Friday, June 4, 2010 - 10:31 AM
Here is a thoughtful note from an colonel wrestling with the decision about whether to turn down command. He agrees with the major (below) that it isn't just deployments that are bothering people in his shoes, but more the poor leadership at the top.
Tom,
I can't be the only one telling you stuff like this...
Bottom line: I have a strong operational background -- have done all the "right" things -- deployed my ass off -- been to all the schools (2 masters degrees, though as you read below -- I'm not a fan of the degrees) -- and more importantly for your post, I am getting ready to fill out my O6 command preference selection for the board that convenes in July.
I know a number of great warriors that have dropped their papers and walked. Either turned down command or requested to not be considered. Family, money, and deployments had little to do with it. In all cases, families were strong and wives supported the obvious grind to be expected with command and further promotion. In a nutshell it is simple -- every single one of them simply reached the tipping point in terms of disgust with what they saw in our system (DOD). These aren't a bunch of knuckle-heads I'm talking about -- these were officers that shocked a lot of people by walking away from it. One of your respondents made a comment about how important command is for Marines, and that's very true. However, for most of us the motivator that keeps us going is knowing that we make a difference -- leadership is so very critical, much more so then most realize.
Making a difference. Once you reach a point where you're now sitting at the table with the decision makers and the glaring nonsense becomes evident -- you realize making a difference is more in line with contributing on a team like Oxfam or any number of other NGOs that are doing more with less and without the fanfare. -- You can't help but wonder which team should I be playing for? Where will my personal and professional contribution weigh more?
I have seen half a dozen O5/O6's either turn down command (one a guaranteed stepping stone to O7) or request they not be considered by the board (since they already made a decision to retire). In every case -- every case -- deployments, civilian pay, and family considerations were not the PRIMARY influence.
After years of dedicated service, doing the right thing, leading warriors who joined for all the right reasons, attending all the required PME schools, executing the "mandatory" b-billet tours, you now find yourself as one of "they" (at HHQ). Imagine the surprise to discover there is no magic happening behind the green door. All those years assuming that the GO/FOs were working their asses off to refine/tune regional/theater/strategic paths that make sense of what
subordinate commands/units are executing -- well, hang on -- not so fast. All that "strategic stuff" you learned at Top Level School was really cool in the classroom, but... here's what you more often hear: "... we'll get to that cool stuff later after we iron out & synchronize our social calendars" (and "why in the hell do I only have one secretary when the GO/FO across the hall has three? -- shit me a point paper on that one").No bitterness -- just plain surprise. So, 24+ years into it -- closely reaching that mystical point where you think you really can help make a difference -- and you get slapped in the face with the emperors' not wearing clothes. Tom, you've asked the right question before -- why aren't more of these folks getting fired?
Truth is -- most of these O5/O6's are turning down command because they've spent their entire professional lives making a difference and having an impact. The reality is (as I contemplate my own cmd selection form) -- some of the NGOs out there are contributing more to a better end then our own organization. Wouldn't it make more sense to play on that team vice carrying some of these whacko's on my back?
Bottom-line, Tom, you do a great job pointing out the O5/O6 commanders that are being booted (as they deserve) -- but we're doing a piss-poor job getting rid of the dead weight above that level; as long as that continues... a lot of good senior officers will continue to bail out. I didn't spend all this time to join a damn social club or spend an hour counting who has more secretaries. I've got about 2 weeks to make a decision and although command is the greatest job in the military, I'm not sure it's worth more of my time.
This is a powerful statement by the kind of officer that one would think the Marine Corps would want to keep in its ranks. The military’s obsession with advanced degrees that often have little or no value added is a symptom of a system, which appears dysfunctional. It would be interesting to know how other top quality armed forces such as Israeli, British, Australian, Japanese, etc., handle issues of officer development and promotion. Perhaps Tom could shake his network of global contacts for some views like that of the above Colonel.
I'll say. The last one, too.
I don't have anything to add to these expressions of how serving officers think; they wear the uniform, I don't. I have to say, though, that I've always wondered how a force evolves when it is "half-at-war" for a protracted period of time. Army and Marine junior officers have often had to make multiple deployments a part of their careers, but it seems to me that a higher percentage of more senior officers remains occupied with the routine of peacetime service, doing the same kinds of things they might have ten years ago. Inertia is a powerful force, and I suppose we shouldn't wonder when rising officers blooded in the half of their service that is at war look at the other half and wonder how they can make a difference there.
The dividing line between the peacetime half of the services and the wartime half isn't bright, clear and red. I have long had the feeling -- and I cannot prove this -- that at senior levels major combat commands were assigned using peacetime criteria, at least in the early years of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns. As the Iraq insurgency started to grow in that war's first year, for example, the bright spot in the country was often said to be the 101st's operations area around Mosul. The 101st's tour expired and it went home with its commander, who was eventually given command of American forces in the country years later, when under peacetime rules it was his turn.
You don't have to believe Gen. Petraeus can leap tall buildings in a single bound to ask yourself if he was a) that much better a general at the end of 2006 than he had been three years earlier and b) so less prepared than Gens. Abizaid and Casey to be a theater commander that it made sense to rotate them first through the job Petraeus was eventually given. By the rules of the peacetime Army, it probably did. I don't know how greatly those rules influence assignments to other important positions or the potential of good officers to "make a difference" in them. The sense I'm getting from comments here and elsewhere is that they're still pretty influential.
