Thursday, July 1, 2010 - 10:43 AM

I was checking something in Eliot Cohen's classic Supreme Command, the best book every written about how presidents should handle generals, when I noticed this very good summary of last week's events:
Generals are, or should be, disposable. Statesman should not, of course, discard them thoughtlessly, nor should they treat them discourteously. Yet all four of these statesman [discussed in the book] showed themselves able to treat generals in line with Gladstone's first requirement for success as a prime minister: 'One must be a good butcher.' Indeed, it was the most mild-mannered of the four, Lincoln, who relieved commanders the most frequently."
As we digest the McChrystal blowup, those are words worth keeping in mind.
Like Lincoln, Gates is mild-mannered, and has relieved generals left and right. A far cry from Rumsfeld, who was all bark and little bite.
Generals usually possess an attitude of self-importance that only they fully comprehend how to wage war. It reminds me of Napoleon’s famous observation that “both in war and prostitution amateurs are often best”.
Abe couldn't spare horses, but . . . .
Though the story is true, I am reciting it from memory in part: Abe Lincoln, upon hearing that the Gray Ghost, John Mosby had captured a Union general officer along with the officer's mounts, was heard to say he could spare the general, but the horses cost money.
The problem today, as pointed out a few years ago by a serving military officer, whose name escapes me, is that modern presidents seem to believe they don't have sufficient personal expertise to override their military subordinates and demand the relief of a nonperforming or underperforming commander in combat.
How ironic that you would put up a picture of Lincoln standing next to general John A. McClernand and one of those 'despicable' private contractor guys--Allan Pinkerton. lol
History repeats. While the civilian leadership hire and fire generals for winning wars and elections, private industry has always been there, waiting patiently for you guys to get organized.
No govy, no taxy, no joby for Pinkie
Pinkerton wasn't a producer, he didn't make things, so let's get away from the honest businessman routine, ok. He was dependent on the government for his startup. Later on when he did start relying on private industries for his business he and his boys were involved in some pretty messed up crap, and one of the "private" industries he worked for, the railroad, would not have existed if not for government largess.
Face it, Feral, you might dislike them, but without 'em, hoss, you ain't got a job.
Left to Marshall and most of the Army's top generals, we probably would have landed in France much earlier than June 44. FDR made the final call here, averting likely disaster..
Well, yes, technically he did. But the cross-Channel invasion was strenuously resisted by Churchill and the British for almost two years, for both good reasons and bad. What Roosevelt might have done on his own is a moot point, but no analysis of his thinking about a second front in France would be complete without noting the strongest influence upon it.
I am curious, what was the 'bad reason' that Churchill did not want a premature front on the continent before the allies were ready and had acquired mastery of the air of the potential battle space?
I can't speak for exactly what Zathras means, but I'd expect that the "bad" reasons Churchill and the British opposed invading the continent was their preference for a peripheral strategy (operations in the Adriatic, Greece, and Rhodes and other Aegean islands, with the aim of bringing Turkey into the war) rather than operations in France. Even as late as the Tehran conference and after, the British were stalling on signing off on a 1944 invasion or appointing a commander for it. Churchill and many other British leaders, understandably, feared a repeat of the WWI western front, and preferred a return to the traditional British strategy for the continent of marginal operations and finding continental allies to do the heavy lifting.
In any case, FDR was correct in 1942-43 in overruling his generals who wanted to invade France. And he was correct again at Tehran when he joined with Stalin to overrule Churchill and force the British to agree to schedule the cross-channel attack for 1944.
Much of the enthusiasm for offensives in southern Europe came from Churchill personally, particularly later in the war. In his disinterest in a cross-Channel assault before mid-1944, Churchill was more completely in sympathy with the British military leadership.
OK, I understand but I would say that rather than 'bad' reason one should say a ‘different’ reason since there was some logic to the Turkish strategy. By the time of Tehran Churchill had become the very junior partner in the allied relationship but at the same time likely had a more profound understanding the consequences of Stalin’s inevitable march into Eastern, indeed, Central Europe. He was always searching for a way to mitigate that influence. Of the quality historians John Lukas probably writes most illuminatingly about this strategic paradox.
