A salient and most relevant point made by Col. Rigden is as follows:
“The fifth premise is do not fight a war or campaign that you cannot win. There is a potential decision point in the planning or conduct of every war or campaign in which the astute leader may conclude that the costs of success or risks of failure far outweighs the benefits of any success. If the state being supported is on the verge of collapse and enjoys little popular support it may be too late or too expensive to start a counter- insurgency campaign. Likewise, if there is a long-standing stalemate with equal claims to legitimacy, there is little chance of resolution between the sides. No amount of military action or information operations will win the people over if the nation is truly divided. It may be that the situation must be left to resolve itself. The British experience in Palestine and Aden are clear examples of campaigns which were unwinnable and resulted in British withdrawal. Determining this decision point in the actual conduct of war is extremely difficult. Recognizing its inevitability while still in the strategy formulation or campaign planning stage is genius; acting on it is the essence of moral courage.” If American military and political leadership possess one great failure it is its lack of moral courage versus its often-plentiful physical courage and its willingness to substitute thoughtless ‘can do’ bravado for sound strategy.

After years of studying the British military and naval history it is my view that for material, cultural and historical reasons the British Army in particular learns and innovates more slowly than the American Army. The fighting experience of the British Army being longer, deeper and broader than the American gives it an inclination to hold on to traditional norms longer while not automatically assuming what is new is necessarily better.

2 of the Brit COIN hard cases, Belfast and Palestine, saw considerable cash and arms support for terrorist-insurgents being raised in the good ol USA. Populist patriot myths aside, some of that activity was criminal at both ends.

Dudus Coke, whose forces are heavily engaged this week in Jamaica, is known as a trader in the US arms market, using major proceeds from the US drug trade. A cash/ordnance/safe-haven relationship also exists between the US and Mexican narco-insurgents.

Drugs, guns and insurgency go together like the internet and Al Waki. Maybe we should study on applying the COIN pop-centric stuff here in our own cities and pot super-farms, if we really believe in it?

Ex marine company commander and PRT dissident Matthew Hoh's warning re our Pashtunistan quagmire is a somewhat different thesis. But I see many of the same moving parts.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102603394.html
http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/daniel-ellsberg-speaks-with-matthew-hoh-on-afghanistan

TYRTAIOS, is as right as rain. If British or American forces had the ability to conduct operations with the ruthlessness of SS Einsatzgruppen or the Roman’s renowned vengeance to those who would revolt in their rear areas then shear terror might end resistance. We all know about Kitchener’s use of population removal to ‘concentration camps’ during the later stages of the Boer War. However, what is less known is that the Americans during the last stages of the Philippine insurrection used exactly the same ‘concentration camps’ and in some cases were even more over the top as in the wholesale execution of prisoners and burning of whole villages. The prime difference between the public attitudes in the South African War was that the Boer’s were European originated white settlers. The indifference to the slaughter in the Philippines can be imputed to the fact that Filipinos were merely brown people requiring civilizing.

"Anyone out there who knows how the British Army works that very different approach to officer management? "

Regimental system, and less institutional positions draining their man-power. British Lieutenants typically have 3+ years of platoon leader time. American Army now promotes them to Captains in 3 years, with at best 12 months PL time.

Tom,
The two biggest differences I noticed with the British Officer system in my six month stint with Her Majesty's Service were the absence of an "Up or Out" policy and promotions based on age, not time in service as an officer.

This probably explains how Col Rigden managed 7 years of company command time. Since promotion boards are based on age, they didn't look at him with his "commissioning year group" as we do here. He may have been commissioned young and the promotion board may have decided that 32, 33, and 34 year old Capt Rigden wasn't ready to be a Major yet. Of course, the commander of his regiment clearly thought he was a capable commander and didn't feel the need to move him to a staff job to give someone else "a turn" as the US military is wont to do. Perhaps all that troop leading time hurt his standing with the promotion board as he wasn't "well rounded" enough. We should all be so lucky.

