I've felt on many occasions that we change the way we fight wars to accommodate our personnel system. I’ve seen this in shuffling folks from job to job, theater to theater, and base to base to make people “better rounded” and give everyone (read officers) a chance to get command and a shot at promotion. Good commanders should get and keep command. Bad commanders should get fired.

Ike was right. War is not fair. Life is not fair. Armies exist to win wars and folks have risked and sacrificed much more than a chance at a 20 year pension.

Mr. Ricks wrote: "the cost of hurting the feelings and careers of officers in the chain of command"

Its hard for outsiders to understand, but all the spin about integrity and honesty is a joke above the rank of LT. The entire officer corps is continually engaged in spinning the truth and covering up mistakes on a daily basis. The best at this game become Generals. This is not just allowed, it is expected. Junior officers learn early on that refusing to pencil whip reports and investigations may result in a career ending poor eval.

The culture is so mind controlling that there are many US Army officers who actually think the surge in Iraq was a success and we won the conflict there. I'm serious, they really think that, because saying otherwise is such heresy their career may end if they spoke otherwise.

This is why Navy accident investigations are top secret and names of witnesses are not recorded, so that everyone can tell the truth. This is not the formal JAG that is made public. The Navy never allows any outsider to read those, including Congressmen.

Taking random potshots at the officer corps of the Army seems to be an obsession here -- blanket condemnations of thousands of professionals seems par for the course.

I don't think anyone suggests the Army is perfect, or that there should not be a continual attempt to improve. But you would be hard pressed to find a job that demands more of its people, in tougher conditions, shouldering more responsibility for less pay.

The issues revolving around Wanat have little to do with whether leaders "love" or "take care" of their Soldiers -- it has everything to do with what the Army and the nation owes to relatives of those killed.

What are the rights of an aggrieved parent, and what demands can they rightfully make on the institution? No question the Army should carefully assess the performance of every leader -- but is a casualty's parent the best judge? Are families not getting answers, or do they not like the answers they are being given? And no briefing, disciplinary action, or ceremony will ever bring another loved one back. It is a fine line between accountability and vendetta.

Tom, I think your analogy to WWII is disingenuous. Do you think Ike and other WWII leaders "loved and took care of" the Soldiers they fed into the meat grinder of the Huertgen Forest for no real purpose? Tarawa? Monte Cassino? Point-du-hoc for that matter? Did they treat their troops better than the leaders of today? I seriously doubt it. Leaders today go to extraordinary pains to protect the lives and well-being of Soldiers. That is why situations like Wanat are so shocking to the public -- because they are so unusual, people start the think it isn't war -- that there isn't risk, and that the enemy no longers gets a vote.

Taking care of Soldiers isn't just about trying to satisfy aggrieved parents. What do the other Soldiers in that unit think about their leaders? Sure, relieve officers when necessary for the discipline and morale of the unit. But is that what is going on? Or are we relieving officers as a sacrifice to avoid the heat of angry relatives? Maybe a little of both?

During the second half of my Army career I was struck with how often senior Naval officers, especially on ships, were taken down by incidents, whether they had much control over them or not. The rule seemed to be that the senior officer was ultimately responsible for anything that happened. While in the Army blame quickly travels from the seniors to the junior officers and/or enlisted soldiers. And sometimes senior officers who try to investigate and clean up the messes left by predecessors, encounter roadblocks because if something was fixed, that means something was wrong and we sure don't want to venture into that quicksand.

I witnesses that in Afghanistan with detainee operations and the infamous Jacoby report.

What is often forgotten is that there are always witnesses, people will talk and the truth will come out. That's what I've always found great about the Army. There are a few who are in it for themselves or get caught up in their success or that bow to political pressures from their civilian bosses; but there are many more who will not allow harm to the collective integrity of the organization and will stand up for what's right.

Little by little breeches in trust chip away at the Army's integrity and people begin to lose faith in the organization. We can't afford that with an all-volunteer force. We have to do the right thing if we are to maintain a cohesive, volunteer Army.

Marshall is worthy of praise but you seem to idolize him in a way that threatens your senses. If Marshall and the WWII era leadership were so much better then why don't we ask those survivng members of the CBI theater. Maybe Merrill's men might have something to say about Gen. Stillwell.
Does this example justify what happened at Wanat? No. Nor does your example justify your generalization of today's officers.

