Friday, July 2, 2010 - 10:38 AM
Here's a comment from Beau Cleland, who is now studying strategy at Johns Hopkins SAIS but used to play football for Georgia Tech, and later suited up for the U.S. Army in Sadr City and Oruzgan Province, among other places. It's not often you get a column from an artillery officer who was attached to the SF, so gather round and listen up.
By Beau Cleland
Best Defense deputy chief, military personnel policy bureauThe recent controversy over the remarks by and subsequent relief of Gen. Stanley McChrystal highlights a severe but seemingly intractible problem with the way senior leaders are developed in the U.S. Army. To be successful and have a chance at attaining a general's stars, officers are expected to move sequentially up a series of positions, from platoon leader to brigade commander, "checking the block" at each level as they advance. Many of these positions are a requirement for advancement, limiting flexibility in assignment. This system has been in place for decades, and only the feeblest of changes have been made to it, despite nearly nine years of war.
The Army officer personnel management system rigidly creates excellent fighters and technicians whose skills, as Greg Jaffe notes, apply only tangentially to the requirements of being general officer in today's conflicts. All along the chain, there is a fundamental mismanagement of talent. These days, unless you're convicted of some sort of crime you stand an excellent chance of reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel as long as you still have a pulse, and very few assignments are competitive in nature before you reach that rank. What this means is that no matter how gifted an officer is tactically, no matter how inspiring a leader he is, no matter how intelligent, there is no way for him to be promoted more than a year or so sooner than he would be otherwise. The same applies to important duty assignments: across the Army units choose company-level commanders not based on who the best commander would be, regardless of age or time in service, but on whose turn it is, or who has managed to sneak away from a deployment to get the check-the-block "education" in order to take command. The result is frustration for a great many promising young officers, many of whom leave the service at the end of their initial obligation in search of more flexible opportunities.
The paucity of suitable replacements for Stanley McChrystal highlights where this hemorrhage of young talent leads after 20 to 30 years of relentless homogenizing (beyond David Petraeus, the cupboard is pretty bare at the 4-star level). 19th-century Prussia (later Germany) offers us an interesting alternative to our current crushing mediocrity: the Generalstab (General Staff) system of old. The old Prussians are usually depicted as mechanical, monocle-wearing stiffs, but they had a remarkable knack for identifying young, talented officers and placing them into the General Staff's separate system of education and advancement. Certainly their system was not without its drawbacks (militarism, an insular, monkish outlook), but they were on to something with identifying and separating talent early on, and then training that talent in the skills needed for operating at the higher, operational and strategic levels of warfare. This decade's parade of failed and mediocre generals prove that the United States is not doing a very good job of this -- let's create the next generation of strategic thinkers while they're still young.
That's the place to ID and grow the flag talent. USMC has a rigorous system of selection for senior service colleges: National War College grows Commandants. An Air Force classmate once told me that he doubted any USAF officer at National had less than 3-star backing and most had 4-star: National grows AF Chiefs of Staff. Navy has been largely indifferent, using the Strategic Study Group at Newport and various staff shops in OPNAV to grow talent and using the test of command at sea as the final evaluation.
Army? It all seems to be due-course progress in which senior service college is another ticket to get punched. In recent years, Army support of Professional Military Education (PME) has been notably weaker and this much commented on. This may relate to the issue in the original post: if you don't step outside the daily grind and try to deliberately and consciously groom and pick your front-runners, you end up with a pack of mediocrities.
And this is part of a larger issue still. We need fundamental military reform. Focus on US Army - it's the most broken. Use our inability to manage victory in Iraq or finish the job in Afghanistan - both Army drills - as proof the system needs a major fix. And do look at three other aspects interwoven with the Army's woes: the manifest deficiencies of the AVF; the isolating insulation of the military welfare system (especially the Army post system); and the adverse effect of the absence of a draft.
I think that we need to take a step back here and answer the question asked and not answering what we wanted the question to be.
By far and large the military is meeting the challenges placed upon it. From force projection (ie deploying the surge to Afghanistan while simultaneously drawing down in Iraq) to power projection (anti piracy off of the horn of Africa to the support we are providing to South Korea). From kinetics (direct fire engagements supported by combined and joint fires) to non-kinetic contingencies (Haiti & Thailand) the military is doing what it is tasked and trained to do.
Where the "failures" are coming into play is in those points where a purely military response is not sufficient to the task at hand. The ackowledgment of need for whole of government approach is creating this issue. As the largest agency with the most fiscal flexibility and operational reach the military has been tasked with taking the lead. This means that the Generals that have been trained and selected based upon their military competencies (fight and win America's wars) are being graded on a skill set that they have not been required, or encouraged, to build (develop a nations economy, infrastructure, and political system). These failures have been focused on the 4 star level primarily as this is when the generals transition from "General" to "Viceroy".
This desire to create military "viceroys" is a natural outgrowth from the combatant command system. Instead of attempting to change the entire military to create up to a few 4 stars it might be better to instead change, and empower, the other elements of the USG. Specifically, instead of having a general as the head of a combatant command or COIN expedition place a civilian with the title commander. This would enforce unity of effort and unit of command. This civilian would have be trained, educated, and selected based upon his/her expertise in diplomacy, economics, etc and would have the ability to do what needs to be done. This could be an ambassador or a political appointee. The fact that GEN P is a statistical outlier does not mean that the rest of GEN officer corps is incompetent at their jobs. Only that he is competent in areas outside of his traditional role.
There is not so much a failure in our generals as much as it is a failure for our government to appoint the appropriate person with the appropriate skill set to accomplish the mission.
You will find this on the wall behind me...
I divide my officers into four classes; the clever, the lazy, the industrious, and the stupid. Most often two of these qualities come together. The officers who are clever and industrious are fitted for the highest staff appointments. Those who are stupid and lazy make up around 90% of every army in the world, and they can be used for routine work. The man who is clever and lazy however is for the very highest command; he has the temperament and nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious is a menace and must be removed immediately!
--Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord
Substitute lazy with "efficient" or "focused" (although the Puck in me still likes "lazy") and voila. But good luck finding too many education or promotion systems that value learning over grades or "checking the box". Certainly in the civilian sector there is far too much money invested in the latter to for it to prioritize in any efficient manner the former.
And in change of subjects. The likely soldier whose nomination for the first non-posthumous MOH in years was under a stop-loss at the time of his deeds as was his friend who died.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?pagewanted=10
He didn’t run to the front because he was a hero. He ran up to get to Brennan, his friend. “But they” — he meant the military — “just keep asking for more from us.” His contract would be up in 18 days but he had been stop-lossed and couldn’t go home. Brennan himself was supposed to have gotten out in September. He’d been planning to go back to Wisconsin where his dad lived, play his guitar and become a cop.
Why Does Everyone Miss the Obvious? It's Recruiting!
While I enjoyed Beau's insights, I think that both he and Greg Jaffe are missing the forest from the trees.
As I've said repeatedly, the best way to tackle this issue is on the recruiting/accessions/input side of the ledger. Any reforms aimed to fix these issues for officers already in the force are simply too little and too late.
The Army's officer recruiting system is fundamentally broken. ROTC resources are irrationally allocated and this allocation virtually assures a continuation of the status quo. The Army's increased reliance on OCS (the largest commisioning source for RA LTs in 2008 and 2009) could provide a means to "fix" the accessions problem - if - and only if - the Army implemented a quality officer recruiting program a'la the USMC. The current OCS recruiting effort is the responsibility of detailed NCOs whose primary job is to put Privates in the Army. This uncoordinated, episodic and wildly inconsistent outreach efforts ensures that the "right" people aren't being made aware of officer opportunities in a professional manner. A great illustration of this absurdity is the Army's use of recruiting sergeants from the Harlem Recruiting station to recruit at Columbia University - in rumpled field uniforms no less!
The obvious way to improve your pool of future Generals is to improve the quality of the entering officer cohort you will ultimately promote them from. There is no "lateral entry." The LTs we commission this year will comprise the very narrow universe of talent we have to select our Generals from in 25 years. Are we doing what we should be? Hell no.
We've tilted our ROTC footprint to the south and disproportionately placed those resources at mediocre institutions. 10 Army ROTC units in Alabama and 9 in Georgia with only 2 in NYC and 3 in NJ. The Army isn't shopping for talent on the same planet as its interagency partners, the private sector, or, hell, the USMC are. This is a huge problem. In an era of great need and limited resources, should we have ROTC programs at places like the Valley Forge Military College? What message does this send when places like NYC, Chicago and New Jersey are so woefully underresourced? In 2006, 59% of Army ROTC grads came from the South. Who can honestly say that this ratio and regional imbalance is how we will find the best talent?
Ditto for OCS. We opted for a "commision all comers" approach from 2003-2009 with a nearly 100% selection rate for civilian OCS candidates. At the same time, we denuded the NCO Corps of its college educated Sergeants in a desperate effort to make 2LT. Pennywise and pound foolish. Instead of taking all comers, we could have developed a targeted, officer recruiting outreach and accessions strategy. We blew it. Consequently, we have new LTs (no prior service) in their mid to late 30s because they needed a job and health insurance.
I agree completely with Beau's concerns about the future of officer promotions and selectivity. I am deeply worried. We are "stuck" with who we commissioned and I have grave worries about the depth of the talent "bench." I was commisioned in 1998 and know firsthand the desperate pressure placed on ROTC to make misison that year and the pressure to commision everyone minimally qualified - at all costs.
Andrew Bacevich is alarmed by the emergence of the AVF officer corps as a "caste" or "family business".
I also have concerns with the "warrior ethos" and, what I see, as a growing anti-intellectualism in the officer corps. A mentality promulgated from the top ensures that mentality becomes widespread. Further, an atmosphere where promotions through LTC are virtually automatic diminshes the incentive for education and life-long learning (i.e. why bother? I'm getting promoted anyway).
IRR, yours is one of the best discussions of this subject which I have read. And as far as the 'warrior ethos' goes it is not only anti-intellectual but counter-productive in producing an almost moronic reaction to stress and change.
This poses the question of whether or not our armed forces are attracting really top tier intellects into the officer Corps? Why would really brilliant and talented young people with multiple career options such as finance, business, law, medicine, the sciences, etc., be attracted to military service as a career? These kinds of people perhaps look at the military services and see a kind of monotonous bureaucracy that isn’t really set up to differentiate between the extraordinary and the ordinary not unlike a labor union. Until the armed forces figures out a way to actively, indeed, aggressively discriminate between the very best and the average by scraping the seniority system and rewarding with rank and responsibility then our true best and brightest will stay away.
Even Worse, Look Who is "Selling" These Opportunities
To paraphrase Chales Moskos, the best recruiter is someone with a credible service experience that the recruit/applicant can relate to.
How do you begin effectively recruiting in a place like NYC when you barely have any officers from there and haven't really tried to recruit there since the 70's? This question only begins to illuminate the problem the Army faces. This issue cuts across all commissioning sources. In 2007 or 2008, only 5 NYC residents graduated from West Point. Five - from a city with a population greater than Virginia or Georgia. Could you imagine only 5 USMA grads a year from VA or GA? Of course not. When NYC is involved, no one even bothers to ask if this is unacceptable - let alone do actually do something about it.
The Army doesn't have the credible "sales force" to recruit the best. The USMC does and their OSO program is a model of how we need to be adjust our business practices. The Army needs to identify young officers who have the personality and background to recruit the best. The young CPT from Ft. Drum featured on the Front Page of the NY Times last Sunday - a Yale and OCS graduate - is the kind of person we need to be sending out to do this necessary work.
A compelling argument for the Army can be made to those with "options." I know of which I speak as I did this as an Army Medical Department Recruiter in NYC (who also dabbled in OCS awareness). It's not impossible. You need the right people. You would be amazed at the dialogue you can have when someone with a latent interest in service finds out that 1) they can relate to you; and 2) you have some knowledge of where they're coming from. Without these elements you only wind up with the "converted" (very small pool) or the "desperate."
