The Lilith Fair of national security

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Thursday, June 10, 2010 - 10:34 AM Share

This afternoon I'll be at the annual CNAS policy hoedown. We will decide, among other things, whether COIN is last year's flavor or simply the beginning of a new era of warefare, as for example Mexican drug cartels erode national security on our southwestern border.

If you couldn't get a ticket, or didn't want to pay the scalpers, you can watch the whole thing on this webcast. The opening act starts at 1:30.

I can't tell whether that is Nagl or Exum in the photo above, by the way.

DeusXFlorida/flickr

EXPLORE:CELEBS, FUN STUFF, MILITARY

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FERAL JUNDI

3:51 PM ET

June 10, 2010

Cool

I will be interested to hear if the panel actually discusses their 'inherently governmental' section in their Contracting in Conflicts paper. They discussed how Article 1, Section 8 (the Letter of Marque and Reprisal part) is a counter to Max Weber's definition of the state(monopoly on force...). Bravo to them for having the courage to challenge that definition.

"To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"

http://www.cnas.org/node/4560

JMARK

4:11 PM ET

June 10, 2010

Lilith Fair?

It's an all-woman music festival. I thought maybe you were referring to an all-woman security policy conference.
"Lollapalooza" or "Bonnaroo" might be more apt, Tom :)

TOM RICKS

7:38 PM ET

June 10, 2010

Bad memory

I couldn't remember the name of 'Bonnaroo.'
Cheers,
Tom

FERAL JUNDI

7:18 PM ET

June 10, 2010

Some comments on the conference

I will live blog the thing through this site, seeing how this is Rick's blog.

The question about Afghan security companies paying off the Taliban directly or indirectly is kind of a loaded question. My reply to that is I am sure thousands of dollars that are part of the numerous aid programs going on for the rebuild and COIN effort are ending up in the pockets of the Taliban or Taliban sympathizers as well? So are we going to apply the same scrutiny to the civilian surge effort that is throwing dollars all over the place in order to 'win' over a population and supposedly keep them from joining the other side.

It kind of reminds me of one of the sites I worked at as a contractor in Iraq. The jundi guards we were using all came from places like Falujah or Ramadi. We worked with hundreds of them, and they all came to our site in order to make a little money as guards. The problem is, there was absolutely no way of telling if these guys were part of the insurgency or not. Call it the paradox of the lone guerrilla, because you just can't tell a persons true intentions, and especially with the cultural and language barriers. That, and there is no such thing as a the insurgent database in a country that doesn't even issue national ID cards or barely keeps up with passports. And especially in the chaos of a warzone.

Let's go back to this idea that we are paying the Taliban by paying local security. I am sure we are. I am sure there are a few Afghans on those convoy teams that are Taliban or are sympathizers. I am sure there are a few weapons that have gone missing too. Bullets, yep. I am sure the salaries paid to these guards, has probably been used to pay for fertilizer for some IED.

I am also sure that some of the money that has gone to aid projects for building bridges or schools, has gone to Afghan contractors who might have loyalties to the Taliban.They might be paying off the Taliban shadow government so that they don't get attacked. How about the farmers who use our aid to try and grow poppy? How about the soldiers and police we trained, that went over to the Taliban because they paid more? Did that training just lead to more coalition deaths, and costs--because of that expensive tax payer funded training? So why are we not investigating this? Or do we only investigate and demonize security companies? I guess my point is, is that a lot of our tax dollars finds it's way into the hands of the enemy, and that is an unfortunate byproduct of today's COIN and war time strategy.

Now, I always like providing solutions to problems I present. Why aren't we initiating policies that steal back that money from the Taliban. We are willing to kill them--which is taking something from a person and organization that is extremely valuable. But why aren't we willing to explore more options for taking wealth from the enemy, besides just taking his life? (I am sure there is some Geneva Convention angle that says not too, but on a philosophical level or strategic level, why is this flawed thinking?)

KARAKA

9:19 PM ET

June 10, 2010

nice panel, tom

You got a couple of nice quips in there. I particularly liked the greeting card one.

RUBBER DUCKY

11:22 PM ET

June 11, 2010

Let's see...

Everything in Afghanistan is turning brown, but (per my fellow commenters) it is not the fault of:

- The AVF

-The US Army

-The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines

-The Army leadership

-Inability to match military strategy to the military situation

-COIN

And II think we should cheerfully stipulate that it's also not the fault of:

-The time devoted to the problem

-The resources devoted to the problem

-The technology devoted to the problem

-Political constraints on the military

-The unsurmountable strength of the enemy

So a conundrum: why if we're doing so well are we doing so badly? Serious questions: if nothing's wrong, how come we cannot win, cannot leave, cannot even define victory?

Serious questions. I have a two-word answer: Game Over.

RUBBER DUCKY

12:23 AM ET

June 12, 2010

And this has what to do with anything?

If you dump one trillion dollars into Bush's wars, it's got to land somewhere.

The real fatcats coming out of this are the armed services. No peer competitors, no strategic demand for high technology, and we're funding the Services at a Cold War rate. Bet that rearming will still fall behind, especially for the Guard, which has all its gear over there.