you're saying. Here's the problem I have with "Suicide Prevention Task Forces" and data points.
A DUI, domestic assault, suicide, or homicide is an ACT. The Army busies itself and wrings its hands over number of acts all the time. We try to stop acts. "How do I prevent suicides?" we ask. We think the answer is to make people take online surveys, sit through power point presentations, and watch videos. All these methods have the same things in common:
- Automated
- Targeted at large groups
- Tailored to no one
- Created with the express purpose of "lowering number of suicides"
Whether it's suicides or Afghanistan, you can always find a way to confuse yourself with minutiae. We shouldn't be surprised that our methods have no effect on the problem, because we've completely misunderstood the problem.
Suicides aren't the problem. People who are deeply wounded are the problem. How do you help someone who is suffering spiritually? Not with methods that are automated, distributed to large groups, or intended to target numbers. Your methods must be:
- Genuine
- Personal
- Persistent
So, anything computer-based is out. Anything that tries to reduce a person to "data points" is out. Anything that attempts to be quick, easy, or "fire-and-forget" is out. What does that leave us with? Sounds like leadership to me.
If you are using books, statistics, and microsoft office products to fight the problem of deep spiritual wounds in our nation's warriors, you are going to lose the fight. I personally can't wait to see this upcoming Army report on suicides, because I'm very anxious to read how they use their month-by-month suicide scorecards to explain what they've been doing right and wrong. That will be quite the exercise in creative writing. Here's a prediction-- they'll use the words "statistics" and "data" at least twice as many times as "leadership."
And that's the problem. It goes without saying that Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen aren't numbers. Neither are their leaders. Here's the survey we ought to be taking. "Hey, Captain Gourley. What's Specialist Jones's hometown? How old is he? Is he married? What's his plans for when he gets out of the Army?" That's not just to levy blame on Company Commanders. Again, the greater Army has to adopt a culture that will let these folks get out from behind their laptops.
This week's Stars and Stripes article on the suicide of Specialist Jonathan Hughey is telling. The family only identified the "warning signs" after he was dead. But they all "felt" that something was wrong. We need to improve the quantity and quality of gut instinct, and place more reliance on it. There is no substitute for, let alone automation or statistical analysis of, the correspondence of the human spirit.
There is only leadership.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
exactly!!!!!! "there is only leadership".....that is the point I am trying to raise to the Army/USMC....this is a leadership issue....leadership is leadership, regardless of context....a complex leadership problem does not have to be overseas.....it can (and in this case is) be in our own back yard....this is a "human" problem....not a computer, poster, online problem.....I just pointed out the Ft Carson "data point" for what it is....a data point....if there is smoke there just might be fire....lets "attack" this complex issue with the same rigor, resources, and LEADERSHIP that we do the complex problems overseas.....
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