I appreciate IRR's discussion of recruiting, and don't disagree with what he says. What he says, though, applies to people who won't be up for general's stars until about 2030 or 2035. In the meantime....
We have now a large number of Army and Marine officers with combat experience, surely the most relevant kind if we're looking for future generals who might help us win a war. So how does their experience weigh in the services' respective promotion systems? Ideally, captains and colonels who have excelled in the field would have a big edge with respect to future promotions for that reason. Do they at this time? Will they in the future?
Junior officers experiencing low level combat while trying to understand and implement a confusing COIN doctrine may end up with practical experience that is not very helpful in a different type of war scenario. We may end up with a corps of COIN officers who are at sea when it comes to conventional combined arms?
Sorry, IRR and JPWREL, you are both off
The biggest problem has little to do with recruiting, the recruiting is mostly political with "Goals" set by whoever is in charge at the moment-for instance, "Goals" for Officers are largely based on each service, usually they represent a goal similar to a targeted minority group or for females. The Navy for instance has a "goal" of 15% going up to 20% for females and even more so for Black due to the low proportion of Black Officers in the Navy vs their representation in the General Populace. So while recruiting is a problem due to what drives it (politics), I really do not think it matters as much as training and time in an area. I do not care who your recruit, you can train them to be at least a mediocre leader, it would be great if we only got studs but you can still get by with pack horses too if you train them right.
Training, outside of the USMC, it is a bit of joke and mostly based on the business model and while it produces great managers, it does not produce warfighters and very few leaders. The focus is on business type "Command Philosophy", "Command Mission", etc...all of which are rarely paid attention to, hardly ever taken seriously and really are just platitudes like "Be the best (Insert unit here) Operators in the world", a total joke but that is what the training produces once these guys reach 05. The SEAL Teams have even swallowed this Kool Aid, taken from the Army, with "The SEAL Creed" and other silliness that is mandatory and placed all over the commands.
The biggest problem after training and focus is the placement, each officer is in a position for a max of 24 months. 24 months is NOT enough time to know what you are doing and be good at it at the Batt., Regiment, etc...level and the 2 year punch becomes just that-a ticket punch. Assignments need to be longer and the combat arms need to be put ahead of the support units for promotions, not promotions within a service arm, ie; if only 5 06's are to be made per year the Combat Arms should get the priority. The whole personnel system is a joke and only produces people who will go to a spot, a program or a unit to "punch their ticket" not to lead and be a warfighter.
ERIC_STRATTONIII, I have no problem with your analysis. You certainly know the inside far better than me. I think what IRR and I were discussing was the larger picture of getting higher quality people to come into the armed services as officers. Seems to me that the services would want academically accomplished people of good character who otherwise would go into other demanding civilian careers. As IRR said that does not seem to be happening particularly for the Army. While serving my tour of duty on Wall Street I ran into numbers of talented young people who possessed brilliant minds and who excelled in college athletics at top tier schools, precisely the kind of person one would think the armed forces would desperately want.
Your point about the quality and intensity of training and serving sufficient time in one billet or another is very valid. I might mention and you know better than I that SEAL’s don’t train like the Army, from what I can tell from my venue they don’t do anything like the Army. They may have those silly ‘warrior’ creeds and other bullshit all over the place but they actually go out and bust their butts training. No Marine even goes through what they do particularly on their visits to Niland.
The point is that ALL groups, except the USMC, have adopted some of the less savory methods of training officers from the Big Navy and the Army, platitudes are all over the place now. As for the recruitment, it would be nice to get the best and the brightest but the best and brightest do not always make the best leaders either, there is not a really good method for recruiting someone who has the intangibles to be a good leader. There is however a good way to train and mentor someone to become a good leader, this is the where we are really lacking-short assignments, business models for training O's, etc..
Also, keep in mind, once your boy is out of the JO ranks, the stuff I am talking about will start to be more the norm for him, once he hits the senior O4 or junior 05 Ranks that is where these things will become the problem as far as training and assignment of our Officer Corps.
I guess to address about training like the Army, no, the NavSOF does CURRENTLY not train like the Army but once you have an Officer Corps that is removed from the Operational Level after 3-4 Operational Deployments and who work more and more with Army SOF groups and start to adopt some their ideas and habits for big picture stuff from the Army and/or Big Navy even, those things influence how they think training for NavSOF should go and what is important. Look to the dropping of 5 weeks off of BUD/S now in order to get more numbers of graduates for an example. You don't kill a frog by throwing him into a pot of boiling water, you put him in a pot of cool water and slowly heat it up till it is too late to hop out ;)
I have to say that this is one of the best comment discussions that I have seen in a long time (well, except for Mr. Kahn's).
I wonder if there aren't a couple of recruiting sources that are being neglected, and I ask this from a position of ignorance only -- for all I know, they are being targeted. One, particularly in the current economic climate, is the recent college graduate -- out of school with no job and in debt. It used to be that it was only the dregs of each class that weren't able to find work, but that's not the case now. There ought to be a way of targeting those people.
Another possibly fruitful source of officer-recruits are law schools. These days, a very small percentage of each graduating class finds employment in large firms or governmental jobs. A huge number of people are graduating with no job and as much as $100,000 in debt. These are bright, talented people. They've just spent the previous three years in rigorous programs learning how to think analytically. With some retraining, they could make decent officers in any branch of the military. Note: I'm not suggesting that they be brought in to the JAG, but that raises another point: many lawyers find that they don't particularly enjoy practicing law. I suspect this is as true in the military as it is in civilian life. How about a pathway for them to transfer out of JAG and into another branch?
Paul,
You raise some great points. Recent college grads and law students/grads are but two audiences who are ready and willing to hear a compelling pitch for officership - if, and only if - it is conducted properly with the right pitch. "Cutting and pasting" the "Army Strong" ad campaign won't cut it with these folks.
