this is the kind of question that is tailor-made for your average History-channel watching coffee-table book reading suburban cottage war expert. Next week: who would win in a fight between a shark and a crocodile? And which is better: Ford or Chevy?

Which would win a fight between a crocodile and a shark? I have no idea, but it would be worth seeing.

. . . let's not forget a word Sailors and shipboard Marines came to know off Okinawa . . . kamikaze, which took a terrible toll in surface craft and souls.

Certainly the platoon structure the Wehrmacht adapted between the wars showed definitively that the infantry's firepower was expected to come from its machine guns. With every squad having at least one light machine gun and every Landser expected to carry ammo for the gun and to maneuver around it, the German doctrine differed radically from Western European policies. The infantry squad was the machine gun. The troops attached to it were just incidental and there for logistical purposes.

I would point out that Germans' complaints that the Western Allies buried them under an avalanche of firepower is simply sour grapes. The Germans planned and trained for maneuver warfare while the Western Allies had always leaned toward a logistical, attrition war policy. That was baked in the cake from before the war and did not reflect on the fighting capabilities of the individual warrior, as some seem wont to imply.

My reading of the history of the two major theaters (Europe versus Pacific) is that the Germans were the more dangerous opponent while the Japanese were the tougher. Of course, dealing with an opponent whose virtual entire force confronting you is willing absolutely to die can make any such engagement very tough because, in the final analysis, you must kill them all.

PRAHAPARTIZAN, you write: “I would point out that Germans' complaints that the Western Allies buried them under an avalanche of firepower is simply sour grapes. The Germans planned and trained for maneuver warfare while the Western Allies had always leaned toward a logistical, attrition war policy.” In actuality, German training and technique was more sophisticated than you imply. A majority of German operations conducted during the 2nd World War were in fact defensive. The German doctrine was extraordinarily flexible in both offensive and defensive modes. For instance their unexcelled use of ‘Kampfgruppen’ (a legacy of the 1st World War) is a testament to their organizational articulation, common doctrine and ability to maintain their poise and combat effectiveness under the most extreme duress. If there is a knock against the German Army in the 2nd World War it was that while it clearly excelled versus their opponents in ‘fighting’ they consistently under resourced the logistical component of operations. This characteristic of German war making to emphasis tactics and operations as against logistics and production undermined their battlefield performance.

I would say that your professor friend does not have a well-nuanced view of this subject. Given that Germany was the first country to figure out the in-depth mobile defense combined with machine guns, its post-WW1 doctrine reflects that profound experience. Its squads work with the machine guns in the defense, but in offense, the machine gun is always in the supporting role.

In an attack, the German platoon reorganized its squads and machine guns into assault and support. Naturally, the MGs were on the support element.

Also, his experience as an artillery/mortar man also bears on his lessons. Redlegs rarely assault, but battery defense, especially in a mobile, flexible defense that Germans excelled at, is absolutely critical. It's only natural that his experience is predominantly on the defensive side.

Not to say that the Allies infantry were any good in any case.

He was an interesting guy and as mild mannered as one could be. In France in 1940 he was an infantryman and in Russia retrained as a panzergrenadier and then went back to France to raise and train a Nebelwerfer battery.

He was an interesting guy and as mild mannered as one could be. In France in 1940 he was an infantryman and in Russia retrained as a panzergrenadier and then went back to France to raise and train a Nebelwerfer battery.

Australian soldiers that had fought the Deutsches Afrikakorps in North Africa in 1941/42 and who were then withdrawn to fight the Japanese in New Guinea initially had not a very high estimate of the tactical skills of the Japanese soldier and found him to be a consistently poor rifle-shot, even at the short ranges that the Japanese were restricted to shooting over in the jungles of New Guinea. They had far more respect for the skills and abilities of the German soldiers of the Afrikakorps and considered German soldiers tactically far superior to the Japanese. Indeed, Australian casualty figures over comparable lengths of time in both campaigns tend to bear this out. In repeated demonstrations of a lack of tactical thought, Japanese tactics of frontally charging their entrenched enemies were soon shown to be quite ineffective: while presenting a vision of animal ferocity they were made short work of by the Australians' light and medium machine-guns and mortars; and of course, the Australians were individually better rifle-shots. The Japanese tactically improved of course, but then they had to. In contrast, the still-fresh German divisions of the DAK in 1941 were by far the more dangerous to the Australians: the Germans were very good tactical thinkers adapting their tactics to the terrain and the enemy's positions and at translating tactical thought into productive action.

