Every Armor Officer I've ever had as a professor has always gone thumping on about how we're losing our core competencies (granted, this is coming from an infantryman so maybe I'm biased). Close with and destroy, blah blah blah...I think it boils down to whether or not you think the Army should be the the main instrument of nation-building. Regardless, right now my unit's got 18 months of dwell time so we're working with two METLs - one conventional (read: gunnery and mounted manuever) and one focused on the realities of current ops (read: COIN). We're moving towards a "jack of all trades, master of none" force, which I don't have a problem with.

Today in ‘DOD Buzz’ (http://www.dodbuzz.com) that very subject is discussed in relation to the lessons learned at hard expense by the Israelis in the 2006 Lebanon conflict. The conclusion seems to be (we have discussed this before) that the IDF allowed their ground capability to become unbalanced as a result of years of playing the role of ‘police’ vs. Hama’s and West Bank Palestinians. They forgot small things like combined arms training and keeping their armored forces properly trained and equipment for the new threats posed by a very tough Hezbollah opponent not intimidated by the Israel’s.

Of course the advantage the Israelis enjoy is that their ground threats are localized in proximity and that the IDF is small and flexible enough to make fairly rapid changes in training and doctrine. The U. S. Army on the other hand never known to be fleet of foot even in the best of times is such a massive unwieldy behemoth that inevitably corrections will have to be made in training, equipping and operating from its current role as a counter insurgency force.

My guess is that this transition back will not be pretty as many units will have to relearn the core competencies of their craft (antiaircraft, armor and artillery in particular) and unlearn a lot of other lessons incidental to their primary missions. Only special operations forces likely see some consistency in their technique in the way ahead.

Article: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/04/19/israeli-lessons-for-u-s-army/#axzz0lYuWpQCY

I would not be surprise if large portions of the U.S. military have to "recalibrate" after the drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan are complete. Needless to say, there have been no major combined arms brigade level battles since 2003 (or maybe 2004) in either campaign, so I don't disagree with Col Gentile that the Army's ability to conduct those kinds of battles is likely diminished.

However, and I am no armor officer, it seems clear to me that the U.S. will need to relearn those combined arms skills needed to defeat enemies like Hezbollah that can fight fairly coordinated small unit actions under set piece conditions. It's probably a good thing the Taliban don't have a bunch of Koronet's. This kind of combat seems to be even more challenging that fighting a full tank-tank battle such as repelling a North Korean invasion.

Clearly the Russians still believe in tanks, and the Chinese are modernizing their armored forces as well. So I have to believe the Army will begin to rebalance back to a combined arms force and as JPWREL get back to their core competencies.

My good friends and I spent years at NTC and CMTC building and training the heavy force that had so much success in 1991 and 2003. It would be impossible to quantify the years of UCOFT, crew drill, TT VIII and XII gunnery and open manuever with a dedicated OPFOR that it took to achieve these successes.

That skill set is now seriously degraded, if not gone. And a generation of company level leaders, both officer and NCO, have already lost the chance to learn those skills at the 'muscle memory' level (I can still give fire commands and have not been in a tank in 15 years). Clearly in the current 'engaged with the enemy' reality, the ability of the armored force (including the critical M2/3 weapons systems in the mechanized infantry battalions) to relearn these skills to the 1990 level is not a possibility. And yet, to paraphrase a certain DOD chieftain, "you go to war with the army you have." We may need that capability in one theater or another one day soon (And don't discount this out of hand, as I never imagined while patroling the Inter-German border in the 1980s that my combat experienced would be in Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, and Panama!).

Think of it in this way... we need the air force to maintain a really good close air support capability. But that does not mean I want the B-2 pilots to stop practicing standoff cruise missile tactics or the F-22 guys to forget how to conduct air superiority.

The question is, with a slowly-gaining-steam withdrawl from direct combat in Iraq, can the optempo support the transition (if you will) of a few BCTs to a dedicated mechanized focus? Start with the 3rd ACR and perhaps portions of 1AD and go from there. Because until tankers are shooting, moving, and communicating - and firing lots of live bullets at long ranges - our rose colored view of what we can do is just not reality.

Bottom line: We could lose a COIN war and it would certainly hurt our prestige and credibility in the world. But if we ever lose a war where we needed lots of heavy armor, I suspect the pain level will be a lot higher.

