Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

The MFKAM (media formerly known as mainstream) is aflutter over Petraeus moving toward local self-defense councils. And rightly so. This is big stuff.

I see two things going on here.

First is David Kilcullen's observation that the best security is provided locally by locals. If they can do that, all your worries about gathering good intelligence and such go out the window. They know where the bad actors are. They know how things work. They know the trails and hidey holes. If you feel able to arm the villagers, they often will be able to take care of business themselves. As Tip O'Neill famously said, all politics is local. And so is security.

Second is that one of the lessons of Iraq (and a bunch of other places) is that you can't impose security from above. It has to grow locally. The job of the counterinsurgent commander is to try to nurture and then knit together those local areas -- from neighborhoods and towns to districts, then into provinces, and finally, after a long time, nationally. From this also will emerge a new national politics, or so the theory goes. The upside is that if this works, it will provide sustainable security. The downside is that it takes years to develop.

An ancillary lesson is that you don't hold national elections first. You hold local elections as each area becomes secure. Then district, provincial and regional elections as they are peaceful. Eventually the abusive, corrupt old regime gets voted out and a new generation of political leaders take over. Karzai is a clever guy so he probably knows what Petraeus is doing, but he probably also thinks that the Americans, beginning with President Obama, don't have the patience to see it through.

I remember Kilcullen explaining a version of all this to me a few years ago in Baghdad, in an Iraqi context, so I was impressed to see NPR get him to discuss the current initiative in Afghanistan. "It's pretty rare to find a counterinsurgency campaign where you didn't end up with some kind of local village self-defense force," he told the radio. "The reason for that is very simple. It's much easier to convince somebody who's under threat to pick up a weapon and protect their own community than it is to convince them to go and serve in the national army in some district somewhere else or put their weapon down and expect the government to protect them. It's kind of an intermediate step."

I've always liked Kilcullen's clarity of expression.

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JPWREL

3:37 PM ET

July 15, 2010

All these bright concepts

All these bright concepts that keep popping up on how to make some progress in the Afghanistan tar pit reminds me of a corporate brain storming secession on how to get sales of a stalled product line moving again. Of course there are all the predictable ‘new’ marketing ideas about a different advertising approach, different labels, new sales incentive plans, and of course subtle threats by management if none of the above works, but never whether or not the product is really any good. It seems like for the past fifty years Americans have been asked to buy a lot of Edsel’s by guys like Kilcullen even if his clarity of expression is marvelous.

 

TOM RICKS

3:51 PM ET

July 15, 2010

I disagree

In my experience, the main product of corporate brainstorming is muddled thinking. Hence the popularity of the 'Dilbert' comic strip.

By contrast, Kilcullen's clear expression reflects clear thinking. I think what is being laid out here is a clear way forward in Afghanistan.

I hope.

Best,
Tom

 

JPWREL

4:37 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Tom, I respect your point of

Tom, I respect your point of view and hopefully you are right. ‘If’ Kilcullen is correct in his rather common sense view of the imperative of local defense then I ask why we did not do this nine years ago when American public sentiment might have approved of a longer term venture in Afghanistan to rebuild security from the ground up? Nine years later the patience of the public is wearing thin and like Vietnam so is their belief in the credibility of the managers of this war.

George Will, no limp wrist blame America first lefty pretty much sums it up today in his WP comment: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/14/AR2010071404223.html

When the trustworthiness and strategic competence of this country’s military establishment begins to be questioned by their normal allies like Will then I suggest there might be something wrong? As Will intimates the real issue is not whether Kilcullen is right or wrong but whether the hand is worth the bet? Now I know some regulars here will carp that Will’s view is irrelevant largely because they don’t personally agree with him. But the fact is that Will’s thought process is intellectually coherent and his historical reflection truthful which is something worth thinking about.

 

TYRTAIOS

4:38 PM ET

July 15, 2010

I think it's a proven concept

I think it's a proven concept JPWREL. Recall that in Vietnam around 1961-62, our Army SF secured several hundred small villages in the highlands using this approach, calling them Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. Unfortunately, guys like DePuy and Westmoreland saw it as too defensive in nature, and these groups were turned into strike forces more to silly MACV's liking. I don't know Afghanistan, but I know the Hamlet Evaluation System up in I Corps showed that villages protected by Marine Combined Action Platoons were almost twice as secure as other villages in our area. But the key: these groups have to have an American volunteer presence among them.

