Tuesday, April 13, 2010 - 7:13 AM

Retired Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, who became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a month after 9/11, made several interesting comments about his experience in working under Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.
"It's an adversarial style" that Rumsfeld uses, he said. "It can put you on the defensive very, very quickly." He later noted that, "I had a person working for me on the Joint Staff who probably should have worn a diaper every time he went to see Rumsfeld."
Retired Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, who served as Rumsfeld's military assistant before becoming vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed with that assessment of the former defense secretary's style, saying that, "He's a wrestler. Wrestlers like body contact."
Part of Rumsfeld's problem, Myers said, was that he had a couple of heavy-handed assistants. He said that defense secretaries and other senior civilians need to watch how their subordinates interact with the military. For example, he said, he thought Paul Wolfowitz was out of line for publicly criticizing Army chief Gen. Eric Shinseki for responding when asked by the Senate Armed Services Committee about his views of the number of troops that would be needed in Iraq. Myers said that in his view, just as military advice should be given in private, so should civilian criticisms of that sort. He said that at the time he confronted Wolfowitz about this, and that the deputy Defense secretary agreed that he had handled it badly.
Myers also repeatedly emphasized the need to establish trusting relationships with civilians, not only in the executive but also in Congress. Lack of trust, he added, was a major problem between the military and the CPA early in the Iraq war: "There was a real lack of trust there, and that was unhealthy."
Despite his faults, Rumsfeld tried to change things, which upset the Generals, whose idea of change is a bigger budget each year. He forced the Army to downsize in South Korea, which did not cause the calamity the Generals predicted. He forced the Army to begin a drawdown in Germany, where our troops still await the Warsaw pact invasion. That drawdown plan has since been scrapped.
Gates had done nothing but push bigger and bigger budgets, and ignored the decline in discipline among the officers and troops, who still shoot up anything they want without penalty. Gates is a horrible failure, which is why he is so popular with the suits in DC.
Yes, Rummy was a bit nutty on the political side, which is why he fit in with the Bushites.
Actually that plan has not been scrapped. I would like to point out that the entire 1st Armored Division is moving from Germany to Fort Bliss. This move is to be completed by 2013. It was originally slated to be finished by 2011. However, given the current op tempo of units it was not able to be completed on schedule.
The Generals worked with their Empire allies in Congress to kill it.
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63348
And now it is dead: http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=67742
So we continue this absurdity of keeping four combat brigades in Europe to justify jobs for 44 Army Generals living like kings over there. The Army does expensive PCS moves to transfer GIs and their families over there, then GIs are busy for a few months training, then they leave their families in Germany for a year to deploy, then they return to prepare to PCS back to the states. An absurd waste of money and time.
I'll admit not having researched the cost numbers in depth (I doubt anyone else on here has either) but I think the supposedly drastic costs of keeping troops in Germany you mention are exaggerated. Sure, shipping people overseas costs some money, but is it really so much more to buy a family's plane tickets and ship some goods and a car or two to Germany than it is for them to drive and ship goods across the country from, say, Fort Benning to Fort Lewis or Hawaii or Alaska? In exchange for these relatively modest extra costs, we have troops stationed closer to the Middle East and the Balkans. And the troops and the families, unlike most Americans who tend to be a bit insular and isolated, get exposed to and make friends with a friendly foreign nation. And, if the arrangement in Germany is the same as in most countries, the SOFA usually requires the host nation government to pay a certain part of the costs of us defending them.
Also, with the recent (modest) growth of the army and the sharp cut-back in bases thanks to BRAC, many of the army posts in the US are pretty crowded and short of infrastructure and training areas for all the BCTs the army has squeezed in (Bliss, where 1st AD was supposed to go, is one of the few exceptions and has tons of open desert available). Places like Fort Carson (my last post) and Knox (my current one) are pretty crowded in terms of traffic, barracks, motor pools, etc and lack the ranges and training areas to train more than about 1-2 of their multiple BCTs at any one time. So, the existing posts and training areas in Germany are valuable to the army's space and training requirements.