Expanded “accountability” for every combat death, plan failure, or decision made beforehand or during execution will only increase combat losses and impede combat effectiveness.

Senior leaders, politicians, and families seeking answers about individual lost sons will force commanders to spend excess time answering investigator questions instead of planning and executing other operations to safeguard other sons (15-6 Apache investigation during Rock Move).

Leaders will be forced to spend too much time second-guessing every decision in advance (should I land this CH-47 to evacuate Wanat casualties while under fire?).

Beyond increased time to plan and execute, predictable actions will result devoid of originality or audacity, that hesitate to expose anyone to risk,..an inherently untenable and unwinnable situation for any military force. So instead of Tom’s vision of history featuring only glorious past commanders (and far higher casualties BTW), the future commander would never dare a Normandy, an Inchon landing, Lom Son 719, 73 Easting, Camp Rhino into Afghanistan, or the blitzkrieg to Baghdad.

Just as significantly, all the smaller operations planned by lower echelon commanders practicing mission command and empowered distributed operations (where more trust is placed in subordinate hands) will evaporate as subordinates hesitate to make rapid decisions aligning with commanders intent.

Finally, while I note much of the CENTCOM investigation quoted doctrine, in one case siding with Soldiers not wanting each Soldier to spend 3 minutes a day hand-pumping their own 3 gallons of filtered water, it also mentioned these two doctrinal tenets:

“the platoon leader establishes OPs along the most likely avenue of approach.”
“for security in the defense, the two primary tools available to the platoon leader are OPs and patrols.”

So the platoon leader (not the company, battalion, or brigade commander) did the best he could in choosing an OP position, because he felt he was not authorized to choose to evict a family from a house higher up the hill given higher HQ requirements to negotiate for property. The QRF platoon leader later did occupy that position as an OP after the attack given the benefit of hindsight and new self-defense authorizations.

The platoon leader also could not take available wood for overhead cover due to the same property rights constraints. Finally, the unit was not allowed to use the C-shaped building for cover and concealment…again not a restriction imposed by the company commander, and possibly not by the battalion or brigade commander, either.

Now you may ask why was the platoon+ given such a lousy location to begin with. Well, it turns out that another doctrinal publication, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, offers these explanations for the choice of Wanat, and the decision to locate close to the population, under “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency”:

* The more you protect your force, the less secure you are

Under the above paradox it states: “Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces stay locked up in compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Patrols must be conducted, risk must be shared, and contact maintained.”

And don’t forget this:
* The more successful COIN is, the less force that can be used and the more risk that must be accepted

Last line of the above paradox: “Soldiers and Marine may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.”

While I’m glad Tom’s dog walk proved enlightening when he couldn’t fully explain Wanat to a friend, it might prove easier to actually read all the material available prior to passing judgment on these Army officers...and making broad generalizations about all others..

A tragedy occurred. Mistakes were made by leaders from team leader all the way up to Secretary of Defense and POTUS. But you should be extraordinarily hesitant to end careers of a young leader who proved capable of safeguarding Sky Soldiers for 14 months of the tour due to one possible screw-up the final two weeks, with multiple extenuating circumstances. It would be a horrible mistake to future Army families not to have a LTC and COL Myer protecting our nation and sons.

BTW, I know none of these officers.

People make mistakes. No mistakes that I have ever made have resulted in one of my subordinates deaths but it goes with the territory if you're fighting a war.

The point I suppose is if the mistake was made in the context of the strategy that was laid down by the political and military leadership. If a Colonel is told that the strategy is to put bases in the middle of nowhere without any real idea of what you are sticking your d**k into then you can't blame him for doing what he was told to do.

It may have been stupid to put the base precisely where it was or to underman it but the officers responsible may have been stupid, that's not their fault. If I give an idiot a gun it isn't the idiots fault if they shoot themselves in the foot it's my fault.