His Actions Speak for Themselves
Yes, he was influenced by Churchill, as opposed to the desires of this miiltary advisors. His signing on to the North Africa invasion also went against the Pentagon's wishes. Later on, in Tehran, he then endorsed the Soviets' demands to open a Western Front, to the great distress of Churchill. I don't think FDR was in anyones pocket when the final decisions had to be made. It was his call for unconditional surrender that sealed the Third Reich's fate.
That is Allan Pinkerton and Gen. John McClernand with Lincoln in the picture.
Walt
This reminded me of Lincoln's famous quotes;
"If General McClellan isn't going to use his army, I'd like to borrow it for a time."
and
"Sending armies to McClellan is like shoveling fleas across a barnyard. Not half of them get there."
As far as McChrystal goes, Lincoln's other quote;
"It is better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to open one's mouth and remove all doubt."
seems appropriate.
How presidents should treat generals
Can you imagine, Hairysteve20, any President today being able to state such thoughts as Lincoln did about his generals? No way.
Everything has changed. Not the least of which is that we are no longer fighting a Civil War on our own citizens, who know because THEY are the ones being involved in the everyday way of war, what their generals are actually accomplishing.
Today it is all filtered through opinions of this or that person who "reports" to us what is "really" happening.
That being said, this President has made his own comment on those generals who believe that their contempt for civilian leadership gives them permission to undermine his policies, publically and privately.
Yes, but the 'generals are disposable' logic can be turned around to suggest Obama has made a mistake in making Petraeus now seem absolutely necessary - and if this has been done for PR's sake, which appears to be the case [after all, isn't the message here that there are so few generals in the US military capable of running a COIN that we we're forced to demote our 'best' general out of CENTCOM?] then it seems to me the table is being set for some serious troubles down the road. Did Obama give Petraeus assurances re withdrawals, troop increases, Eikenberry, putting a muzzle on Biden etc etc? What if he did but Obama backtracks? Or he didn't but Petraeus, now the 'necessary' general whose reputation hangs in the balance, has no choice but to act as if he has the latitude?
Much of the press want to see calling on Petraeus as a clever move by Obama - but seems to me you can just as easily characterize it as an expression of weakness and shallow, short sighted thinking.
I was a big fan of Cohen's book but it is a bit tainted by the reality that he served in Rumsfeld's Pentagon, where Generals were ignored. It is one thing to fire Generals who are incompetent, but it is another to ignore them when they provide inconvenient yet sound military advice.
Yes there are times when Generals and Colonels need to be replaced. What about today? When was the last time someone from State was replaced? When do we see the leadership of Lincoln or even FDR? So far, the military leberated Afghanistan once and toppled Sadam and then told that they need to build nations. Isn't that the work of the other foregin focused Department? Isn't the military there to flex the political muscle?
So Generals are disposable but what happens to a nation whose military can destroy anything it wants but the political component can't find its way out of a paper bag?
is NOT the job of the State Department. We used to have an agency that specialized in that, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but the Clinton and Bush2 administrations took that responsibility away from them and turned USAID into a general contractor, charged with hiring private sector firms to do the job they were allegedly responsible for. I know of several former non-profit organizations that became for-profits in order to take advantage of the money that could be made. The answer is not to blame State, traditionally terribly underfunded, but to reconstitute the old USAID and get them back to work doing what they used to do best.
Tom Ricks fearlessly goes for the Lincoln comparison
Actually, the recent relief of McChrystal is much more mundane than high level conflicts between President s and Generals. The real comparison is with GW Bush's firing of Adm Fallon when Fallon blathered about his fabulousness in an interview in Esquire at the time the surge was playing out. Bush fired him, correctly, and as I recall, there wasn't a lot of admiration, not to say puppylike leg-humping, from the "media" for Bush.
Show me I'm wrong. Show me where you compared Bush to Lincoln and Truman and celebrated his Presidentialness. I don't have to go to the internet to know you attacked Bush as a cretinous moron and evil genius who unfairly fired the brilliant, truth-telling Fallon yada yada. So predictable, yawn.
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