Unfortunately, it may be getting too late in the game for any successful implementation, but nothing ventured - nothing lost (sort of)?

 

JPWREL

4:58 PM ET

July 15, 2010

TYRTAIOS, I am familiar with

TYRTAIOS, I am familiar with the CAP (Combined Action Program) run by the Marines starting back in 1965 in I Corps. You know your stuff and I gladly defer to your experience in that part of the world. However, as I said to Tom an Afghan CAP needed to be initiated long ago and I suspect it is way too late to reinvent the wheel. The bigger question is whether we have made an error in judging the strategic importance of this war?

 

ZATHRAS

5:02 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Getting it right, after nine years

I'd be interested to know if people like Col. Kilcullen really grasp the source of the American public's impatience I keep reading about.

Almost nine years after the Afghan war started, an enemy widely despised in the country is making significant headway against American and allied forces. After almost nine years, military experts like Kilcullen give admirably clear expression to a counterinsurgency strategy that is plausible, sensible, and has good prospects for success, if only we give it another nine years and who knows how many more tens of billions of dollars.

I understand, sort of, the conundrum this situation presents for some military people. Rightly inhibited about criticizing their civilian Commander in Chief, American military officers must be similarly inhibited about even implicit criticism of their former Commander in Chief, the one who handed this wretched Afghan situation off to President Obama. I'm not sure how this would apply to Kilcullen, who is not an American, and I've noticed that some military commentators who are publicly very sure that a deadline for ending the current surge of troops into Afghanistan is a tragic mistake are silent about the much more serious mistakes that put us in this position.

In any event, just as we have to ask if "getting counterinsurgency right" beginning after nine years of getting it wrong will work in Afghanistan, we also must ask if getting it right after nine years of screwing around with this war is enough to pass muster with the American public. As I say, I wonder if people within the military and national security community really get this at all. All these references to the strategic impatience of the people they work for makes me think they may be too used to making arguments to one another.

 

MLANE

5:12 PM ET

July 15, 2010

D-Force

Isn't "Local Defense Force" just another way of saying local militia? And who would be in charge of these LDF's? How about a local elder with the most experience in security and the deepest pockets- commonly known as a Warlord. I hate to be a pragmatist but it just seems like a gamble. Regardless of whatever strides are taken in setting up these LDF's, there needs to be a central authority of some sort. Otherwise, what constitutes local? What are the boundaries of local authority? Will a few LDF's get too powerful prompting alliances that could lead to internal conflict? I feel like Ahmed Rashid will write a book about this disaster by 2016. Or perhaps it will just provide a new afterword for Decent ino Chaos. Hope it works though!

 

INTEL GEEK

6:46 PM ET

July 15, 2010

"Local Defense Force" is also

"Local Defense Force" is also another way to say "police force". Google "Travis Patriquin" and "slideshow."

 

CARL

2:00 AM ET

July 16, 2010

I think "warlords" may be

I think "warlords" may be defined as men who control an armed force and who are NOT subject to influence by the local people. Basically they are leaders of militarized criminal gangs. Aghans don't like warlords much and this was one of the reasons the Taliban was successful to the extent it was or is. Circumstances may force the locals to tolerate warlords but they don't like it and the Taliban takes advantage of this.

A local militia would be subject to the local people through whatever the local power structure is, elders, shuras etc., or should be. They would be the ones that would put the stamp of social approval on the defense force. It seems to me if the locals can maintain primary influence, you don't have a warlord.

 

INTEL GEEK

5:39 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Kilcullen article

Tom,

Has that Kilcullen article that you linked to been published yet?

 

INTEL GEEK

10:59 PM ET

July 15, 2010

In case anyone is interested

To answer my own question, it's chapter 2 in Dr. Kilcullen's latest book "Counterinsurgency."

 

ADAGIO

6:06 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Karzai's Motivation

Tom, I agree with your analysis for the most part, but you may be treating Karzai's motives too kindly. He's sitting pretty right now as long as "the evil empire" has got his back, but each time a local area acquires the resources to take control over its own security, he loses a slice of his power (and his family loses a cut of the loot).

