When Eisenhower had to remove his best combat commander, he did not end his career. Perhaps the same arrangement can be made for McChrystal. His expertise in the special warfare world would be sorely missed in the Army with his departure from active duty. We are liklely to need more and more of it in the years to come.

An essential element in assuring unity of purpose in pursuing national objectives in any country is recognition of the importance of the primacy of the U.S. Ambassador as the leader of the country team.

Gen.McChrystal's direct relationship with Karzi served to send a mixed message that undermined a key element in the larger strategic interest of the United States. Unless and until the Government of Afghanistan can be counted on to move to good governance and change from the age old systems of coruption and favoritism, there can be no victory on the battle field than has real meaning.

Cohesion of the diplomatic and military efforts are essential to success. In my view, that cohesion was undermined by a brilliant general who forgot that he was but one leg in that effort.

My views are from my experience as one who has served a full career as an Army officer and another as a foreign Service Officer.

Did anyone watch GEN P on CSPAN tonight? This is a big hat to wear, I believe people have some unrealistic expectations as to what is accomplishable in A-Stan. I mean most countries rich in natural resources with ethnic/social/religious strife tend to fare so well......that's a joke.

As for the head of the country team I would agree to a point. When the COM is appointed he is explicitly reminded that the military falls out of his purview when the CIC directs it. That is the case here. There is no primacy of the COM or the commanding general. They are peers and partners who's roles should work to support each other and the security strategy. Essentially the role that you are referring to is that of the DOD Attaché in the embassy. There the COM has primacy.

Additionally, in this instance GEN Mc was not solely the senior US GEN but also the senior NATO GEN. In this role the counterpart was the British Ambassador serving a dual hatted role as NATO viceroy and GB ambassador. This is emphasized by the fact that the GEN that stepped up until GEN P shows up is a brit.

I am an FSO (rtd.) (and former SSGT) and knew Holbrook back in the day. He was an anal orifice then and remains so today. I agree with JPWREL that his position is superfluous, and don't understand what he is supposed to be doing.
As for Eikenberry, I don't know the man, but it seemed very strange at the time that they would take the former commander in Afghanistan and make him ambassador, and expect him to stay out of the military side of the equation. He should go as well.

IMO Eikenberry will re-retire, ritual reprisal being the normal course in leadership shootouts. That was the step that was left out when Powell resigned. But then Rove had a narrative to salvage, and Cheney needed someone to belligerently sit on the generals thru the next midterms, insisting 'no insurgency, no civil war'.

It's interesting listening to Lindsey Graham/McCain/Lieberman openly saluting Presidential authority thru the Return of Petraeus, while feverishly re-taping the box they thought they had WH war policy in. To hear them talk.. it's good generals on one side, with dissenting civilians (Eikenberry and Jones?) trying to ruin a perfectly long war with timetables. They love P, but he better loudly mouth 'only if conditions allow drawdown' in new confirmation hearings? Hmm.

They're re-fighting W's lame-duck Iraq Withdrawal retreat. As if the flawed executives and legislatures in the occupied territories won't generally favor their own sovereignty over foreign (us, pak-pashtun) forces.

As a footnote to Gen. McChrystal's career, the hated Biden proposal, to pare the AfPak campaign down to bribing warlords, long patrols and bombing bad guys from the shadows, that would have directed Stan to run the kind of war that he spent his life training for, far from the cameras. The kind that we actually have the lift assets to operate, without funding the Taliban thru the Pakistani freight mafia. Oh, for that mission now...

Wouldn't it make a great BD Season Three plot line if Odierno did take CENTCOM, over Petraeus, and had to decide where the main line of effort was:
a) to get us safely unstuck from Iraq while securing the Gulf,
or
b) to continue to sink costs, protect opium exports and exhaust the force against Pakistani Pashtuns?

Sure, Odierno seems to be doing well and to have things in hand (about as best as could be expected in his position) in Iraq. But he's scheduled to rotate out by September to be replaced by Austin (another former MNC-I commander, like Odierno, but from 2008-9). Don't know much about him, even though he was corps commander while I was there the second time. With so much still up in the air in Iraq, it seems to me that it might take someone a little more established and a little higher profile than Austin to get that country through the next year. And I think Ambassador Hill is retiring there soon too, after only about 12-18 months in the job. Such instability in the senior leadership in Iraq, at the same time that Petraeus is distracted by taking over in Afghanistan, could cause serious problems. I like Tom's suggestion that Odierno be extended in his position a while longer - I'd say at least 6-8 months or so.

