If this family member's account is accurate (and I have no reason to dispute it) this is indeed a sad reflection on the GEN.

i can't see how any investigation can be called complete if "I read SOME [my emphasis] of their statements" is part of the investigating officer's (IO) response. The appointing memo in these regards usually indicates it is the IOs responsibility to independently determine the facts, findings and recommendations of the case. That requires more than a cursory reading of a select number of statements.

The idea that Campbell was anything other than melancholy during the entire proceeding is also NOT A GOOD THING. He's lucky he wasn't lynched by the mob.

Sir,

I fully understand your pain and frustration regarding the deplorable treatment you received from the Army. The Army of today is a business run by self serving managers calling themselves officers. Never in our history have our enlisted people been treated in such a loathing manner as they are now and have been treated for the last 10 years. General Campbell laughed at you, because he views you and all others not part of his rotten club as garbage. The officers of today despise and loath the men and woman under their command. They hold the enlisted in complete and total contempt. They are the worst officers in our nations history. They are the bottom feeders of American society. They are no different than the plantation slave drivers of old.The scum has truly risen to the top in our armed forces today. These rotton scoundrels have no shame and will continue to spit in the faces of the enlisted and their families.

You have every reason to feel ashamed that your son served in the US Army. The officers that are responsible for his death are not worthy of him. They have no regard for human life. The latest commander of CENTCOM bragged aboout how fun it is to kill human beings. These losers are completely imoral and have no discipline nor honor. They will always lie and cheat to protect themselves and their criminal ambitions. As far as Patreus goes, don´t waste your precious time. The tin pot little general could care less about your son or you. The same goes for the little twirp, Gates. They only care about themselves, and lie about everything. The truth is foreign to them.

God help us as a nation. God bless you and your family.

I just can't picture this happening in the U.S. Marine Corps. They've had a couple of problems in Afghanistan, primarily because the army didn't provide backup when it was asked for.
I'm an old Marine grunt corporal and I have to say I cringed when two of my grandsons joined the National Guard. They didn't have a choice, having quit high school and earned GEDs, which the Marines frown upon.
So sorry about those sons that were lost at Wanat.

The Marines just haven't been in this position lately...if Beirut 1983 happened in today's news cycle, there'd probably be a demand for capital murder trials against some commanders.

If I'm not mistaken, portions of that briefing were shown on Dateline and it did seem like the General was not up to the task. I don't know that he smirked at some of the more pointed questions, but he definitley didn't appear properly engaged.

It's an awful situation, but it makes one wonder how war can truly be conducted effectively if small unit-level mistakes are regarded as major defeats or wasted lives.

This was a poor tactical decision, clearly, but should every platoon-level operation be subject to this kind of after-the-fact scrutiny? Will that actually help commanders operate on the ground? I have no answer.

I don't dispute the bereaved families perceptions, as related by Mr Gay and others, or in any way minimize their pain and loss. I will say that the honor of the troops was never in question to this reader. But I wasn't there to tell a smirk from a grimace, and Gen. Campbell's response to Mr. Gay's challenge, as described, can be read in a different light.

Here in history's second draft, without access to the orders, I'm reluctant to condemn Campbell. Wanat (in a way) seems to be a 'friendly fire' sort of investigation, with the orders (or lack of them) being suspect in a costly battle. If the higher echelon orders, including 'commander's intent', were followed, and weren't taken into account, should Campbell seek remedy to the reprimands?

Doesn't friendly fire responsibility usually devolve onto the lowest rungs of command that can bear the weight? I don't see the Natanski report, or the 15-6 as having a mandate to tell it as it was. In a backwards kind of way, Campbell may have been more honest than not in saying, 'the reprimands issued in the congressionally mandated and CENTCOM approved report don't take all the evidence I've considered into account.' If the orders were the determinant in taking exception, revisiting every witness to the battle maybe wasn't the issue.

As a related aside, I'm still fuzzy about the Marine-led ANA platoon's appearance at Wanat, and whether they are an unexplored clue as to what our intent was the day before the morning of battle. Who were those masked men?

What if the Wanat operation went more or less according to plan at a strategic level, perhaps worked too well, in terms of bringing a large enemy formation to battle. Was the appearance of vulnerability part of a flawed plan that drew and mauled perhaps the largest enemy formation seen since Anaconda, within artillery range of the battalion base?

