In 2005 the Sunnis didn't vote and they screwed themselves. Their reaction was to take up arms, align with AQI, and fight. In 2010 they participated in the election and the man they voted for ended up on top. If, with a selective recount and perhaps some disqualifications, Allawi is not allowed to form the government, the Sunnis will conclude that the process does not work (for Sunnis at least). Add to this the recent discovery of a secret prison for 400+ Sunnis at Muthanna Airfield that reported directly to the Prime Minister's office, the departure of most U.S. military forces from Iraq, and an aggressive AQI bombing campaign aimed at Shia civilians and leadership, and all the ingredients are in place for a rapid escalation of violence and break down in the political process.

Will be another dysfunctional national unity government that will include Maliki's State of Law, Allawi's National Movement, the Kurds, and the SIIC-Sadrist National Alliance. The sticking point is that neither Maliki nor Allawi are likely to become prime minister but they won't accept that so the process will drag on for months as it always does. It took 3 months just to put together the provincial councils in 2009. It will likely take double that for the national government.

As for predictions about violence going up, what if it doesn't? How many turning points have already happened and violence hasn't increased? Let me name a few: The Sons of Iraq were not going to be integrated, there was going to be violence leading up to the 2009 elections, there was going to be instability after the 2009 elections, the withdrawal of the U.S. from Iraqi cities, the lead up to the 2010 elections, the aftermath of the 2010 elections, etc. Violence didn't go up after any of those events, in fact they took a large drop right at the beginning of 2009 that has sustained itself for more than a year now. But let me make a prediction, if there's no violence after a new government is formed, there will be another turning point just around the corner where people can predict that Iraq is going to blow up again, and again, and again. That's because people have a theory that they're trying to fit the facts to rather than trying to analyze Iraq and see what's actually happening.

Kinda makes me think that in the end we’ll find that Joe Biden was right about something after all.

Sen. Obama's 2007 mid-surge question to Petraeus still makes sense; When will things be secure enough to bring our troops out?' What do we do if security, for Iraqis, for us, is not achievable, or at least not affordable by mean of extending our occupation presence?

How would continued US combat presence help, when anything we do or say with several divisions of troops, an air wing and a carrier fleet is seen locally as neo-colonial hegemony?

Gen Casey's 2006 formulation also retains merit today: 'Mr. President, we win by getting out.' It's not simple, and its not easy, and it won't be without cost. But it'll never be over for us crusaders until we find a way to be outside, looking in.

The Sunnis voted in the 2005 parliamentary election. They boycotted the 2005 provincial election and the October 2005 constitutional referendum. Not taking part in national governance was not the cause of the sectarian civil war.
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2005/IraqElection_Dec/

For this most recent election, the Federal Supreme Court decision that a plurality coalition can be formed AFTER the election has negated Allawi's "win."
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/08/iraqiyyas_path_to_power

The main difference between the government formation period in 2006 and the one we are witnessing today is that sectarian death squads backed by the official Iraqi forces and insurgents who cannot legally hold a job in the new democratic Iraq (de-baathified) are not murdering each other at an alarming rate.
See the chart and ignore the article: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/04/just-admit-it-surge-worked.html

Violence fatigue has set in. But if the Sunnis believe a new government will return to the 2006 objective of near-genocide, then violence will return and the U.S. will not be there as an interlocutor.

"Chinese Naval Power Expands to Waters the U.S. Dominates
By EDWARD WONG 1 minute ago
China is seeking to project its blue-water forces from the Middle East to Pacific shipping lanes, in a buildup that has surprised foreign military officials..." NY Times 23 April

Iraq will provide them the oil..and they shall have the escorts available.

We may want to re-evaluate our place in the world and possibly devise some national fiscal and security principles consistent with it.

Sideshows from Iraq to Palin may not be a proper horizon even for any of us.

""But as Tom Friedman used to say every year , the next six months in Iraq could be decisive.""

You scored a heavy LOL for that one.

Abu Nasr, we disagree on the Sunni boycott of key 2005 elections as being (or not being) a cause for the trouble that followed. I believe the boycotts, particularly the failure to participate in the Constitutional referendum, was the beginning of general Sunni rejection-ism. Violence escalated after the better attended December election.

Certainly, in 2010 the Federal Supreme court can allow a plurality coalition to legally form a government. Selective recounts are permissible. They can chose how to certify the results. The De-Bathification commission can legally bar people from office or government post. However, just because it is lawful under the constitution (that the Sunnis did not vote for), doesn't mean that it will be acceptable.

The drop in violence had many causes, often discussed here. Violence fatigue was a significant contributor as was Sunni fatigue with the tactics their AQI allies used to assert authority in Sunni neighborhoods. The Iranian realized that to get the Americans out of Iraq, they had to help get violence down to a level that allowed the Americans to do so. Sistani's quiet pressure was invaluable. The surge of U.S. troops and American activism in the Iraqi political process added much to the drop in sectarian violence.

But I think, for the Sunnis, the key reality was that violence was not working. They lost the battle for Baghdad. The Sunnis were forced into enclaves; hundreds of thousands of them left Iraq. Americans were increasing operations to eliminate foreign fighters in rural areas. So, the Sunnis decided to try the political process.

Probably the two best inhibitors of violence in Iraq remain the Iranian desire to see the U.S. meet its draw down schedule and Sistani's pressure to minimize violence. The two best accelerators of violence are AQI's ability to conduct dramatic attacks and an emerging Sunni consensus that the political process failed them. Iraq does seem to muddle forward; perhaps a dysfunctional unity government with Sunni participation can be stitched together, but weak government has never lasted long in Iraq and fatigue can pass.