Finally, it seems possible that Rumsfeld's drive to cut troops in Germany was part of his dislike for "Old Europe" and a side benefit of his determination to ditch the army's mechanized units for nothing but light and medium units. And remember, pre- 9/11, Rumsfeld and his people wanted to get rid of two of the army's 10 divisions, which would have stretched the army even more than it is already.
And sure, there are far too many generals and staffs and HQs sitting in Europe, but don't think it's any different here or anywhere else. I'm sure the military's general officer numbers have continued to grow, as one would expect in a huge bureaucracy.
There are huge manhour costs with PCS moves, administratively and for the GI himself. A month to check-out, a month to move, and month to settle-in, then another three months to go home. Why PCS, just deploy from the USA and leave the families near their friends and extended family members.
The costs of shipping the commissary goods, and all the supply and support shipping, and visiting tech teams. The COLA is higher. Then there are the economic costs of spending billions of dollars in Germany and employing thousands of Germans instead of Americans who pay taxes in the USA.
Finally, the Army knows that it take longer to deploy a heavy brigade from Germany to the Balkans or Middle East. All that equipment is shipped by rail to N. German ports and all the way around Spain! All this assumes the German govt and unions approve of the deployment.
I didn't realize there was an update on the reduction of forces in Germany. However, the reduction of forces is still going to continue. That's why it is a reduction and not a complete withdraw from Germany. The Army never said it was going to withdraw all of its forces from Germany. Three BCTs of the 1st Armored Division are already present at Fort Bliss. The Division HQ is set to move after its current tour in Iraq is up and 2nd BCT is to be there by 2012. By my count that is the entire Division transplanted from Germany to Bliss.
So Myers sees the real problem with the Shinseki vs. Wolfowitz match-up not that Shinseki’s professional military advice was correct and that Wolfowitz was dead wrong but that the public was let in on a private quarrel in the Pentagon. All this over the issue of starting a war, which eventually turned out to be precisely the fiasco, that Shinseki was warning us about. It seems Myers thinks keeping the public in the dark on issues of war and peace is the way to go? This was not a troopship sailing time issue that Myers wanted to conceal but part of the preliminary public debate over the rush into a war of choice against a country posing virtually no risk to our security.
Gen. McMaster's comment about command reaction to active as opposed to passive mistakes would seem relevant here.
I'm gratified Gen. Myers is aware of some of the issues raised by the interaction of civilians and military personnel in the Pentagon, but note that he follows common practice by putting as much distance between those issues and himself as possible. More than one published report had Myers being something close to a yes-man to Sec. Rumsfeld; in Myers telling, this becomes a product of Rumsfeld's adversarial style.
It's a true enough observation by itself, but incomplete. It says nothing about how senior military officers -- who must at some point during their careers have had to consider how they'd respond if someone were trying to kill them -- should respond to a civilian boss or his civilian staff acting in an adversarial way. (The picture at the top of this post is a hint, probably unintended. The wrestler in question is the smallest one on the WWE roster, and defines his persona by not appearing intimidated at the prospect of wrestling much larger opponents).
There weren't many aspects of the Iraq disaster that could be directly traced to a decision of Richard Myers. By McMaster's standard, how much credit should he get for that?
How come I havent begged for your opinion of In The Loop yet?
Mr. Ricks,
Wow at that diaper comment. I immediately thought of In The Loop, and am surprised we haven't seen your review of it. I would love to hear what you think. If you can get through the heavy British accents and humor, the scenes about war planning, civ / gen interactions, and media are pretty priceless.
It is more accurate to describe Mr. Myers as a representative of two major defense contractors rather than a former General, lest people think he is working for their interests.
I'm not sure of any surveys showing the public's opinion of generals and admirals, but last time I checked the military as a whole has some of the highest approval ratings of any institution in the country, along with the supreme court. Maybe people don't like the flag-rank officers as much though, but I'd bet its far higher than congress or maybe even the president.
We love our enlisted people. Never in the history of our country have the enlisted suffered for such a prolonged period of time. They are being led by the most cowardly and inept losers in US history. US military officers have run our brave men and women into the ground. They treat them like shit and demand they accept it, while doing everytrhing they can to cover their own yellow asses. Who can ever forget how the war mongrel freak McChrystal SPIT in the face of the Tillman family.