Not saying that Mr. Gray and families should be satisfied, or that this is anything except speculation on my part. But Wanat was 2008, and upper management still thought killing enemy was the next best thing to winning.

What Mr. Gay and others should bear in mind is that General Campbell did a detailed review the CENTCOM JAGMAN investigation, the 15-6, and other pertinent information. He stated that he did not watch some of the inflammatory TV and newspaper accounts that family members may have seen with only part of the story. General Campbell chose not to read the Combined Arms Center (CAC) 245-page report of one well-intended, hard-working historian only because some considered aspects to be opinionated, and he wanted to remain objective.

General Campbell also appears to have considered the chilling effect that fault-finding would have on other leaders. Such concerns were expressed extensively on a CAC forum about the event and its original punishments. Soldiers and Leaders might become unwilling to take risks to protect the population or approve airstrikes and artillery if hindsight frequently put careers on the line. In 2008 there were insufficient personnel in Afghanistan to mount the sort of massive troop build-up at Wanat that families may have felt was necessary. The company commander had spent most of the year with only two of his three platoons so his other platoon could support elsewhere. The replacement unit was going to have even fewer Soldiers. In addition, a series of unfortunate equipment and contractor failures led to engineer equipment and supplies not arriving in time prior to the attack. But keep in mind, the Chosen Few had only been at Wanat for 4 ½ days and projections were it would take one to two months to build the originally-planned COP.

Families of these valiant Soldiers should recognize that ending the careeer of a Silver Star recipient multi-tour company commander is not the answer. He arrived on scene a day prior to the Wanat attack because an investigation was dictated over actions he took to protect the same Soldiers at an equally dangerous COP Bella as it was being closed. Would he have requested that same Apache strike if he knew his actions might end his career? If the mortarmen attacking COP Bella days earlier had not been eliminated and other key Taliban leaders wounded by the air attack he requested, a more damaging attack easily could have occurred at COP Bella during Operation Rock Move possibly taking out a CH-47 helicopter extracting multiple troops. Likewise, the battalion commander was supervising actions of forces in contact in other valleys of his area of operations. Should the Bn Cdr have neglected sites experiencing ongoing firefights while Wanat was quiet 8-12 July?

Also recall that General Campbell witnessed 58,000+ fellow Americans fall in Vietnam. Actions by leaders such as the Battalion and BCT commander have led to 1/50th of the Afghanistan deaths versus those of Southeast Asia. Casualties in war are inevitable. Mistakes are equally inevitable as COL Brostrum would testify and Mr. Gay should admit…as I’m sure he has not always read the other player’s poker hands correctly, just as Warriors cannot always predict what the enemy will do. War is inherently uncertain and not every contingency can be anticipated. Some risks can be planned around, but unforeseen events and casualties often will occur anyway.

Every family feels equal grief when their son or daughter is killed by the more numerous IEDs that end many lives and maim others. Should we penalize the platoon leader or company commander for choosing that patrol route and having insufficient route clearance capability? Yet it was exactly equipment failure of a piece of route clearance equipment that prevented the jingle trucks from moving engineer material to COP Wanat. Should the engineer commander, already departed from theater Bn engineer officer, or vehicle mechanic have been reprimanded? How about the Bde and Bn S-4 and unit XO/1SG for failing to get water and supplies to Wanat?

What of the 101st Cdr or G2 for not providing sufficient Predator assets the final few days? Do we fire Secretary of Defense Gates for not convincing President Bush to mount a surge earlier or for approving 15 month tours? Where do we draw the line in seeking blame for casualties that inevitably occur in combat.

Can any family member state that they would not have made mistakes in the final two weeks of a grueling 15 month tour? Can a lead investigator whose Marines serve only 7 month tours, identify with what Wanat leaders were experiencing serving twice as long? Yet despite how dog-tired that unit must have been, and deployment activities that had to occur and required manpower, they courageously attempted to protect the incoming unit by moving the COP from an even more dangerous and hard to supply Bella location to Wanat.

“Admiral,” if you would like more factual versus fictional insight into what occurred at Wanat, please check out comments below this linked article:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/07/what-really-happened-at-wanat/

The nation shares the grief these families are experiencing. Lessons have been learned from the experience so their sons hardly died in vain. Families should recognize that many other lives have been saved because Wanat was never occupied in subsequent years and other valley sites in northeast Afghanistan have been abandoned or beefed up.