 

IMC

6:29 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Previous attempts during this war and the Soviet war

Tom, I too admire this kind of clarity because it underscores the problem with this approach:

"It's much easier to convince somebody who's under threat to pick up a weapon and protect their own community than it is to convince them to go and serve in the national army in some district somewhere else or put their weapon down and expect the government to protect them."

A) Doesn't this mean that it's easier to foment micro-civil wars all over the place than to leave a viable state (resembling Zahir Shah's)? That makes sense, logically, I guess. But it is seriously wishful thinking to hope that this will all, you know, get knit together later or something.

B) Doesn't this quote describe the motivation behind young men joining insurgents like the TB?

 

MLANE

7:20 PM ET

July 15, 2010

A police force that will

A police force that will fight against the Taliban once the U.S. leaves using assault rifles and RGGs. Thats a little more than a police force.

 

INTEL GEEK

11:01 PM ET

July 15, 2010

That IS a police force in A'stan

You've got to send them out armed to fight the bad guys. The bad guys have automatic rifles and RPGs (I assume that's what you meant by "RGG"). Giving the local police anything less would set them up for failure, which means death when the bad guys are the Taliban.

 

MOHANCOJ

7:35 PM ET

July 15, 2010

The Ruff/Puffs!

Back to our Vietnam experience. Our primary local defense corps consisted of the Regional (Ruff) and Provincial (Puff) forces. These were lightly armed milita that operated on the village and province level, and were supported and trained, to some limited extent, by our forces. I recollect a training center at Na Trang for some of their cadre. While far from elite fighting units, they did provide security at their local levels, and served as "trip wires" when the VC threatened their communities. Their very existence also forced the VC to concentrate their forces before attacking a community, rather than just walking into a totally undefended area. They performed a similar role to the Marine CAPs in the other three Corps area. As I recall, they also played a limited partner role to US and ARVN operations on occassion, acting in blocking and other roles. While looked down upon my many, if not most, regular forces, they did play a role in Vietnam that warrents further study in counter insurgency planning. As the Army turned its back on its Vietnam experience when it pulled out, a reexamination of these formations might prove useful. We did, if fact, win the counterinsurgency fight in Nam. It was a conventional invasion that toppled RVN in the end.

 

MOHANCOJ

7:35 PM ET

July 15, 2010

The Ruff/Puffs!

Back to our Vietnam experience. Our primary local defense corps consisted of the Regional (Ruff) and Provincial (Puff) forces. These were lightly armed milita that operated on the village and province level, and were supported and trained, to some limited extent, by our forces. I recollect a training center at Na Trang for some of their cadre. While far from elite fighting units, they did provide security at their local levels, and served as "trip wires" when the VC threatened their communities. Their very existence also forced the VC to concentrate their forces before attacking a community, rather than just walking into a totally undefended area. They performed a similar role to the Marine CAPs in the other three Corps area. As I recall, they also played a limited partner role to US and ARVN operations on occassion, acting in blocking and other roles. While looked down upon my many, if not most, regular forces, they did play a role in Vietnam that warrents further study in counter insurgency planning. As the Army turned its back on its Vietnam experience when it pulled out, a reexamination of these formations might prove useful. We did, if fact, win the counterinsurgency fight in Nam. It was a conventional invasion that toppled RVN in the end.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

8:48 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Tactique du jour

The difference between this constant search for new solutions and mere thrashing about is that thrashing about has more thought and insight behind it. Into our 105th month of this goat-rope, one would think that the great minds assembled would have come up with something that not only worked, but worked well way far back.

Perhaps we could issue all these monkeys word processors and wait for them to craft a masterpiece by random pecking at the keys. Would cost a lot less and I defy anyone to tell me why that approach would prove less efficacious than this continual churning of soft ideas being rotated through the theater in hopes that a miracle occur.

If 'war' is the tool we've chosen to do whatever it is we are attempting in Afghanistan (still waiting to hear what that is), then we should use it well: apply brutal, ruthless force without quarter until the final objective - whatever it is - is achieved. No, I don't like that either. So maybe 'war' is not the instrument for this task. Maybe the US Army is not the tool we need. Maybe 'war' the way we're waging it is in fact unwinnable. Not because we can't wage war but because we won't, and all this other silly crap is pure experimentation: 'war-lite;' 'proxy war;' 'my SAM thesis tried out in the field.'

