When you have a military machine as powerful as ours and neocon militarists always eager to wield it, politics to them seems like a mundane, indeed, superfluous process. The ‘endless war’ camp inhabited by such visionary ‘statesman’ as McCain, Graham, Liebermann, etc., have decided they are much more clever than Clausewitz and have envisioned politics to be merely a tool of perpetual war not the other way around.

JWING, an impressively informative comment. However, while not trying to be disrespectful of your views I think your markers of progress are essentially meaningless since the reality of Iraq is that it has been stitched together by American military force and cash. And since that presence has an eventual termination date and Iraq does not have REAL institutions of pluralism and stability the end result after the departure of our forces will be a resumption of the normal historical continuum of political brutality and chaos.

I think Iraq will still see violence for the next 10 years, but eventually it'll end. I believe Iraq is working its way towards a struggling developing country whereas before it was a failed state. That is a huge change. The country will still be wracked by major problems, a lack of jobs, mass corruption, lack of services, etc. but that's just like most of the developing world. Politically it'll still be hindered by weak and bickering political parties, again very similar to other countries, but they'll still muddle along like they do. I do not see an "unraveling."

JWING 3:23 PM ET July 26, 2010 Opinions

I've heard pretty compelling analysis saying that the 'breathing space' that many attribute to the surge was much more closely tied to the 'anbar awakening', where we managed to buy off many of the sunni insurgents in that province, and provide a lull in the violence that allowed for some minor gains in political progress.

Statistically, that seemed to be supported by data, with drops in violence preceding the arrival of many new troop deployments.

But i'm sure its debatable.

Still, I'm not so sure you provide much to really pop Tom's argument; OK, the surge was not intended to solve things like disputes about Kirkuk, or Mosul. But they are still problems, and the war there has still failed to establish conditions we should be particularly proud of.

JWING:
You put a lot out there to chew on, but I think that's the point. It's isn't sufficient to swallow Tom's provocative short-hand: Cynical to believe our goal was just to get out with some shred of integrity.

Iraq, the real place, country, theory or whatever, has always been a challenging location with puncuations of robust stability under strong leaders, probably many as bad or worse than Saddam.

Lost in the short-hand, however, is that once we changed regimes, there came a point where our occupation became a drag on further progress to whatever chapter needed to be written next by the Iraqis. So, the only way to move to the next square (Iraqi self-determination) was to let them get on with it.

As you say, Mosul is not all of Iraq, and its unique latent and evolved challenges are immense. Also, there are deep economic issues that must find their way, either by action or inaction.

The history or Mosul actually argues for some robust and independent leadership/control for economic reasons---so maybe the real answers for Mosul are re-establishment of the necessary equilibrium needed to make its natural relationship to trade/exchange through Turkey is something. I doubt the national government would challenge anything that actually worked---whether Sunni or Kurd, just so that they got on with things. Isn't that a recipe for some separate venue for Mosul solutions similar to what always worked in the past?---when it worked.

It is a separate problem that will, as in Salah ad Din's day, require a separate solution.

Steve

Let me simplify:

Before Surge: Iraq was in a civil war
After Surge: Civil war ended

Before Surge: The gun was the way everyone was trying to solve their problems
After Surge: Politics is how everyone is trying to solve their problems

Before Surge: No one cared about Iraqi law, constitution, etc.
After Surge: All the parties are talking about is this court ruling, this amendment, this deadline set in the constitution, etc. as they try to put together a new government

Before Surge: Maliki was considered weak and ineffective, protected Sadr, was considered a bystander during the civil war
After Surge: Took on Sadr and the insurgency, is considered such a strong leader that many think he is an autocrat, they want to lesson the powers of the prime minister, and make sure he never returns to office

So how weren't those "political breakthroughs"? And again, to think that Iraq is going to solve all their long-standing issues in one year while they were in a civil war is to ignore history because no other country has ever been able to do that.

As with most debates over "The Surge" - and many others - this simple principle is often a problem. JWing usually writes great commentaries but I must put this principle to him with comments like "But the Surge did lead to a change in Iraqi politics. Before the Surge everyone was using the gun to achieve their goals. After the Surge most of the Sunnis gave up on Al Qaeda and insurgency, and politics became the major area of contention. "

This glosses over many different developments and changes that may have had a lot to do with the results JW lists, leaving "the Surge" as their supposed cause. Not so, or at least, far from proven. Perhaps the biggest is the Awakening. This is where Sunnis began to give up on AQI and the insurgency, but let's remember that this movement started a couple months before the Surge even began. And if we are to remember the history again, major drops in violence did not really begin until many months after the Surge began, and also many months after the Awakening began.