Mr. Gay,

I'm very sorry for your loss. Your loss is our nation's loss. For 200 years, good men and women have been sacrificed on the fields of valor, some under good leadership, and some under inept leaders. That does not diminish their sacrifice or yours. Please accept my deepest condolences.

V/R

bp

You really have see the recent Dateline NBC report on this battle. The base selection was so bad one had to laugh. All the soldiers were appalled when they arrived. It was at the base of a steep valley where an enemy could pour down fire from all directions, and did. They were ducks in a shooting gallery.

One might thing they were put there as bait to lure the Afghans into massing for a major attack so that firepower could get lots of KIAs, but that doesn't explain the lack of water.

Ideally, you want remote outposts on top the highest hill in the area, like this

http://www.327infantry.org/files/first/images/fred_ranck/firebase.JPG

Its hard to attack and shoot uphill, and hard to see up there. Many mortar rounds sail over the top. Its better for helos since they can use the hill as a shield and swoop in from one side. Hilltops are also easier for the air guys to see the base, so they don't bomb it.

Are there copies of the offical reports out there? I am sure the battalion/brigade did a 15-6 back in 2008 and I bet the Army did another before this more recent CENTCOM one. There is a lot of speculation out there - much of it armchair quarterbacking. Its easy to say put the patrol base on the hill with hindsight; its a good idea. Maybe Wanat was a bad call but how do we know without the original orders/intent and the overall situation - the information that the report has? We make decisions with incomplete information in the Army all the time - we have to. That doesnt negate the loss of our people; that is always a tragedy.

The Dateline report has videos of the soldiers after they arrived at Wanat. They were angry and afraid, as they talked about the horrible location of the base. One soldier explained on video of how the Afghans would set up on the high points around the base and shoot them to pieces. The nearby village is evacuated as Afghan elders stopped to warn them to leave. They said hundreds of Afghans are coming and will shoot them up down there.

Perhaps it was overconfidence that airpower would protect them, and it did save most of them. I hate to second guess too, but if you watch those Dateline videos made by the soldiers themselves, one must wonder who decided to put a small base down there, and why the unit remained after they arrived and found it unsound. I speculate that some General selected it by looking at a map, yet when soldiers arrived and reported the mistake, the Colonels were afraid to the the General he was wrong.

Quit bitching, our Apaches will blast the ragheads to Allah if they attack Wanat! OORAH!

Mr. Ricks may have already addressed this elsewhere, but is this the true feeling of the majority of the families involved? It's hardly odd for the angriest to speak over the majority.

I misspoke earlier when stating that Gen Campbell did not consider the CAC report because it was considered opinionated. Instead, he stated in his report that it was not considered because it was a “draft which has not undergone pre-publication vetting and academic review in accordance with standing CSI research protocols.”

Also apologize for seeming to make assumptions about Gen Campbell’s thoughts without making it clear that it was based on his formal written response and COL Brostrum’s letter published here that described Gen Campbell’s fear of questioning command decision made in the heat of battle that might lead to risk aversion.

Other parts of my post also were based on COL Brostrum’s letter from the earlier blog. While understanding his strong reaction, attempted to point out why adequate “water, defensive material, engineers, and leadership oversight” were not on hand…the broken engineer equipment and stranded jingle trucks.

Showed that the company commander did not “decide to do paperwork back at the Battalion HQ.” He was required by higher HQ to document information for a 15-6 investigation of the Apache strike he approved near COP Bella that killed 17 “civilians.”

It was not just “face time” for the Bn Cdr to be concentrating on areas in Chowkay and Korengal valleys that were under attack, or to be attending “multiple shuras and key leader engagements with local officials.”

The battalion did not have 8 platoons that could have been dedicated to the small Wanat site without giving up coverage of the other 14 platoon-sized COPs in the battalion’s sector. Wanat was less than 5 miles from larger Camp Blessing so reinforcements were close at hand, and a ground QRF did respond rapidly the day of the Wanat attack, as did an Apache QRF, 50+ rounds of 155mm, and a B-1 bomber.

In other words, the actions that grieving COL Brostrum implied may not have been reasonable, very well could have been were it not for the benefit of hindsight, and the handicap of very understandable bias.

I spoke with my son in Afghanistan today, things have been a bit rough the last few weeks. Talking to him sent me searching the internet for information and I found this site, I had to join and vent my thoughts.

