My ePRT South East of Baghdad in Madain faced this very issue. Madain was once an agricultural engine for Iraq, with an extensive irrigation network focusing on wheat. The reality today is that there is no returning to the past, the water is not there, and will not return in the quantities that sustained wheat and other water intensive crops. Our solution was to focus on drip irrigation systems, copied from the Israelis. Our wonderful Colorado School of Mines BBA, (Bicultural, Bilingual Assistant) designed a locally produced system that would irrigate crops using only 20 percent of the water needed in traditional farming. It worked with well water and could use the highly saline water successfully by dripping it onto the roots, which are able to filter the salt, rather than on the plant itself. The system used local materials and labor, and could be assembled for around $2,500 per system. Using the local, Iraqi run agricultural association (which we fathered), we were able to successfully establish this system through out the qada, as well as serve as an example for other PRTs to use throughout the country. Our partner US military units recognized this as an effective COIN tool and used CERP to fund hundreds of these units. Drip, of course, is not suitable for wheat or other similar crops. It is, however, perfect for vegetables, fruits and other garden produce. Mada'in, lying in Baghdad's South Eastern belt, was a perfect market for this produce, which could undercut the largely Iranian produce in the markets. Iraq will have to adapt to the water realities, as will the rest of the world.

that's absolutely fascinating. I mean, it's terrible that the water sources have effectively disappeared, but it's definitely a way to return some agricultural productivity to otherwise dry regions. Do you have some information on how or whether the system has been implemented?

When I left Iraq late last year, the brigade and its attached battalions in the AO had well over 200 installed and 400 more on the way. Farmers were lining up at the COB trying to participate in the system. The contractor being used was the agricultural association that we sponsored (Green Madian). It is run entirely by the local Iraqis, and offers assistance, including tractor rentals, seeds, training, agricultural advice, etc., etc. We deliberately tried to establish an Iraqi run NGO that would live and thrive as we pulled out. The Army followed its required bidding process in determining the contracting entity for its CERP funds, and the association won hands down. Essentially, it was doing the work (training the farmers, providing technical assistance, vetting suitable candidates, providing credit when needed for seeds/fertilizer/etc., and installation and maintaining the systems), at cost in order to promote the association. The farmers also were required to share in the labor, including digging the necessary wells, etc. Green Madian also was getting into green houses, fish farming (it built a fish pond at its headquarters, and successfully demonstrated six types of carp that could thrive in saline water), etc., etc. The real hero of this effort is Mr. Floyd Woods, a DOA GS-15. When I left, Green Madan's success with drip irrigation was being copied by other PRTs in the area.

How is that a good example of COIN? How does one convince farmers to actually put some hard work and risk into farming when the actual GOI could, in one swoop, import it on a soul source contract and sell it for cheaper? At one point do we stop spending our money and make the GOI accountable for the lack of upkeep in their own irrigation systems. This is a problem for the GOI to figure out, not the tax payers. They need to first make the commitment to raise tarriffs or subsidize the farmers and commit to self sustainment or revenues other than oil before we pump one more dollar into this. This includes all funding sources (CERP, USAID, QRF, and Iraq's own).

how does one lump the AVF alongside these politically and poorly thought out expeditions that seemingly involve mission creep of nation building, and employing our forces to inappropriately do such?

As an example, the Israeli Defense Forces are drawn from compulsorily military service, and I'll assure you, they aren't interested in nation building outside Israel, but seemed to have had their hands full with what some might call an irregular force in Lebanon in 2006, for a variety of previous discussed reasons, save one: they never intended to go in with a total war mindset, only to suppress the threat – a threat that still exists.

Perhaps the real crux of the problem is we toss good people in the AVF into untenable situations where they are pitted against an indigenous portion of a populations that have more at stake than any foreign force will ever, and view their conflict as total war, and will always sacrifice to a greater extent?

The issue is a political one of not understanding where to project force, and more importantly when, and has nothing to do with the All Volunteer Force, except to what extent we ask them to sacrifice Rubber Ducky.

Because the AVF has been fighting these woe-begotten wars and feeding a steady diet of happy talk back to presidents and the American public alike. The honest statement - from the AVF's leaders, from the US Army's leaders - would be and have been: "We can't win, we haven't a clue how to proceed, we're just screwing around and wasting lives and dollars. You want a successful military? Well, we're just not it."

Or is all the noise you made about accountability in a previous thread not meant to apply to the AVF? Is that sad outfit exempt?

we have some general officers serving and recently retired that history, and also our nation should hold accountable. But they are with us whether we have an AVF or not.

Frankly, irregular wars are resource hogs and excruciatingly slow slogs and historically, when not able to levy total war, and population control (i.e. the Philippines, American West) we don't do well with them.

I assure you, I am no fan of how our involvement is thrust upon the AVF, by political hacks with an agenda, along with the less than adequate dissent of our military leadership has provided (in spade for my involvement in Vietnam).

Now that said, I am sure you are familiar with the term, main focus of effort, which is closely tied to a commander’s intent. The commander’s intent here was to mainly focus on the politics of water in Iraq.