It's a mug's game.

 

JAYLEMEUX

8:47 PM ET

July 28, 2010

You must not have gotten the memo.

The problem with your suggestion that "Maybe 'war' the way we're waging it is in fact unwinnable" is that, if it were true, the US servicemembers who have died to date would have done so in vain. This would make the rest of us feel bad. It logically follows, therefore, that we simply haven't yet figured out the correct way to win and then implemented it properly. The servicemembers who remain to die in implementation of this method, of course, do not serve any purpose for our calculations.

Furthermore, Al Qaeda will have nowhere to go if we bring borderline stability to Afghanistan and lob a few Hellfires over the Pakistani border. This point is crucial because we can't afford to allow another terrorist attack to occur on US soil. The lives of American civilians, you see, are worth more than the lives of everyone else, American servicemembers included. Added to the losses we suffer from lightning strikes every year, another terrorist attack would be unsustainable.

Finally, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the Afghan civilians we don't accidentally or, every once in a while, intentionally (Where do I get these ideas from?) kill will really appreciate this inevitably successful effort when we're through.

 

JAYLEMEUX

8:56 PM ET

July 28, 2010

I almost forgot

This is a bit of a digression, but still REALLY important to point out: There is no information of value in the 91,000 classified Wikileaks documents that I haven't bothered to read. This wholly inconsequential information is, however, a pressing national security risk.

 

CHRISWALKER

8:55 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Time will tell...

...whether this is the best or worst idea we've have throughout the course of this conflict.

American security relations is littered with cases wherein the weapons we left behind are shooting at American troops when our interests change.

This concern aside, I can envision how this could be an operational risk given low population density of the majority of Afghanistan. This is a problem of scale. A larger Taliban force systematically targeting villages (only very loosely networked, and some very remote) could fear whole swaths into submission, and worse, work to equip the Taliban (... yes it's a guerrilla insurgency for the most part, but some attacks are larger than others).

There would need to be intelligence network so pervasive as to spot these campaigns in advance and mobilize larger forces to keep this sort of system afloat. Therefore, to the extent that a state-sized force is a indispensable part of this new strategy, we have to be smart about the disbursement of our limited resources to achieve the proper threat-response equilibrium.

http://www.christopherwalker.wordpress.com

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

9:28 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Local Defense

I'm glad to learn that Petreaus' political skills are proving effective in Kabul. McChrystal also promoted local defense, but was undercut by various opponents, including Eikenberry. Petreaus is also well aware of the narrowing window of opportunity in US politics; in 2006 he declared that his goal was to speed up the clock in Iraq and slow it down in the US.

Part of the deal is measures to link these local militias (under another name; can't call them militias!) to the national government through the Interior ministry, with sufficient US partnership to make sure they don't get vacuumed into the general corruption.

But I want to emphasize the part of Tom's comments that most others are ignoring, the part about rebuilding a national government from the local level up.

In the absence of strong checks and balances, a central government is too dangerous and too attractive a target for take-over. We see the consequences all over the global divisions of the old second and third worlds.

An illustration, with all the errors and risks of over-simplification:

In the British North American colonies, both government and property ownership was dispersed. People had a stake in good government, and through the practices of managing their own farms or shops and participating in local government and civil society, experience in government and webs of association though which to coordinate action. With success in the revolutionary war, fought by 13 colonies working together, these colonies voluntarily joined together to cede limited power to a central government. When that didn't work, they reworked their contract in the Constitution, putting more faith and power in central government, only 13 years after the Articles of Confederation.

The economic structure of plantation economies is different. It created a disenfranchised segment, often a majority of the population, without the education, skills, associations, or stakes to promote good government. Latin America and (nearly) the US South show the problems of oligarchic power.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Louis the 14th strongly centralized power in the capital, while the aristocrats controlled property and most power within their domains. The rebels seized the national center and began arbitrary exercises of power, provoking reactionary swings. It was over 50 years before France began to settle down into a stable political system.

Afghan society and politics have remained largely local; one of the fundamental reasons is that the country has lacked the wealth to support more of a political hierarchy. The current government is parasitic on our troops and our wealth. A ground-up approach to both security and politics promises to be more achievable and more sustainable.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

9:39 PM ET

July 15, 2010

To what end?