Or duel confirmation hearings?
;)
The Senate hawks clearly want an election cycle shot at putting Presidential authority in a straight jacket.

I heard a retired green man on TV coment on trash-talk in the RS article that he's never even heard said about Marines stationed nearby. Interservice poetry slams can get rough, eh Tyrtaios?

A little inter-service rivalry is a good thing, but only up to a point Double W, when it becomes a distraction and creates ill will. The Army's problem is though they do in fact do good things, they have a mediocre public affairs branch, whereas the Marine Corps does, and always has had, a public affairs branch that equals or exceeds Joe Stalin’s PR machine.. So the Corps gets their message out better. We'll see how the next CMC articulates manuever from the sea in the 21st century with a Navy that is more and more showing a disinterest in supporting such.

I think you may be right...Allen could come up for nomination, after all, he was a candidate for Commandant--or they could move Mattis in when he departs JFCOM. One thing is for sure, it's gonna be an interesting time for rumors intelligence (RUMINT) around the beltway.

Suresh, if you're really an Indian spy, keep giving us the classified dope, because my sources are being eclipsed by reporting in a youth culture magazine.

What the heck mixi ? You, Sir, have a very lame definition of Spy.

But yes since you added Indian to it. It might be true. hahahaha

I get the feeling that some who comment here like the above think Iraq has been safely tucked into bed and lights turned out – I don’t think so. There is no reason to believe that anything has been accomplished in Iraq other than the removal of a vile Baathist Sunni minority dictatorship to be replaced by a Shiite majority as intent as the old Saddamist’s were in having their own way. Sorry but story not over.

Wishing Petraeus well in his new digs in Kabul but any combination of different ROE’s or a different Ambassador or larger number of trigger pullers will not impress the Taliban who think (probably rightly) they are winning. Petraeus needs the authority to do two things have a more flexible time limit and second to develop a dialogue with the Taliban without the influence of the endless war clique McCain/Graham/Leiberman.

I don't think that the war in Iraq has been won, so don't put words in my mouth. You'll notice that I don't say that, at all. What I do say is that we now have achieved the potential for victory, and that we are moving towards something resembling peace and stability. I am not under any illusion that things are all sunshine and rainbows in Iraq-- we fought hard to get to where we are, but where we are is not victory, and even this great progress could slip away if we let it. This war was a tough slog, and I don't think that we've reached the final chapter quite yet.

To your opinion about us accomplishing nothing in Iraq and us trading a Sunni tyranny for a Shia tyranny... I must say that you are wrong. Look, agree or disagree with the decision to invade Iraq, but Saddam Hussein was a very murderous dictator. Thousands killed by chemical weapons, thousands more killed by his thugs, tens of thousands killed in pointless wars with Iran... this guy racked up quite the death count (some say hundreds of thousands, some say over a million). The moral equivalency saying that the guys in charge now are just as bad as Saddam is, simply put, ludicrous. Now, the guys in charge might not be great, some are probably thoroughly corrupt, and some are probably bad to the core, but there are also plenty of decent guys trying to work for their country's future. What we have now is a vast improvement over Saddam Hussein, and if you don't believe that then you are simply ignorant of the facts-- you are vastly understating Saddam's cruelty and vastly overstating the ill-intent of Iraq's current leadership.

Also, one must remember that a semi-autonomous and generally peaceful Kurdish region is quite an accomplishment, seeing as up to just a few years ago Saddam Hussein was still trying to wipe the Kurds out. Now the Kurds, 20% or so of Iraq's population, have a real chance at building a solid future for themselves. That is a real improvement for a significant part of the population (to say nothing about the majority Shia who no longer live in fear of Saddam's secret police). Now I'm not here to argue one way or another about whether achieving a safer Iraq for the Iraqis was worth it, but we did accomplish it.

It's difficult to see anything that Bush did that was obviously reasonable. Abandon Afghanistan? Fabricate an Iraq enemy? Invade Iraq? Thoroughly screw up the occupation? Even the vaunted surge was of far less merit than the Sunni Awakening that preceded it, the result of USMC brilliance in the field and nothing from the Putz in the White House.

The reason the current Commander in Chief's leadership is praised is because it is leadership. The last guy? Leadership? C'mon.

...Bush and every member of his team that has not written a tell-all memoir deserves great credit for every thing that may be said to have gone well during and immediately after his administration. All the things that went badly are things that just happened.

Don't you read Shadow Government?