"...leadership is so very critical, much more so then most realize."
This so true for the people who CARE, and care for the right reasons. I have recently volunteered for an assignment that was devoid of all perks except two. Mission and leadership. I realize the latter isn't perfect but it is, in my view and five years of experience under it, the very best leadership of my branch. In the "cons" list to the assignment I volunteered and fought for were many factors. In the "pro" side was solely mission and leadership. That's it. Leadership that prioritizes the mission over their own fiefdoms, career progression, and petty politics.
Unlike the author of the article, I'm not a command kind of guy and I have many limitations. But despite my limitations, as a very combat experienced field grader (in my branch), I don't view command as something worth the sacrifice because 1) the "system" doesn't elevate the right kind of performance and 2) even if you display the right kind of "performance" to achieve rank, you can't do much to tackle the real problems that need to be addressed (without quickly getting a pack your bags notice and perhaps a blurb in the media about your boss "losing confidence" in you....whatever that means). I have recently seen one good DO on that track get canned because he informed an O-6 that his off-the-cuff-without-thinking directive made no sense and would impair the mission. He was gone in a split second despite all the boxes he checked, all the hard work he put in, and despite the fact that he was right.
Though my vantage point is very limited, in my estimation I've had the pleasure of serving for perhaps two or three commanders in fourteen years who were able to navigate the system and get promoted while keeping their focus on what matters. I consider these types to be incredible and far superior to me. Two turned down O-6 to retire. But even if I had the "skill" to navigate those same waters, the ability to make a real difference "at the top" seems illusory. It's too late for me to change my path assuming I could, but even if I could I would still wonder, "why bother?"
Senior leadership is key to those who care about what matters. What matters is the mission, not the number of secretaries or any other ego stroking metric. This author is absolutely right. Leadership IS so very critical.
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more officers turning down command
As an Army Warrant I have a lot of leeway with instructing/counseling regular officers as I see fit. The great LT's, CPT's, and MJR's are few and far between. The good ones are a little more represented, and the muddlers are plentiful; the bad ones are equivalent in numbers to the good ones. The problem as I see it, is to counteract the muddlers and the bad officers. This is an age old problem. Reading Stephen Ambrose, Cornelius Ryan, or any other respected WWII authors there were few great leaders, and lots of poor to bad ones, but the good/great officers took charge and got the job done.
The difference between then and now, was the great ones felt honor bound to stay and protect their subordinates; where as today, the first thought is about me. If enough good and great officers stick it out and band together, they can overcome the poor and bad officers now in charge, as well as those in the pipeline. We can all complain about the plethora of bad officers, but its up to us, the good/great ones to contain and mitigate them.
You better watch for this spam
This guy has been posting spam like this on your old paper, the Washington Post, and on McClatchey. You better start monitoring comments and delete this ASAP or you'll find it on every story.
Try a challenge and response system, where you have to type in slightly-obscured letter and numbers.
Wow, Colonels talking like Captains
As the proud torchbearer for the Junior Officer Protective Association (JOPA), its a little disconcerting to hear Colonel's talking like Captains thinking about getting out. In the early years of the war (s), some of my peers were hitting the company grade off ramp years and deciding to stick it out for a tour or two in Iraq or Afghanistan. The common sentiment was that war was too important to leave for the field grades. Hearing a field grade speak this way about other field grade is bothersome. Anytime life imitates a chapter of "A Bright Shining Lie," I get worried.
On the other hand, as the military becomes a smaller and smaller segment of society and the NGO community continues to grow, it isn't that surprizing the two would compete for talented folks who want to save the world, albeit in very different ways.
Mr Bacon, Oxfam isn't that extreme. One of the most hardcore Marine LtCol warriors I know is now working at the US Institute for Peace. He would have made a hellova General. I also know a few other Iron Capts who joined and sometimes started their own NGOs. Yes, Force Recon dudes teaching farming in Africa.
I too was a member long ago of JOPA, during tumultuous times, but called it something else. "Lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way!"
As in some long marriages, partners can grow apart, and that is understandable. Than again, sometimes a partner is no longer able to accept what they see as the ever increasing challenges to that partnership, and separate under the guise of something else.
There will always be a Marine Corps! What size it is; what it’s (re)defined mission statement will be; how it reorganizes and equips, as well as how it is supported by the Navy, will be a demand placed on the next Commandant, who SecDef gates is narrowing down on a short list to hand the president, and will present a challenge to leadership at all levels for those that are up to it - leaders the next CMC will lean on.
I hope in time to see your sobriquet as IronMaj (not all majors need have a lobotomy, some escape)!
Can I tell you a secret IRONCPT
Us Colonels? (I am of the LTC variety) We are just like you CPTs. Indeed when we look at each other we often wonder how we got to be so old so quick. Or counter-intuitively we don't recognize it. I happen to be a very young post command LTC - just turned 40 a few weeks ago. But when I look in the mirror I still see that young dumb LT. And when I talk to my peers it is the same thing. And we tell the same old war stories. And we bitch about "the Man" and counter-intuitively forget that in many ways...we are "the Man" now.
That's life. I like what this officer talks about here. We all want to make a difference. No doubt some of my soldiers didn't like me, or didn't think I had their best interests at heart. But I know I did. And I did the two things that were most important 1) accomplished the mission 2) brought them all home (in that order). We went one better by making things a little bit better for the Iraqis (and we also didn't shoot, kill or hurt any of them).
