Monday, June 28, 2010 - 11:13 AM

I had an article in the Sunday Washington Post explaining why I think Gen. Petraeus faces a tougher challenge in Afghanistan in 2010 than he did in Iraq in 2007. Also, I was on Meet the Press yesterday with a whole cast of interesting characters -- Sen. John McCain, Rep. Barbara Lee, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, and handsome writers Wes Moore and Sebastian Junger.
I watched the show. I especially liked your warning to the Congresswoman. The political forces on this will make for a tough several months for the President. Having P4 there may provide the cover to withdraw if he believes necessary in the national interest. Still, even this tough because many parents (like the ones from Dateline last night) will wonder why we lost so many great Americans only to possibly withdraw.
Yours and Bacevich's articles in WP yesterday were both very good, important.
From the article:
"It seemed novel only in the context of Iraq, where for many years the American commanders had terrified families by knocking down doors in the middle of the night, treating locals not as the prize to be won but as the playing field on which they confronted the insurgents."
It was clueless Ray Orierno who was responsible for a lot of that. I often wondered who left him in Iraq so long. Did he ever learn anything?
Walt
I wrote about this somewhere near the end of my book 'The Gamble.'
Best,
Tom
Gee, have I got to buy ALL your books?
Ordierno did what? Yes, cluelessly abuse the Iraqi populace in his AO, or yes he did learn anything?
Walt
If you need I can dig out the page reference.
1) Yes you really must buy all his books (LOL). Actually you really should at least buy Fiasco and The Gamble - they are after all sequels per se.
2) If you read Fiasco you'll find that Tom is not so kind to Odierno. If you then read The Gamble you will find that Odierno is transformed by his relationship with Petraeus (Mutt and Jeff) and Ms Emma Sky, and others et al to the way of the Dragon (ok, that's my exaggeration for effect).
3) I am skeptical that leopards can change their spots or that old dogs learn new tricks. So I give Odierno the benefit of doing better as an MNC-I commander than he did as a division CDR perhaps due to issues of chain of command, guidance, intent, and perhaps circumstance - instead of any grand ephiphany on the part of the good General O.
4) Regardless of our interpretations (Tom's, and my own) it seems that Odierno has done an excellent job in maintaining and growing Petraeus' gains in Iraq - and for that he deserves all due credit.
5) Conclusion: Seems he learned something - or simply has done things differently.
[Note: I take particular interest in both Odierno's and Thurman's tenures as CDR of 4th ID - as a former member of the Ivy Division. Sadly they didn't have a good reputation in the earlier phases of Iraq]
"Yours and Bacevich's articles in WP yesterday were both very good, important."
I definitely concur.
Walt
Correct me if I am wrong. But Stan, who ain’t the Man anymore, decided he would have to concentrate his forces around the major population centers in what is obviously an economy of force, since some old European once stated to defend everywhere is to defend no where. General Petraeus as CENTCOM, obviously approved this operational tactic, and I see no reason it will change.
If Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, is a rural centric country, how does one really implement COIN outside the major population centers (which is questionable even in Kandahar), where the Taliban may or may not be providing services, but are at least able to dispense justice, and protection, through a shadow parallel government, unlike the central Karzai cabal, and where there also seems to be more incentive to support the Taliban, and less incentive to cooperate with our forces?
Again something I cannot see Gen. Petraeus changing anytime soon either. But perhaps what he can change, is his commander-in-chief's caging the withdrawal time frame in semantics for political reasons, and define it – that in itself is maddening as it stands now.
Tom,
Any idea where Junger was getting his 400K killed by the TB? Did he mean by the TB or during the warlord years? He invoked this number as a caution against pulling out prematurely, but is there any guarantee that the TB would or could come back into Afghanistan like they did during the 1990s? I think those HiLuxes would be easy prey for $50 IEDs we were seeing all over the place. Furthermore, it would seem that drones could continue to attack AQ/TB C2 and training camps w/o troops in the country.
K2
f Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, is a rural centric country, how does one really implement COIN outside the major population centers (which is questionable even in Kandahar), where the Taliban may or may not be providing services, but are at least able to dispense justice, and protection, through a shadow parallel government, unlike the central Karzai cabal, and where there also seems to be more incentive to support the Taliban, and less incentive to cooperate with our forces?
Again something I cannot see Gen. Petraeus changing anytime soon either. But perhaps what he can change, is his commander-in-chief's caging the withdrawal time frame in replica TAG semantics for political reasons, and define it – that in itself is maddening as it stands now.
(10)
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