Gian,

It doesn't matter whether Tom's narrative is factually right or wrong. Here, the NYT column is merely filler for reminding everyone that it's the dominant variation on truth, sort of like when Tide tells consumers that it's the top detergent.

It doesn't mean that it's the best cleaner, or even if it cleans anything. It's just the manufacturing of approval by telling potential buyers that all their friends probably buy it, too.

The more fundamental purpose for this entire, lamentable exercise is merely product placement for CNAS, Tom's employer, within FP, Tom's other employer.

He engages Exum's argument without any sophistication, nor will be likely be called to discuss LTG Barno's role in the media rollout of the CNAS report (WAPO/FP previously reported that the new CNAS hand allegedly is under investigation by DOD IG for wasting taxpayer money, among other claims).

It would be bad for business to disclose that salient fact or even engage Exum's effort with anything more than a footnote to middlebrow NYT columns. If you do, the terrorists win.

What's so sad about the "dominant" narrative is that it's sold like this. Perhaps that's why it seems to be drifting away from serious defense analysts like so much gun smoke in the breeze of Kandahar.

WIthout serious intellectual underpinnings, the "dominant" narrative is supported today by only two pillars: Famous generals who say it is so, arguing by rank and credentials; and a few elite journalists and think tank wonks using the "we're No. 1" rhetoric.

Somehow, I doubt the "narrative" you spin of Tom's abject sycophancy is correct, either. Maybe he is just commenting on the stuff he reads--and agrees with. He labels his sources"my CNAS compadre's", or something to that effect, all the time. By the way, comparing "Tide" detergent's marketing to a blogger's opinions is a little bit of a stretch. When did criticizing the military become "the thing to do"? The herd instinct doesn't really apply to bloggers: originality is their only commodity.

Is Marjah the proof of the narrative?

Announce well in advance so most of the 30,0000 population has left (and never returned). Hold and "manage" the remaining 2-3,000 last ditch folks with 10-20,000 troops until the much-trumpeted "model" fades from public view. Move on to next "model" under completely different approach and tactics. (PS- Spent millions in an otherwise minor economy where you are now the only economic game in town, and the distortive effects of your money (like Spaniards bringing smallpox to Central America) destroys much of what was there before you came. Come back in a few years to clear again).

Gian: Is that what you meant?

Outstanding post. But how can the army do that? That's not its job.

In Vietnam there were scads of DOS employees out in the field, the most prominent being Dan Ellsberg and John Paul Vann - they very people who got disillusioned when the whatever passed for COIN then was abandoned.

Where are the civilians now?

I was eager to read Mr Exums’ piece believing in the first few pages that he broke the pardigm that others have continued to propagate regarding the overreliance on the big “M” as the panacea to a blight requiring the prescription of other means. In sum, Mr. Exum notes that the essence to good COIN strategy is establishing rule of law through legitimate and well intentioned governance and then sets out to show how we have failed, or at best been sporadic in that regard in Afghanistan. Based on those axioms I found the article most ironic given the title of the piece, “Designing a Political Campaign for Afghanistan,” and the authors endorsement of “Army Design Doctrine” as the concept for developing a political framework. Irony withstanding, as a military Officer I also find this predictable and somewhat alarming. Is the author telling us that the Department of State has no other conceptual framework for foreign policy? Is USAID just winging it? Proposing a military design construct as the model for other means may not be the best fit; but to his defense where is the DoS Nation Building doctrine or the Law Enforcement training resources? While it is easy to scrutinize the military efforts in Afghanistan it is only because they are the face of the effort; having codified terminology, doctrine, planning constructs, and paid the price in resources (both blood and treasure). When does the rest of the Nation ‘mobilize’ and pull their weight? Don’t bother, it’s rhetorical!

MAJ Chris Rankin,
Command and General Staff College
United States Army

/////////// The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government /////////

In Nicaragua in the 1920s we called Sandina's followers "bandits." If we can't do COIN we'll just go after the "bandits." Sheesh.