So in that spirit, please hold that thought. I am sure (in fact, I’m positive) there will be a future comment by your self concerning your favorite AVF at a more appropriate time, and I will challenge your assertions then. At the moment, I have a pressing need in regard to the flow of water myself.

DBF

The Army layer cake has grand strategy at the top, the province of the political realm (though informed and advised by the military); then military strategy (realm of senior military); then operational art (realm of the combat arms and the field commanders); then tactics (at the platoon level, up and down); and under it all training and doctrine and culture. The military - all grades - gets a pass on the grand strategy, but the rest of the layer cake belongs to those in uniform at all levels. Bad General is a copout. Our Army and our AVF have failed in all the layers.

TYRTAIOS, I always like your comments because you are smart and informed but on the issue of the AVF our friend RD’s got you in a ‘full nelson’. Besides the civic injustice of a mercenary army for a democratic republic the very existence of the AVF allows and encourages politicians to experiment with military adventures they would think twice about if the lives of their constituent’s sons were in jeopardy.

I said I would address this issue to the Duck at a more opportune time, which I will, but mentioned nothing about responding to you JPWREL. Since we are playing by jungle rules, and I am a former jungle bunny, let me say the following: good men are only as good as they are trained, lead, and just as importantly, employed.

I again use the IDF as an example, who I further again remind you are primarily composed of conscripts and reservists. They were employed with no clear objective piece meal into a conflict in 2006 they were surprised by, and not trained properly for as a result of political and military leadership responsiblity.

We have an AVF that has shown they can adapt at the tactical level and to say otherwise is disingenuous.

I remind you of Vietnam: we may have won the Cold War, but it came at a cost with our long war in that emerald green country primarily planned and executed by noteworthy general officers, that came out of World War II. . . .they won a world war, but they weren't too smart with the next one were they?

“We have an AVF that has shown they can adapt at the tactical level and to say otherwise is disingenuous.” This statement is an old debate technique in order to make a statement appear as a fact. What is disingenuous is to declare that the AV Army is operationally and tactically effective relative to its size and cost. For unique institutional reasons one could conceivably say that about the USMC but the Army? I think not.

JPWREL - It is just as easily a debate technique turned-around. The political leadership and the military’s as well, should have made it clear that there is no quick satisfactory end to an insurgency and civil war, that is also to some degree state sponsored from across the border. That is not the fault of companys, platoons, and squads taking care of business in front of them.

I stand by my statement that we have an AVF that has shown they can adapt at the tactical level and to say otherwise is disingenuous. The problem is that they may have adapted too well to the detriment of other skills that they may be called upon to display in the distant future by the small unit leaders of today in charge when the balloon goes up.

America like to fix the problem and move-on. Insurgencies are not that simple. Even the the British in Malaya were confronted with it long after the emergency was lifted, but compared to Afghanistan (or Vietnam), the Brits had it made in the shade.

...is to fight and win wars, not to execute tactics. It's a 'force,' not a collection of sergeants and platoons. Defend the troops, fine; that's not a defense of a bankrupt concept that has trapped them in endless conflict.

The American Military has failed, in my estimation because it so loved the idea of an entirely 'professionalized' force that it abandoned its direct connection to the people it serves, shifting from a cadre for citizen-soldiers to fall in on to a well-trained mercenary force autonomous of the people.

The AVF is a pernicious idea that has not worked, has not won. Bring Back The Draft!

Another disreputable technique used to defend the Army’s performance in this war is to use Sean Hannity’s favored technique of implying that criticism of the war’s prosecution, indeed, the wars rational is a criticism of the valor and sacrifice of ‘the troops’. One may sell that ‘gotcha’ crapola in goober land but for anyone seriously interested in national security policy its ‘sell by’ date is long expired. The performance we get out of the Army’s leadership relative to its cost and size is definitely sub par and close to Lehman Bros. in quality. The trigger pullers may be doing their job but the senior officer corps seems to be in a state of both confusion and denial and merely willing to go along to get along.

While dining sumptuously on weasel on a stick, I have come to the conclusion that blogging is habit forming on Tom Ricks’ site, and Madame Tyrtaios did me a disservice by supplying me with a lap top, and thus find myself responding back to you , when I initially stated I wouldn't until a latter date.

Be that as it may, I concur that any standing national force we field, all-volunteer or otherwise, isn’t for executing tactics, and am well aware that small unit tactical successes do not equate a future strategic victory or even a satisfactory outcome. But your statement about our small unit leaders as part of the “layer” aren’t getting it is incorrect and the only issue that sticks in my craw.

Additionally, and I hope finally, I can see no compelling evidence that we would view Afghanistan any differently toward our national security (whether I do or not), nor have gotten our act together any sooner militarily (we certainly have no civilian backfill) were we to have had a draft prior to 9/11.

As for bringing back the draft, which I assume would only affect the Army, and moderately the Marine Corps as it once did? The battle space and what is now expected from small units leaders doesn't lend itself to a two year turn around. There is also no reason to believe there wouldn’t be the same old loop holes for the connected and privileged; some things never change.