I still question some of the things I did, still wonder whether I did the best I could, or set the best example. I am reading BLACK HEARTs right now and I worry a lot about how we train and care for our troops - lots to worry about in that book. I wonder if I was guilty of the same mistakes - and just got lucky - or if I was really good, or good enough.
In the end, we all worry and wonder about HHQ. But when we get there, we either hunker down and do our best to do right by our units and soldiers, or we become part of the problem.
As a guy who works with one foot in the civilian world and one foot in the other though...I can tell you it all sucks, bureaucracy reigns everywhere and even though the Army looks stupid and inadequate at times it is still more fulfilling and exciting than almost anywhere else.
Great Book Hunter...I was a part of 2nd BCT for that deployment, I can tell you the book is spot on and very fair. The author states in the beginning how each door that opened up led to another, very true..even to the point that the author did not hit on every aspect of what was going on in the BDE AO; but if he did that it could be a longer read than War and Peace.
What really comes out is how the BN Leadership/Staff seemed to be on one side, and the Companys on the other...the mentality of lower vs higher is always out there, but the sentiment followed even after the deployment.
Army Officer recruiting commercials? So so sad.
Colonel, please just free yourself and separate. I did and am much happier, as is my family. After two deployments and countless battlefield mishaps which resulted in deaths, due to leadership failures, I can only say that service to the nation has become service to oneself. The recent surge of US Army "Go Army Officer" commercial advertisements is a great indicator of the current status of Officer's in the US Army. If the US Army is a measure of how the DOD is handling Officer retention problems; then we are in a very sad state of affairs. I agree that these issues must be fixed at the top. Until I see leaders that follow the oath, I will deter all friends and family from military service. When I see leaders choosing combat duty, rather than running from it, perhaps I will regain some faith in our military leadership. Has anyone seen how many Officers have evaded combat postings? Just take a ride on the DC metro and see how many combat patches you see. It is truly sad that so many "Warriors" have become self-serving politicians, just like their leadership in civilian office. In closing, my Grandfather once predicted that the United States would one day be required to man its defence with mercenary forces. I see that day approaching sooner than later.
Why is MacArthur featured in those Army Officer recruiting ads?
Reminds me of Tom's recent post about the worst generals in American history. Although Tom is right that the Army as a whole has "extirpated his memory. The influence of Marshall, Eisenhower and Bradley lives on, while MacArthur has been treated as a historical dead end."
As an active officer, I agree - MacArthur is rarely mentioned or memorialized, while the others (and I would add Patton and maybe Pershing and Abrams to some extent) are remembered everywhere. With that in mind, it makes me wonder: why is MacArthur featured so prominently in those Army Officer recruiting commercials that are everywhere now? Given his insubordination, and that he was the most famous general fired in modern US history, who would think he would be a good role model for officer recruiting?
Officer Recruiting Commercials are a Long Overdue Positive Step
Mr. Bruce,
I disagree. I think the Army's recent decision to advertise officer opportunities - just like it advertises enlisted opportunities - is a long overdue step in the right direction. Between 2003 and 2008, the Army was essentially accepting every minimally qualified civilain OCS applicant that wanted to join. Yes, that's right, a darn near 100% selection rate of minimally qualified civilians (age 21-42) and an OCS graduation rate that regularly trended north of 90%.
Why shouldn't the Army take steps to advertise its officer opportunities to a largely agnostic civilian population? I mean, without a robust officer recruiting network like the USMC, how else is the Army going to get the message out? The detailed SSG recruiter in the strip mall recruiting station? Not likely.
For the past 2 years, OCS has generated almost HALF of the Regular Army's cohort of 2nd Lieutenants. Given this reliance on OCS and college graduate civilian applicants, I can't think of any good reason why we wouldn't want to communicate these opportunities.
Waiting for self-selecting civilians to pursue OCS on their own hasn't worked. While we've made our "numbers", quality has suffered.
Victor,
My biggest problem is the overt emphasis on general officers. I think that the inclusion of officers who graduated from OCS (e.g. Joseph Grano, Rep. John Dingell, Sen. Bob Dole or Rep. John Conyers), served a term of service and went on to achieve great things in the civilian world would be a better, more inclusive pitch.
The same people that think these Army Officer recruiting commercials are a good approach. Getting the word out that the Army needs officers makes sense, but Army Strong / Go Army.com may not be the best method. MacArthur is iconic, so someone not really involved with Army history may just think it makes a good image. GEN Casey was used in the first Army Strong commercials during OIF IV, despite things on the ground not going so well.
If Soldiers made commercials, they would be simple and to the point; yet probably effective.
"US ARMY. GOOD SOLDIERS NEED GOOD LEADERS. COMMIT TODAY."
Pat,
Great comments. I concur completely. The "Army Strong" schtick is some pretty thin gruel - especially when this ad campaign is ostensibly targeted at college graduate 20 and 30 somethings with "options." That said, at least the Army is (finally) trying to target its officer outreach with these ads and the pilot program that allows some guarantee of OCS branch choice for qualified alumni of the US News Top 30 colleges/universities.
I agree that a USMC-lite pitch - something like: "To Whom Much is Given, Much is Expected" would resonate more; or "Wanted: World Class People to Lead World Class Soldiers." I actually used the former pitch when I discussing OCS at career fairs during my time as an AMEDD recruiter in NYC.
Better yet, check out the major in the most recent officer recruiting commercial who doesn't have a right shoulder patch. Damn, I wanna have that guy's career track. How do I sign up?!