Without exaggeration, the increased reliance on OCS as a source of officers and the economy, are providing the Army with a once-every-half-century chance to fundamentally shift who and how it recruits and selects its officers. Really, this is a golden moment and, thus, far, the Army has completely blown it. The USMC has not.
Law students/grads are certainly eligible to enlist for OCS. I've seen an uptick in attorneys at www.armyocs.com. Unless an individual is passionate about "law" (very few are), I almost always suggest they consider regular OCS and service as a basic branch officer: 1) the service commitment is a full year shorter than JAG, 2) the accessions bonuses are better; and 3) service as an officer in the Signal Corps, Corps of Engineers or Military Police (among others), provides one with tangible leadership experience and is a great platform to "recareer" after discharge.
You are correct, the Army is completely missing these recruiting sources and in the rare instances where it does engage them, it does so ineptly that it casts the service in a less-than-flattering light (e.g. SGTs with a HS Diploma/GED sent to recruit on selective campuses; or recruiters in rumpled field uniforms at events where everyone else is wearing a suit).
I cannot tell you how impressed I am with the increasing caliber of 20 and 30-somethings visiting ArmyOCS.com. Great degrees, impressive work experience, extensive foreign travel and language skills. These are precisely the people we need in our officer corps. Unfortunately, we're only getting through to the small fraction who are already "100% sold" on the idea or those who have great patience in navigating a truly dysfunctional officer recruiting system that often seems designed to discourage those with "options" from pursuing an Army commission.
Again, this is a once-every-fifty-years opportunity. I hope that the Army commits to catching this opportunity before it is too late. Army OCS "College option" is a fantastic deal - Great pay, great experience, a three year service commitment (training, a deployment, and a few months after return to the next phase in life, and the wonderful new GI Bill that can provide a top-notch graduate education for nothing or close to nothing (e.g. Dartmouth for free).
Again, sorry, but it is not recruiting that is the problem, it is training, mentoring and assignments.
I would look at my previous posts and our previous discussions on this topic, you can recruit from MIT, Harvard, etc...all day long it does not mean you will get good Officers, the Army trains managers, not leaders and not warfighters, the same can be said of all the services, with the USMC being the possible exception. How then does the Marine Corps continue to produce good leaders compared to the Army and in my opinion the Navy? It comes down to training and mission focus. The USMC is still hampered by our personnel system and could be improved upon but they do a good job of making leaders, not just managers, which is what the rest of the services seem to do.
Eric, What are you taking about?
Eric,
I think you are fundamentally misstating what I am trying to say.
My point is simple: The military's decision (except the USMC) to essentially write off vast swaths of the country as a source of future leaders is problematic and will make a bad situation worse. I'm not just talking about "MIT" or "Harvard", I'm talking about CUNY, SUNY and Central Connecticut as well. These resource allocation decisions have screwed everyone - first generation Americans at state colleges and the prep school set alike.
The interesting thing is that you readily concede the USMC has it the most "right" as far as leader development goes. Is it any coincidence that the USMC employs an officer outreach/recruiting strategy almost identical to the one I advocate? I'm not trying to say I have all the answers, but there would seem to be some merit in the Army aligning its leader recruitment efforts to those areas where other government agencies, the private sector and even the USMC have had demonstrated success in recruiting solid leader talent.
Look at the campuses Army ROTC chooses to focus on. Who actively goes to Valley Forge Military College or the New Mexico Military Institute (2 year military junior colleges) to recruit future strategic leaders? Think about that one.
The point about "MIT" and "Harvard" was the I really do not think recruiting matters as much as training. The reason the USMC does such a good job is due to their focus on combat and combat leadership, all the other services focus on management and look to a business model, very different approaches to the problem vs the USMC.
While throwing the net a bit further is not a bad idea and I agree, the Northeast especially is lacking for good programs (again, we have talked about this before), in the end, recruitment is really only a tiny part of the battle. Their is no barometer to tell you who will be the best combat leader, often those things that make a good combat leader are intangible or learned over time and matter not as much about your background, education, socio-economic status, etc...they matter more about how you were trained and mentored.
If you truly want to train the Officer Corps of tomorrow, revamp the personnel system, the branch system in the Army (All should be trained as infantry first like the Marines) and most importantly-focus leadership training on leadership and not management. Base the training on the Military Culture, not the Business culture. A CEO loses money, a CO loses lives.
I would add a couple of observations to this excellent discussion. The comments, particularly of IRR Soldier are spot on.
The Army has over the years gutted ROTC, replacing many instructors with "contractors." Officers believe that a ROTC assignment is the kiss of death. Compare this with the increase of personnel assigned to the USMA.
The Army has eliminated many schools in all parts of the country, who had a good academic reputation but produced only a handful of commissioned officers in favor of maintaining schools that produce a large number of commission officers yet whose graduates are in many cases functional illiterates.
Until there is a new Officer Personnel Management Act, the Army will be hamstrung in promoting deserving leaders quickly.
Lastly, the Army War College is a joke. It is the weak sister of all the Military Senior Service Colleges.
It seems that the Marines attract a more pugnacious and focused officer candidate because well it’s the Marines. The Marines can have much more teeth to tail than the Army largely because the Navy takes care of much of the support and logistics. The Marine Corps is identified in the publics mind (and their own) that they are the elite of America’s conventional armed forces. The Army does not enjoy that reputation (even in their own minds) thus will attract a different sort of recruit. Essentially, the recruiting process looks to be self-sorting.
Need proof -- Iraq and Afghanistan. How can we spend a trillion dollars to "help" those nations yet we are now hated there?
I've pondered the issue of General selection for decades, and concluded that the cut throat political games required for promotion produces smooth talking political Generals rewarded for promoting themselves, often at the expense of the Army and nation. Even after reaching four stars, they instinctively do what they always did, spin the facts and hide problems to look good. Kick the can down the road and sail through another one-year ticket punch assignment.