Then there are other important changes that took place, such as the Sadr ceasefire, who controlled the Mahdi army, a major (perhaps the major) group involved in ramping up those death counts in the bloody civil war. This happened to coincide exactly with the big drop in those death counts in late 2007, after the Surge had long been in effect, and the Awakening had already long been a major movement. This points to another important theory about what happened to really change the security from the worst of the civil war: simply, that one side won it and so called it quits. The militant Shiite groups had managed to ethnically cleanse (or, religiously cleanse, really) enough of Baghdad by the end of summer 2007 that it felt it could just declare victory and quit.

When you actually consider all these things, how much credit is really left for the (to some all-important) Surge of additional US troops into Baghdad? Not that much some would say. At best, I'd say it's one factor among several that resulted in the developments JW cites. Though it is actually possible we might have seen a similar trend regardless of the Surge, simply due to the Awakening and the civil war simply running its course.

For that matter, the Sunnis still on the side of insurgency don't seem to have given up even if their opponents have declared victory two years ago. See the continuing large scale bombings and other revenge attacks continuing to target, not just Shiites, but perhaps now even more so those among the Awakening who turned against the insurgency, again, starting in late 2006, before the Surge. You can see who groups like AQI and others see as the cause of their losses (or apparently in their mind, their temporary setbacks).

"Perhaps the biggest is the Awakening. This is where Sunnis began to give up on AQI and the insurgency, but let's remember that this movement started a couple months before the Surge even began. And if we are to remember the history again, major drops in violence did not really begin until many months after the Surge began, and also many months after the Awakening began."

The Awakening was in Anbar and started in 2005. You're conflating that with the Sons of Iraq (SOI), which was a purely American creation during the Surge, while the Anbar Awakening was indigenous. The Awakening really started taking off in 2006 when the Marines there finally realized what was going on in a large fashion and started supporting them. That helped clean up security in Anbar. The SOI was started by Petraeus during the Surge when he decided that he would try the Anbar model in the rest of Iraq. It eventually led to most of the insurgents in Baghdad, Salahaddin, Babil, Diyala to give up and switch sides to the Americans, and was a major reason why security in the entire country improved.

"Then there are other important changes that took place, such as the Sadr ceasefire, who controlled the Mahdi army, a major (perhaps the major) group involved in ramping up those death counts in the bloody civil war."

The Sadr cease-fire was a major change, but a couple caveats. By the time Sadr declared a cease-fire he'd lost control of most of his militia, which had broken up into a bunch of different factions. The Mahdi Army was not a top down organization to begin with, but rather a large amount of individual, locally organized units that would look to Sadr for advice, but didn't really take orders. After his cease-fire was declared there were plenty of Mahdi fighters, and others who became known as Special Groups that continued fighting. By the end of 07 that's who the U.S. and Iraqi forces were focusing a lot on, culminating with Maliki's offensives in Basra, Maysan, and Baghdad in 2008.

"This points to another important theory about what happened to really change the security from the worst of the civil war: simply, that one side won it and so called it quits."

Yes, the Sunnis got beat, which is why they switched sides and joined the SOI. They were getting attacked by Al Qaeda unless they followed their orders, they were getting hit by the Shiite militias and Shiite security forces, and by the U.S. If not for the SOI program, many of those Sunnis would've had to continue fighting, but they would've largely gotten wiped out eventually, it just would've taken a lot longer and a lot more killing.

"The militant Shiite groups had managed to ethnically cleanse (or, religiously cleanse, really) enough of Baghdad by the end of summer 2007 that it felt it could just declare victory and quit. "

Yes agreed with the first part, and those demographic changes were solidified by the U.S. putting up blast walls to keep the warring groups separated from each other. As for the second part see above, the Shites didn't stop fighting in 2007.

"Though it is actually possible we might have seen a similar trend regardless of the Surge, simply due to the Awakening and the civil war simply running its course."

I think the civil war would've rumbled on for a lot longer without the Surge, but the insurgents still would've lost.

Overall I'm not one to say that the Surge was a panacea for Iraq and everything was solved afterward. You can see that in my other posts. What I'm trying to say is that the Surge was a major factor in changing Iraq, basically because it lucked out to come at the right time. You had the Anbar awakening as a precedent, you had most of the insurgency getting hammered, you had the breaking up of the Shiite militias into little factions, you had Iraqis getting tired of the fighting and ready for a change, and you had the demographics of Baghdad, the center of the fighting changed. All those played together. It's also important to remember that those changes in the security situation allowed for political changes in 2008 and 2009 beginning with Maliki finally asserting himself, going from a pushover for the larger Shiite parties, to becoming a nationalist figure that now many complain is acting like an autocrat.