Tom; you have stumbled upon a debate that is occuring within the military; it goes further than just M1 tanks, but to how we train and equip the military for the future. Heavy, Medium, Light? How do we train units; to be experts at COIN, traditional warfare, or to be fairly good at both? This debate led to the decesions on the Army's FCS, and the specific programs that got cancelled.
Recent JFQ editions have had this debate, most notably between Nate Fryer and John Nagl.
RPM makes a valid point, what would be worse for the nation, to lose a conventional fight, or to lose in COIN. Some would argue that losing a traditional fight is the MDCOA, however ask the Soviets...errr Russians and former Soviet Republics what a protracted COIN fight can do.

Gian Gentile asked me to post this response:

"Tom, I have never, ever, ever referred to myself as an expert on anything, let alone Iraq in 2006 or 07/08. I challenge you to find a quote by me personally where I refer to myself as an "expert" on either of those two topics. To be sure I have experience as a combat battalion commander on the ground in West Baghdad in 2006 that I often draw on and does still shape my thinking on things. But an expert, no, not me. I am a student of military history so the notion that I could ever become an expert at anything would be obliterated by the possibility that there is an argument or document just waiting around the corner to prove me wrong.

"To Starbuck's points I would just ask that he read in one of the last paragraphs of the piece where I comment that American infantry platoons easily handle the kind of enemy that we face now in Afghanistan, with the implication that they can easily handle that enemy because of their skill and fighting prowess as American infantry platoons. My larger point which he clearly failed to see is that I am not talking about the courage and fighting skills of our infantry and scout platoons on the ground now in Afghanistan (because clearly as Wanat and Keating shows their is plenty of that) but the competency at combined arms at higher organizational levels like Brigade and Division and higher. And lastly with regard to Starbuck it is puzzling to me how he can say rather assuredly that out of nowhere now I pop off with a concern about the extinction of the armor corps when in fact for the last three years since my return from Iraq I have written many, many opeds, articles, and essays highlighting that very problem. Starbuck on his blog mentions the discussion occurring on this topic on SWJ blog; I would only point out in that regard that while there are plenty of folks who disagree with what I have to say there are also plenty of folks who find themselves in agreement with me too."

A "minor" nuance concerning Hezbollah infantry stopping a column of IDF tanks during the July 2006 War. I will assume this is reference to the Battle of Wadi Saluki, the poster battle for everything that can go wrong?

As has been pointed-out, in the five or six years previous, the majority of the IDF were almost entirely engaged in low intensity urban counter-terrorism in the West Bank and the Gaza. As such, all regular forces, including tank crews were retrained for small unit infantry policing.

Now for the nuance: the IDF’s 401st Armor was held-up in an observable position for a week, giving-up speed and surprise, which additionally allowed Hezbollah to surmise the objective and thus the avenue of advance to be used. This further gave Hezbollah the opportunity to employ in great depth, massive amounts of 3rd generation AT-14 Kornet anti-tank missiles. In addition, air and artillery supporting arms were denied the 401 due to the proximity of friendly infantry – obviously a lack of faith in the IDF’s combined arms capabilities by the general staff?

Up until 2006, no one thought the IDF would face an enemy capable of operating as an insurgent force that could move into a conventional mode – why would the U.S. Army (and the Corps) think our forces will not at some point in future also?

PS--I didn't mean to send a bunch of question marks--I had pasted in your name in Greek.

I've disagreed with COL Gentile before in this forum. But on this matter he does bring up a good point - indeed it is a point that many artillerymen documented a few months or years back (I think McFarland was one of the authors?). Our tankers are sorely out of practice; but I think those skills can be regained to some extent - with the proper emphasis.

But the proper emphasis requires much more than what we have done in the past. Our gunnery/maneuver programs have always been pretty poorly resourced - they are expensive after all. This would be a good place to instill the embedded training modules that were (surprisingly one of the better elements) of the now dead FCS program.

My bigger question is why Fort Benning for the Maneuver Center of Excellence (though that misguided decision was made long ago)? Hardly the right place to grow an Armor force in swampy woodlands. That was a boondoggle for some smart general or politician with designs on big money.

The Armor School should have moved to Bliss if it had to move at all.

Curious why COL Gentile didn't respond on his own, he has posted here before.

but Exum's WINEP piece - http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus63.pdf - at page 11

Matt Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared
http://kingsofwar.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/op26.pdf at 54-55 is a bit "thicker"

Neither is particularly thick (especially Exum) but perhaps you could mine the cites that are footnoted?