Actually, the Confederate were not ‘insurgents’ since they had no interest in overthrowing the government of the United States. They were a ‘rebellion’ that desired to separate themselves and establish their own independent state. They were little different from the Spirit of 1776 who did not wish to overthrow the British government but to transfer sovereignty from one side of the Atlantic to the other. The Confederacy’s ‘rebels’ desired that same separateness and independence albeit for more sordid reasons. Otherwise you are most correct in you comments.

The Confederates were by no means insurgents. They had every right to leave the US under law. The only insurgency I know of currently in the US is the one being waged by the degenerates in the District of Corruption, and their fellow thieves on Wall St.

1. Appomattox says otherwise.

2. And you, sir, are an idiot.

Typical response from nationalist war mongers. You know, the same people that crucified Christ.

Before my time.

Culture very well may in itself make politics primary in Afghanistan. Consider the chatter advisors hear between Taliban and the ANA over phones and radios. In addition, Karzai and other leaders seem to talk/correspond back and forth with various elements of the Taliban. They obviously know each other, are probably homies or related in some way, etc.

So in the end it is politics - it just ain't America’s version of politics. A good platoon leader/sergeant grasps this on the small level if he works an area for any given period. He will know who the shakers and movers are in his area, and try to work with them - if he's savvy (or bright).

Know what I'm saying here Dog?

politics is central. your neo-imperialist perspective is far more naive than others'; we don't live in an era where you can just look in your little "COIN" handbook and win the war by being more tolerant than the other side, neglecting political imperatives in favor of being nicer. it's hard to be nice when you're bombing villages. Lacking a viable political strategy is about as culturally insensitive as it gets because it means that "success" presupposes the occupier's total domination of the country--an impossible feat. you're right about how soldiers in the field should approach the conflict, but not about how broader strategy works. counterinsurgency is just a bunch of tactics, not a panacea for every situation. cultural sensitivity is a tactical ploy that enables political accommodation. If there is no political accommodation, how are you going to make it culturally acceptable for Afghans to work with us? What cultural value is more emotive than patriotism in the face of perceived occupation? This can't be an American-centric effort, so how do you establish security without reaching understandings with the political actors who can help you implement the strategy (i.e., provide resources and manpower)? and how is it that criticizing the obama administration for lacking a political strategy demonstrates a naive faith in its rationality? perhaps you mean too little faith in its irrationality? you could be right that Obama cynically calculated--most likely the calculation was aimed at the next election: the electorate would turn against him in a heartbeat if he withdrew from Afghanistan only to be attacked here in Amurrica. Much to everyone's surprise, and despite the promises of "YES WE CAN!" and "CHAAAANGE!!!", our political system remains cynical. Politicians have a hard enough time fulfilling concrete pledges. It might be best for everyone to take their vague, idealistic rhetoric with a dose of that "unforgiving reality".

"A tribal elder was gunned down yesterday while he was shopping in Kandahar, the latest targeted killing ahead of a NATO-led operation here that will be a critical test of the Afghan war. . . .

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, saying Hayat Khan was “dealing with Americans and working against us.’’ Khan was a member of a district shura, a traditional meeting of elders and community leaders called upon to solve local issues, said Zulmai Ayubi, a spokesman for the Kandahar provincial governor. . . .

Since April 12, at least 20 civilians have been killed in Kandahar, including children. . . .

Aid workers also have been targeted. . . .

Last month, gunmen stormed a mosque and killed the deputy mayor of Kandahar as he knelt for evening prayers."

All from a single report (http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2010/05/05/tribal_elder_killed_in_afghanistan/) from a couple of days ago. Muliply that by 365 days and 34 provinces in Afghanistan and some variable for unreported-by-western-media incidents, subtract the number of @$$holes who happened to get caught on the losing end of a feud, and you'll get the number of effective leaders lying in pools of blood, tossed in shallow graves, and mourned by a handful of terrified, silent locals.

Another flood of weapons won't stop this from happening any more than it stopped the assassination of government officials and 'collaborators' in Peru, Rhodesia, Vietnam, Mozambique, Columbia, Congo, Mexico, Iraq or Afghanistan. Remember - the insurgents' main target isn't the conventional army - it's the population.