"A ground-up approach to both security and politics promises to be more achievable and more sustainable."

Why? To pacify a war-like people? To transform an ancient culture? To bribe our way to 'victory?' Or is all this aimed at some vital American interests that even justifies us being there, leave alone tampering with local institutions in our ham-handed way?

Let's try this again. If the game is to deny sanctuary to Jihadists, we should be operating in Somalia and Yemen and - truth be told - London and Amsterdam. If it's to transform the Middle East in a peaceful democracy (the new Georgebushistan), we're idiots. If if if: what are we trying to accomplish and why is it worth so much money and blood? Until we can answer those questions, 'how' is moot even if there is a how that would work, a point not to be conceded. Mug's game.

 

JPWREL

10:27 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Here is Rubber Ducky at his

Here is Rubber Ducky at his best and most incisive summing up with a ‘clarity of expression’ far in excess of David Kilcullen the real absurdities and self-delusions behind our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Good prose too!

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

10:55 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Getting the premises wrong

Where's your evidence that the Afghans are a war-like people? The fact that they oppose being subjects of the imperial schemes of outsiders?

They face a general problem of societies in the absence of a competent central government, which presents them with the need to be ready to defend their own villages, to aggregate in larger groups (tribes) when faced with collective enemies. Yes, they develop a warrior ethos, but that doesn't mean they love war, violence, or death.

It is belittling to Afghans to call their culture 'ancient'. Like us, they live in modern times. I just had my car repaired by an immigrant from Afghanistan. Their institutions reflect their history and their situation. The local security and governance strategy in fact does a better job of recognizing how to work with Afghan "culture" than the imposition of a central government.

It's not about "democracy" as a the magic pill GW Bush naively thought it was. Empowering local groups helps Afghans achieve their own goals through development of their own institutions, as opposed the the imposition of a set of rules by a special interest, whether that be the US, the USSR, or the Taliban. The local power provides a check on national powers and corruption.

The terrorist groups are opportunistic. They may be in Yemen today, but they've no reason not to recolonize Afghanistan if and when it is possible. The Taliban aren't only after Afghanistan, another branch is after nuclear-armed Pakistan, and parallel groups are considering their options across the "Stans" of Central Asia. Broad geopolitical interests are at stake. This area is the center of the Old World and it's billions of people, it again lies on important trade routes. I'm not going to make wild claims about falling dominoes. But helping stabilize Afghanistan now serves two ends. It probably costs less to work on this regional problem here and now than it does to defer it to the future. And it recognizes a certain moral obligation to the Afghans after using them as chess pieces in the Cold War contest against the USSR.

I'm not a war-monger or imperialist. I thought Bush's haste in invading Afghanistan was un-necessary and his invasion of Iraq was immoral and naive. I just like to consider both sides of an issue. I'm willing to change my mind if it is clear in a year that this isn't working.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

11:28 PM ET

July 15, 2010

OK...

'I'm willing to change my mind if it is clear in a year that this isn't working."

And which year would that be? 2002? 2003? 2004? 2005? 2006? 2007? 2008? 2009?

Or is 2010 the magic year? O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay! He chortled in his joy.

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

1:49 AM ET

July 16, 2010

Duh

How about the common sense interpretation, one year from the date that I write this? Is that firm enough for you?

I'm not talking Friedman units. Once Gen. Petreaus put the right strategy in place, the trend was clear within a year. I think a year for him to show that he's on top of Afghanistan is sufficient. If its not clearly improving, it's time to strongly consider the Biden alternative.

 

TYRTAIOS

4:28 AM ET

July 16, 2010

Jabberwocky

Ok Rubber Ducky, I'll grant you the situation in pornographic; that is to say a real f**k story, which started the day someone decided we should try our hand at nation building.

However, we are where we are, and we can't start pulling conventional troops out before July 2011, which I know you understand. So the question is: what else would you have Petraeus do since he knows the Afghan Army and the national police aren't going to be up to the task, except on paper, anytime soon?

 

RUBBER DUCKY

11:53 AM ET

July 16, 2010

"What would you have Petraeus do?"

Go after terrorists. Use SOF to maximum extent available and plumb for a major build up oour national SOF capacity. Bring sharply focused combat to those who are a vital national interest for us to stop. And quit screwing around in nation-building because of sunk-cost. Shorthand: the Biden approach.