No need to mock my quote as you did above, especially because the statement that "He [Petraeus] snatched a potential victory from the almost certain jaws of defeat" is, well, the truth! Not to rehash the history, but we DID face almost certain defeat in Iraq-- violence was spiraling out of control, Al Qaeda had gained some significant footholds throughout the country, sectarian gangs were absolutely ravaging Baghdad, the situation seemed utterly bleak. Perhaps most importantly, public support for the war had ebbed to a precipitously low level and Congress was looking for an escape hatch. Defeat seemed likely. General David Petraeus-- along with more soldiers and a significant new strategy-- was tasked with, yes, snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. The so-called surge wasn't just our best strategy, it also happened to be our last real strategy, too-- and it is thanks to the “Great Surge” (a strategy that you also seem to mock for unknown reasons) that we can actually discuss anything resembling peace or stability in Iraq, a reality that would have been unheard of just a few short years ago.

As to your other points... what, exactly, is so foolish about giving General Petraeus that which he needs to win? Now don't misrepresent me-- I'm not arguing for an endless war or an open-ended commitment as you try to claim-- but that doesn't mean that we shouldn't give him the resources and flexibility that he needs. And I don't think that is a violation of anyone's constitutional responsibilities. The man who saved Iraq (or at least gave it the chance to save itself) is the only man that I trust to try to do the same in Afghanistan. The past two administrations -- both Bush and Obama -- have mucked around in Afghanistan without a clear plan for success. And sure, to another point of yours, it'd be nice to wait around for the Congress to finally assert itself or contribute some meaningful ideas or leadership-- but it hasn't happened in the past almost ten years, and frankly we don't have the luxury to wait around for them to get their act together. Our current war effort is chaotic: a dysfunctional relationship between ambassadors, envoys, generals, the President, and his team. Let's cut through the chaos and allow Dave Petraeus to do his thing. I don't understand why anyone would think that continuing to muddle through as we have been for the past ten years is somehow the more “constitutional” position. Let's support the constitution by defeating those “foreign enemies”-- by giving Petraeus what he needs to make it happen.

Well spoken, JD. Mocking is poor form. I accept the reproach.

But consider, what is the difference between snatching 'potential' victory from defeat, vs fighting back to a conditional stalemate (sunni-shiite, US-Iran) from defeat? (Defeat in this case being further bloody chaos and descent into regional war on our watch.) Both describe a heroic effort, a relative victory, our warriors shielding the population. But they don't ring the same. One shouts of (potential) resolution to our satisfaction, the other salvages a bad deal, accepting a continued conflict and cost, uncertain prospects.

The war sacrifice and improved circumstance for both Iraq and the USA after our 2007 counteroffensive is, as you say, remarkable. It was a doubtful outcome for even Petraeus, signalling caution for the next round. But given the dissembling PR offensive from Team Rumsfeld, and a broad national self deception up until 2006, I don't accept that Team Petraeus' infowar tactic of lowering expectations was accompanied by the kind of transparency that builds an accurate history so close to events.

ie:

How did POTUS' orders to Petraeus differ from Casey's? How was DP's 'commanders mind' then re-formulated for Odierno, and how did that sync with Odierno's prior tactical plans, dispositions, and interactions with Jack Keane? JSOC's 2006-8 role in W. Iraq is mentioned as significant, but that strategic attrition campaign is never sized, or the 'surge' difference described. Where was McChrystal's JSOC element in the chain under Odierno / Petraeus during the surge? (Covert ops into Iran was an element in Fallon's beef with the WH.)

How did Barzani and his kurd battalions relate their separatist goals to the surge? Relations with Maliki from Bush-Crocker-Petraeus has to be a critical set of records, especially once the US recognized a malign Shiite intent, allowed re-arming and redeployment of Sunni forces into the Shiite capitol, and operations against JAM commenced. What was the Odierno/MNFI or Petraeus/CENTCOM advice, when the US Withdrawal timeline was being forced on a very reluctant lame-duck WH, in Nov 08.

Was ISAF's McKiernan (working under Petraeus/CENTCOM grand strategy) unable to comprehend DP's mind? Or was he hung out to dry, left to operate under last years orders, like Casey in 06?
--
Some of these are important questions, might give new context to Petraeus' reputation, and the counteroffensive period in general. By all accounts DP works his staff hard and uses his reputation as a mission multiplier. Good on him if he wins by wit, skill, endurance or bluff, inspires by persona or gravitas. But a reader still needs a fair and open record, before he can say he understands the surge and what follows.