"I think the civil war would've rumbled on for a lot longer without the Surge, but the insurgents still would've lost."

You "think" so, but you should acknowledge that this isn't really a fact. It's your guess. And...

"What I'm trying to say is that the Surge was a major factor in changing Iraq, basically because it lucked out to come at the right time."

These are somewhat contradictory comments. If it happened to come after the Awakening tide had already started, and the Shiite majority overpowering the divided Sunni minority was mainly a matter of time, then how do we really know how "major" a factor it was in what happened. Afterall, it may have mostly just "lucked out to come at the right time" - correlating with, but not so much causing - a decline in the sectarian violence. I tend to think it was a contributing factor, but how major a factor seems to be so much guesswork. The 'surge' of US money into the hands of groups like the Awakening for that matter may have been a bigger factor than the 'surge' of US troops into Baghdad, but the former could have been done without the latter.

"The Awakening was in Anbar and started in 2005. You're conflating that with the Sons of Iraq (SOI), which was a purely American creation during the Surge, while the Anbar Awakening was indigenous. The Awakening really started taking off in 2006 when the Marines there finally realized what was going on in a large fashion and started supporting them. That helped clean up security in Anbar."

Here, no, I'm talking about the Awakening. Yes the first inklings of this did start in 2005, but the real take off for this as a viable movement against the insurgency was around September 2006. The surge began in the beginning of 2007. This Sunni divide was well underway before the surge, but certainly continued to grow after it began. The SOI, as far as i can tell, is just another name for the same movement.

"Yes, the Sunnis got beat, which is why they switched sides and joined the SOI."

Again, I think you have the timing wrong. The civil war raged on for about a year after the Awakening (or SOI) became a prominent force.

"You "think" so, but you should acknowledge that this isn't really a fact. It's your guess"

Huh??? If I say I "think" something that's not a statement of fact, that's my opinion.

"I tend to think it was a contributing factor, but how major a factor seems to be so much guesswork."

There's no possible way to find out which of all the events that happened during that time was more important than another. You just have to analyze it and come to your own conclusions.

"The 'surge' of US money into the hands of groups like the Awakening for that matter may have been a bigger factor than the 'surge' of US troops into Baghdad, but the former could have been done without the latter."

Yes, but the formation of the SOI was part of Petraeus' counterinsurgency policy. No change in policy, and there probably wouldn't have been the creation of the SOI.

"The SOI, as far as i can tell, is just another name for the same movement."

It's not. The Anbar Awakening was started by the tribes in Anbar themselves because they were getting squeezed and mad at Al Qaeda in Iraq. They started fighting against them in 2005, got wiped out, re-organized, and then finally got supported by the Marines in 2006. This was exclusively in Anbar province amongst a certain set of tribes there. After they became successful in 2007 they did try to get other tribes in the rest of Iraq to form their own Awakening movements, but that didn't happen until the Americans organized and funded them. That came with the Sons of Iraq program, which was formulated by Gen. Petraeus and his staff in 2007. Part of his policy was to build up local security forces, and try to divide and conquer the insurgency based upon what he saw happening in Anbar. It was good timing because some insurgent groups were in open warfare with AQI by early 2007. The first SOI units were created in Baghdad made up of ex-insurgent units and had nothing to do with tribes at first. It was then expanded to the rest of Baghdad province, Salahaddin, Diyala, Babil, etc. and even into some Shiite areas of southern Iraq. No Petreaus, Surge, and change in policy, no SOI. It was an American creation, which is why Baghdad has no problems with the Awakening, but basically gives a cold shoulder to the SOI.

""Yes, the Sunnis got beat, which is why they switched sides and joined the SOI."

Again, I think you have the timing wrong. The civil war raged on for about a year after the Awakening (or SOI) became a prominent force."

The reason why so many insurgents were willing to give up and switch sides and join the SOI iis because they decided they were getting beat. They were either going to get killed by Al Qaeda, the U.S., the militias, or the Iraqi military. Your timing is off because your thinking about the Anbar Awakening as being the same thing as the SOI.

It's not often that you find a commentator who can so easily unravel the (flawed) logic of a blogger, make a better point, and do all this in a far more intelligent and articulate form of writing than that of which he criticizes. Bravo saintsimon, for again demonstrating how biased Mr. Ricks' writing is and how incorrect his conclusions are.