From the perspective of the US Army, this would be a bad strategy. Far less needed in resources, fewer promotions, less emphasis on traditional combat arms, and - most chilling - promoting the wrong guys.

In all this flopping and twitching to arrive at 'the right strategy' (here read: 'flavor of the week tactic'), SOF has never been seen as a primary option. Why? Because the US Army simply hates SOF. Tolerates it perhaps. Forced to accept it, especially after SOCOM was stood up. But note the reason SOCOM was established is because SOF simply could not get an objective shake from the Army.

If anyone sees this local policing initiative as the silver bullet we've been searching for, the one that will end this conflict and allow us to retire 'in victory,' please speak up. Anyone.

 

TYRTAIOS

12:38 PM ET

July 16, 2010

I am playing Devil’s

I am playing Devil’s Advocate: it would seem odd that the consummate special force's operator, Gen. McChrystal himself decided the best course of action was to shift from anti-terrorism to that of counter-insurgency (though anti-terrorism ops continue in the background) when he made his recommendations last year, prior to being relieved?

How do you reconcile that Rubber Ducky?

 

RUBBER DUCKY

1:21 PM ET

July 16, 2010

McChrystal

He was riding in the train. He wasn't the conductor and he didn't design the railway or lay out its route.

The SOF guys don't determine where they play or when. That's at the level of military strategy, close to grand strategy. To the extent that My Favorite Army has influenced Afghanistan strategy, argued for its preferred course of action, and brought its traditional biases to bear, it shares responsibility for the current direction. But it doesn't have final say and certainly a single officer can't force the whole organization to shift its direction - unless that person was in the position of ultimate Army leadership and was in fact an entirely capable leader. Not McChrystal (and to the last characteristic, not anyone in recent memory).

 

RUBBER DUCKY

2:11 PM ET

July 16, 2010

And would add...

During the string of bad years in Afghanistan when the Bush Administration simply ignored that war, the US Army had pretty much free reign in deciding what to do and how with the forces it had. Yes, it was a NATO force - combined - and yes it was all US Services involved - joint - and yes it was constrained in size, but at heart and in its leadership it was an Army game. Somehow My Favorite Army raised 'just screwing around' to the level of strategy. Not off the hook for the bad years - it was the Army's game by default.

 

TYRTAIOS

3:55 PM ET

July 16, 2010

I will agree that a wise

I will agree that a wise commander should have been perspicacious enough to change tactics from chasing bad guys around based on less than adequate intelligence long ago, which is interesting also, since our present chief of mission was a former commander himself. But to be fair, we've faced three centers of gravity: Karzai in Kabul, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the support and sanctuary offered by Pakistan.

My idle, LtGen Victor Krulak argued with the Army in Vietnam that there was no merit in seeking out the NVA in the mountains and jungle and swapping blood. He tried to run interference for Gen. Walt in I Corps to focus our efforts on population centers in the lowlands, instead of those stupid search and destroy missions ordered by Westmoreland. Krulak always believed the war was among the people. I came to understand that also, and why it has taken us this long to figure it out probably does go to the crux of your argument.

Toujours Fidele - DBA

 

RUBBER DUCKY

10:16 PM ET

July 16, 2010

OK...

It's a date, booby. One year from today, magic will have occurred. Can hardly wait...

 

JIM GOURLEY

9:45 PM ET

July 15, 2010

Pressfield vs. Petraeus

I think I've already mentioned on here a time or two Steven Pressfield's "It's the Tribes, Stupid" blog. COL (ret) William McAllister continues posting there as a sidebar "Agora" blog. Now, you can read his incredibly astute (read, chock-full of academia) observations on it, or you can make life easy on yourself and read this: http://agora.stevenpressfield.com/category/one-tribe-at-a-time/

It's Special Forces Major Jim Gant's paper "One Tribe At a Time". I'm sure the fact that Gant's first name is "Special Forces" will turn you off to it, but give me a second. I was HIGHLY skeptical of the document when I first read it, and wrote a series of questions to him that Pressfield dedicated an entire post by Gant to answer.

I'm sold on it. Apparently, so is Petraeus. I'm sure he came up with it completely independent of Gant, though.