I'd also take a look at
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=754&CISOBOX=1&REC=4

and also the Tel Aviv Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (it has a new name now, but you can still Google it and come up with the center)

even though I don't see any reference (at least by name) to the battle in the Naveh interview; you could try seeing if you can search within the Jaffee Center website

Maybe also try the JPost and Haaretz (through LexNex?)?

Hope this helps, although I think the English language literature might simply be sparse.

Good luck!

The thread begins here:

http://defense-update.com/analysis/lebanon_war_4.htm

Some folks have just spent too much time trying to wrestle with tea cups, clear-hold-bribe and other COIN elements to remember what other countries like Russia and China actually strategize to do with a heavy military force in the kind of deeply toxic and kinetic environment where humvees and strikers are nothing more than interesting speed bumps.

Rumsfeld said you go to war with the army you have. A future enemy of the Russia/China Class will not be armed with CERP, and their "Government In A Box" is not so gentile as to suggest that we need the captured population more than they need us.

Marjah is not a metaphor for all wars, and is not a credible Way Forward for all future wars. It is a small skirmish (as yet unwon), in a very confusing sidebar to US military history.

I fired my first M60A1 in 1975, when US Army morale was very low. But armor units like 64th Armor always had an esprit of their own. Whether guarding the "Interior German Border" until it collapsed, or leading the last successful formal military assaults against another nation's army (Iraq), Sergeant Rock still has a very real purpose---even if just as a deterrent.

The primary mission is to prevent another WWI & II, and serious wars in which civilization itself can come under threat.

Even in 1975, it was clear that the armor role is a particular and interdependent part of a combined arms operation in that future toxic landscape. More so today.

Nice to believe that the US will spend the next century fighting with "tea cups," money-as-a-weapon, and remote-control wars against scattered pop-up targets and IEDs, but it is unrealistic.

Like any other wealthy and powerful empire, we deluded ourselves for the past thirty years, that we could use money-as-a-diplomatic/development-weapon to eliminate foreign risks and problems. Now, as all those chickens come home to roost, the Pentagon is trying to teach us how, by cross-training soldiers as nation-builders, to use that weapon, but showing no better results. Maybe, they should get back to a mission they are designed and capable of.

I did not see the Colonel in Iraq when I was there, and my mission, beginning in December 2007, was just to stop the flow of photographs of young dead soldiers onto the pages of my Washington Post every morning (that mission was definitively accomplished). To date, I have never seen a credible lessons learned evaluation of what really happened in that successful effort, and the final result can only be measured after Iraq stops spinning (2020?).

The idea of abandoning armor proves that Kool-Aid remains the drink of choice for many when faced with profound uncertainties, and lack of intelligence, planning resources, and imagination.

Maybe it's because Mr. Ricks and his friends at CNAS have developed such expertise in combined arms warfare that they've just totally lost patience with the intellectual shortcomings of this poor old full colonel. After all, it's not as if Colonel Gentile has any credibility or experience in this area. Not next to Mr. Ricks or such other experts as the Kagans or Andrew Exum.

Or maybe it's because Gian Gentile isn't a Coindinista and is a constant thorn in the side of those who've decided that the US Army must stop living in the past and must embrace a future of "small wars" and constabulary work. In these folks' vision of the future—which unfortunately seems to call for endless war—there is apparently no need to worry about major battles against sophisticated foes; the U.S. Army will always be faced with inferior and unsophisticated adversaries, who, given the right incentives, can be cajoled into turning their societies into model democracies.

Snarkiness aside, it's very disappointing to see Mr. Ricks, the self-styled friend and fan of the military, making light of the thoughts of one of the U.S Army's few intellectuals, one of the few officers who's actually thinking beyond the next village, and is worrying about the state of the force and of the nation. A lot of people, even us retired officers, worry about our Army's readiness, and, although one doesn't expect civilians such as Ricks to understand the issue, one would also hope that experts such as Colonel Gentile—who do know the issue and do worry—would be met with a little more respect. For example, his "expertise" or lack thereof with respect to Iraq has nothing to do with his subject matter, yet you feel compelled to poison the well.

Mr. Ricks, your friend Starbuck is a helicopter pilot. Can't you do better? You're well connected. Why don't you ask some of your other contacts, some of your contacts with stars—Petraeus, McMaster, et al—whether Gentile is off base? Why don't you ask Marty Dempsey, who's putting together training and doctrine, whether Gentile is full of hot air? As matters stand, it just looks as if you put Gian up there as a punching bag for your friends.

Tom,
In the past twenty years of our most excellent Iraq adventure what units have you commanded or served with, again? What deprivations and hardships have you and your family endured?