If you grind down on people for 8 years...
...you end up with a pretty ground-down force. We teed up the AVF, told all it was splendid ... and then abandoned it to seemingly endless war. Pay and patriotism go only so far. Simple truth: we've hung these folks out to dry.
AVF: failure.
Bush's war in Iraq: failure.
Bush's war in Afghanistan: failure.
Step back a bit and look at the scene. What's to like? What's to motivate good people trapped in the system? Our entire military establishment is due for reform and overhaul: this ain't working.
What are you talking about?
You think it is the grind that is pushing these guys out? It is poor leadership at the top, 06's and above are very out of touch with the reality on the ground, have a tendency to micro-manage and are still more concerned with making rank over all else. These are the complaints I have heard over and over again by the JOs who get out and by our enlisted who get out as well. The USMC has been a bit better but the terrible leadership at the top of the other branches is glaring.
As for the other babble, what failures are you talking about? One would almost think you hope that Iraq goes down, that OEF goes down, etc..just to massage your ego and you can say you were right. Please inform me how you would do things different or are we going to go down the same lanes we have in the past and you will say that we "should not have been there" or "pull out now"? Really Ducky, for someone who writes as much as you do for Proceedings you do not seem offer much in the way of anything constructive or that is in touch on the current wars and the effects they are having on our Officer Corps. Our JOs are pretty good but the reasons they get out are what I stated above and I have yet to hear any single one of them say it is due to failures in the wars or due to the 8 year battle, people got into this know what was what.
"...the AVF has not been a failure"
We've been fighting ill-equipped irregulars in Afghanistan since 2001. We've been mired in Iraq, which we defeated in 2003, ever since we 'won.' The Army and Marine Corps seem to be coming apart at the seams, we've little capacity for defense elsewhere in the world, defense modernization is being stripped down for O&M, and defense costs are through the roof. This, all of this, 100% of this, is the end-state of the AVF, that silly bet we made that national defense could be outsourced and we citizens could ignore it. The time to argue that the AVF is not a failure is after it has won all it set out for in the Middle East. Hold your breath.
See US Naval Institute Proceedings October 2006 p. 12 for a fuller argument.
The Army is the only group that has had a problem with retention or recruitment throughout the conflicts, the war in Iraq is not lost despite your continued carping about that and Afghanistan being lost as well, DoD costs are still a small fraction of our overall budget and nothing you have said argues or supports your idea that the AVF is a failure. So, please, feel free to toss me something concrete that says the AVF has failed? I know you write now and then for "Proceedings", is it your article I am looking for? Just cut and paste it if it is that insightful.
Ducky, with all due respect, I really think you are out of touch on this topic and on the topics of the conflicts, it really sounds like you want us to lose to prove a point at times and that disappoints me a great deal.
Nothing to cheer one up like finding out that all is well in the Middle East! Stunning victories by the AVF! Two extended, grinding, seemingly endless wars ... for neither of which exists even a cohesive definition of winning ... held up as exemplars of success!
Pardon me but that's bullshit.
Again, give me some real points about how the AVF is a failure, you post nothing constructive, no points about how the AVF is a detriment just more ranting about it being a "failure", all talk, all bluster, no substance.
Two extended, grinding, seemingly endless wars ... for neither of which exists even a cohesive definition of winning ... held up as exemplars of success!
Pardon me but that's bullshit.
Yeah, that is the fault of the AVF
Really Ducky? That is your reply? Again, did you right the "Proceedings" article? Cut and paste it if is it so insightful, perhaps it will open eyes and give your view some validity since your arguments as present are not cutting it.
I know this is just a blog but man I have to stop being so lazy and proof read my posts lol
Whats your argument?
That a professional military is less able to win in Iraq and Afghanistan than a conscript Army?
or
That we need a conscript Army so the American public feels the cost of these engagements and forces our withdrawal?
They are very different arguments.
You make a good argument about the importance of narrowing the military/civilian gap. And, while conscription could do this it has many other nasty effects. I think there are better ways to help the citizens understand their military. Ending conscription was a good thing.
FREEMANMF writes: “I think there are better ways to help the citizens understand their military.” I ask what would those be? From what I can tell the civilian world never understands the military, indeed the very nature of the military precludes that understanding. Consequently, citizens need to have a stake in the military.
Had we the army intended by our Founding Fathers, the neocons would have been forced to weigh the cost of their imperialism in political terms before we went in and Congress would have been compelled to do the same. You don't need rocket-science to understand that, in those circumstances, abandoning Afghanistan would have been much harder ('we' would have already paid the price to be there rather than 'those AVF mercenaries and who cares') and going into Iraq on such sketchy and ultimately false pretexts politically impossible.
Once in, I'm less sure we'd have insisted on 'withdrawal' than that at election time we'd have been far more critical of those poltroons who'd gotten us into this mess. As well, we'd have had far more interest in waging these wars well and intelligently rather than letting Bush/Cheney mangle their management and a clueless Army leadership mishandle their execution as it thrashed around (and still does) to find the right strategies to contend with the small bands of irregulars we have been facing (at times I think our guys couldn't organize a two-float parade).
I've become convinced that imperial aims (Vietnam; Iraq; Afghanistan) require imperial measures. These in turn require the imperial force found in a self-contained military divorced from the internal life of the nation. We have that now, we've applied it in imperial fashion, and we now face the gigantic tension between democratic ends and imperial means. The AVF is not of our nature and not in our interest. It's called national defense, not national offense: we should quit acting like the Roman Empire lest we end up as it did on the bone heap of history.