The lack of an Up or Out policy was a two edged sword. I saw some fantastic 50 year old Majors and some horrible 50 year old Majors. I'm not sure which system is better.

Also, commanding Gurkas isn't always great for an officer's career. It used to be that commanding Gurkas as a Capt or Lt meant you couldn't deploy to Northern Ireland, which used to be the yardstick for operational experience. Of course, Iraq and Afghanistan changed all that.

This 1 ½ minute You Tube of the Irish Guards ‘Trouping the Colour’ is a delight. It is amazing that in this day an age actual first rate combat units like this one can still drill beautifully and within weeks deploy to Afghanistan and relieve their Welsh Guard brothers is remarkable. There is something to be said for tradition and military bearing. Notice the black faces in the IG - a long time coming.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVZzkzSPUac

The real face COIN and Imperialism. The British war criminals had a grand old time in Kenya, indeed! Concentration camps, mass executions, torture, rape, etc... British officers are racist scum.

"They wouldn’t say a thing, of course, and one of them, a tall coal-black bastard, kept grinning at me, real insolent. I slapped him hard, but he kept right on grinning at me, so I kicked him in the balls as hard as I could. He went down in a heap but when he finally got up on his feet he grinned at me again and I snapped, I really did. I stuck my revolver right in his grinning mouth and I said something, I don’t remember what, and I pulled the trigger. His brains went all over the side of the police station. The other two Mickeys were standing there looking blank. I said to them that if they didn’t tell me where to find the rest of the gang I’d kill them too. They didn’t say a word so I shot them both. One wasn’t dead so I shot him in the ear. When the sub-inspector drove up, I told him that the Mickeys tried to escape. He didn’t believe me but all he said was ‘bury them and see the wall is cleared up.’"

Admiral likes to define all British Officers as racist, this is an error. In doing this he makes the mistake of equating the undoubtedly racist attitudes and behaviour of previous generations of officers with those of today and recent history.
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Like any public institution, the British Army broadly reflects the society from which it is drawn; thus, in our more racist past, both the officers and men of the British Army tended to be equally as racist. As society has changed, the Army has changed too, albeit more slowly due to institutional inertia.
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To charge today's officers collectively with racism is to ignore the reality of today's Army and the society from which it recruits. There will be some who still harbour those outdated attitudes but, as in wider society, they are increasingly rare and are now more likely to be weeded out.

Let's not forget that our army--any army for that matter--can be racist. Hopefully we are more aware of the problem, but were we any less racist in Vietnam than the British were in dealing with the Mau Mau or the French with Algeria? One thing that British administrations had--and I don't know if this carried over to the army--was a requirement that colonial administrators be able to speak and write the language of the area. While the State Department gives a stab at this there are no exams as there were for British Colonial administrators. Yes, we have the Army Language School in Monterrey etc. but how many troops really have a grasp of the very different and complex cultures they are dealing with?
So let's not just say all British officers are pigs.
The issue was company officer training etc--not whether we like the end product.
As to the critics show us a force that has been effective as have the British but have never had a tinge or racism. Don't think we see that--The French, the Italians (gassing Ethiopians) all had their racist episodes--let's not forget that all those now seemingly touchy-feely governments in Europe came from colonial powers, colonial powers that were to a greater or lesser extent racist. Even the Greenlanders sometimes don't have kind things to say about the Danes. And the newer powers similarly have neocolonial issues with some racism attached--vide China and Tibet.

So how's about we drift back to the point --and also look at whether their company and regimental equiping structure is different, whether the training and other systems are different or the same and what if any difference this makes.

On parade ground drill, I think having grown up partly in Britain that I can say that by and large any British unit--from any branch of service--will have better order, be better at parade ground drill than most US units other than special drill units such as the Marine Corps drill team etc. It's just something they do and pride themselves on. In comparison we look many times as if we are shambling.

But that doesn't mean they are better--only different.