You all who write here present as professionals. You all present as wisened participants somewhere, some place in this conversation, regardless of your positions. I have read all of these presentations by TR on the subject of Wanat and I see many passionate view points. May I present mine.
I was, in a past time, a Marine officer. By the nature of the Corps, we were all taught to think and believe as grunts. We all worked our jobs around the "18 year old PFC with the rifle" on the ground. As it was, I was an aviator. My son was a Corporal. He was killed in action in a gunfight in Iraq in 2005. Some shitty little ville on the banks of the Euphrates that needed to be cleared, part of a larger operation to stop the eastern flow of bad guys and material out of Syria. There weren't enough people to do the job in 2005. The borders were never secured in 2003. It was just a continuing series of operations and stop gap crap that was indicative of the whole operation since the inception of OIF.
Friends, we shit the bed from the start, both in Iraq and OEF. Planning and execution was erratic, spotty, piss-poor, political choked and all kinds of other negatives that one could call it, from the beginning.
In the consequence, we lost far too many people doing operations that either should never have been started (Iraq) or should have been completed years ago--as far as the armed forces of the USA is concerned.
Wanat is but a symbol of every damn thing gone wrong. Arguing about the outcome and who should or should not be held accountable is almost a moot point. Yes, believe me, none of us can bring back those lost. No one can fully rectify an operation that went so terribly lost. Will the Army (and all other fighting services) learn from this, or will this be a continuation of the division that is rapidly ripping apart the country and the military?
Those of you who are active duty and read this: please rescue the institutions that you represent--the uniform that you wear. I personally witnessed the demise of the US military in the 70's after Vietnam and it wasn't pretty. If you all have allegience to your Service, and the USA, please fix the damn details. Plan to either stay professionally and with a positive purpose or work to retrogarde our forces,
My personal plea is to get us out of Moslem lands. 18 year old American gunmen walking those lands is too far stupid. And I'm sick and fu**in' tired of attending funerals.

I think there's a notable fact here that hasn't been noted-- that the Platoon Leader at Wanat was killed. The officer chain didn't just commit negligent homicide of the enlisted men. They killed "one of their own" as well.

The Platoon Leader in combat has a special status that no other Soldier or Officer does. I haven't seen a single movie, book, or other dramatization where the Platoon Leader plays the role of either hero or villain. He always appears as some hapless bystander, the guy caught between the two worlds of his men and his superiors. His college education won't allow him the brotherhood of those he leads, and his lack of warfighting experience won't let him hang out with the Company Commander. If he's doing his job right, he's too busy to have five minutes of social interaction with his fellow PLs. But in this case, as in many others throughout history, the PL astutely and gravely foreshadowed the tragedy that befell his unit. "We're going to get fucked up out there", he said. No one listened. No one's listening now, either.

The Army glosses over the PL's statements because he was just a cherry Lieutenant. The media passes him over because, as an officer, he doesn't make the same tragic character as the innocent, powerless Soldier who died following orders.

A Brigade and Battalion Commander should certainly "love Soldiers", but let's be careful about that ideal. You can carry it to an extreme. This is combat. People will get killed. Most of them will be Soldiers. If you thus love Soldiers, you wouldn't send them to combat. Even Schwarzkopf waxed poetic about holding dying Soldiers in your arms. I don't doubt he did it multiple times. He still ordered people into battle knowing full well it's a contact sport.

You demonstrate your love for Soldiers by being dedicated to your profession. Some reading through the Code of the Samurai and Tsunetomo Yamamoto's 'Hagakure' would demonstrate the paradigm. Dedication to operations management and attention to detail was the acme of success here, not emotion.

Flowery remarks would not have saved Soldiers at Wanat. A troop-to-task analysis would.

I've seen commanders so anxious to get out and see 'the boys' that they forgot they were running a Brigade. I've seen guys run a Battalion into the ground because all they cared about was making the grade and accomplishing 'big things'. You cannot love 750 men all at once, equally. Nor can you forget them entirely.

Successful commanders do not try to embrace Soldiers. They embrace span of control theory.

So the Battalion staff had its eye "on other things." Cry me a river. When has a Battalion in combat NOT had eleventy-million things to do, all of which were THE priority? I don't expect the Commander to remember it's PV2 Shmerdlap from Wyoming's birthday today.

But I expect him to listen to his Company Commander. And I expect the Company Commander to listen to the Platoon Leader.

If thirty six Joes all gripe about a mission, then things must be going well. If four squad leaders lay their rank on the table (so much easier to do now than with CPT Sobel, what with velcro and all), then it's insubordination-- but the kind that you have to listen to. If a Platoon Leader comes up and says he has misgivings, Houston, we have a problem.

If we are to truly respect and care for Soldiers as "members of a democratic nation", then we should view the Platoon Leaders as the duly-appointed representatives of the people. However, I reject the notion of the Soldier as some sort of Democratic Prometheus. The Soldier is a Soldier-- a professional warrior. A scholar in the martial disciplines, a fighter of unique and profound skill, and a state-of-the-badass-art skull basher. There's more value in this view than Ike's.