Ducky,
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So the argument is compulsory service would make politicians better consider the cost in using forces, so we would not have gone to war with Iraq. A fair argument. I would just remind you that the Iraq resolution received 296-133 votes in the House and 77-23 in the Senate. Our current Secretary of State, top diplomat, voted to authorize the Iraq invasion.
You still seem to argue compulsory service would produce a less "clueless Army leadership." I think it is clear that the quality of our Military would decrease with compulsory service, and our leaders would less be able to focus on their strategic decisions with the distractions inherent in a non-professional force.
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JPWREL,
.
I just got to Cambridge this week after being overseas for the last 3.5 years and encountered a great example: USMC held "Marine Week" a few weeks ago; they brought in all sorts of weapons and equipment and had it available for public viewing (including landing an Osprey). Talking to people here, for many of them it was their first time interacting with service members and they found it very enlightening. I applaud the Marines for reaching out and helping the citizens in Boston understand who they are and what they do. I think public outreach is a tremendous tool for increasing citizen awareness of their armed forces. This and other public affairs efforts should be increased.
Other measures to reduce the citizen-soldier divide: Focus more recruitment efforts on regions of the country and segments of the population historically under-represented in the Military--I encounter a shocking number of citizens who have never met a Service Member before. Geographically distribute our Armed Forces' basing. The Army recently unblocked Facebook, this is a huge step in allowing our Soldiers to engage directly with the American public--Service Members should continue to be encouraged to talk to American Citizens and explain what we do. I think recently embedding reporters has done a lot to increase public awareness of the Military, this and other practices that increase transparency should be enhanced. Perhaps, more outreach to Schools, not as a recruiting effort, but to help young people better understand who their military is and what it does.
Forcing people to serve in the Military is not a good way to help people understand or appreciate their Armed Forces, I think it will tend to lead to conscripts resenting and be disgusted with the military and the professional/career-portion of it---I have seen that to be the case in Germany and South Korea. It is very very bad both for the military and society.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are not about us attempting to militarily defeat "small bands of irregulars." If that was the goal we could easily do it. It is about establishing a capable and stable democratic society friendly to America in places that are ill-prepared for democracy, hostile and distrusting of us, with long lasting violent struggles, and with neighboring countries opposing our efforts. You should be able to appreciate that that is a brutally hard task for our military to accomplish. It is quite possibly impossible, and you can hardly fault the military for struggling with an impossible task.
FREEMANMF: "I think it is clear that the quality of our Military would decrease with compulsory service..." We went to war in 1941 with a cadre leadership and draftees. That turned out pretty well, eh. And even were your contention containing some truth, military efficiency is a lesser value alongside the proper functioning of our democracy.
We went in with draftees in Vietnam also. That turned to shit, but we ended that ill-fought war precisely because we were killing draftees with no end in sight (were it the AVF fighting we might still be grinding away). And would note that, unlike WW-II, the Vietnam draftees were enlisted only. In WW-II we filled out our officers corps with draftees there too . Had we had some draftee officers alongside all the straight-leg West Pointers, we might have had some common sense there with which to leaven Westmorland's incompetence.
FREEMANMF: "The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are not about us attempting to militarily defeat "small bands of irregulars." If that was the goal we could easily do it..." Bullshit. Ain't happened yet. And it's not a trivial goal - it's the sine quo non. Ball in your court.
FREEMANMF: "...establishing a capable and stable democratic society friendly to America in places that are ill-prepared for democracy, hostile and distrusting of us, with long lasting violent struggles, and with neighboring countries opposing our efforts." Those are imperial goals. Dumb ones, too, if success in trial-by-combat is the test (and it is!). If in fact it is impossible (like, apparently, is defeating small bands of irregulars or so the record shows), the Army leadership owes itself, its nation, and the very concept of honor the honesty to say so, loudly and forcibly. Instead we get strategy-du-jour, the White Knight of the month, and continued failure in even the goals you raise as imperative.
Ducky- "Those are imperial goals. Dumb ones, too, if success in trial-by-combat is the test (and it is!). If in fact it is impossible..., the Army leadership owes itself ... to say so, loudly and forcibly."
They are the goals the Army has been given. While I have my opinion, I am not arguing here wither they are imperial or not, wise or not, just or not, imperative or not, or if they should be our goals. They are the goals. Policy would be much easier if we knew what was impossible and what is not. The feasibility of establishing a "free democratic Iraq that is an ally to the US," should be debated, but is of course ultimately indeterminable. It is not the Army's role to publicly challenge policy decisions, senior leaders provide their best military advice and then execute the mission the best they can--many have done that.
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Ducky-"Bullshit. Ain't happened yet. And it's not a trivial goal - it's the sine quo non"
Not sure what you mean: We have defeated many "small bands of irregulars." And, we have defeated Nations, Taliban no longer run Afghanistan and the Baath Party no longer runs Iraq. But, those victories are meaningless if their forces are replenished. You must address the underlying causes to do that, you must engage in nation building and that takes time.
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Ducky-"even were your contention containing some truth..."
You will not concede that an all volunteer professional military is more capable than a conscript one? This is absurd, entirely unreasonable, and irrational. I do not bother with discussions with irrational ideologues. Go do some thinking and come back when you are ready for rational, reasoned discussion.