We need to select our future Generals when they are selected for LTC. A slice of those will be tagged as fast trackers and automatically selected for all the needed schools and assignments, so they don't have to "compete" for them. This will produce a well rounded, properly trained General officer who is not stressed and paranoid after two decades of back stabbing competition. Others can only rise to the rank of Col.
The recruiters and trainers in the US Army are not picked because they are excellent recruiters (with people skills) or trainers (with teaching skills). Soldiers are generalists and the personnel system is based in the industrial era. See "Path to Victory" D. Vandergrift for an insiders view into the Army personnel system - a little older but not much has changed; not a bad read. The reality of the system is that if position calls for a infantry sergeant, then that is what you get. He may be an excellent trainer but a poor combat leader - or vice versa; the system doesnt look for talent, it looks for competence. You may be a talented staff officer but a medocre commander - well, the system is going to put you in the position it needs to fill. The Army believes you need to be everything to everybody - a good at whatever job you get...oh yeah, for those of you who arent familiar with the system, you change jobs about every 12-24 months. During my time as an officer, I served as a tank platoon leader, logistics officer, personnel officer, operations officer, recon company commander, etc, etc. I was certainly more talented in some of those jobs than others. There is a good mongraph on our the Army is relooking talent - problem is, it take a while to make changes from the inside. For those of you interested, its a free pdf:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=988
Agree that the military looks for competence, not just tactical skills. A great infantry, armor, or logistical company commander does not always equate to a leader at the operational and strategic levels. Once you reach the Field Grade and General Officer level, the military needs more than just tactical battlefield leaders. Watch CSPAN, the military needs GOs who can work with and influence civililian leadership, the military needs officers who understand the institutional side of the house (manning, equipping, training the force). Understand that all who complain about recruiting, well, recruiting command is headed up by a GOFO, as is ROTC/Cadet Command. Manouvering on the battlefield does not always relate to success in these fields.
For RD and his first comment, it is more than just SSSC. Joint assignments, SSSC, or equivilent (ICAF, etcc), Army/Navy/Marine/Air Force Staff assignments, are just a few of the places where the military (not just the army) grows it senior leadership. Now go back and relive your cold-war glory days.
1. Attributing flaws in general officers to failures in recruiting is a copout, as though the intervening two decades of experience, training, and grooming - how the recruit was raised - are less than primary determinants. Silly.
2. ICAF is one of the 5 senior service colleges.
3. Concur your basic commend commending jointness etc. SSC is where those bound for flag rank best (and perhaps first) come into close contact with the people and topics they will need to engage if moved up.
4. Cold War days were not glory so much as hard, grinding work. The neat thing about winning a war: you don't have to 'return.' How're those Iraq and Afghanistan things working out?
Really?
While I agree with your points about training being more important than recruitment and think recruiting has little to do with anything but numbers, acting like you "Fought" in a war is a bit much. The Cold War was just that-Cold, hardly a shot fired. Also, Vietnam and Korea were hardly stunning examples of either your Cold War era leadership or your Draft Military that you seem to think would do a much better job. Also, I would not say we are all done with Russia quite yet.
1. Did not say I 'fought' the Cold War, but that it was hard, grinding work. But making Polaris patrols, ready to fire on 15-minutes notice, and conducting SpecOps in waters still not to be revealed - that was pretty real and not to be denigrated by those who weren't there.
2. As to Korea and Vietnam, it was precisely because of the political facts of the draft that these wars ended. Had we now the same pressures - the same suspicion and fear of a standing army as our Founding Fathers - we'd have finished the work in Afghanistan long ago and never gone into Iraq.
I regard both outcomes as vastly better than the current stasis in Iraq and the endless prospect of victory-free conflict in Afghanistan. On the latter in particular, with a draft the citizens with kids in the fight would not have permitted those idiots of the last Administration to ignore the good war they started in Afghanistan so they could go play in Iraq, nor would we have allowed that second, feckless conflict to start. And were Afghanistan not successful by then, we'd have turned those bums out in '04 and reset the registers with a team that - regardless of your politics - could not have been more incompetent that the incumbents.
3. Again on Korea and Vietnam: these were Army fights and Army led. Fault lies in Army leadership then and now. But that does not negate the virtues of a draft. Indeed, the greater presence of citizens in the military and the whole-hearted support of the American People characterized the last big one we won, WW-II.
4. Finally, something these discussion often overlook is the frequent lack of history and experience in matters like the Cold War among many of the commenters. Whether that makes me old or you callow is a judgment call.
Irrelevant...we can sum up all your posts with "The Army lost, get rid of the all volunteer force"
What you miss in your analysis is that to offset the political aspects of having an all volunteer force, the U.S. Military can not sustain itself without the Reserve or National Guard. This was a system put in place by leaders such as coin Powell. A large part of the sustainment structure, as well as combat units reside in the Reserve and Guard respectivly.
The decision to leave either Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghnistan is a political decision, not really influenced by wheather it is an AVF or a draft military. You make the campaign promise to leave, that is what you do.
The "experience" you have is in a draft military, and in the Navy, hence your propensity to say that what you did and experinced is what would work.
You implied you "fought" and those of who came up in those days were involved too, so stop the grasp at glory, the might cut it "Proceedings" but not in real life. (Yes, I have read some of your articles)
Also, speaking of history you never offer anything constructive or point on how a miracle save for all of us the draft Military would somehow be? Why? Just because it would force Americans to somehow rebel and get us out of OEF and OIF? That seems to be your reasoning and not a good one I might add. As for any other benefit, there is none really, with the exception of the possible re-connect of the Civilian-Military Culture. As to the Army being jacked up and you singing the praises of the Navy a lot, go look at your history again Ducky, that is what it is-History. The Navy is just as bad at the top for leadership, I will even give you the benefit of the doubt and say back in your day it may have been a lot more professional and well lead-it is a total joke now, not a combat leader in the fleet have I met. The CNO is scary PC, really they are all Pols with Uniforms and who are trained on the business model, not trained for combat. They have VBSS teams (Go look it up Ducky ;) ) go on board without rounds in the chamber, most of the crew are hardly cross trained in other ratings, Damage Control is not a priority for all members, it has become a specialty, and Sailors initial training is horrible compared to how it was just 15 years ago. Heck, even the Navy complains about it! The Navy Times even wrote articles last year covering that topic and how ill prepared the kids were when they go to the fleet after boot and A school. So while the Army has a lot of problems, the Navy is just as bad and is mostly run by guys who are good Politicians that happen to be in a uniform. Outside of NSW and a few Expeditionary Commands there are no combat leaders in the Navy.