Don't "love" your Soldiers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants-- respect them for their commitment, train them thoroughly in their profession, and trust them at the critical moment. Raise your expectations of them by demanding that they be more than they are on a daily basis, literally forcing them to "be all they can be." And yes, get rid of the ones that won't chew the leather. It will shed the unit of liabilities, but it will also inspire the others to know that this isn't a place for non-hackers. You will increase your esprit de corps.

Love is unconditional. Combat is HIGHLY conditional. Marshall and others succeeded because they conditioned their subordinates-- and cut loose the ones who wouldn't. That's why "soldier" is a noun and a verb.

Ultimately, the only way to accomplish these things is through the Platoon Leader. He's the guy that's going to get the individual troops to do what they need to do. That's why we spelled it out in the manual-- "the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for everything the platoon does or fails to do." That's an immense responsibility, but it's doctrine for a very good reason. It's time we remembered that.

From what I have read, the key problem at Wanat was an attempt to implement COIN doctrine designed to counter small bands of insurgents or bandits of no more than a dozen men. In the Wanat region, insurgents could quickly mass hundreds of men for battle.

Some good comments on this thread, along with a few that reach a little far beyond the subject of the main post. And some commercial spam.

I wonder if it seems to anyone else that all FP blog comment threads have recently become targets for an increasing number of commercial spammers hawking crummy merchandise from dubious suppliers. I've seen other blogs similarly besieged in the past; some seem to have managed the problem, though I'm not sure how.

FP management has told me it is working on the spam problem here, and has my best wishes.

The possibly incendiary term "mercenary" aside, Arvay speaks a lot of truths and I think his opinion is gaining an increasing amount of traction as we approach the 10th anniversary of our invasion of Afghanistan.

The really revealing comments however, come from Jim Gourley and, to a lesser extent, Soldiersdiary. These comments, both troubling and completely devoid of historical perspective, showcase for all the growing "warrior caste" in our AVF. This pernicious attitude must be exposed and, wherever possible, challenged.

Jim,

Let's be accurate here. The "warrior ethos" "newspeak" that has completely consumed the United States Army is a 2003 invention. While the term "warrior" may have been used sparingly before that point (e.g. The 1st "Warrior" Brigade of the 10th Mountain (LI)), it was NEVER used to refer to individual soldiers. Moreover, soldiers were never encouraged to think or refer to themselves that way. The "warrior" developments we have seen over the last decade are a product of the failed Army Chief of Staff, Peter Schoomaker (2003-07), and were gleefully amplified by Rumsfeld's OSD-Public Affairs shop run by the now discredited Larry DiRita. These are the facts.

The United States was founded on the concept of a citizen-Army completely subordinate to civilian control. The expeditionary British Army of 1775 (i.e. the dreaded "Redcoats") and the Hessian mercenaries were the very epitome of "warrior cultures" during our Founders' time. Our Founders were resolute in NOT creating such a thing in the United States. This is why I have such problems with Schoomaker's "expeditionary, campaign quality Army" terminology. Ditto for the following line in the Army's new "Warrior Ethos": "I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy, the enemies of the United States of America in close combat. "

Madison and Jefferson are turning in their graves!

Jim, you engage in willful historical revision and must be called on it. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of your screed is the notion that those Citizens who don't wear a military uniform are meek, child-like creatures in need of "protection" by our heroic AVF. What complete and utter crap. If the United States wished, it could call upon these very citizens to defend it via selective service - something it has done in the past. America's citizen soldiers have a pretty damn, fine track record. In WWII, about 91% of the US Army - to include many officers - were draftees. In Vietnam, our draftees had a HIGHER educational attainment level than volunteers and a LOWER AWOL/desertion/UCMJ rate. Again, many of the fellow citizens you choose to denigrate are amply capable of defending our nation - as officers and enlisted personnel - if they are called to served.

Soldiersdiary,

Your indignation to the "mercenary" reference is a strawman. It was not even anywhere near Arvay's central point. Arvay's central point was the growing disconnect from the military and the citizenry it serves. As more and more people in the US struggle with unemployment, a lack of health insurance and retirement benefits, the military is increasingly lavished with "Cadillac" or "Lexus" benefits. An O-6 in the DC area makes more (with tax-free BAH) than a Senator or Supreme Court justice. A married E-5 with dependents makes almost 60K a year with free health insurance - who these days with a HS diploma or GED can even dream of such benefits? What irresponsible, single Mom in the US gets a free, government provided home after making poor life decisions? Other than US soldiers, none. That's Arvay's point.