Tom,
You really need to have some of your own thoughts here. Here is Gen Myers, who was the senior military adviser to the SecDef and the President at a time where the US made some of the worst decisions in the history of its foreign policy: going into Iraq too small, disbanding the Iraqi army, refusing to acknowledge an insurgency, etc. He allowed Rumsfeld to dominate the Joint Staff and failed to provide the President with the best military advice.
As someone who worked on the Joint Staff in 2001-02, I saw how the top-down process of deterring dissent worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I had hoped that the Joint Staff could provide a counter-balance, but Myers allowed himself and the best people in the military to be silenced.
To blame others for being afraid of being around Rumsfeld misses more than a few points.
I'd love to hear more about that
Could you elaborate on this? I'd love to read examples of how this worked.
Thanks,
Tom
"As someone who worked on the Joint Staff in 2001-02, I saw how the top-down process of deterring dissent worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I had hoped that the Joint Staff could provide a counter-balance, but Myers allowed himself and the best people in the military to be silenced."
Tom,
Well, it was a long time ago, so let me see if I can remember. I was on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship that put me on the Joint Staff's Directorate of Strategic Planning and Policy on the Bosnia desk (with some dabbling on Kosovo/Serbia/Macedonia, depending on who was on leave or TDY). So, I was not in OSD, but worked with them constantly.
So, three stories that come to mind:
1) Because the OSD folks at the lower level lived in a very fearful environment, during my year, they did not write policy papers. When the interagency agenda had a paper to be written by DoD, the junior OSD guys would defer to the Joint Staff guys to write the paper. They would then go to their higher ups with the paper and essentially hold it at arms' length and their superiors would choose to burn the paper with their laser eyes (yes, silly metaphor but you get the idea) or not. The paper, if intact, would then make its way through the interagency process. Ironically, this gave the Joint Staff more influence as it would set the agenda for the discussion. So, I remember in my first couple of months there, a LtColonel essentially wrote the American position on an effort to stop conflict at its earliest stages in Macedonia (Task Force Fox, if I recall correctly).
After I left, I was told by colleagues that Rummy had put in a change--that papers would be written by OSD. And the guys at the bottom responded by writing papers that were very unilateral, very right-wing so that they could only be accused of being overly enthusiastic.
2) Because I was the new guy, I got tasked with a snowflake (I think you mention snowflakes in Fiasco) where Rumsfeld was asking how to get all US troops out of every single commitment around the world that he could think of (he missed Iceland but the USAF 2 star above didn't). I had to coordinate with Joint Staff desk officers covering the rest of the planet and basically argue the handful of guys in East Timor had more bang for the buck than pulling them out and so forth. I ended up doing the same exercise, responding to the same request three times over the course of 12 months or so because I was/we were (not just my random advice but that of the JS chain) disagreeing with what he wanted to hear.
3) In late 2001 (after 9/11), six Algerians were picked up by Bosnian authorities as suspected terrorists. In January of 2002, they were due to be released due to the limits of Bosnian laws at the time, so the question became what to do about this? Ultimately, it was decided that US (not NATO) forces should pick these guys up and send them to Gitmo (before Gitmo became known for what it is now known for) as the first guys caught outside of Afghanistan to be sent there. A guidance cable needed to go out to give the USAEUR (commander of US Army Europe) authority to go ahead. But as news of this was getting out, people started to gather in Sarajevo. The longer this took, the more likely it would provoke a crisis. But the sticking point was Rumsfeld. We could not get his subordinates to get the issue to Rummy one evening (it was 7 or 8) because they didn't want to disturb him. But delay might lead to a riot or something like it. But we had to wait until the next morning when it was ok to bother the SecDef. This experience again indicated the climate of fear that the folks working under him perceived.
I hope this gives some idea, if not actual eyewitness accounts of people being "wirebrushed," of the working environment created by Rumsfeld. I left after my year's fellowship opposed to the on-coming war because I knew OSD would be running the post-war phase and they would screw it up. Not because the people there were inherently bad (although the top of the dept was, well, Feith) but because a crippling management style where the job was to provide the expected answers would only lead to bad decisions.