Sorry Ducky, I am not sure exactly how the Navy was in your day but the Navy of today is a PC joke lead by guys whose leadership is based on the business model and career enhancements.
"The decision to leave either Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghnistan is a political decision, not really influenced by wheather it is an AVF or a draft military."
Huh? Politics in a vacuum? Wowzer. Guess you missed the Sixties. Guess you missed Nixon's election on the promise that he would end the Vietnam War. And it doesn't take much imagination to see that the politics around Bush's decisions to abandon Afghanistan and invade Iraq would have been far different had he and the members of Congress been required by a draft to justify sending citizens not in the military to conduct these wars.
The question of a draft is ALL about politics. It puts brakes on hubris and constrains imperial desires. The AVF enables hubris and imperial desires. Me, I prefer the voice of the people to the uninhibited ego of a dimwit like Bush, and that's with or without the blessing of St. Colin.
You are correct, a draft puts constraints on imperial desires.
Warm Regards,
Levée en masse, World War I, and World War II
RD, I am new to this forum but have seen many of your posts demonizing the AVF. Can you explain? What I have so far is the AVF makes the military easier to use. I am not sure there is any historical evidence to support the claim. In order that a conscript force constrains the use of our military, the population must be engaged (I think you'd agree conscription would engage the pop?). What of the short attention span of the US population? It took 10 years for Vietnam to end - 10 years before the protests had an effect. SOLDIERDIARY makes a great point. Conscription expanded the bloodshed/destruction of war. What about all the brushfire wars pre-WWII and post-WII in South America? Below the threshold, I assume? I am really trying to figure out your argument. Sounds like a great thesis project.
Mr. Rick, sorry for hijacking this thread - I had to ask...
"What I have so far is the AVF makes the military easier to use. I am not sure there is any historical evidence to support the claim."
Iraq! Jesus H. Christ! Iraq! If you can't see that, let's drop the argument.
"It took 10 years for Vietnam to end - 10 years before the protests had an effect."
Wrong. In 1968, LBJ chose not to run because of the nation's growing opposition to the Vietnam war and the success in early primaries of Gene McCarthy on an anti-war platform. Vice President Humphrey was tainted by his association with LBJ and the war. Nixon ran promising to end the war and won. Anyone who lived through the '60s and early '70s would not make the statement you did: our entire nation changed.
"Conscription expanded the bloodshed/destruction of war."
And well it may - war is a bloody business and, once engaged, may evolve to a strategy of attrition. But i would not use WW-II to make that point.
"What about all the brushfire wars pre-WWII and post-WII in South America? Below the threshold, I assume?"
Yes, and fought that way, by standing forces needed for quick response and small conflict ('zero-promotion' war). The AVF was invented only in 1973; the ability to engage militarily without a draft existed before and after - no point proven.
In summary, four promises of the AVF: 1). We will always have the number of servicemembers we need; 2). We will always have the quality of servicemembers we need; 3). the AVF will not change the character of the military in relation to the nation it protects; and 4). it will actually work. All four points can be argued; the last two are clinchers: the AVF no longer represents the nation it serves but rather exists separately as what it is, a standing army; the AVF has not produced the victory promised in Iraq and is failing in Afghanistan ... and note: these are not peer competitors.
The prospect of mobilizing a draft really makes a politician's head hurt; won't go there unless the case for war is overwhelming and there is no question of national support. Contrast that with Bush's glib mendacity and the easy votes in Congress that gave us Iraq and damned us to the longest war in our history in Afghanistan. War is a serious business, a nation's business: outsourcing war to an AVF is an immoral evasion that makes bad war far too easy. We're engaged in two bad wars to prove it, one bad on its purpose and the second on its prosecution.
ERIC, you criticize the Navy’s senior leadership (justifiably in many cases) yet it is an AVF Navy. The most professional and effective Navy this country ever produced was in WW2 with fresh conscripts many of whom had never seen the ocean. One of the key reasons for this was the ‘quality’ of the general recruit in that the Navy and USAAF had first choice of the Category 1’s and 2’s thus highly trainable human material. Had we a properly functioning National Service act today the technical services like the Navy and AF would have a much broader and deeper pool of recruits of superior quality than today’s average recruit. The Marines and NSW would likely still get all the pugnacious recruits they need because of their prestige and elite status. Since you are sensibly big on training I would thank that the better the quality recruit in education, industriousness and self discipline the easier for the Navy to train them to a higher standard and expect them to stay out of trouble?
The Navy still gets a highly educated recruit for the most part, far more so than the WWII era recruits and you are also being selective-WWI, Korea, Vietnam, heck, even the Civil War were full of conscripts, how did some of the leadership work out then? Mass assaults in WWI and the Civil War, on line fighting with the introduction or repeating rifles, the mini ball, etc...it all goes back to how are leaders who make the choices on how the troops are trained and prepared are they themselves trained and prepared. The Draft Military did well in WWII dues to one thing-focus on combat leadership, ie; get the war won, now we focus on "Don't rock the boat" and "Keep the people in office happy and you will retire a 4 star".