It's possible that most or all of the assassinated leaders were locally despised. That leads to a different problem (and one that goes back to the birth of the Taliban): what if the most effective local leaders are our enemies? What if the Taliban are the best at providing quick, accepted justice and grievance resolution? What if their taxation is considered more acceptable than anything tried by Kabul?

But that doesn't change the fact that the local leaders with the most influence on the local population are the equivalent of town councillors and school trustees. They're also the most vulnerable, which makes them doubly attractive as targets: soft and with a big impact on the immediate population.

You are right - there has to be a certain amount of local support for the insurgents. Lack of such support did in General Grivas in Greece. But such support is often effectively achieved as much through terror (cutting off limbs or lips, ears and noses happened - still does actually - a lot in African brush wars) as through sympathy. An ineffectual local leader is in many ways fairly safe. He can be held up as an example of government problems and milked for propaganda purposes. An effective local leader is a threat - he might outgovern the 'resistance.' He therefore becomes a high priority target. If he's in a remote village with minimal policing, and where the adult population are out working the fields, then he'll end up dead in a hurry. If the population are armed, then the natural scrappers - the first couple of wannabe-heroes - end up dead too. Everyone else will put survival first.

So you need to push persistent security out to protect those leaders. And here's my tangent: in Afghanistan you do that be overhauling our approach to the ANSF. Scrap the National Police. Restructure the Army. There's no external conventional threat so they don't need an equipment-deficient clone of the US Army. Turn the ANA into a version of the Caribinieri - a paramilitary security force. Give them powers of arrest and investigation. Pay them enough that they have minimal incentive to be corrupt, and let them periodically move around the country rather than restricting them to the same province for years on end. With security in place (rather than simply giving everyone a gun and hoping for the best) you then give local leaders a chance to govern. And who knows - maybe with the right conditions Afghanistan can generate a Magsaysay or two.

“So if he knows that he can't be protected, the obvious response is for him to join Taliban. He tells them "You need me to pretend to be the government appointee or they'll think this whole village is in the resistance and bomb us. But we'll really do things your way, and if the government sends an inspector who sees we aren't following their rules I'll pretend I'm just a normal corrupt local leader. What do you have to lose?" They might kill him anyway, but what does he have to lose by trying?”

We’re going in circles. The implication now is that a competent leader with a strong streak for survival will naturally gravitate to the Taliban, which I suppose would confirm the original thesis of the argument, whereby effective local politicians lead to the elimination of violent incidents. But for all the wrong reasons.

I would rather keep that leader alive and on side through the provision of effective security, which I maintain is the first priority. My original statement really should have read ‘It's rather optimistic to assume that a good district chief WITHOUT ADEQUATE SECURITY will keep the peace.’ I think your idea of security through more guns runs the risk of mass chaos (how do we differentiate the armed villagers from the insurgents? What IFF procedures do you put in place to keep a Predator from killing a truck full of angry villagers en route to extract payback from a group of Taliban?). I prefer to focus on developing a competent paramilitary internal security force.

I agree with a lot of your points. You’re right about the limitations of rule through fear. You may die a natural death, like Tito, but more likely you’ll meet a nasty end, like Ceausescu. As for mafias, that’s exactly what I was describing. I got as much out of watching The Sopranos and The Untouchables (and Deadwood, for that matter) before deploying as I did from the cultural awareness briefings. The latter helped me figure out what to do when I first met village leaders. The former helped me figure out what they were really saying. Secret comms with villagers are critical, and do exist – mostly through the NDS. The problem there is that the NDS doesn’t share info with NATO. Setting up an anonymous tip line also works, and was one of the reasons the Taliban targeted the cell-phone infrastructure a couple of years ago.

As for running those elections and being prepared to leave – I’m behind you all the way. Which reminds me – wasn’t the original point of invading Afghanistan to eject AQ and deny them a haven? Since they seem to have moved to Pakistan, and since the Taliban have absolutely no expeditionary capability, haven’t we achieved those aims? But that’s another rabbit hole we could disappear down . . . !