The investigation is complete and everybody's butt has been covered. The Brass walked away with their records clean and their cushy pensions intact.

Of course that should not have been the purpose of the investigation in the first place. Nor should it have been about finding fault or placing blame. It should have been about learning what could been done to keep this from happening again. It should have focused on the strategy and tactics involved in putting 30-50 troops in some remote outpost surrounded by 300-500 Taliban.
Backed up by 3 or 4 dozen Afghan Army or Police with questionable allegiance.
High or low ground is a matter of degree when you are out numbered 10 to 1 and your mission is to walk foot patrols on the valley floor, to mingle with the locals as if somehow that will make them love us. It is damn hard to win them over when we have said that we will be leaving and the Taliban has promised to murder them and their families if they give aid to the Americans. What would you choose?

Did the Commander and Chief in Washington or the Generals in Afghanistan learn anything? NO!

Today my son is in a FOB not so much different than Wanat . Ambushes and fire fights are routine for the soldiers serving with him. They have taken casualties and the fighting season has just begun. Supplies and mail are hard to get because you can’t drive there and it is to dangerous fly helicopters in. Sounds a lot like Wanat doesn't it.

To those that have given and lost so much I give thanks. For those on the field of battle today, I pray for your safe return. And for the clueless in Washington D.C. and the Generals waiting for their pensions I don't give a shit.
I do wish that you would put down your golf clubs.

The redacted CENTCOM investigation is at this link:

http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/foia/rr/CENTCOM%20Regulation%20CCR%2025210/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2fsites%2ffoia%2frr%2fCENTCOM%20Regulation%20CCR%2025210%2fWANAT%20%2d%20Re%2dInvestigation%20into%20the%20Combat%20Action%20at%20Wanat%20Village%2c%20Wygal%20District%2c%20Nuristan%20Province%2c%20Afgh%2e%20on%2013%20July%202008%2fInvestigation%20Supporting%20Documents&FolderCTID=&View=%7b41BA1AAF%2d785A%2d481A%2dA630%2d12470AFCD6FD%7d.

As most are too busy to read it in its entirety and few have the ability to read it objectively, I provide some pointers and a challenge.

The challenge first – find the statement(s) that show there was not adequate planning or supervision and dereliction and negligence were in the place of contingencies and frictions of war. The pointers:

First, we all love Marines. They are our nation's finest planners, tacticians, resourcers, executors, warriors, and they each have impeccable integrity. A USMC Infantry LtCol was the embedded tactical trainer (ETT) OIC based at Blessing and responsible for the Marines at Wanat. Read his CSI statement (40C), his CENTCOM statement (40A) and if you have the time, note the questioning and re-questioning in his CENTCOM interview (40B). If we take his statements at face value we could conclude with "the end." If we don't believe this Marine's statements do we conclude that all Marines are unbelievable or just this Marine is unbelievable? The public domain has determined LtGen Natonski (USMC) (who based on his bio has not served in Afghanistan; based on his EXSUM did not walk the ground; and based on the CENTCOM enclosures did not interview scores of relevant people) is the objective investigator. A read of his work shows his conclusions are drawn from inferences in the absence of statements or facts. There is a larger Marine connection in the background but that can wait.