Myers is a bigger tool than I thought he was. This is one of those, better to keep your mouth shut and be thought a fool than to open it and remove all doubt. This comment validates that Myers was a total failure as CJCS.
As for Rummy, holy crap. He's a man, like any other man. What is there to be afraid of? If one is a 3 or 4 star general, at the end of a 25-30+ year career with a secure 6 figure retirement awaiting...why put up with the martinet strategies of a flaming asshole like Rummy who thinks he knows better? Are all these guys really that pussified and pacified?
My Shinseki appraisal just went up a tiny notch, but I have always held the opinion that he too failed. Decorated Vietnam veteran with missing leg parts, truly knowledgeable about the force he led - allows dipshit civilian to undermine the military expertise, cut the size of the invasion source and directly jeopardize the success of the mission...costing countless American and Iraqi lives in the endgame. YES, Shinseki was duty bound to obey (as was Myers) but if they truly beleived in their stance then they should have voted with their feet. Like Keane did. There is a special place in hell awaiting all of them. As others have already indicated - match this up with BG Mcmasters quote on active mistakes versus passive failures.
HERRSCHEISSKOPF69's first post is actually accurate. God help us all.
I'd Normally Agree, But Keane's Retirement F&*%ed the Army...
"Shinseki was duty bound to obey (as was Myers) but if they truly beleived in their stance then they should have voted with their feet. Like Keane did."
Hunter,
99% of the time I would agree with your entire post. However, by using GEN Keane as the example I have to disagree. It is possible to do an honorable thing (decline elevation to CSA on principle) while simultaneously hurting the very institution you devoted your entire adult life to building.
GEN Keane's decision to decline take the CSA position hurt the Army immeasurably. This was the causal factor that cursed us with 7 years (and counting) absolutely inept and clueless senior leadership. This causal factor has placed us in a tailspin. I believe that only someone with the credibility and force-of-will like GEN Petreaus can pull us out of this malaise.
By retiring, Keane enabled Rumsfeld to recall GEN Peter Schoomaker from retirement - arguably the worst Army Chief of Staff (CSA) in modern history. Schoomaker, who was already retired for a reason, proved spectacularly incompetent as CSA. Neither his career trajectory, education or assignment history qualified him for the task. Because of this, Rumsfeld found him especially appealing as a CSA candidate - malleable, dim and utterly clueless to the ways of the Beltway, Politics and the Joint Staff. Look at his assignment history - "black ops" from Company Commaned through being named DCO of the 1 CAV as a BG. He lacked the insight and bureaucratic seasoning that Shinseki, Keane, Reimer, Sullivan, etc. had.
Schoomaker took on GEN Casey as his Vice. We all know where that leads us. As I've said before, April 2010, the month Casey walks across the parade Field at Ft. Myer for the last time cannot come soon enough.
Regardless of who served as CSA from '03-'07, the Army would still be incredibly strained. That said, I firmly believe we would be better off intellectually, doctrinally, ethically and strategically had Jack Keane been at the helm. Moreover, he may have spared the Army four years of torture at the hands of CSA Casey!
Finally, let us never forget that Schoomaker and his second VCSA, GEN Cody, served as Rumsfeld's willing goons. No one dares remember the 30-35 1, 2 and 3 stars - an entire generation of GOs who were cashiered out of the service by Schoomaker and Cody at the behest of Rumsfeld. Schoomaker's treatment of GEN Kevin Byrne, the former TRADOC Commander, was disgraceful and cowardly. Let us not forget Cody and Schoomaker's treatment of MGs Taguba and Weightman. Schoomaker fired MG Weightman at WRAMC/NARMC and conveniently his younger brother gets the job - the "on deck" circle to being named Surgeon General of the Army.
I meant 2011 for Casey's Retirement ...
By saying 2010 I was caught committing an act of wishful thinking.