Training is and always will be the key, recruiting is a tiny part of the problem as I have stated several times in previous posts. Train, Mentor and reward good leaders. The USMC is also an AVF branch and manage to maintain training standards, esprit de corps and have, IMHO, the best officer corps by far. So, tell me, would a draft somehow changes the training and leadership of the Navy, AF or Army? I think not and this whole hope that a draft military would save the day seems a bit much to me. I have said again and again the only benefits that a draft military would have-
a possible reconnect between the civilian culture and military culture (something I am not sure I want) and there would be a more broad distribution of the burden, both the rich and the poor would be forced to join that way, now the burden is carried by the working and middle class. The poor not being able to pass the ASVAB and/or not having a HS Degree and the rich not thinking they should serve. I actually do not think that would spread the burden out though, I pointed prior to the examples of Bush and Gore both skipping out on duty due to connections. I just think the draft is something you use in a real emergency-WWI, WWII, The Civil War, etc....
Al Gore served in the US Army and in Vietnam. "Al Gore's military record is in no particular need of improvement. He was one of only about a dozen of the 1,115 Harvard graduates in the Class of '69 who went to Vietnam." Fuller discussion here: http://partners.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/071100wh-gore.html
"The poor not being able to pass the ASVAB." Arrogant bullshit.
"I just think the draft is something you use in a real emergency-WWI, WWII, The Civil War, etc...." Iraq and Afghanistan: what are these? Playtime? If it's not serious, why are we there? When did war become a not-serious business? Or are you signing on to my thesis that the AVF has enabled an imperial world view, with all the evils of a standing army so inimical to our American Democracy?
Have never said a draft would 'save the day.' Have said it would have kept us from failure in Afghanistan (our current situation) and out of Iraq completely. It also leavens leadership quality and courage, as in WW-II.
"...a possible reconnect between the civilian culture and military culture (something I am not sure I want)" Ah, the superiority of the military individual. Again: arrogant bullshit.
Gore did a shorter tour and was not in a combat unit, nice try, do some research
The poor are not doing as well on the ASVAB due to OUR poor education system, go look it up Ducky, that is why the burden is falling on the working and middle class. The socio-economic groups at the lower end of the spectrum suffer from poor schools and hence often do not get a HS degree and/or pass the ASVAB. I wish I was making that up, you have a problem with that? Take it up with the NEA and AFT, don't use "arrogant bullshit" to cover up your ignorance.
We should be in OEF Ducky and the fact that you do not even do basic research shows how out of touch you truly are on many military matters, heck, you still thought military areas were all company towns with everyone living on base, that the NEX/AEX etc...were subsidised, etc...etc...etc....I also recall you saying that we should not question our orders and we even had an argument about why you should behind closed doors. Really, you never cease to re-enforce my opinions about 0's. So, tell me, why should we not be in OEF? And your Draft Military, the one that was involved in Vietnam from 59'-75', how did they do again?
Ducky, the last line about the "superiority", it is different culture (Military) than the one it supports (Civilian), necessary to be so, where did I say it was superior? Again, I recall you saying we should reflect our society in past posts, culturally. That does not jive with a good working military. It also kind of contradicts some of your posts in the past about just doing what your told by the civilian leadership and not questioning it, so should we question openly, I mean that is what civilian society would do and you want us to be a reflection of that correct? Or, should we just shut up and do what we are told Ducky?
Ducky, you often post ignorant, uninformed comments and what you base them on I have no idea. How the heck "Proceedings" lets you write for them amazes me due to the out of touch some of the comments you post are, it does in fact prove that our officer corps is lacking in ground truth in a lot of areas. I see it all the time, people to far removed from the fight really have no idea what is going on in their own AOs.
Here is a real set of questions Ducky-
How would you repair the terrible leadership in the other branches? (Army, Navy, AF)
How would you restore many of the traditions that have gone away in the Navy due to PC?
Do you think the 2 year assignments of Officers to billets is the way to go and if so, why? If not, what would you change?
How would you make the Officer Corps better overall?
Tell me the advantages of a Draft Military vs an AVF? (not including what you hope will be mass protests like Vietnam, since that is an action you hope will stop the war and will not in fact improve the military)
1. Am not trying to 'fix' the military with a draft. Am pushing to reform the military's relationship with the nation it serves.
2. Thou shalt not froth at the mouth.
The last post was hardly a froth and you alway say that a draft military is superior to a AVF, you have talked of their past performance in posts, even posts on how they did in combat vs "our" performance in OEF and OIF, so please, spare me the back pedal. Lets not kid ourselves, I remember most of your posts, hard to forget ;)
As for reform with the nation it serves, reform what? How? What are your goals and how do you really think a draft would help? It certainly is not going to help at the leadership spots, which is what this topic is on. Good leaders? Well, that comes down to training, mentoring and time in (wisdom), so- what are the benefits vs the cost?
I've said the AVF is failing in its missions in its two wars: with this much blood and treasure invested, we should not be so totally baffled by small bands of irregulars. We are losing our ass. The draft would have kept our focus on the first one and allowed us to cap victory. It would have kept us from ever getting into the second one in Iraq.
As to fixing My Favorite Army, that gives me about as much trouble as responding to nitwits. But I'd start with a fundamental, reform-oriented review of every aspect of the Army and go from there.
AF? I'd absorb it into the Army - no longer can justify 'combat operations in the air' when there ain't none and the mission has evolved into space/cyber in one direction and pure ground-war support in the other. We do have need for coninuted space/cyber functions; maybe a new branch of service to serve these new warfare areas.
USMC: zero change; they know who their customer is and they pay their way.
Navy: break the backs of the three dominant warfare communities and get the officer corps back to being blue-suiters with primary loyalty to the nation and the Navy, not the particular warfare specialty they serve in.
Finally, I don't like mercenaries, be they contractors in the war zone or AVF professionals. We need a cadre on which to fall in on for big conflicts and to serve as a ready-response force and military presence at all times. But a standing army living apart from society and claiming special privelege and position? Nope. Not in my country.
RD,
When your done with those changes, you can fly away on your majic unicorn. Hopefully the monsters won't catch you on your way out.
As for the rest of us, we will look for intelligent, informative posts that are relevant to the threads.
RD, your wish that somehow we would re-connect with society via a draft is a nice one it is just that, a wish.