You are quite simply losing grasp of the argument and sound a bit like you are way out of touch, you accuse the wars of all being "imperial" aims, I recall you also saying that military towns are company towns where the guys are all stuck up in the bases or on base housing when nothing could be farther from the truth, you use WWII as an example of why a conscript Military would be better but we had one in Korea, Vietnam and the several incursions in between that also went on and I might add that Vietnam was hardly an example of how a conscript Military would be better. I honestly think that you and a few others are still thinking this is the same military that we had in the late 70's by some of the things I see posted and lead me to believe that you are a bit out of touch with the realities of todays military.
As for the AVF, the AVF has yet to lose any battles I know of, the Army is the only branch that has has any problems in retention or recruitment, you retain corporate knowledge when you have a professional military and you also ignore the downside of the conscript military. Personally, I think our initial training is still to soft, that quotas need to go since they undermine faith in command and each other, that if you want females in the military they have to meet the same standards and that our own mens standards need to be increased and that we need to bring back some of the traditions that bonded us together.
Solution?-If you really want to change and make the military better, get rid of half of the Officer Corps, get rid of the way that officers are assigned for just 2 years at each post since it is not enough time to know your men let alone your job, train them to be war fighters and leaders first and not business executives as is often the case today. Train our officer corps to be more concerned with the men and the mission over their careers, train them to be adaptive and make them understand that in battle "Commanders Intent" and Initiative is more important than a freaking SitRep every 5 minutes, train them that loyalty goes up and down the CoC, train them mission success is paramount and that their FitReps are not. The biggest problem the military has right now is among the 06 and above crowd, many are still stuck in the old ways and are still VERY risk adverse, we have a few diamonds in the rough but if you want real change push for it in your old realm, the Officer Corps.
I agree that the divide is a problem, but I also get more and more concerned when I see many in our military condone this divide by being softer on the "new generation" since it is not their fault that they were raised in such a self-entitled culture. It also never ceases to amaze me how big that gap is in some areas, if you were to go to Southie, Lowell, Billerica, etc...you would not see people who were unfamiliar with the Military and those towns are only a short drive from Cambridge but they might as well be a million miles away.
Perhaps more Military History Courses being allowed at the college level that were not tossed out as "Peace and Conflict Studies"? Maybe allowing general enrollment in some of the classes that ROTC has? More Fleet Weeks or perhaps just a day of interaction, I know the Navy is looking to do one in Boston down the road. Maybe even more mention of the Military in High School History as a cultural study course, who knows really but something does need to be done. People truly do not understand the reason why the Military has to be different or why they have to do the things they do, I am often shocked at some of the things I am asked "Why can't you just leave?" or "The guy only had a knife, why did they have to shoot him" or my favorites "I heard none of the kids made it out of high school" "they are all red necks" etc...etc...Look at the men who have been awarded the Medal of Honor, in the 60's and 70's that was on TV and it was a big deal, now it is just a blurb.
I sometimes think that even just teaching about Military History might help a bit with the social disconnect but the Academics on Campus I fear would not be so welcoming-
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2008/04/03/why-dont-colleges-teach-military-history.html
I agree with everything you state here. (Your O-5 drinking buddy). I owed you a stalwart agreement or two from previous threads.
One addition, can we O's get just a little credit when we do do all those things - without becoming your bosom buddy drinking friend? Not looking for any accolades, just could do with a little less being treated like the devil himself. LOL
Hunter, sorry, do not mean to lump you in with the others lol
I know you try and do the right thing man, I know you must feel like sisyphus at times. It just gets discouraging when I see so many good O's get out or give up in the face of what I consider politicians who happen to wear uniforms. I had one G1 at Camp Slayer in 04', we were getting shelled every night by a 60mm, we assumed they were using a car to hide it and then just launch it into camp, they never hit anything really but we wanted to do a RECCE and then ambush them since it would be pretty easy to determine where the shot were coming from, when it got up to him (the BG) the quote we got from out our Col. was "Someone could get shot!" and that is why it got canked. Wish I could make that up. See, I have heard there are some great Flags Officers out there but I have also heard that Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster are out there too, I want to believe but man is it tough ;) All kidding aside, while we do have some good ones, why are they so few and far between? I wish you the best of luck in what ever you decide to go and do from here, my email is the same as the ID except with yahoo on it. Cheers mate! :)
Anyone who has ever put on a uniform knows this is nothing new. For the most part, the good leave (frustrated just like TR's blog describes) and the dead weight hang around doing just enough to get by. This is as true at the JO level as anywhere else. It's no surprise, then, the exceptional commanders are few and far between.
Only people that participate make a difference
Sir,
If you want to really make a difference leaving now is the wrong way to go about it. Stand and fight! It’s what we have been trained to do our whole careers. Quitting because you have some disillusionment is not the mark of a good leader. A good leader perseveres though the hard times, comes out better for it and makes a difference in the organization that they are in. If I quit every time I ran into a poor leader I would have left the Army years ago but for every poor leader I have come across I have also worked with and worked for many more good leaders.
The military had a similar situation following the Vietnam War a lot of good leaders left the military because they didn’t like the way things were done. Some stayed, fought and helped rebuild the military from one of its lowest points into becoming the best and most powerful military in the world. A lot of those names are very well known even to people who don’t know much about the military. Those names include: General Colin Powell, General H. Norman Schwartzkopf, General Fred Franks, and General Barry McCaffrey. How different would the Persian Gulf War have been if they all left because the military was at a low point? None of these men made Tom’s list of worst generals ever. They all stayed during one of the military’s lowest points, they stayed and made a difference.