Well I find myself in agreement with much of your post as well - shocking huh? But I can't speculate what might have been. I only wish Keane had left loudly, insisting something to the effect "You want me to be the Chief, after what you just did to Shinseki? And you expect me to follow suit? Fuck you and the horse you rode in on brother." Indeed he should have sent his own snowflake, the day he retired, and said something like "I love the Army and its soldiers but I can't work for those who won't take ANY of my advice as a senior representative of the service which I have 30+ years of service in. I leave saddened but with my honor intact." (this is also what Shinseki should have done when they told the Army to take Iraq with 30,000 soldiers).
It's like an adulterer who runs off with his mistress. Can the mistress truly believe that the adulterer won't do the same thing to her later? Keane would have been marginalized just the same. I think he knew this - and I think (given what I've read after the fact, including but not limited to "The Gamble") that Keane recognized that the only way he was going to fix things was from the outside inwards.
Concur that Schoomaker added nothing to the CSA job - thanks for the dumbass Warrior Creed though. It will live on with the dumb beret as part of the "sound and fury signifying nothing" And the less said about Casey the better.
It is like we have talked about prior, the Flags were more concerned with their rank than anything else and now will talk "openly" about how much they did not like Rummy and yet lacked the will to do the right thing at the time.
I am a retired National Guard Officer and can tell you 'bout Rummy's picks for General.
A certain individual was promoted (over more qualified people) to BG of the Sig Bde. Rumer had it this person was "Hand Picked" by rummy's people for the position.
I worked with this person in both the civilian & military 'worlds" and knew him to be totally clueless about just about everything.
When this Sig Bde was (finally!) alerted for Iraq duty (One of the LAST ONES GO by the way) they were sent to Bliss for training. Now from what I understand, once a unit is mobilized , no personnel changes are done to "Keep Unit cohesion." This indiviual was soon given a desk job at the Guard Bureau and one of the people that were passed over in the first place was promted to take the Brigade over.
By the way, I volunteered to go back in after 9/11 but flunked the physical. I was upset about it at first, but the more I find out about how this "War on Terror" has been planned and executed, the more relieved I am not having to be a part of it!
Now that educated people see that we lost the Iraq war (really a colonial occupation) why does anyone take a key player in this failure seriously. Myers was the blue potted plant standing in the background while the Bushites deceived the American people into invading Iraq, and then screwed up the occupation to the point we will soon be forced out.
Does anyone remember the huge Sadr militia that dropped out of sight and stopped fighting? It wasn't because he gave up, he is just waiting, and recently began a campaign to ensure the Americans leave.
CMEYERGO,
Please explain what you see as a colonial occupation in our time there? As for screwing up the occupation, the flags, DoS and Bush all had a huge hand in that, it was a failure via co-operation across the board as far as poor choices go.
Sadr is not waiting it out in his city and his militia is not the powerful force you think it is or seem to be reading it is. A lot of things were already tried over there by his militia and they are not going to get the power that many think they are.
He has made a few million dollars from part-time "director" work since he left the Pentagon.
http://biz.yahoo.com/t/40/7028.html
I await his next lecture on ethics. I sure it will follow the logic that if it isn't illegal, its okay. This is why Sec Gates had to limit the millions retired Generals were skimming from the Pentagon as "mentors." The four-stars had no objections Hell, they set it up and are mad it has fallen apart before they cashed in. Oh well, there are still millions in kickbacks awaiting them in corporate boardrooms. After all, you can't expect them to survive on $120,000 a year in retirement.
Osama's hunter speaks out -- from the CIA
The military was not designed to fight terrorism.
In any case we need to address the ROOTS of terrorism otherwise more of our men and women will come home in coffins or missing bits.
I like this analysis from a CIA guy:
"The young Nigerian in Detroit and the Jordanian bomber in Khost and his wife have told America’s Marines, soldiers, and CIA officers what they already surely sense, but what their political leaders deny. Both attackers cited motivations that pivot on U.S. support for Israel against the Palestinians; U.S. occupation of Muslim lands; and U.S. attacks on their fellow Muslims. The three individuals’ words echo the components of U.S. foreign policy named by bin Laden in 1996 as the causes of war — which also include U.S. support for Arab tyrants and exploitation of Muslim energy resources — and which polls show 80 percent of the world’s Muslims identify as attacks on their faith.