While I agree with your AF Comment, no need for them to be a different branch and if the Army would train all of it's people as Infantry first it would give us a better pool with one more branch who had basic skills to pull from. I disagree with just about all else you say-
The Army has a problem at the leadership level, same as does the Navy and AF, the simply have a poor model for leadership at the 06 and above, it starts at the 05 level. It is also has a problem with how it trains it's people and billets them-2 years is not enough time to know and do your job or make changes in unit as an OIC or CO. The lack of training in the non-infantry arms is dismal, it needs to be re-vamped.
The Navy, same problems, they are loyal to their rank and careers, then the warfare pin and at the top they have the same problems in leadership as does the Army. The Navy itself has poorly trained sailor compared to just a decade ago.
Lastly, RD, you seem to think we live apart and claim some sort of superior position, what exactly are you talking about? I think you are far to removed to comment like that, your past posts on military bases being 'Company Towns" or housing, etc...is a bit typical of your post without the knowledge base to back it up. Even in your past career field I recall you saying that the Sub Capt's were just fine in what they did and not risk adverse at all, again, out of touch since I have seen it myself when working with them over and over again with the rare exception and usually that is only due to a direct order from someone above them. If you think that the military tends to view it's culture as being superior to the civilian culture it protects, I would agree with you but also that part of that culture is a strong belief that we protect and serve the US Constitution-Period, end of story and if you do not think that Military Members in your era held the same views I have a bridge in NY to sell you.
JPWREL,
RD is a bit removed from the reality of what is going on today, it is evident in a lot of his posts and while I am always thankful for someone who has served he is hardly a weeping willow who calls people names (Note that the AVF are mercs in his view) and makes comments that a retired man should be able to take if he is going to give. I also would not call the Sub force elite anymore, they are better fed than the rest of the fleet and in that way, yes they are elite but outside of that, not so much anymore. The Navy RD grew up in is all but gone-traditions, standards, combat focus, etc...gone. Many of his fond memories of Company Towns, Subsidized NEX and Housing, Free Medical and Dental, all gone....
So, while I respect RD for serving and putting his money where his mouth is, most of his views are outdated and uninformed and calling the AVF mercs? Well, that is just typical of him and speaking of superior position, I think it is Ducky who seems to have that idea that he is somehow owed some special respect for his views due to having served for so long and I suspect because he got published a couple of times. He is owed a thanks and respect for that time in service but not his views if they are that far off and as often is the case, terribly uninformed.
SOLDIERSDIARY, RD’s comments may be pipe dreams considering the military/political /industrial complex that has evolved into the national security state which we must live with today. But his views are philosophically much more in line with the spirit of a democratic republic such as ours and it’s founding documents. I also think you do a disservice to RD who is well known and long experienced personality in the USN’s elite submarine community with your disrespectful comments merely because you have a different point of view.
RD - not really trying to make a point so much as trying to understand your position. I assumed your vehement dislike for the AVF is based upon some solid argument (which you provided - thank you). I am not a fan of conscription based upon my interaction with foreign conscript forces. I think professionalization and competency suffer in a conscript military. Conscription is associated with a short (1-2 year) commitment and high turnover of personnel but it certainly weighs heavily into the political calculus when those nations commit troops to war. Germany's role in Afghanistan comes to mind as a good example. I do agree that the US military is isolated from society as a whole, however. I view your argument as a means to improve the process our country uses when committing to a major war or getting out of an escalating one. Tell me if I get it: politicians will think twice before sending our troops to combat and when small contingencies start to spiral out-of-control, will less likely expand our military commitment without significant domestic support. As a soldier I am more concerned with our military effectiveness than with the military's role in the democratic system. Our imperial ambitions are a result of politicians who we vote into office, not the civil-military link (or lack thereof). I am sure there is an argument that the draft and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive. I agree, there is an argument but my experience with foreign draft-based militaries doesn't instill confidence that it works well. As a soldier, I want to get the boys in, complete the mission, and get them home. After being asked by a reporter if he thought Iraq was a 'good' war, my First Sergeant said, "You don't want me to pick which wars we fight. Maybe there will be one where we disagree, then where will we be at?" There is a risk in this line of thinking. We could end up like German General Staff in WWII but I think our values and traditions mitigate that well. I do not care for characterizing our military as mercenaries - it doesn't exactly pay that well compared to the risk. The men and women I serve with are dedicated to our nation. They do the best they can with what they have. Also, they volunteered! They have stepped forward to serve the nation. I recently met an Australian officer who told me his army is a mercenary force compared to ours. The comment resulted from our talk regarding the number of deployments we had; I had 38 months worth. Much like conscription, volunteerism also has a strong military tradition. What I do not understand is how a conscript military will do better in a fight. Even in WWII, the victorious draft-army was led by mostly West Pointers or careerists at the top.
Just to clarify: Even with a conscript army in 2003, going to Iraq was at least an even bet. There was quite a lot of support for the war. I was an infant in the 70's so I have no experience there but my point about Vietnam was that with a conscript army, it took 10 years for us to leave. I agree that the war changed us but it still took a long time to change direction after our initial commitment. Touché on the attrition comment and brushfire wars - I agree fully.
Lastly, getting back to the main thread here. Our military leaders, the generals, will always come from the professional-soldier class. By definition, they are careerists and the draft will likely not increase the pool. Training, education and experience are the main ways to impact our future leaders. New Goldwater act in the works; not only is joint important but interagency? I do like the Marine approach of every Marine an infantryman.
RD - I appreciate the discussion. Sincere thanks.
Army Officer Mid-Career Schooling
To improve the Army officer corps, we need to return to mid-level schooling selection boards. It used to be that only the top 50% of Army officers attended Intermediate Level Education (ILE - Major's education). This generally limited opportunities for majors and only the top 50% got the career-enhancing jobs, possibly providing more experience to the best performers. Not perfect but a culling process none-the-less. We could also raise the bar of ILE if only the best 50% attend.
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