All arguments rely on defined conditions for terms used. Saying tom made up his own criteria is no different than what any 'analyst' does. Provide the alternative please to rebut him, and perhaps your point will have more weight to it other than nanny-poo-poo type criticism.

What facts? The only evidence Tom provides to support his bold claim that the SURGE HAS NOT SUCCEEDED is from a washington post writer who comments that in NORTHERN Iraq: "Kurdish and Sunni Arab leaders battle over disputed lands, provincial and central government officials wrestle for control, and Sunni insurgents continue to slip back and forth across the porous borders with Turkey and Syria."
If that is fact and proof that the surge failed then we might as well just pack it up and call it a done deal. This post was a 4 paragraph (each 1-3 sentences) that largely contained nothing of substance. Facts? Please.

The US is likely going to renegotiate the SOFA so that some U.S. forces can stay past the deadline. There will be U.S. air bases, trainers/advisers, the State Dept. rather than the U.S. military will be in charge. In 5 years they plan on ending the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The mantra of the Obama administration is that the Iraqis are now largely responsible for their own affairs.

Odierno sounded quite sanguine and mater-of-fact hands-off about the failure of a government to form, while unconditionally proclaiming compliance with all provisions up thru 1/9/10 goals of 50,000 in a non-combat role.

Video and searchable transcript: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/228992

A suspicious man (moi?) might insist that Team Odierno has major skin in the succession fight, and suspect that we are witholding our key support for assurances vis renegotiation. Hard to see it coming out all our way, while we are squeezing Tehran so hard.

WW, I would say that the Surge did more than that. Al Qaeda lost its support amongst the population, most of the Sunni population turned on the insurgency as well, and most of the insurgents switched sides. Militants use to openly take to the streets and parade around. That doesn't happen anymore. Mosul is the only urban bastion of the insurgency. They are also trying to rebuild in northern Diyala. They have hideouts in Baghdad, Anbar, and Tamim, but they are a shall of their former self. I can see AQI disappearing in 5 years. The homegrown insurgents will take longer because they have more deep seated issues with the new Iraq.

Does 'insurgency' still mean AQI to you? Major attrition of the takfir cells and networks was major, as you say. But foreign and Iraqi recruits are in waiting, and the Sunni imperative and fears that feed the AQ cult are still in being.

I count Zarqawi's local recruits and foreign fighters as only one faction, each insurgency with flavors, local arrangements, history and foreign sponsorship. Hez teams were also coming in to see what they could learn and teach, alongside Quds trainers. Our Saudi buddies, blood enemies of any Shiite or Persian supported regime in Baghdad, have a long tradition of giving cash to many factions.

If the Sunni tribes moved our way in 2005-7, we saw the need for balance (Tehran's hand growing stronger, regional war building), re-flagged enemy guerilla units as patriotic Sons, before the Sunni's were defeated in detail.

Certainly the rump Baathist command in Syria was running out of cash and arms by 2006, which had paying for a good deal of the Sunni tribal resistance. My guess is that Saddam's cousins at least tacitly supported a deal that allowed us to pay the tribes to help us hunt takfiris of the OBL cult. But the Iraqi Baath, which started with conspiracies abroad, hasn't gone away either.

AQI have always been a minority within the insurgency.

"But foreign and Iraqi recruits are in waiting, and the Sunni imperative and fears that feed the AQ cult are still in being."

There are hardly any foreigners coming into Iraq anymore, and Sunni apprehensions about the new Iraq fuel the insurgency not AQI. AQI's main goals are to kill Shiites, incite a retaliation and fight the western infidels. That just doesn't sell in Iraq anymore.

If you think the insurgents are just off in the waiting for something than they've done a piss poor job of it since they've lost almost everything: territory, foreign fighters, funding, and most importantly popular support.

AQI was nearly virtual construct anyway. Baqubah/Diyala was the New Islamic Caliphate? C'mon. Info camouflage is important enough, without believing theirs or ours.

Obviously the AQ narrative got too big for its britches in Anbar etc, but they survived in Pakistan thru the many US 'victories' in Iraq. THere are enough pissed off disenfranchised Sunni MAM's subsisting in Jordan to form several Baathist divisions, with even more in Syria.

Too soon to declare victory, although putting 'neocolonial occupation' to rest may contribute to further progress. Even Odierno says that keeping our bargains has deflated our utility as an insurgent recruiting tool.

It's possible that the OBL cult motivation and international recruiting network has somehow dissolved, but color me doubtful. Limited strategic victory is the best i give it for now, an expensive one at that.