While it is hard for Americans to hear, we are at war with a steadily growing number of young men and women in the Muslim world because of what the U.S. government has done in that arena since 1945. The current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies.
Should some of these policies be changed? I surely think so...."
http://thehill.com/special-reports-archive/699-homeland-security-january-2010/75531-when-troops-and-cia-officers-die-for-a-fantasy
When troops and CIA officers die for a fantasy
By Michael Scheuer - 01/12/10 06:25 PM ET
The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence services are the most important part of America’s defense capital. When they enter the service of their choice they are well aware of the implicit contract between the nation and themselves. In return for their career, America has the right to call on them to go into harm’s way, very often at the risk of their lives. I have never known a Marine, a soldier or a CIA officer who did not accept this reality, and I have never known one who balked when called on to deploy. That said, each I have known — and I suppose all — hope that if defending America costs his or her life, the cause for which it is spent is clear and worthwhile. It is precisely on this point that the U.S. government’s executive and legislative branches are lethally failing these men and women.
The events of the past three weeks throw into sharp relief that we are sending our young men and women overseas to fight an enemy that does not exist. Among the first thoughts expressed by President Obama after the near-miss al Qaeda attack on Christmas — and then echoed by his lieutenants, various members of both parties in Congress, and numerous pundits — was that the young Nigerian bomber hated our way of life. And since seven CIA officers in Afghanistan were killed by al Qaeda on Dec. 30, the same thought has been expressed by the same people.
This central thought has been accompanied by additional assertions, among which are the attackers were nihilistic Muslim fanatics and the attackers’ motivation has nothing to do with Islam. The sum and substance of the U.S. bipartisan political elite’s response to recent events has been — as it has been since 1996 when Osama bin Laden declared war on America — that the Islamist terrorists hate us for who we are and how we live, not for what we do.
This contention is a fantasy. It is fair to say that all the U.S. Marines, soldiers and CIA officers who have died in Afghanistan since 9/11 and in Iraq since Saddam’s removal have died fighting an enemy that does not exist. In numbers now approaching 6,000, these men and women have bravely fought and died in combat against an enemy whose main motivation U.S. political leaders have consistently denied. No U.S. soldier, Marine, or CIA officer has been killed by an Islamist fighter who took the field because America has women in the workplace, beer is available in ample supply, and there are early presidential primaries in Iowa every fourth year. Indeed, Islamists motivated by such issues would not rise to the level of a lethal nuisance; they certainly could not stymie the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The young Nigerian in Detroit and the Jordanian bomber in Khost and his wife have told America’s Marines, soldiers, and CIA officers what they already surely sense, but what their political leaders deny. Both attackers cited motivations that pivot on U.S. support for Israel against the Palestinians; U.S. occupation of Muslim lands; and U.S. attacks on their fellow Muslims. The three individuals’ words echo the components of U.S. foreign policy named by bin Laden in 1996 as the causes of war — which also include U.S. support for Arab tyrants and exploitation of Muslim energy resources — and which polls show 80 percent of the world’s Muslims identify as attacks on their faith.
While it is hard for Americans to hear, we are at war with a steadily growing number of young men and women in the Muslim world because of what the U.S. government has done in that arena since 1945. The current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies.
Should some of these policies be changed? I surely think so, but that is a discussion for another time and broad public debate, perhaps during the 2010 midterm elections. For now, the discussion must focus on our enemies’ motivation and the knowing failure of U.S. leaders in both parties to be honest with our fighting forces. If we fail to understand that motivation, America cannot shape a war-fighting strategy to either defend those policies or defeat the tenacious, talented, religiously motivated, and growing foe our soldiers, Marines, and CIA officers are now losing to in the field. Those men and women — and their parents, spouses and children — deserve to know they are risking their lives to defeat a skilled and enduring enemy, one who is motivated by the impact of U.S. policies, and one that genuinely threatens America. They are not fighting the cartoon-like foe described by their political leaders for the past 15 years.