***I've never understood why he thinks he is an expert on the Iraq war in 2006 because he was there, but thinks he somehow knows the war in 2007-08, which he didn't see.***

I thought you beyond such hyprocrisy and shallowness. Me thinks you have SME bias, nay--SME hubris; you should check youself. You ain't all that.

AB

There are experts on the civil war, WWII, and so forth, I assume those current experts did not serve in those wars.
Serving in the War can make you an expert in your lane, e.g. training police, or perhaps an expert on a specific town or aspect of the country; it does not make you an expert in all aspects of the war, to include what occurs above the tactical/operational level, but not at the strategic level. You can be an expert on the strategic level, understand what leads the nation up to war, but have no idea of how to PMCS a HMMWV

Armor necessary? Ask these grunts in Chivers video from NY Times and I'm guessing they could have made use of a couple of Abrams

http://video.nytimes.com/video/2010/04/19/world/1247467534488/the-inches-that-matter.html

there was an excellent article in popsci on the UGV called ripsaw. i believe that is the main direction of the army. much like the transformation the airforce is going through.
http://gear.ign.com/articles/935/935932p1.html

I agree that our core armor competencies are fading, but unfortunately that is the case with all branches, but none more than the field artillery. As a field artillery officer serving in a field artillery battalion I did exactly two field exercises dealing with fires and the rest were focused on being a motorized infantry unit. Additionally, I know officers that have gone to the captain's career course without ever having served in a field artillery battalion (an epic fail if I have ever seen one). Artillery units are asked to do every thing but artillery in combat (mainly in Iraq, and probably about 50% of the time in Afghanistan ~ rough swag). There are E5s and E6s who haven't touched a howitzer since AIT, and that is a problem. The artillery branch itself strives to remain relevant through such exploits as creating "effects" but more often misses the mark. So if you are looking for a branch that has lost its core competencies, look no further than the king of battle, or more appropriately the for rent Soldier of battle.

"I've never understood why he thinks he is an expert on the Iraq war in 2006 because he was there, but thinks he somehow knows the war in 2007-08, which he didn't see"

I've never understood, Tom, why you arrogate onto yourself the mantle of Iraq COIN expert when you also don't seem to have spent much time in OIF in 2007-08, have never spoken to any primary Iraqi sources (especially insurgents) and based your writings about COL Gentile in "The Gamble" on the notes you took for "Fiasco," portraying two versions of the same man.

While you might have engaged his article critically, using empirical evidence to refute parts of it or bringing in voices from the armor community who might quibble his assumptions, instead you lower the bore and fire a couple of slurs.

One might suggest the Gian interacts every working day with many officers from branches affected by these ongoing wars, including armor and field artillery. I submit that he probably greets on a Monday more officers like these men than you shall in a year, and almost all of them served in OIF, very many during 2007-08.

This is so patently obvious that we must pretend otherwise in order to entertain some musings you've cribbed about IDF armor implementation in Lebanon or read the latest COIN bumper sticker from "Starbuck," this time with him waving the bloody shirt to rally those fellows fighting overseas against the seditious essay Gentile wrote.

Don't you owe your readers more than this? If you want to tackle the article, then do what you did when you were a reporter: Find some experts on armor (Nagl, in your office, came from the cav), a few who might know something about Hezbollah and Israeli scuffling in Lebanon (Exum) and then offer some counter considerations.

But whatever you do, don't continue this nonsense of telling the world he's "prickly" (he's actually one of the nicest guys I've ever met); that the historian who wrote a book on how pop-centric uses of force in the past failed to achieve their assumed goals; or the implied idiocy that he's somehow subverting troops in the field by honestly raising issues of vital importance to many of them.

It's silly.

Hunter:

Let me get some facts straight based on your recent post. The History Department at West Point does offer a history of unconventional warfare elective but it is not just open to history majors but others as well; in fact it is a very popular course that many other majors take part in. Also the History Department teaches a year long history survey course that all senior cadets are required to take on the history of the military art. There are many lessons within this 80 lesson course that deal with irregular war, unconventional war, and counterinsurgency. Moreover West Point writ large is committed to educating these young men and women so that they can go out into the field army and perform as army officers; they take foreign languages, courses on culture, and a good number of cadets are given the opportunity to travel abroad. The History Department, along will all of the other academic disciplines plays a critical role in this regard.

This past fall the History Department hosted a conference on the history of unconventional warfare which brought in such scholars as Jeremy Black, Brian Linn, Pete Mansoor, Conrad Crane, and George Herring.