I see the articles and the hear the sound-bytes from the politicos. The "I'm very confused" stuff from guys like Kerry and McCain doesn't surprise me. They try to view Afghanistan from a western political vantage point. The problem is that Afghanistan is neither western nor political. It's harsh, rugged, and tribal.

T-R-I-B-A-L

We messed up when we tried putting a central, democratically-elected government in. We totally circumvented the jirga tribal councils, which is essentially a poke in the eye to every major player in that country. Karzai is the President of Kabul. Period. The only way he'll ever be anything more is by maneuvering through the jirga councils and networks of warlords. That's right, warlords. We will deal with warlords, and if we're smart, we'll make friends with, train, arm, and fight with warlords. Major Jim Gant would, and he's willing to put his life in their hands. Maybe we should let go of our western ideals of democracy and MTV and give it a shot. That's why the language of "local community police that are vetted" is laughable. That's garbage lingo to make people feel comfortable. These "cops" will simply be each local tribal leader's militia. The only vetting that will be done (because it's the only vetting you need) is the chief's good word vouching for them. The only training they'll need is... well, they won't need training, because as we've seen they're already supreme fighters. That's why we're hiring them.

Here's the one problem with all this, and Major Gant addressed that in his response to my questions. This plan requires platoons to go out and live in the villages. Not set up little fire bases 800 meters outside the villages, I mean RIGHT INSIDE. The platoon leaders will very quickly have to learn how to conduct relations, how to go native, and how to win the trust of the tribe by virtually becoming members of the tribes themselves. When a tribal militia leader comes and says "hey, we got hostiles on the next ridge and we're going to get in a fight", that PL has to be ready to swear a blood oath to go and fight and die with these guys while still being smart enough to keep his men alive.

That's a HECK of a lot of responsibility and judgment to put on a Lieutenant's shoulders. In fact, it's just about the RIGHT amount to put on him. This will work if we execute it correctly and let ground-level leaders do what they think is best. There will have to be a high degree of acceptance within our own ranks of Afghan culture and its new role in influencing our ROE. Then again, a change in the ROE is going to have to come commensurate with this strategy anyway. When it comes to how justice is done in the Hindu-Kush, 10,000 "local community police" can't be wrong.

On changing the ROE, it's high-time for that anyway. I hate to sound like a salesman hawking blogs, but I've already spoken on Afghan tribalism versus Americans' romance with rules in warfare on my own site. I went through Walzer's "Just and Unjust Wars" and, sure enough, he doesn't see any problem with drone-striking the crap out of a village if your platoon gets lit up. http://swordandscript.com/general/the-afghan-cyclops-why-any-roe-is-a-weakness

At the end of the day, why not try it? We're going to scale the operation back considerably in a year or so. We might as well empower the tribal chiefs on our side enough that they can put together some kind of resistance against the guys who aren't. Besides, these are the people that have been dictating the terms of warfare there for the last 10, 50, 100, 1,000 years anyway. As the late, great Steinbrenner said: "If you can't beat him, offer him twice what the other guys are paying him and give him a pinstripe jersey."

 

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ADMIRAL

2:13 PM ET

July 16, 2010

Recycled arguments

Mr. Ricks,

How many more dead and mutilated are you willing to spend on your friend´s arguments? We are at the point where all these arguments are nothing but recycled garbage. Since you are in favor of this war (A big time DC cheerleader) to go on and on, the real question is cost. How many more dead, mutilated, and mentally ruined boys and girls are you willing to sacrafice? Why is this disaster worth one more life? Why Mr. Ricks, should people be killed and mutiliated for your belief´s? What is your responsibility in all of this?

 

GZZZUS

6:29 PM ET

July 16, 2010

Belief? How about responsibility?

Admiral,

I doubt its just a belief. To put it bluntly, there's a certain amount of responsibility a country takes on when they decide to bomb the shit out of an enemy living within a sovereign nation.

It seems to be a re-occuring theme in US foreign policy to blow up a place and then put it back together. Its generally had good results. The complications with Afghanistan are vast, and while this is a vast generalization, but they seem to stem from the tribal differences which is a natural deterrent from forming a cohesive national identity. (Though, that being said, I'm an American and the 'national identity,' portrayed here doesn't really speak to who I am. ) It seems utterly reasonable to empower these tribes to secure their own interests and then slowly build councils to govern the entire country which would hopefully lead to a less disconnected central government than the one currently in power, or cynically empowered.