Yes, even with a draft, our leadership will still be drawn by volunteers (i.e. those that reup). The key point is that a draft would bring in a much broader swath of Americans - as volunteers and draftees. Some of these individuals will choose to stay and serve 20 or 30 years. The Army's current officer accessions/outreach posture would not bring a GEN Colin Powell (or any CCNY student) or a GEN Kevin Byrnes. It's a sad indictment that our Army would actively seek officers from Manhattan and Brooklyn in 1958 and 1969, but not in 2010.

It wasn't always this way. Last month I saw a very illuminating film at a documentary film festival: Frederick Wiseman's "Basic Training" (1971). This great documentary followed a Basic Training company through Ft. Knox in the summer of 1970. If you watch this film, you will be stunned just how much our Army's posture towards its citizenry has changed in 40 years. Despite being filmed during Vietnam and showcasing combat Veteran Drill Sergeants and officers, there is no "warrior" talk. The Commanding General, Company Commander and First Sergeant all treat their soldiers as citizens who will serve and honorably return to their communities - this theme is palpable and was obviously not a P.O.V. of the filmmaker - as the AVF was still 3 years away. The Army was seen as a "rite of passage" - even by its "lifers". This is a very different attitude than today. Also, the film visually demolishes the myth that our 1970 NCOs and Citizen-soldiers were "drugged up losers". Buy it: well worth the $19.99. Consider it an investment in civics education and recent Army history.

No one cares if commanders "love" their troops. People want to know that American soldiers are dying for a cause worth fighting for and that their lives and bodies are not being wasted because of stupidity. The former is a political matter and politicians will be judged accordingly. Commanders will be judged (partially) by the latter. The latter is what Wanat is all about.

I'll freely admit to not knowing much about the way ground pounders operate, but I do know that location was not the smartest place to put an outpost. The supply issues, while important, are secondary. Whoever was responsible for locating it there should be brought before the God of War and disemboweled.

"In a war for democracy, you couldn't have generals acting like Prussians"

This may be a wished for state but by no means a necessary one. Since America is the first and only 'true' democracy to field a powerful military it seems we want to or need to identify our civic and martial selves too closely, possibly as a means of reassuring ourselves that we fight the good fight or maybe just as a means of encouraging a 'free' people to surrender that freedom for the sake of a 'just' cause - whatever, the point is a democracy and the force it expresses in defense of its beliefs are not identical - in many ways the military expression represents a suspension of those ideals it is asked to defend - and it's hard to see how a viable defense could be mounted any other way. Of course, the line is blurry, not fixed - it's right that we ask our military to be a harsh but necessary force for 'good' and act accordingly - but that admonition is as much rhetorical as practical and therefore must be applied discretely otherwise one will be led into a false assumption like you're made here, Mr Ricks, thinking that a democracy and the military raised to defend are and must be one in the same thing. The sage of the first democracy, Plato, understood there was often an unnatural balance between the disparate needs of the state and the state itself - his philosopher King, an admirer of Sparta, would have ordered children to march to war with their fathers so that they could learn this most vital of trades - now, would that amount to an enlightened albeit extreme acknowledgement of cruel necessity, or the ramblings of a barbarian?

The number of attacks aimed at the officer corps amazes me - it is also upsetting. Our Army has the least distinction between its officer and enlisted corps of any that I have seen and many officers have served on both sides. Visit the armies of the first world and you will see the distinction between the two. Look at country's lower on the socio-economic scale, the that distinction grows. The wholesale condeming of a group is ignorant. I do agree that some officers are self-deluded, tactically incompetent, and ego maniacs. The officer's job is to complete the task. That task must be weighed against the risk (of mission failure and loss of life). The system is predicated on following the orders of your superiors.

My experience as a officer has been hugely rewarding and Im not talking about pay. I became responsible for a cavalry troop of about 100 guys in Iraq a few years ago. I will tell you that I loved those guys. I am in touch with many of them today on FB. R.E. Lee once said something like, "To be a good leader, you must love the army and you must commit to death what you love." I sent guys out on missions everyday. I lost 2. I visited their families later and I carry the responsibily for their deaths. You do the best you can to balance the mission and the men. Its the contradiction - doing the mission puts the men at risk...focusing on the men, means no mission accomplishment (and no purpose for your organization).