WW wrote: "Obviously the AQ narrative got too big for its britches in Anbar etc, but they survived in Pakistan thru the many US 'victories' in Iraq. THere are enough pissed off disenfranchised Sunni MAM's subsisting in Jordan to form several Baathist divisions, with even more in Syria."

That's to ignore the indigenous roots and specific policies of Al Qaeda in Iraq. AQI was started by Zarqawi on his own following his model rather than anything to do with Al Qaeda central in Af/Pak. Zarqawi's policy was based upon driving out the international community, attacking U.S. forces, intimidating and killing any Iraqi that was willing to cooperate with the new Iraq, and ultimately attacking Shiites to create a civil war so that the state would collapse and Sunnis would turn to him to protect them. He also killed and and intimidated any insurgents who didn't follow his lead. AQ central objected again and again to his attacks upon Shiites, and begged hm to get along and cooperate with other Sunni insurgent groups rather than force them to follow him. Zarqawi never listened. Even after Zarqawi was dead and other leaders like Masri who were directly connected to AQ central took over AQI, they still demanded that the insurgency follow them and they never stopped their attacks upon Shiites and other insurgent groups That narrative did not survive in Pakistan because AQ central never agreed with it.

And if there are "divisions" of Sunnis sitting in Jordan and Syria then they've been staying there for the last 2-3 years so how pissed off can they be?

"Surge was the beginning of the end for the insurgency... Al Qaeda lost its support amongst the population, most of the Sunni population turned on the insurgency as well, and most of the insurgents switched sides."

Again, you have the small problem that this development was underway months before the Surge started.

You get the 'false rhetoric' buzzer on that, JWING

Either the multi-million wave of displaced Sunni remain outside the borders, as with the Palestinian diaspora, or it returns to accommodation or conflict. Try to hand wave them into peaceful neutrality, you're only kidding yourself.

A demobilized soldiers cousins are killed, his family run out of the country on threat of death, and his home taken or destroyed; how pissed off should we expect him to be? Multiply that by hundreds of thousands MAM's, and you have the refugee populations in Jordan and Syria, adjacent to an experienced underground Baath command cell.

No small thing.

I would judge that AQ senior leadership were quite active in supporting recruitment of foreign fighters for Iraq service 2003-7, independent of Zarqawi's run. It was the AQ cause celebre. Iraq jihad was a far more concentrated and successful effort than the mobilization of volunteers for Chechnya or Bosnia. Many jihad veterans returned to their home countries, as after the anti-Soviet jihad. Suicide video testimonials were designed by arabs to recruit arabs.

The Syria-Iraq jihad pipeline is mostly quiet for now, the transit ports more carefully watched, local support withdrawn (as you point out) and US troops are by design no longer making daily targets of themselves. But why conclude that the takfir cult narrative or jihad network is defeated over there, or that international/Saudi money for violence has suddenly dried up?

Like Wonder Bread or Oxidol, AQ is an established brand name for a product that can be revived and locally packaged, in Yemen, Somalia, or Iraq.

Glad your Gr-grandaddy survived JP.

The 'Surge' almost certainly cost more Iraqi soldiers and insurgent fighters their lives than the unsurpassed one-day toll of Antietem, with multiples in civilian conflict mortality.

Obviously Lincoln was unsatisfied, fired McClellan. But Lee retreated from Maryland in a condition that temporarily exposed him to defeat in detail, and London saw Lincoln/Union holding firm, finally issuing the Emancipation Proclamation.

Oh I agree with you WW, the battle was unusual in that while McClellan was defeated in all his endeavors he stumbled into a 'strategic victory' even if he did not understand it at the time. Again like I said it was similar to the Coral Sea in May 1942 where the IJN essentially defeated Fletcher’s Task Force 11 and 17 but in doing so suffered enough damage that they had to cancel Operation MO the invasion of Port Moresby. Thus, from a tactical defeat the USN escapes with an important strategic victory. My only point was to dispute as you say, “demonstrated tactical effectiveness” of the Army of the Potomac as commanded by McClellan.

As far as the surge in Iraq is considered my guess is that fifteen or twenty years down the road when less passionate history is written about this war 'the surge' will be considered much ado about nothing when considered in the totality of what lies ahead for Iraq.

Agreed JJ, but we really do need to include Iraqi casualties and costs in the calculation.

A long war was a war lost, by the 'weeks, not months' criteria Cheney and Rumsfeld were using to sell the war.

By that light, the surge looks a lot like good money chasing sunk costs in a losing proposition. But all we really know is how it seems looking back from here. Looking forward, renegotiation of our use of Iraq air bases (or not) is... so last century.

All we really need is high altitude air-space permission to run AWACS and radar drones between Insurlik and Qatar.