DoD skill with deniable deception didn't start with Rummy, or suddenly evaporate when he left. Petraeus inherited a formidable and well staffed propaganda operation. World class. I assume his press strategy was focussed on the US audience as the main effort, and much bigger than interviews with Ricks and Robinson. Looking behind the curtain is called for.

Gaining strategic patience from Congress looked like a very near thing, mid 2007. If it wasn't a cliffhanger, was it a charade? That part, which looks like a military PR offensive against the majority party, I have a right to know about, or democracy itself is a charade.

So far as civilian limits on a commanders budget and mission, that's as old as Al Hamilton or McClellan. But MacArthur in Korea 1951 is a cautionary tale. Having snatched stalemate from defeat in detail, after his second loss of Seoul, he wanted battlefield command of nukes, without coming back to Washington to discuss their use.

(The nuclear armed Islamic Republic enables Pashtun infiltrators, with China behind Pakistan, Russia watching us bleed. All our good allies. Complicated stuff, even for a Princeton Ph.D.)

Citing MacArthur in this context offers me the opportunity to note that WW2 was the last Declaration of War. The advent of nukes gave rise to permanently expanded presidential powers, making POTUS hostage to 24/7 instant war minders. The national security state sold us the need for secret wars and permanently classified armies and arms, still expanding after 60 years.

I'm not accusing DP of being an American Caesar, but he's probably the most popular and politicly celebrated general since Mac or Ike. The One and Only? Those who love what DP did for Bush (snatching a potentially victorious narative from certain ignomy) should be wondering about DP's deal with Obama this week. Between the two of them, DP's done that negotiation before. I'm reminded of Lincoln's election year concerns with Grant.

I voted for Obama, and I'm wondering when I'll get the transparency I hoped for. Not on Petraeus or Gates' watch, I fear. And not from the news analysts on NPR, who are telling me that Team McChrystal's meltdown had nothing to do with strategy and mission.

and of course you are technically correct. . . .and there is also reality.

Duel hatting can also be a euphemism phrase to say that in the very short term CENTCOM will be lending his weight to running the show in Afghanistan in addition to the region he oversees.
In the meantime he will also be bringing his considerable weight to getting his ducks in line of his choosing prior to nominations and confirmations.

I recognize all general officers above the rank of BGen must be reconfirmed when appointed to a new billet. They also must be confirmed to retire at their present grade as well by a board which will rubber stamp McChrystal retiring at 4 stars.

It's Afghanistan. You could try Ghani, but he'd be even more dependent for his survival on the US because he would be an honest politician. Abdullah? As Malalai Joya said, shave his beard and put him in a suit, but he's still a warlord.

I repeat, it's Afghanistan; Ismail Khan, Dostum, and the Taliban did not descend on that place from the moon. No, Afghanistan is not stuck in the 13th century, they and outsiders have found new and exciting ways of screwing that country up even worse than it was in the later Middle Ages.

What you almost need is a new Abdur Rahman Khan. Some might say, I am implying that Afghans aren't deserving or capable of open, free democracy and good governance, and need authoritarianism. As individuals that idea is silly, Afghans are like any other people they can learn to function in an open society. But as a group? Yeah, you can bet your bottom dollar that society isn't capable of good governance.

The Taliban aren't the only lunatics. Case in point- our recent erstwhile allies the Shinwaris, they who threw a hissy fit in the 1920s when the Queen appeared in a photo with her shoulders and entire arms showing.

The problem with Afghanistan is nobody has yet to really put the Pashtun in their place since they got all uppity from the 17th century onward. Even back during the Golden years of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a country run basically for the benefit of Pashtuns, with an internal pecking order of Pashtuns. The policy down through the centuries by insiders and outsiders (and still going strong) has been to throw money at the Pashtun tribes in the hopes that they will behave themselves. I honestly don't understand it, the people who are all for doling out this cash are the same people who would normally be against any kind of money being paid over to a potential criminal element. Just imagine if the tribal elders were American gangsters, would you pay them cash to behave?

Historically, as soon as the cash runs out, the Pashtun start acting up. Call me a biased observer, but the problem isn't all Afghans, it's the Pashtun drama/welfare queens. And now we have Americans falling in love with these tribal elders and shuras; it's the same con/shakedown the Afghans have been been running for generations. Because of this, "it's the tribes, stupid" policy I find very troublesome.
Basically, it's a boondoggle.

But in these cases
We still have judgement here, that we but teach
Bloody instructions which, being taught, return
To plague th'inventor. This even-handed justice
Commends th'ingredience of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips.

I'm going to fucking Vegas. Betting it all on 20.