Wednesday, June 23, 2010 - 9:11 AM

The Navy fired the captain of the USS John L. Hall on Tuesday, because the frigate slammed into a pier under his command. Today's Best Defense puzzler: What does the Navy understand about command responsibility that the Army doesn't?
Question: What does the Navy understand about command responsibility that the Army doesn't?
Answer: Everything.
Everyone of these losers the Navy is canning was selected by the Navy to command in the first place. HMMMMM?!?!
Regardless the Navy is playing with their boats, while the rest of the forces are hard at work in OEF and OIF - except when getting relieved by the POTUS for mouthing off.
Hunter, after writing the above I thought I would hear from you! :-)
You were probably waiting for it in the other thread to about the Army's biggest enemy too....
Mostly just trolling a bit. But you have to admit, the rampant firings seem to indicate the Navy has plenty of problems too.
All the services have their issues. The Navy has been reliving ship, sub and aviation commanders continuously ever since the first USN vessel's keel touched water in 1775. That is their historical inheritance from their parent service the Royal Navy in its glory days of the 18th Century. They both developed a reputation for having a low tolerance for screwing up. As you know one really doesn’t know how an officer may perform until he assumes his command. The Navy assumes that a certain percent will be duds and try to pull them as quickly as possible. As WW says, when it comes to ships, subs and aviation they require satisfactory performance 100% of the time.
My favorite Navy duel standard ?
JPWREL - My perception based on my distant experience as a Marine sea going detachment commander aboard a carrier is that my favorite Navy has a duel standard of sorts: surface warfare officers were held to a higher standard than aviators, specifically those that fly jets, for both mishaps involving horsing around and conduct ashore.
Funny story: a squadron commander flying off the deck home for end of deployment had classified documents in the belly tank and hit the wrong button or lever and jettisoned it into the Pacific. He got a pass on that, but was upbraided by the group commander for losing all the booze that was contained therein.
Times have changed I know, but I've often wondered about automatic death for Navy skippers when they bump into something. Things happen sometimes, even to the best, or worst. Perhaps we would be better served judging on the basis of the total record and man.
The classic illustration, which I never tire of bringing up, is Nimitz running onto a mudbank. Court martial, letter of reprimand then onto to being the best ever. No chance in today's navy. I read this in Proceedings 20 or more years ago and the point still holds I think.
“Nimitz had graduated 7th out of 114 Midshipmen when he graduated from Annapolis in 1905. Assigned to the battleship USS Ohio, he traveled to the Far East. Remaining in the Orient, he later served aboard the cruiser USS Baltimore. In January 1907, having completed the required two years at sea, Nimitz was commissioned as an ensign. Leaving Baltimore, he served on several destroyers during 1907, including USS Decatur. While conning Decatur, Nimitz grounded the ship on a mud bank in the Philippines. Though he rescued a seaman from drowning in the wake of the incident, Nimitz was court-martialed and issued a letter of reprimand. Returning home, he was transferred to the submarine service in early 1909.”
Here is young Ensign Nimitz, super smart, saved a seaman’s life and had only been in the active Navy for two years. I see this incident in no way comparable to Cmdr. Herman Pfaeffle situation who has been in the service since 1983. Yes, the Navy does look at the whole service record in relations to the gravity of the incident under review.
if you choose, you can see it a little different
I see an guy who has been in the Navy for 27 years and came up from the ranks. Using today's set of references I see the Navy protecting the exalted Academy graduate vs. defenestrating a ranker.
Of course, you can't judge that Navy with this Navy's set of references. That Navy was more tolerant of honest errors and was better for it.
The skipper of the Hall was a Commander (O5). Nimitz was an Ensign (O1) when he ran aground. I think an Ensign would be given a second chance in today's Navy.
On a US Navy ship, if a junior officer runs the ship aground on their watch, it is much more likely for the skipper to be relieved for failing to train them right than for the junior officer to be relieved for the incident. That has been true since time immemorial, and is well understood by every naval officer. There is room for a lapse of judgment when you are early in your career, but by the time you get to command, the accountability is swift and terrible.
Nimitz was the skipper of the Decatur when he grounded it and he was relieved. The point of course is That Navy didn't kick him out and he went of to great things.
The Navy does not allow mistakes, so commanders often make things much worse by covering up problems. Note the Navy doesn't even wait for an investigation to determine the cause. Perhaps a drunk tug boat Captain caused the incident. Never mind, its just easier to can a loyal 20-year officer instead of examining the problem.
Let me provide a great example. Recall the USS Stark that was hit by two Iraqi excocet missiles many years ago. Although the incoming missiles were detected, the ship never activated its anti-missile systems. Why? The Captain didn't trust the officers on duty and worried one might harm something. He wore the activation key around his neck, so it took time to wake him and the missiles struck before he got dressed.