Scheuer is a former senior CIA officer and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.
Noteworthy here, I see that HERRshallnot be named here has been culled from the threads.
Huzzah Tom. A small cost to free speech but a great boon to intelligent conversation.
Ditto's
Must have been the manure collector. Honestly, I just got home from dinner with friends, and this is the first I've seen of it. (Btw, turkey injected with sherry and roasted with garlic does a lot for a man.)
Cheers,
Tom
...or he is getting a royalty for every time he posts the same article.
None of this is simple, and many on here ignore some of the conflicting imperatives.
Do flag officers make policy or do the civilians?
When civilians (primarily politicians) pursue ill advised policy for political reasons (as is their wont), to what extent should military officer publicly oppose them?
When you are ignored or abused, do you resign in a fit of pique, or stay and try to work around it?
Military culture says that you give a candid assessment, and once the decision is made, you salute and move out. If you disagree with the decision, at what point do you begin flouting civilian control of the military?
Not trying to defend Meyers or any of the GOs mentioned -- but I am sensitive to the fact that the shotgun blasting about flag officers on this and other threads is ignorant, and doesn't really address the real issues.
There are a lot of people here who disagree fundamentally with the Iraq war, and seem to be blaming senior military leaders for not preventing it.
A lot of senior officers actively and passively opposed the Bosnia/Kosovo interventions and got thoroughly castigated for it, and accused of threatening the principles of civilian control of the military. Tough to have it both ways.
As I am one of the ones RBB is likely speaking of, allow me to clarify. I have absolutely no problems with civilian control of the military. Indeed it is a hallmark of the American system. Regardless of the hierarchical nature of the military there is and always has been a two step or tango within the chain of command where orders are given, questioned in private, modified as necessary OR implemented as originally given. THIS DICHOTOMY IS BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT. In this case it is clear there was no respect. Good people don't patrol the hallways of the Pentagon trying to scare the shit out of THEIR OWN staffers.
But when the experts in the service are routinely ignored and their advice is never accepted then you must come to a conclusion that you can either support the regime or not. Most mid level officers in the organization never have any such opportunity. Oh they can voice their opinions behind closed doors - and often do. But more often than not, they are expected to salute and drive on. If they are at retirement stage they could do so or resign.
But these aren't mid-level officers. These are the strategic policy makers. Their retirement is not at risk, they earned that long ago - its like University tenure, the tenure is supposed to ensure their freedom of thought and action. Indeed as young LTs we used to joke, "oh, how I wish I was forced to retire as a BG or MG." MG Nash of 1st Armored Division was one of our unfortunate examples - he who did some questionable things in Bosnia and was rumored to be dipping his wick in other people (than his wife's ) well.
No, when these guys at the top ranks disagree with the civilian side of DoD they can choose to stay and implement the policy to the best of their ability (which is a good thing most of the time) or they can choose to retire/resign with their honor and good sense intact.
Tom's post here makes it clear that OSD under Rumsfeld was a terrible posting where the SecDef and his underSecs made sport of trying to terrorize the uniformed members of the office. To me personally this is laughable - honestly does Wolfowitz scare you? Not me. What could these guys do to a GO? Not recommend them for promotion from 3 to 4 stars? Make you work late? Chew your ass? Really all lame. if you make it to that level and that kind of stuff still affects you then there is likely something wrong. If I was in those shoes I would likely start out by stopping to work the 18 hr days that are de rigeur at the Pentagon and probably just work I don't know 12. Regardless these punks can't bend your dog tags or mark your meal card no dessert. Worse thing they can do is - SEND YOU TO IRAQ, LOL (I kill myself).
So in a toxic environment where NONE of your advice is taken - why stay around and justify their actions with your complicit/tacit agreement.