What? There are a dozen examples in 1942 Philippines, and Wake Island.

Apparently, they don’t count.

At Wake Island, the Marines completely wiped out the first landing force. There, and in the Phillipenes as well, no defended U.S. Infantry position was seized by Japanese assault - not a one.

Walt

I am not sure I understand your line of thinking WhiskeyPapa? The Wake Island defenders (Marines, Sailors, and civilians), under the trained eye of Col. Jimmy Deviroux, did frustrate the Japanese, but in the end had to surrender. Certainly the Americans and their Philippine Scouts flummoxed the Japanese also. But also had to surrender - thus, the Japanese took those positions.

Incidentally, taxi drivers used to like to sell Japanese Peso currency issued by the Japanese as occupation currency to "slightly" intoxicated American servicemen – I’ve still got a foot locker full I’ll bet.

"The Wake Island defenders (Marines, Sailors, and civilians), under the trained eye of Col. Jimmy Deviroux, did frustrate the Japanese, but in the end had to surrender. Certainly the Americans and their Philippine Scouts flummoxed the Japanese also. But also had to surrender - thus, the Japanese took those positions."

The Japanese seized NO, NONE, ZERO U.S. infantry positions by -assault- throughout the whole war.

Walt

The use of two nuclear weapons against Japan was based on two factors a need to try to terminate the war before a potentially horrendously costly invasion of the Japanese home islands and to send a political message to the Soviet Union. Had the Soviets faltered in their war against the Germans and were forced into a Treaty of Brest-Litovsk type scenario then the western allies would have been left to tackle the Wehrmacht on their own. Without the Russians doing the real heavy lifting and engaging the best part of the Wehrmacht in the east and given the relative combat performance of the western allies versus the Wehrmacht a most problematic situation would have developed to say the least. It is difficult to imagine public opinion in the United States, Britain and her Dominions accepting the colossal bloodletting of such a campaign anymore than we relished the idea of invading Japan. In that situation the atomic bombing of Germany (the original objective of the Manhattan Project) would likely have taken place without the slightest hesitation or pretense to mercy.

JPWREL, I wonder if we should contact Daniel Inouye, who fought as a U.S. soldier in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and find out his thoughts?

Incidentally, there is an argument that says that of the following two issues, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet entry into the war. It was the Soviet invasion that had the greatest impact on Japan’s decision to surrender.

The argument continues that the most important, and immediate cause behind the scenes in Japan’s decision to surrender was the emperor’s sacred decision to do, brought about by a select group of the Japanese elites, who strongly felt that in their estimation, the Soviet entry into the war was a more powerful motivation than the atomic bombs to seek a cessation of the war by accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation.

TYRTAIOS, good point about the Soviets and their effect on the thinking of the Japanese. A senior Japanese officer interviewed after the war contends it was the Soviet entry which really concentrated the minds of the Japanese High Command not the atomic bombing. Remember that the March firebombing of Tokyo actually was more physically devastating. Anyway, this officer’s comment was that the Japanese felt that if the Russians ever got into Japan they would never leave! While the Americans crushed the Japanese war machine the Japanese never really feared the Americans like they did the Soviets. They had good reason to think this way since when the Soviet invaded Manchuria on August 10, 1945, they managed in ten days to virtually obliterate the 1.5 million manned Japanese Kwantung Army.

You appear to be saying the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan to keep the Soviets in the war against Germany. I find it difficult to believe you could be that clueless so I must assume I misinterpreted or you misspoke. Could you clarify?

Wow, I must have written in a most confusing manner – sorry! Let me clarify, it has been long speculated that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan served a two-fold purpose. Firstly, to shock the Japanese into a capitulation so as to avoid having to launch the invasion of Japan with all the bloodshed that would entail. The other reason was that it sent a powerful political message to the Soviet Union (whose war with Germany was over) of the power of the United States. Richard Frank discusses this in his fine book ‘Downfall’ as does Hastings in his ‘Retribution’.

Thank you for clarifying that.