Second we all love NCOs. They call it like they see it, know ground truth and have the intestinal fortitude to speak the truth. I understand the battalion commander was an NCO before many of his NCOs were born and in the eyes of his former NCOs (scores if not hundreds that lined up to support the chain of command), he maintained the ability to see, know, and speak. Was everything perfect? No. Did they understand the mission? Yes. Did they understand the need to move from Bella where there was worry of the base being overrun, men killed, captured, and tortured while aircraft were shot down and men road marched up canalized mountain trails to reinforce? Yes. Did they understand timing and the selfless need to set up the next unit for success? Yes. Did they understand the location? Yes, as the best of all worst places (43B, page 1; 37A, pages 1-2). As an aside, all that want to be on the highest ground, every piece of high ground in Kunar and Nuristan has higher ground within 1000 meters, which is what happens when you are in the foothills of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Look at the available video from the area. Did they have the required resources? Yes. All they wanted or needed? No, like throughout the rest of their tour, throughout their AO. More than they expected? Yes. A bobcat for a platoon defense? When was the last time a platoon defense saw one of those at NTC, JRTC, or JMTC? Last time at any other COP in the AO? See the documentary Restrepo and see how another platoon established an initial base (43A, page 10; 43B, page 1). Were they out of water? No. Were they low? Yes (33A, page 4; 43A, pages 8-9). Did they have a well and two creeks within meters that the ANA were using? Yes. Did they have water purifying pumps/filters per squad? Yes. Did they have iodine tablets? Yes. Did squad or platoon chain of command opt to maximize these? No (33D). Why? Because to this experienced group the perceived threat was such that they could manage priorities such as to rest in the heat of the day (while not purifying available water) and work in the cooler periods of the day (43A, pages 8-9). Or as the platoon sergeant said, because these (pumps and iodine tablets) were meant for patrols (33D). Did the platoon call for an emergency resupply? No (40B, pages 13, 14). Why not? Because they did not perceive the low water as an issue at the time nor the enemy threat to warrant the immediate resupply. Did the platoon sergeant prioritize what supplies came in with the company XO? Yes (33A, second statement page 2-3). Was the platoon thrown out alone and unafraid? No, in fact they were withdrawn closer to indirect fires, vehicle, air, and (if necessary) foot mounted support. Was the platoon enabled? Yes, with more resources than any platoon at any time in the 14 months of the deployment and to the detriment of other bases (43B, page 1; 41A). Did they occupy, secure, and set their defense uninterrupted? Yes. With no indications or warnings (CENTCOM), the first rounds weren't fired for over 100 hours (or slightly longer than the entire Desert Storm/combat experienced by some). Did the Waygul Valley have hundreds of contacts? No. There were less than fifty contacts in the Waygul Valley in 14 months and nearly 400 in the Korengal (10 km south) ( ostlund). Three contacts occurred near Wanat. CPT Myer and his RTO were in all three to include the battle of Wanat (the only veterans of all three engagements).

I didn't reference the chain of command from company, battalion, brigade, or CJTF (their enclosures are 16,7,11,9) as well established fact fearing pundits established each as a self-serving dishonest dolt. Those few that look for additional truth absent the command, may want to read the DCG's statements (10A,B,C), brigade DCO's work (AH 64 15-6, original 15-6, or his statements 30A,B; 30B, pages 27-30 are insightful as he references Mr. or Colonel Brostrom's involvement early on), or the Marine ETT's (41A,B,C). If you don't "trust" officers? How about the platoon RTO (40A,B,C), mortar section sergeant (43A,B), alpha team leader (37A,C), or platoon sergeant (33A,B,C,D).

Few if any operations could withstand the national level scrutiny associated with Wanat. To include ongoing operations in Helmand where nearly 150 US and coalition forces have died since Operation Moshtarak was initiated in January. Nearly 70 were well trained, equipped, and resourced Marines. Many more were special forces of some type. May they rest in peace and their parents and all value their sacrifices and those of their units.

The intent of this post is not to bash the CENTCOM investigating team or their conclusions. It is to remind all that statements and interviews are on the net. Information is public. Based on each person's experience and interpretation, the lens they read through, the statements could be interpreted in many ways. The suggestion is not to read solely through Mr. Cubbison's lens or a grieving father’s as neither has a completely clear view. I'd also suggest you not asume every officer is a dolt and every general is a golfer. Most officers I know have been making incredible sacrifices for the good of their men and units for many many years.

Cole2 comes across as an official Army spokesman. How about it, Cole2? Where's your PAO shop? Or do you just like being a sycophant?

Cole2: "Can any family member state that they would not have made mistakes in the final two weeks of a grueling 15 month tour? Can a lead investigator whose Marines serve only 7 month tours, identify with what Wanat leaders were experiencing serving twice as long?"

Real class. Nice turn of phrase, Cole2. I'm trying to think back to my first tour in Vietnam and wondering if my mom would have been comfortable with stating that she wouldn't have made mistakes in my shoes. She was pretty sharp, though. My dad, with a few years in WW2, undoubtedly would have denied any mistakes. But then there's my baby sister, who was about 14 at the time. Yeah, she would have screwed up. You're right, Cole2. Family members would indeed make mistakes, esp. if they were in junior HS.

Campbell's a war hero who saw 58K troops killed, the families just don't understand how hard it is for him and for all of the other poor suffering officers. And of course, no Marine could ever truly appreciate the hardships they've faced. One truly hopes Cole2 didn't have it as tough as General Campbell. We wouldn't want to have those Wanat families distressed by further hardship.

