Let's remember that this generation had, from 1975 to 1990, a 'clear and present' danger. The military's chief task was to conduct military operations in support of a foreign policy doctrine of containment that reached back to 1947. The doctrine, training, and equipment that came out of this period was singularly focused on that task. And in that task, the US military was victorious. "Winning" the Cold War was one of the most important foreign policy successes in the nation's history, and the military played a vital role in that victory.

Criticism can be levied that the military did not somehow pirouette from a focus on heavy armored combat to preparing for counterinsurgency between 1992 and 2001... but does anyone seriously think that was possible? What I remember of that period was 'drawdown' and 'peace dividend.' This sort of hindsight seems to me both dishonest, and a bit premature.

And another thing... how can Linn begin to criticize the post-Vietnam generation of leaders while simultaneously giving 'sympathetic' treatment to the 1950s generation? Seriously? The guys who thought the Pentomic structure made sense - that the army should have a short range nuclear capability? Aren't these the same chaps who failed to notice a little trend called 'wars of national liberation' and subsequently sent a unprepared conventional force to fight in Vietnam? Give me a break.

However, I'm conflicted on this. I'm a member of that generation (74 to 94) albeit I retired as a lowly junior field grade, not a senior officer, and I'm very proud of being part of two important endeavors: turning the post-Vietnam Army around and helping win the Cold War. Desert Storm? Not so much...that was more like a live-fire training exercise at NTC than a war. Having said that, we sure produced an amazing number of less-than-stellar general officers. How and why that happened has always puzzled me. So, in that respect I can certainly understand Linn's attitude toward this generation's seniors.

Mr Linn's attitude reminds me of those sports writers that hold back their Hall of Fame votes for athletes who weren't nice to them or were of the prickly variety as players. If you don't share your history with me then I won't treat you nice in my version of history. Who knows? Maybe Mr Linn got his chops writing as a beat reporter for the Knicks back in the day.

Three cheers of RPM! Excellent point. "Cold War" has almost become a perjorative in security talk these days, such as "oh, that's just a Cold War weapons system" or "national security was so much easier back in the Cold War." Its en vogue to pine for the stability of the bi-polar world. But, in truth, I'm not so sure that the prospect of Mutally Assured Destruction was such a happy thing, nor the very real threat of reliving the Eastern Front circa 1944. Perhaps the leadership of that era could have been more foresightful in preparing the military for the post Cold War when the Iron Curtain finally did come down.

Great point about the leaders in the 50's. The Army was really struggling to stay relivant in the nuclear age, so you've got to cut them a little slack. Still, I'd love to meet the guy who thought up the Davy Crockett atomic mortar system. http://www.roadsideamerica.com/news/16096 2000m max range, 2500m blast radius. Awesome. That's one way to impose fire discipline, I guess. And we give the current generals a hard time?

The backdrop for AirLand Battle doctrine and FM 100-5 was the intense battle for Cold War resources and mission prominence among the three major Services. The Navy's Maritime Strategy was partially response to this internecine conflict, as was Navy's then-newfound interest in the documented capture of naval warfare topics in codified doctrine to rival Army's FM series. Air Force was similarly occupied with writing down all the reasons for it to be funded well and better.

One can have a slight suspicion that this rush to establish and document doctrine might account for a certain ossification of strategic thought around Cold War themes, which has given us a Cold War Navy 21 years after the Wall fell, an overly heavy Army baffled by the irregulars it faces, and an utterly irrelevant Air Force pursuing the F-22 in order to maintain air supremacy over ... the Taliban.

As a line of native American poetry has it, "...sometimes a thing can be made too clear."

Regardless of the merits of one generation of officers versus another, can any military group really be said to have won the Cold War? It was a policy victory, not a military one, and one where the opponent's failed system and ideology arguably had more to do with the victory than much of what we did.

Keep in mind, the demoralized post-Vietnam military did just as good of a job keeping the Soviets out of Western Germany as the 1980s military after it and the 1960s military before it. All that the United States needed was a credible force to demonstrate its resolve. The rest was done through domestic policy and international relations.

Generals win wars. Really win one, just one, and your a good general. Lose one; your not.

Iraq and Afghanistan will be worse for America a year from now. Sad, but true, because America and almost every American who has served and bled wants liberty, the rule of law, fair play. Not there yet in Karada.

So, who failed? The guys or the Generals? I argue, a lack of winning is failure.

Jaff

Thomas,
I have to say that this issue you raise is exactly the problem with the Baby Boomer generation. They refuse to see their own complicity in the failures of past and present.
it's that simple, and depressing.
Their generational ego is so fragile and arrogant that any sense of self-reflection is impossible.
The response Bush gave when asked what mistakes he's made is the perfect analogy of the generational point you make about the military leaders. " I can't think of any...."
and, i agree with you that history will not be kind to that generation at all.
As Lewis Lapham once said, History doesn't repeat, but it ryhmes..... The BB generation is proof of this: the same mistakes every decade with the same ideological responses, but expecting different results.