I think you hit the nail right on the head there. I think it really depends on who you're asking.
From the perspective of an infantryman, I would have much rather fought in the ETO against an enemy that didn't require me to kill ever last single one of them, and from whom I could expect a modicum of mercy if things went wrong. The Germans were no saints, but compare that to being captured by the Japanese.
If I were commanding at the operational level, the Germans presented a much tougher nut to crack. I don't believe that after Guadalcanal an American battalion ever found itself in the position of being overrun and annihilated (please educate me if I'm wrong on this). The US Navy was able to effectually severe enemy lines of communication and cut logistics to a trickle to prep the battlefields for the Army/Marines. After Midway, it seemed that a Japanese defeat was a forgone conclusion, it was just a matter of how much blood would have to spilled to do it. The fact that so much of our resources went to the European theater speaks to this (yes, along with the endless political considerations). In addition, The Japanese army lacked the technology, resources, and expertise in maneuver warfare to pose a serious threat to larger scale American attacks. Where's the Pacific theater Kasserine Pass, Anzio beachhead, or Ardennes counteroffensive?
I could sum it up by describing a signature Imperial army tactic. To the individual soldier, Banzai charges were terrifying and potentially vicious attacks . However, higher level commanders would see them for the reckless waste of soldiers that they were, and breath easier.

I don't know, Boon. Maybe Joe in the ETO could have expected a modicum of mercy from German soldiers, but not so much from German machinegun and 88 rounds. Italy, Normandy, Siegfried Line, Hurtgen Forest, Ardense - all meat grinders. At least the troops/Marines in the Pacific could expect something of a break when they finished securing whatever island they hopped onto (assuming they survived, which I realize was far from certain). In Europe, for the average leg infantryman, generally speaking the only way off the front was on a stretcher. Several US divisions (1st IN, 2nd IN, 4th IN off the top of my head) were in combat for 9 straight months between D-Day and VE Day and suffered about 200% casualties. Not sure how that stacks up against the divisions in the Pacific. I don't want to get into "who had it worse" or whatever. War is hell for everyone. But I think the grunts in the ETO had it plenty bad.

I totally agree with you, BOLANDJD, that the slog of an average American infantryman across Europe was an unmitigated horror that only ended in death, wounding or capture unless he made it May 1945. However, I see that as a consequence of the strategic and operational realities of fighting a modern enemy on the European continent. The conditions were horrid and American units did indeed get torn up as they encountered never ending combat. But, I'm looking at this from the perspective of an individual soldier in contact. Was the lethality of the European campaign due more to the strategy imposed by geography and technology, or more to the fighting qualities of the German soldier?
From an American soldier's perspective, I think the best question to ask would be, "If you had to take that hill, would you rather there be Germans or Japanese defending it?" Surely, the overall conditions were bad, and I'm not trying to downplay the meat-grinder that was the the Italian campaign or the Hurtgen. I'm just saying that if conditions were equal and there was an equal amount of time to rest and refit afterward, I think that your average soldier would rather attack a German position. To me, the of body count in Europe has more factors to it than the tenacity of the enemy, and begins to veer into "who had it worse" territory (to which I would throw in malaria, jungle conditions, and tropical weather for the pacific).
So would an average soldier rather storm Tarawa or Omaha? Iwo or Casino?
Is this fair? I'm worried that I'm continuing a debate just for the sake of arguing.

The Japanese ran rings around the Brits at the start of the war. Yamashita was brilliant in Malaya, operationally, tactically and spiritually. Outnumbered, the Japanese out fought the British Union forces, including some very tough Aussies. They also were masterful in Burma, winning Stillwells praise. The great HBO series "Pacific" clearly depicts the fighting skill of a great opponent. MacArthur used his operational flexibility to out flank the Japanese strongpoints in the Pacific, reducing the need for us to go head to head against a tough foe at their major strongpoints, such as Rabul.

"Basically, Japan’s Army left no legacy of tactical or doctrinal innovation for the world to study. Equipped with antiquated weapons and technique and logistically always undernourished there was little here for the western allies to learn from. The intellectual squalor of the Japanese military merely bought a death ride for those poor unfortunates that perished in the name of the Emperor."

Wow! I'm sure H. John Poole would disagree!