You are wrong, I don’t attack Coin, I attack dogmatism in the American army of which sadly I see a lot and although you probably won’t accept it this dogmatism is being driven by straightjacketed coin thinking.

This wrangle and its many manifestations - treads vs wheels, heavy or light, main force or special force, COIN or force-on-force, maneuver or attrition - seems an endless discussion in a self-perpetuated debating club. The Germans dueled - we argue about tanks.

Certainly the other Services could be afflicted by this idea that the monkeys should run the zoo, but fortunately and generally the other Services are directed by leaders who actually lead, setting priorities, establishing strategies, and insisting on 'Follow me.'

E.g., when CNO Tom Hayward found dissent starting to build among naval aviators on the choice of the F/A-18 as the Navy's next aircraft, he solved the problem by simply telling the dissenters to shut up. They did. We built the F/A-18. USMC followed a similar path on the Osprey. The Air Force has moved steadily into space operations and drone warfare against an entrenched fighter-pilot mafia ... because Air Force leadership has kept discussions internal to the force and loyal to its decisions.

While I love good writers and strong opinions in the military (been there, done that), I also find tank discussion tedious - so 20th century. Perhaps someone in the Army above the grade of O-6 might simply say: "This is the decision, here's where we're going." And perhaps he might augment his order with this quotation from Faulkner's The Bear: "Them that's going, get in the goddam wagon - them that ain't get out of the goddam way!"

than the kick the door down, strike and sail away or bus driver services.

The debate among the Army officers is refreshing, invigorating and quite frankly needed. It is wise for this among those left to occupy and re-sort a lethal argument's debris. Suggest it maybe fielded even been more in the area of infectious epidemic defense in an environment of biological turbulence. Not sure that, as the nation state deteriorates, warriors become driven Insh' Allah or by the traditional god of profit and with enemy communications globalized, defused and diversified, a prudent service planted among the chaos can not otherwise act.

Right, its the COIN thing.It is sucking down everything, and forcing every constrained choice between what should be done vs. what must be done.

While the issue is on the table, the Indian and Pakistanis are in open fire fights in the very place where the 1971 duel played out between India's rocket launchers and two Pakistani armored brigades. Pakistan sued for peace after loosing the whole column.

Notwithstanding that analogy, it drives home the point that there are plenty of other real conflicts that are going to require heavy armies, and not just tea cups.

Glad the Col jumped in. It wasn't about him, but the emerging dogmas forced out of short-term necessity rather than wisdom.

Sometimes, though, they are self-inflicted wounds. Last Friday's State Department Press Conf was an excited announcement by State's Deputy Lew and USAID's new Chief, just back from an exciting and upbeat Mil show to Kabul and Marjah---verything is just GGRREEAATT there. If you exploit these folks too much with the flash of super-spun war tourism, don't expect them to ever send more than the three State contract workers out of the Kabul Kakoon to Marjah.

So the military is getting lost in development/diplomacy in part because it does it to itself. Like an overly excited puppy (before it pees on the floor).

Hunter,
Interesting, I was in the 2006 Winter CGSC Class Fort Leavenworth and we had both COIN classes as part of the core curriculum AND electives to delve further into COIN. I distinctly rereading some of the founding authors of COIN from Mao, to Galula, to Thompson, to Trinquier. While we invested more time into COIN, among other topics, in SAMS, I thought CGSC did a decent job at teaching COIN fundamentals to future S3s and XOs when you look at the myriad of topics they try and cram into a relatively short amount of time. Let's not forget that every leader goes through more COIN seminars from BCTP, COIN classes at NTC/JRTC/JRMC and the COINSOC in Taji prior to operating in Iraq. Part of being a professional is the continued self-study and reflection of pertinent military topics, from COIN to logistics. Relying on a military school system to provide more than the basic understanding of COIN is prone to disappointment.

The Colonel hits the nail on the head: it is not about COIN but the slavish worshipping of COIN theory versus gaining a better understanding of the second and third order effects of a military force incapable of accomplishing it's core, mission essential tasks. Army Brigades now get to try and get train on two METLs (Mission Essential Task List): A Deployment (D-METL) and a Core (C-METL) set of tasks. But with 12-18 months to reset, refit, retrain and redeploy, (with 6 weeks gone for a training center rotation) where does a unit get a chance to train its Core skills, those tanker-centric tasks not on any Deployment set of skills? Simply put: they do not.

AR 220-1 rewrite. Thanks SOLDIERSDIARY.