Thursday, June 3, 2010 - 10:20 AM
By William Shields
Current operations branch, Best Defense office of H.R. McMaster affairs"The military has adapted tremendously." So began Brigadier General H.R. McMaster's American Enterprise Institute talk the other day, begging the question: "Since when?" McMaster's point is familiar to many Best Defenders but serves as an important reminder of how much the military has evolved in a short time.
McMaster harkened back to the 1990s, when we "took a break from history." The Gulf War encouraged a false sense of confidence among our armed forces, according to McMaster. We defeated an enemy that we didn't acknowledge was both inept and unmotivated. That false confidence was coupled with the application of the same technology to land warfare that earned the U.S. maritime and aerospace dominance. Only unlike, in the sea or the air, land warfare takes place amongst people. While the Navy and Air Force contend with one target, practitioners of land warfare face thousands.
McMaster hammered away on this overreliance on technology, arguing that the replacement of a coherent strategic worldview with technology led to a military doctrine that operated in a vacuum apart from politics, the foundation of all wars. The emphasis on "full spectrum dominance" sought to overwhelm our competitors in spending and technology so that the few wars we did have to fight would be cheap and efficient. But it turned out that those were the wars we wished to fight rather than the wars we would fight.
It was the era of "networks" and "seamlessness," words that McMaster joked took on Orwellian overtones. He was referring to George Orwell's seminal 1946 essay "Politics and the English Language," in which Orwell reasons that that our language "becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the process is reversible."
The process did prove reversible. Two insurgencies reminded us that wars "will remain firmly in the realm of the uncertain." Decentralization and initiative became paramount. We will always plan imperfectly for future environments; the key is to not be so far off the mark that you can't adapt.
Given Tom's skepticism of the service academies, readers of this blog may find interesting a question posed to McMaster, whose answer illustrated the overall transformation of the military. It came from a former Air Force Academy instructor, who wondered whether the service academies' focus on engineering and technical training ill-prepared students for the cultural interactions central to our current conflicts. McMaster offered an unequivocal endorsement of the academies. He claimed that today they provide a "superb education" far removed from his time as a cadet, when engineering was "forced down his throat." At least at West Point, students can now major in the humanities and have access to language training and overseas programs, both with the aim of acclimating students to the cross-cultural interaction required in population-centric military strategies. It is an education that prepares cadets for conflicts, and a world, distant from those taught to cadets twenty years ago.
Personally, I think the Army is and has been for a long time almost in a state of mass hysteria about its role in national defense. To be fair the Navy and Air Force actually have an easier to comprehend general mission that is sea control and air superiority. The Army and to a much lesser extent the USMC are expected to be ready to handle everything from high intensity conventional warfare to low grade insurrections and counter insurgencies. And woe be to them if they are caught unprepared to shift from one gear to another.
My concern is that the Army has gone over the top making COIN the be all and end all of its training doctrine at he expense of skills in the use of supporting arms such as artillery (from what I hear a lost art in the U.S. Army) and armor. The Army has ten divisions and some of those divisions need to be as practiced in managing conventional combined arms doctrine even if that is not what is called for in Helmand Province. My wild guess is that if we could peek into the Army’s deepest recesses we would find that readiness for conventional battle is at or near an all time low? Hopefully, someone out there in the know can prove me wrong?
Transcript of McMaster's speech?
I tried with no luck AEI website. Know where to find the transcript? Might come in handy for my grad thesis.
While I have nothing but admiration for the courage it takes to be the voice of opposition, I just can't say I agree with the need to maintain the massive armor and artillery formations in their previous states. Clearly, Gentiles isn't calling for that force structure either, but given the limited resources available (in both personnel and capital) I just don't agree with those calling for a resurgence of conventional military training. In no way should the Army abandon all capacity or training for high intensity war fighting but out of curiosity just who exactly are we preparing to fight with this conventional force?
I have to side with Nagl on this one ("Let's Win the Wars We Are In" pretty much sums things up for those who don't know where he is coming from). We have come a long way in the realm of unconventional warfare fighting but the nature of our current conflicts and enemies is they are constantly evolving. McMaster himself may have put it best, "It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the solution to this, you're wrong, and you're dangerous. You have to keep listening and thinking and being critical and self-critical."
I think the whole call to get back to conventional capabilities is all a bit premature. The book is far from being closed on Iraq. Afghanistan is looking very tenuous indeed. For a long time I tended to think that we werent succeeding in Afghanistan because the resources werent available at the time. I am wincing at my hubris.
Gentiles is doing the military a great service by questioning the accepted practices of the day. I hope he doesn't burn out or get shelved. He is a smart guy and its good to have a critical eye to keep us COINistas honest. All the same we dont have the answers in Afghanistan (to say nothing of Pakistan) and before we start preparing to fight wars that are well over the horizon we need to finish what we have on our plate today.
Who is John Galt? I assume you are the son of a mechanic from Ohio and graduated from Patrick Henry University... that being said, the current administration would agree that you must win the wars you are in to remain relevant as a force. However, once these are over, we really have to examine our force structure. Do we plan on what other countires capabilities may be (China), or what is most likely (a COIN/SSTR enviornment)?
China is frequently brought up and is a complex subject that honestly requires its own discussion. China's threat is not military in nature. In fact China will do all in its power to prevent a major class with the US. Our economic interdependence has us locked into an economic MAD scenario (wildly oversimplified but not far from the mark). The CCP has made a Faustian bargain with its revolution prone populace. Essentially the CCP retains total political control and in return it will improve standards of living (through providing an unheard of perpetual 8% growth rate). Providing that economic growth represents and existential problem for the regime. The US is of course China's largest trade partner. Next 5 are Japan, SK, Taiwan, Germany, Australia all solid allies of the US (especially against an aggressive China). The point here is the CCP is rightfully scared of its own populace that has a penchant for bottom up revolts (no less than 5 dynasties met their end this way). War with the US would bring fiscal ruin to China. China will not confront the West but it is too clever to liberalize things at home (it saw what happened under Gorbachev and the CCP wants none of that!) Anyone interested in China should read this one page tour de-force "Chinese Ways". Ely Ratner has written done some other insightful work on the subject. " Hopefully this post comes off as only moderately snarky (its be best I can hope for really hehe).
I've heard several senior Army leaders comment on the Nagl/Gentile argument. The one response that resonated most with me was this: Our conventional capability has suffered over the last decade but our force is tested, hardened and increasingly adaptive. I can personally attest to the fact that our technical skills in combined arms combat has atrophied but we have developed a whole host of other skill areas that were non-existent when I came in the Army. Ground combat is about controlling ground - which involves significant interaction with people. How will this hurt us? Look at the prospect of a future war - I think the hybrid war is the most likely future war scenario. The mix of simultaneous conventional and non-conventional threats will require more than a simple conventional approach to solve. The big question is can we conduct the conventional fight more effectively than our adversary - from my anecdotal travels and interactions with foreign military's...I'd say yes.
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