All about the Benjamins (or Metrics)
The differences might have something to do with the nature of the enterprise. In this case, a bad commander begets bad ship handling which begets a large and expensive accident. As an engineering officer, if the engines don't work, you have failed. If your section fails an inspection, with easily quantifiable standards like "does machine X work"? or "can your crew complete task X," leadership (or management) is fairly straightforward. Not sleeping with a shipmate is also a pretty brightline rule as well.
The Army is in the people business and is much more squishy. Failed leadership manifests itself differently. Troops have a vested interest in not being killed by the enemy, so a great sergeant can hide the problems with a bad lieutenant. Great platoon sergeants do that for a living. Failed leadeship often means low reenlistment or guys angling for transfers to different units. Sometimes it manifests itself in suicides. However, in those situations, there are a myriad of other factors that play into those outcomes, unlike the log entry "at 0730, ship runs into stationary object."
War is usually accepted as a mercyless meritocracy, but modern wars are much more subjective. You can play with numbers, as we did in Iraq, and keep your casualties low by holing up on base and doing passive patrols. Do a couple raids based on sketchy intel, detain lots of innocent people, then write yourself up for an award for capturing hundreds of terrorists. With no checklists or inspectors, sucess or failure becomes more subjective.
Yachting with my favorite Navy
As others can attest to, the Navy while yachting, frowns on running a vessel aground, banging into others, and hitting a pier too hard..
I recall when the USS Coral Maru (Coral Sea) ran aground in San Francisco Harbor heading for Alameda. That night, everyone was ordering Coral Sea on the rocks in the bars of Oakland.
Docking a boat, landing an airplane...
Navigating a ship or landing an airplane, requires satisfactory performance 100% of the time. It's not like the sidewalls got scuffed nudging the curb with the family car. An aircraft commander that bends his bird on landing would be taken off flight status, pending investigation, the same way a patrollman mans a desk after a shooting occurs. The investigation generally finds cockpit error, since knowing his aircraft condition and total awareness of landing conditions both fall within the pilots responsibility.
If it turns out that a tug crewman passed out with the throttle open, and the USN Capt. and crew were performing, then the investigation should show that. If they heard the vodka calling, used power to ease in over the mud at low tide, and it pivoted and pranged instead, not good.
I wonder if todays ship security drills impact interactions with tugs and pilots. The ports that Russia left operating in Georgia might be nervous locations, relatively primitive, dredged 'as needed' and not suited to blue water warships. Which would still be the skippers responsibility to deal with.
Jimmy Doolittle wiped the gear off a Jenny playing around once. They kept him and he did great things.
How many times in the last 20 years has a Navy skipper had his ship bump into something like a dock and not been relieved after an investigation? If there are a few examples I might be more inclined to believe the Navy's actions aren't just a kneejerk.
The Stars and Stripes article states $160,000 damage was done to the ship none to the pier. How damaged was that ship anyway?
Pranging a Jenny wouldn't count
A better contra-example would be the destroyer skippers that intentionally grounded off of Omaha beach, to provide fire support to the poor survivors there. Dunno how that was ruled.
An investigation is supposed to be run by an officer of higher rank than those whose actions are being looked into. Hard to do with the hard luck master of the vessel still aboard. I agree the $160K might be a dented plate, but it was a port docking, not an op. 100% is the acceptable score for a USN vessel, for warping in with no damage. Unless a boat driver can tell me different.
Pranging an obsolete Jenny trainer wouldn't count, back when pilots were expendable and engines unreliable. But a pilot had better be sure he can land, before he takes off. That's how the FAA looks at it, even without crew and passengers. A war mission has different rules, but the military is unforgiving about losses not covered by procedure and duty in this day and age. The days of scaring livestock and flying under bridges are over.
WW, those RN and USN destroyer captains did not take much of a risk since it was low tide and by early afternoon the tide would come in and free their ships. .
Taking shells or bombs while aground off of Omaha beach
Taking casualties from shells or bombs after intentional grounding posed considerable risk to a tin can drivers prospects, in a navy run by battleship-minded admirals and their desk-bound assistants.
I never heard that any flag officer took the initiative to order the tin cans to charge the beach, to save the trapped troops from destruction in detail. Wasn't it skipper initiative off of Omaha, officers willing to risk their men and lose their command?
Don't be so quick to damn one service with generalizations based on isolated incidents.
There is usually far more variety between individual commanders than there is between individual services when it comes to setting standards for dismissal. I've seen more than my fair share of Army commanders relieved over issues as small as accountability of non-sensitive equipment. Something far more mundane than running a ship into a pier.
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