Real class. "Smirking." "Smiling." "Laughing." General Campbell comes across as a real standup dude.

Go Army.

Gentleman, I'm a contractor civilian, former enlisted and West Point grad aviator, who has read Cubbison's report, the CENTCOM report, 15-6, and General Campbell's reports in their entirety. GroundTruth nailed it. You are welcome to go directly to the cited references and read the actual events/testimony. I've seen all the TV and news reports, read all the articles, and read lots of forum comments from respected war-experienced Majors and a Doctor who was there who commented on the chilling effect these reprimands would have.

It might surprise you to learn that I agree with Mr. Cubbision that this unit did not adequately attempt to bond with the local population and used entirely too much indiscriminate force. That's not my call as a civilian who was not there. Was merely researching for a training activity to make sure that what happended to these courageous Sky Soldiers does not happen again from the standpoint of what a small group of troops we train can do about it.

Hunter, Sir you raise a legitimate question. We know our sons lost in combat will not return to us and I am sure that Stone Ross is not bent on revenge. However, you miss the point with concerns about the company commander and those up in the chain from the Wanat unit. It is the policy of cover-up and principle of defense of dereliction/"second guessing the commander in the field's decisions". It is BS that so many Prime Assests--ie, US troops lives--are treated with so much lack of concernvis-a-vis worry about commander's careers and Silver Stars. Our sons' lives are not expendable like so much equipment. Stop ignoring that fact, please. Our concerns are about accountability and incompetence.

Mr. Gay/Stone Ross is a reputed professional poker player. Bluff Magazine knows who he is but he isn’t quite the player he has billed himself to be in several Valdosta articles and other forums (http://www.bluffmagazine.com/players/frankie-gay/64977/player-profile.asp). He is aspiring to bluff his way into notoriety in both the world of poker and the public domain. He played a bit part in his son’s life as his son was not raised near Mr. Gay as he grew into the man he was. This has caused some internal family strife. Mr. Gay, the one who aspires to bluff (lie) for a living has spent a year calling men with sterling records and reputations with their soldiers, NCOs, peers, and seniors liars. He apparently records everything, to include being more concerned about posturing himself and his camera crew at the 173rd Airborne Memorial than memorializing his son, but produces nothing but poorly recollected memories that are continuously dispelled. This same camera could or should have captured the scores of paratroopers and families that lined up to talk to Ostlund at the memorial. Troops don’t usually stand in line at a voluntary event to talk to a former commander that was a fu$%^& and that didn’t demonstrate competence, care and concern for each. When asked to produce the recordings, he flubbs. With the venom he dispels it is hard to believe that he would not produce damaging recordings at first opportunity. The fact is a compassionate commander that owed Mr. Gay nothing, as he wasn’t acknowledged on his son’s army paperwork, provided him the facts as they were known and the facts have not changed, only Mr. Gay’s references to the “Water Gate” tapes has changed. Perhaps he will have time to cut and splice his film and tapes of a commander attempting to provide knowledge, peace, and kindness to a man who is not listed on one of his fallen soldier’s army paperwork but who claims to be the fallen’s bereaved father. The movie should be interesting.

To those that have yet to read the statements above, to include the gold star families, the truth is available and has little to do with an incompetent chain of command. In fact an objective read may conclude the same as Mr. Brostrom in the July 17, 2008 AP article at http://militarytimes.com/valor/army-1st-lt-jonathan-p-brostrom/3630767/:

Brostrom's father, David Brostrom, a retired Army colonel, praised his son and fellow soldiers for the work they are doing in Afghanistan, but said they are not getting the resources they need.

"My son is very well trained. His leadership at the brigade and below were probably the best you'll ever find, the best in the world," David Brostrom told the Honolulu Advertiser, “(But) they were put in a situation where they were under-resourced."

He said the U.S. has put Afghanistan on hold while it fights the war in Iraq. He said the enemy has been slowly gaining a foothold.

"It took something like this, nine soldiers killed, to be a wake-up call. I just hope my son's death drives some policy to do what we need to do right in Afghanistan in order to protect our soldiers.”

It is unfortunate if each persons desire to pontificate and speculate in the absence of facts is more important than taking the time to read available information and then draw informed conclusions.

GT