"By 1939, the Japanese had come close to perfecting their individual and small-unit tactical technique. Still they failed to secure victory in their under-reported, six-month battle with the Russians at Nomanhan, Manchuria. Their nemesis had field-wise infantrymen, better logistics, and more armor. Though second-to-none tactically, the Japanese had been operationally outmaneuvered by Soviet armor."
(H.J. Poole, "Phantom Days", p.5)

“Japanese strength…lay in small units and the epitome of Japanese doctrine was embodied in small-unit tactics. Night attacks…and the willingness to engage in hand-to-hand combat were the hallmarks of the Japanese infantryman. Indeed such tactics were very successful against Soviet infantry in 1939.”
(Leavenworth Papers No.2 – Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet tactical combat, 1939, US Army, Edward J. Drea, p. 88)

“The Japanese were soon forced to face the same reality the Germans had in WWI. No amount of infantry expertise can stop an opponent willing to invest any number of men and machines. The Allied forces that pushed the Japanese back from Imphal, India, during WWII had not only vastly more supplies/equipment, but also eight times more men.”
(“Phantom Days”, p.6)

“Coupled with the spiritual or psychological values of offensive spirit…such tactics produced one of the finest infantry armies in the world…It (the IJA) was an army…that tried to use doctrine to compensate for materiel deficiencies.”
(Leavenworth Papers No.2, pp.17-20)

Iwo Jima:
“Most of Iwo’s defenders did not fanatically die in place. There is far more evidence of maneuver-war-motivated perseverance than bushido-related resignation. Kuribayashi’s marriage of close embrace with tactical withdrawal was so ingenious as to possibly constitute a significant advance in the tactics of defensive warfare.”
(“Phantom Days”, p.76)

You make a number of points here in an attempt to establish some sort of innovation on the part of the Japanese Army in WW2. For instance: ““The Japanese were soon forced to face the same reality the Germans had in WWI. No amount of infantry expertise can stop an opponent willing to invest any number of men and machines. The Allied forces that pushed the Japanese back from Impala, India, during WWII had not only vastly more supplies/equipment, but also eight times more men.”?(“Phantom Days”, p.6)”.

In fact the Japanese launched a campaign which was dramatically under resourced and whose units were not in supporting distance from one another. The actual numbers of combat troops engaged were little different the bulk of the 14th Army forces that you are counting were line of communication troops there to insure that the front line combat units were sustained with food, fuel and ammunition. The Japanese in their wisdom apparently felt that logistics were less important than the will to sacrifice oneself to the Emperor. Gen. Bill Slim does a great job in describing how Indian and British infantry learned to defeat Japanese small unit tactics in the Burmese jungle by the application of aggressive infantry tactics, supporting arms particularly air power and making sure that their operation were logistically sound. These were all elements that the starving, diseased Japanese operating on a shoestring never mastered.

"Gen. Bill Slim does a great job in describing how Indian and British infantry learned to defeat Japanese small unit tactics in the Burmese jungle by the application of aggressive infantry tactics, supporting arms particularly air power and making sure that their operation were logistically sound."

Exactly, they learned how to defeat Japanese small unit tactics later on in the Burma campaign. Because initially, the allies got their asses handed to them. As FM Slim writes in the chapter "Aftermath":

"[in 1942]We were too ready to classify jungle as impenetrable”, as indeed it was to us with our motor transport, bulky supplies, and inexperience. To us it appeared only as an obstacle to movement and to vision; to the Japanese it was a welcome means of concealed manoeuvre and surprise. The Japanese used formations specially trained and equipped for a country of jungle and rivers, while we used troops whose training and equipment, as far as they had been completed, were for the open desert. The Japanese reaped the deserved reward for their foresight and thorough preparation; we paid the penalty for our lack of both.” […]

[…] “Tactically we had been completely outclassed. The Japanese could – and did – do many things we could not. The chief of these and the tactical method on which all their successes were based was the “hook”. Their standard action was, while holding us in front, to send a mobile force, mainly infantry, on a wide turning movement round our flank through the jungle to come in on our line of communications. […] Time and again the Japanese used these tactics, more often than not successfully, until our troops and commanders began to acquire a road-block mentality which often developed into an inferiority complex.
There was, of course, nothing new in this idea of moving round a flank; it is one of the oldest stratagems, and there were many answers to it. The best answer would have been to do the same to the Japanese before they did it to us, but we, by reason of our complete dependence on motor transport and the unhandiness of our troops in the jungle, could not carry out these hooks successfully in any strength. They were only possible for forces trained and equipped for them.”[…]

[…]”In preparation, in execution, in strategy, and in tactics we had been worsted, and we paid the penalty – defeat.”

FM Viscount Slim, “Defeat into victory” pp. 118, 119 and 121

Furthermore the Japanese tactic of “close embrace”, as used on Iwo Jima, resembles the NVA/VC technique of “hugging the belt”(used 20+ years later). Both were successfully employed to neutralize external US fire support. Now, what does that tell us about US “mastery” of enemy tactics?