You can leave if you want to but I’m staying because I would like to think that I’m not a horrible leader and the military needs us more than ever. You can only make things better if you participate. Getting out and then complaining about how bad it is only makes you part of the problem and not the solution that you could have been.
Fox-men as these Lakota were called, were noted for their care and concern for the tribe in peaceful times as well as in times of war, and if something was needed to be done, no matter what the danger or "difficulty," they frequently were the first to volunteer.
The Kit Fox was one of the societies from whose members, were frequently chosen to serve as Aki'cita which translates as soldier, but it's implied meaning is more like guard.
Aki'cita acted as guards and watched over the tribe when the tribe moved from one place to another and kept watch for enemy activity when a camp was chosen. Aki'cita also acted as civil police to preserve order in the camp. Warriors chosen to serve as Aki'cita also had the responsibility to maintain strict control during a buffalo hunt.
Sounds quaint? I will assure you I am anything but quaint. I see the misuse of the word warrior to describe anyone in uniform all too often. It sounds to me Jim King, you've earned that right by one willing to watch over his tribe.
Well said, Jim. I was thinking the same thing, actually. Certainly the Army, and every other institution in American society for that matter, has gone through low points and high points. And it is quality leaders that weather the low points and pull the Army up. I suspect that it really weighs on officers considering turning down a command. "If I don't take the command, some schlub will get it and hurt Soldiers" or something like that. Its a really tricky balance, though, when the said disillusionment has adverse affects on family or personal life or even self image. Not everybody wants to be or needs to be the next George Marshall. So everybody has to make their own decision based on their personal circumstances. If the good colonel feels called to end his military service and go do good work at an NGO, I wish him the best of luck. If he takes stays in and takes the command, I pray he does make some positive changes to help Soldiers and improve the Army.
Jim,
Outstanding post.
Also, no disrespect to any one serving. The ones I have come across as complaining about their boss's the most, in both military and civilian world, are the ones who complained about them selves the most.
If you are not part of the solution you are just continuing the problem. It is always interesting when people state how effective they 'were', but as the higher they get, the top begins to tapper, you begin to see how impact-full you really are.
I agree with you and TY on this, a lot of our good JOs are getting out just as they know their jobs and are getting out due to the terrible leadership at the O6 and above level. I hope that more of them stay so that when they make rank and go up the ladder that they will make the transformations needed and that when morale is low in the ranks they will try to raise it via training and not by something silly such as issuing out berets. While it is hard for me to hold it against those that get out it does in fact weaken our nation, the NCOs are the tactical leaders but the big picture and planning needs to fall on the shoulders of capable Officers who care about the mission and the men over their careers, sadly many are getting out and that knowledge is lost and the senior O's who do stay often continue us down a path of what seems to be madness. I have to agree with another poster who said in todays military that a man like Patton would not make it, truly a sad statement.
A Message for the Less Than Best and Brightest
Jim King has a great post on this thread.
General (Retired) Fritz Kroesen addressed this issue in December 2000 in ARMY magazine (title of his op-ed is title of my comment here).
http://www.pica.army.mil/voice/voice2001/010126/4_comment.html
I have a lot of friends who got out (and more than a few who came back in or tired to come back in post 9-11-2001) and a lot who stayed in, or, such as "Hunter," transitioned to the Reserve component, and are still serving. The the vast majority of the guys who stayed in are damn good...I was selected recently for battalion command on my second look and I consider myself very lucky; the guys who made it in my year group on the first look were universally outstanding leaders and savvy combat veterans and the first look guys on this list are of the same quality. I know a lot of very talented friends who were not even selected as alternates. Many, but not all, of the guys who got out were pretty talented also, but frankly if any of them played an "I'm too good for the Army...my talents are/were unappreciated" they would be laughed at. Talent is important, but as legendary coach Jimmy McGinty said in the movie THE REPLACEMENTS, "Heart...you gotta have heart." In many cases (not all), the guys who got out just did not have the desire to stay in and work through the tough times. That is not a dig at them...I and quite a few others still in seriously contemplated at various points getting out to pursue other interests and opportunities. Some went on to serve in other ways: FBI, DoJ, House Armed Services Committee, UN.
BTW - just as a reference point. I had about .6 years remaining on my commitment when I decided to give the Guard a try, when I left active after company command. I went into the Guard with a typical AD chip on my shoulder and was lucky enough to marry up with a good unit, with an absolutely great peer CPT as a full time AGR Training officer. Together we transformed an Infantry battalion, esp. post 9-11. His friendship, leadership and peership (to coin a word) set the conditions that turned my .6 years into 10+. Later, together we commanded the sister battalions in a deployed IBCT.
The Guard is becoming a great place to be. The fat ass beer drinkers, golfers, and war story tellers are pretty much all gone. They are replaced by serious warfighters. Indeed in the shitty economy and our rust belt state they are often chomping at the bit.
Make no mistake too. Balancing a civilian job, Reserve Component job and family is damn hard work - real hard if you are doing it right. While in command (3 years total) it was not unusual for me to talk to my OIC several times a day, and I won't even try to count the number of days I had in uniform. Suffice it to say it ain't 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks a year anymore.
What I am trying to say here is that, for those disenchanted with the Active force there are alternatives. We are always happy to take the castoffs from AC, and indeed you may find a niche here that wouldn't be available to you in the AC force. I've had a great career in the RC and done more than I ever hoped, faster than I ever thought possible. Most importantly I felt like I made positive changes/outcomes for the units with whom I have served.