Gotta crawl before you walk. Gotta walk before you run.

I really hope this works. I really don't support the lack of continuity between being hands off on all narco activity (afghanistan), and then being all about the Merida initiative south of our own border. Seems disconnected to say the least.

 

THEBLUEAMERICAN

8:25 PM ET

July 16, 2010

underestimating the C in C

Karzai is like most people in that he underestimates President Obama and at his own peril. Just like the deadline, read through the lines. President Obama is first and foremost a lawyer (ok, he is a good man also). Petraeus would not of taken the job if he thought he was setting himself up for failure. Building these local militias is the end run around Karzai. Karzai should have moved to Dubai when he had the chance. Oh well. This is why I like Obama so much. He thinks and adjusts while keeping his eye on the big prize.

 

ARTFUL AID WORKER

7:12 AM ET

July 18, 2010

I wish Aussies Had This Level of Debate!

Like Kilcullen, I'm Australian. I have also spent a lot more time in Indonesia than he has - I daresay in places and circumstances more dangerous than he encountered. Mainly working in parts of the country affected by conflict, but not in Timor Leste.

I have read the comments thread, and assuming that most feedback is American in origin, I take my hat off to you folks! I wish Australians were engaged in this level of informed debate. Most Aussies don't seem to give two hoots of a wobble; either that or they are indifferent to the consequences of our involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

For an aid-worker who works on between/post conflict recovery and reintegration, albeit not in an active war zone (for reasons obvious to me, but not to the Surgettes), it seems to me that there is no process by which accrued knowledge from all occupation-related operations is used as a basis for developing politico-military strategy. To coin a phrase frequently uttered by the late John Paul Vann, the US doesn't have nine years experience in Afghanistan, rather it has twelve months experience, nine times over!

Furthermore, the entire corpus of contemporary counter-insurgency theory with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan relies on the alignment of too many fundamental/critical/key/must-have/important requirements for it to work in practice.

In his intriguing book The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen, prescribes the following conditions-precedent for COIN solution to work:

"Priotization is critical"

"our strategy must seek first and foremost to build... an Afghan state capable of managing its own problems"

"Effective COIN requires security forces who are legitimate in local eyes"

"Population-centric...human-security 24 hours a day is critical"

"Integration with Pakistan strategy is also fundamental"

"Building the planning and oversight capability of the Afghan government is key"

It just goes on and on. From a technical viewpoint, the presumption of so many enabling factors being in place or created concurrently for this approach to work is fanciful in the extreme. I have never experienced such a celestial alignment of enabling factors in difficult working environments.

Is it possible that military agencies are the wrong agents of change?

http://negativeagain.blogspot.com/2010/01/even-their-own-generals-doubt-their-own.html

 

SALOMANDER

2:55 AM ET

July 19, 2010

Blueamerican expains it for ya -- Obama is misunderestimated!

"Karzai is like most people in that he underestimates President Obama and at his own peril. Just like the deadline, read through the lines. President Obama is first and foremost a lawyer (ok, he is a good man also)."

Good stuff.

As I often complain, there has been a serious falling off in the number and intensity of posts here at the Tom Ricks blog celebrating the poster's man-crush on Obama.

Blueamerican steps up to fill the gap with some excellent Obama leg-humping, starry eyed blathering etc.

Yes, why waste time on Kilcullen, Petraeus, Capt Travis Patriquin (whoever that is!)* when you could be rhapsodizing about Obama -- he's a lawyer, he's a good man, most of all he's a thinker, he adjusts (not like that idiot Bush!)

Let's face it -- when it comes to doing what he does well -- and that would be buying ice cream and talking about himself -- there is nobody better than Obama. He was up in Maine this weekend buying ice cream, talking about himself, and also wearing mandals and walking the dog -- other things he is great at!

Now that he has handed over responsibility for Iraq to VP BiteMe, Afghanistan to Petraeus, the economy to Bill Clinton -- President Obama will have more time yet for buying ice cream!

*I know who he was.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

10:48 AM ET

July 19, 2010

Man-crushes

Actually, 66,882,230 citizens had a 'man-crush on Obama.' That translated to 365 electoral votes.

You lost.

Piss off.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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