The Army officer corps is not a group of mercanaries. They dont do it for money. There are plenty of headhunter groups and contractors looking to pay six figures when you get out. They want to do the right thing; they are expected to do a lot.

Wanat is a travesty but you cannot ask the question, 'was it worth it?' It never is. You send a platoon on a patrol and it gets attacked - you lose men. Was it worth is? What if you just didnt patrol today? There are plenty of things wrong with Wanat. The Army owes a family an explaination - maybe it is a simple, we never thought that would happen? Macarther should have know the Chinese would come into Korea - the indicators are there but he and his staff missed it. Hold the leader accountable. That leader is responsible.

WWII leaders have no legs up on leaders today. They took risks that often led to far greater casualties. MG Norman Cota comes to mind. He displayed extraordinary leadership on Omaha Beach but later bled his division to death in the Hurtigen Forest for what? The mission he was given was bogus but he didnt complain - 'once more unto the breach!' He was part of a broad front strategy that spelled disaster for the units assigned to that piece of ground (and many other units as well). My point here is that leaders are repsonsible for everything that happens or fails to happen. The leaders at Wanat will take that to the grave, as I will take my losses with me where ever I go.

Rant complete. There are many officers out there who truely care for the men and the mission.

IRR, there is no hubris here. While I am proud to serve my country, I am by no means advocating that military members are better than anyone else. In the conscript/AVF debate, I find your comments to be thoughtful. I really hate those who shut down the discussion because they believe some of us (pro-AVF) are not smart enough to understand. I disagree with conscription based on the belief that we will lose effectiveness. The complexity of conflict and military technology requires more time to learn/understand than in the past. Wars happen quickly and mobilization takes too much time. The character of conflict has changed. My opinion is vested in my experience working with foreign conscript militaries. Conscripts tend be in service for 18-24 months; even in European armies with high-technology militaries like Germany, conscript-based units lack the depth of knowledge compared to their professional brethren.

I think you have a great point about the 'self-selection' of today's US military but I don't believe conscription is the answer. Less than 1% of our population is in the military - even with the draft, it would remain less than 1%, assuming that force structure will not significantly grow. While it limits self-selection, it certainly wont immediately bring the services closer to our population. Looking at the diversity of our military, it mirrors our society pretty closely. I like the idea that USMA take on a similar construct as Sandhurst in the UK. There is a great study on the diversity of the military that will shed some light on who actually serves. IRR, you'll find some ammo in their to support the draft, but you'll also see a significant amount of diversity. Not sure the draft, unless completely blind can do as well.
http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/SOLIC/Documents/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/Special_Operations_Low_Intensity_Conflict/CDA%20-%20Who%20Serves%20in%20the%20Military%209-17-08.pdf

I am not a believer in conspiracies - there is always a whistle blower (thank God!). As for the Wanat issue, I reserve judgment against the chain of command. I do not know enough of the facts to determine negligence but I do believe negligent officers should be cashiered out. We are responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen - the buck stops with the commander, regardless of his direct involvement. Some officers feel a larger obligation to the organization than to individual soldiers and their families. Wanat seems to fit into this construct. It is a slippery slope for sure in most cases. There are times you will sacrifice lives for the good of the organization; not an easy decision but the command must think of the many over the few. Any military deception operation, or a feint attack for example. This becomes more palatable during major combat operations like WWII. The sacrifice is thought to save more than what was laid to rest - some sort of morbid cost benefit analysis. In the case of Wanat, putting the reputation of the Army first is not only unnecessary but a disservice and certainly hurts the organization as a whole.

Unfortunately the Army is not immune to the problems of many other large organizations. The Army, like the civilian world, deals with problems of integrity. J THOMAS, there is no systematic lying going on. Before I enlisted, I was a manager in a retail store. I did what my boss wanted - the Army isn't much different. Your boss has more experience than you do and should be more competent as a result.

One last point, I checked the 2010 pay charts and an O6 with 24-26 years in service makes $120,000 a year with BAH/BAS rounded up. A US Senator in 2009 makes $174,000; a Supreme Court Justice makes $223,500 in 2010. A CEO for a company with 2000-5000 employees makes between $150,000 to $340,000. An O6 command usually has about 3000 troops in it.