One qualifier: Don't join the RC thinking you won't deploy, because unless you are a good hider, you will. Oh, and we don't want you anyway.
It's not just COLs and LTCs...
Majors feel this way too. (and apparently Captains, if I read the other responses correctly)
I've been waiting for 15 years to get to be "them," but each step of the way up the ladder, I've been disappointed. Majors might run the Army, but we're not able to actually affect change. And I'm not excited by what I see above me in the rank structure either, especially from a "focus" standpoint.
Perhaps those of us who grew up as company-grades-at-war will change the Army and the way the generals lead it, but I doubt it. What I've observed is a self-serving system that reinvents itself each successive generation of general officers. Our system rewards those who suck up and play politics, and shoves by the wayside those who try to actually make something happen. I firmly believe that GEN Patton would not be able to find a way to the top in today's Army. He'd have been passed over, and would be selling pharmaceuticals by now.
Peacetime Armies rarely translate well into wartime Armies. The traits we reward in peace are those that keep money flowing and bases open - namely the ability to politic on your services behalf. The kind of officer who succeeds in this environment is rarely the kind that relishes a battlefield fight, and even less often does that officer show themselves to be the kind of flexible, insightful officer who can adapt and overcome against an agile enemy, such as we're fighting right now. And the general officers we have now all grew up in peacetime. They succeeded in having a military in place that was able to begin and wage combat operations based on "the war we wanted," but they have almost all (with notable exceptions) failed to transition into the kind of forward thinking, flexible, dynamic officers who can not only transform our approach to warfare on the battlefield, but position the military to succeed in the future.
The Colonel is right. "They" care about their own success, not the military's (whether it be the USMC or the Army or the larger DoD). This should not be construed as a blanket statement, but the majority of general officers, and many at the LTC and COL ranks as well, have their own interests in mind. If they look good, they really don't care who they step on. And believe me, I've been stepped on more than once.
Truthfully, the one thing we crave, all of us, even the newest field grades, is strong, morale, intelligent LEADERSHIP. Give me a smart guy with a head on his shoulders, who cares about something larger than him or herself, and I'll go anywhere and do anything that they ask. Miss that mark, and no amount of prodding and cajoling will get me motivated to help them better their lives at my expense.
Simple stuff, really. Simple stuff.
And it goes without saying, but obviously the view expressed herein is the authors own, and does not necessarily reflect DoD policy or opinions.
I am just sitting back and reading it all. Good stuff all around. Thanks to all who have posted comments.
Best,
Tom
The comments sort into two piles:
- Those who see the Army as a tool of the nation, made up of citizens and subject to America's values and founding narrative: in short, an American Army
-Those who see the Army as standing on its own, made up of hired professionals and subject only to factors of efficiency and effectiveness: in short, an imperial Army.
Both views have merit. I prefer the former. The latter is a valid concept, but its proponents should be honest about what they are propounding.
Ducky, really? Now we are an Imperial Army?
Again Ducky, bring some real reasons why you think the AVF is a failure? How are we an "Imperial Military"? As for two groups you think we fall into, I would add a third, those who are out of touch with how currently the military works, how it operates, how it is lead and who actually populates it today and what our missions are. The Military is vastly different then the one you left decades ago Ducky, vastly different. It is different from when I first came in back in the early 90's.
Its mission is unchanged in law. Its structure is unchanged in law. Its governing directives are only adjusted and moved forward, not changed in some fundamental way. Its culture is always evolving and changing with the world and the society it (barely) lives in - that evolution is unchanged too.
All that's old is new again. I won't give you that it's different nor yield that first principles should be discarded for the expediency of the moment. The fundamental purpose of the US military is to protect our nation - I'd prefer putting into home defense, improved intelligence, and better law enforcement one-tenth of the cost of our two adventures to extend the American system to lands that don't want them.
And beyond the un-American nature of our imperial aims, we are such bloody hacks at it, losers in The Great Game. Try this for up-to-date on how well it's going and what lies down our path to extend empire: http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16274575
Nothing could be further from the truth.
One, I really do think you are out of touch with the military of today and how things are run, how Officers lead, how people are trained, perhaps I am wrong but your posts at times lead me to believe that.
Two, we have always gone into other countries and fought "Small Wars", I would read our history a bit more closely if you do not think this is the case, heck, the Navy and Marines practically earned their reps on "Small Wars" in China, Central and S. America and a few other spots. How is this different, especially when one of the Nations helped attack us directly.
Three, we are actually very good at it if you take history as a whole, just because our political and senior military leadership has screwed up left and right now does not mean we are bad at it.
Fourth, we are not an "Imperial" Military, we have not taken someone's land since the late 1800's in the PI. Outside of that we pay rent for bases, get SOFAs and while I know that you are unhappy that Iraq has not failed yet, neither has Afghanistan and if you have nothing constructive to offer except "get rid of the AVF" then I have to wonder what your point of posting is except romanticize the draft and degrade the AVF?
Ducky, you gave a good deal of service to this country, for that I thank you but I do not think that gives you license to almost hope for failure in OEF and OIF or continually down grade the Military we have when you truly do not know that much about how it is set up, trained and lead. In short , give some ideas about how to improve our military outside of getting rid of the AVF, if you do not want to do that then there is really no sense in engaging you anymore.
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