This belongs in the NSC's arena, not DOD's. The military is an instrument of national policy. The policy is set at the NSC. And there is enough military expertise over there that policy implementation is not reliant on Army Field Manuals or NDU papers or OSD decisions.

Let us stipulate that at most times in most things the military is competent. But competence is not a substitute for role and responsibility - the fix to incompetence elsewhere is to fix it elsewhere. Because when the military gets outside its role, it gets outside its expertise also - doing something well does not imply you know what you're doing.

Population Centric Counterinsurgency--FM 3-24--is the New Millennium’s version of the Indirect Approach because it aims to circumvent the enemy indirectly by going directly to the people. Ironically it traces its roots to Guilio Douhet and the origins of airpower theory which after World War I also sought to avoid the enemy indirectly in large ground battles by going directly to the people. Obviously the "going" to the people were radically different, but both do have in common the idea of the 'indirect approach.

There are also obvious links between current Coin and TE Lawrence and how the latter was embraced by Liddell-Hart when he first started writing about the indirect approach after World War I.

This is the natural consequence of absolute fealty to a doctrine born out of imperialism: you become an imperialist. What the hell are you talking about, Tom? Are we supposed to "directly intervene" in any country that we have a security interest in, like Georgia? I'm all for studying the pitfalls, but sometimes there isn't a viable alternative. We could sit here for months discussing the pitfalls of the "direct approach", not limited to fiscal cost and military blood. By the way, I am happy to catch this fairminded report reflecting on the downfall of your beloved "small wars".

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/12/94058/pentagon-rethinking-value-of-major.html

These tactics were only reasonable at a certain time (2006) in a certain place (Iraq), after we foolishly engineered a sectarian war. There is no massive civil war in Afghanistan to be tamped down. If anything, it's the continuation of a low-intensity war that's been perpetuated for 30 years. Al Qaeda didn't come into existence solely because of a wartorn Afghanistan. And they aren't even there today. We are creating more violence by trying to occupy these territories, in all likelihood playing into our enemies' hands. I don't trust the Pakistanis enough (either their word or their capabilities) to roll the dice and predict that our strategies will dovetail perfectly with one another. Aint gonna happen. We need to be more intellectually flexible if we're going to defeat a global terrorist network--one that, mind you, doesn't even exist in Afghanistan. The very fact that entire blogs are dedicated to studying "COIN" (there are probably more specializing in that basic set of tactics than in global strategy itself) should indicate that we have straitjacketed ourselves into a restrictive mindset. The title of this entry is ridiculous--is losing American troops "fun" just because we get to analyze their clever exercises in warzone sociology? And how about dropping trillions of dollars? Please. We can't fight any wars if we've mentally bankrupted our military families (a topic you harp on, appropriately, all the time) and fiscally bankrupted our treasury. In terms of public perception (if not the military's), you and your clan of "COIN" acolytes have ensured that the only approach that is "much vaunted but not much fun" is the one that we have been employing for the last 4 years in two theaters of war.

SD:

Because the idea is that to get at the enemy you do it indirectly by going around him, so to speak, by going directly to the people. As I said in the first post, this was the same notion with Douhet that in order to defeat an army on the field of battle you do it indirectly so to speak by going directly at the people where the armies that do battle are made from.

A COG discussion would be interesting especially with regard to pop centric coin which has violated the teachings of St Carl by predetermining what the cog in any counterinsurgency campaing will be: the people.

gian

The only Georgia I care about is the one whose capital is Atlanta. The state with 10.6 percent unemployment and all of the miseries that entails. The state, that just like all of the others, has been ignored by the federal government in its pursuit of.....what? World peace? Domestic tranquility? It's not going to work. It doesn't work. In point of fact, there will never be world peace, and so far as domestic tranquility is concerned, all I see is where all of this wonderful COIN business has disturbed it mightily. Sure doesn't help it. How about it, COIN guys? Tell us again about everything your foreign adventures is doing for the American people. "Fighting them there so we don't have to fight them here" is getting a little tired. It's utter BS. Just imagine what could be done to shore up domestic security if mega-millions of dollars weren't being poured down overseas ratholes.

The only COIN in which the U.S. Government should be legitimately involved is where it starts worrying about its own backyard. This country is a trainwreck and and we need to be thinking lot more about that. Guys like Tom Ricks and his CNAS/COIN brethren should be a little more concerned about the "hearts and minds" of those Americans for whom they care little and whom they seem intent on impoverishing. I love Mr. Ricks's compassion for the military spouses. Yeah, give 'em taxpayer money for school, but keep the hubbies in the grinder forever. Real compassion.

@JJH722: Great post.

@Gian Gentile: From your old friend Publius. Keep it up. You're getting there. The other side never had any cogent arguments, but it's now really running out of gas. Sputter-sputter-cough-cough-gasp.