Shinseki stayed around and did his duty - when his departure (quiet or otherwise) might have forced some introspection on the part of OSD. Recall that Shinseki's successor was named a year early - effectively making him a lame duck. This was OSD trying to undermine Shinseki. Credit to Keane (who was that named successor). Keane said "Nah, I need to spend some personal time with my family, time to retire." This wasn't the bombshell many of us in the service might have hoped for. We had higher expectations from Keane in the role of CSA. It would have been nice for either Shinseki or Keane to put their stars on Rumsfelds desk and say "I respect the office and the service more than this to sit here and implement strategies that are doomed to fail. I've supported you every step of the way thus far but this is where I have to draw the line. I've given my best opportunity to recommend viable Courses of Action in cases 1,2,3,4,5,...etc ad nauseum. You've chosen to ignore me before, and now you have chosen to undermine me. Obviously my services are no longer required here. Goodbye." If Shinseki did that on one day and his successor the next, don't you think our Congress or WH would take some humble interest in why?
Then there's the likes of Myer who ex post facto remarks that HIS staffers lived in fear of the OSD. WTF? I don't have any more words for him that wouldn't dissolve to HERRshallnot be named here level.
Yes, its tough to do the right thing when literally millions of peoples lives are on the line. But I guess that is why it is so important. None of these people demonstrated the moral courage to do what was right. Keane's example was the best one, he left on his terms - AND THEN THE SALTY OLD MAN still accomplished his goals. And he followed all the rules, written and unwritten in doing so. That's chutzpah, and we should all be grateful, because although Petraeus gets all the credit - most Americans have never so much as heard of Keane - those of us in the force know who the real hero is.
You are correct and I agree with your post and only wish (this is going to pain me to say ;) ) that more Officers had that vision of what you are supposed to do when you are put into a leadership position.
Hunter, interesting response from the inside. Sounds like the typical corporate HQ where rocking the boat is not on except the DOD's product can be lethal to their own employees. One guess that I could make is that a lot of GO's decline to be controversial because the OSD could drop some hints to the military industrial complex that such and such a GO may not be a suitable post-retirement hire?
I bet dollars to donuts that if Shinseki had slammed his stars on Rumsfeld's desk and walked out the door with his honor intact he would have plenty of companies clamoring over him. Anyone can find proficient managers out on the street, its much harder to find real strength and conviction.
As an aside: When I was a young butterbar my very first Bn CDR was sort of a psycho tyrant. He went through Bn S3s like sunflower seeds, chewing them up and spitting them out, one by one. A new S3 guy came in - everyone could tell immediately this guy was shit hot, knew his stuff, ready to work hard. It only took a few months before the S3 couldn't put up with the martinet's bullshit. The S3 tried to do all the right things (the kind I described in my last post about Shinseki and Rummy et al.) Finally he exploded, I obviously wasn't in the room but within hours everyone in the Battalion new exactly what was said in that private office (right next to the S1, CPT Xs desk). The words that will live on forever "Sir, you are a savage and I cannot work for you." Every soldier in the unit respected what the S3 was trying to do. The BDE CDR took that S3 as his BDE S1, he later went to a different BDE as a BN XO and still had a successful career. More significantly the BDE CDR told the BN CDR that this was HIS last chance. The next S3 would be successful, or both the S3 and BN CDR were going to FAIL. I think you can see how the Shinseki/Rummy situation should have paralleled this one.
As it stands Shinseki surely ain't hurting. One of his recent assignments was as Leadership Chair at USMA - a job I should think anyone would be honored to have. He is now part of the VA (don't recall the exact title) as part of the Obama administration.
I am waiting for the truly high muckety muck to just retire quietly and go fishing. I lost some respect for my Dad when he decided to never really work again after retiring with 30 years of service - like Mark Twain I have learned as I grew older how smart (and honorable) my old man actually was.
Shinseki is Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
A view good view of the best of the "down stairs" help..
Tom, can not help thinking that your trip to NC was a very expensive alternative to watching old videos of Masterpiece Theatre. This forum event truly presented two of the best butler help that the upstairs staff could have selected. Always respectful, well appointed and of the strongest discretion in all matters. It is apparent that they will be well compensated in the future to remain so regardless of the decay or chaos that may inhabit the upstairs compartment. Their expertise will continue to be sought so as to maintain the security of the household in all circumstances.
The questions remain, if you will indulge me:
In a democracy why is security of this elite household greater than national security?
Are butlers the real models for generals and admirals? Remember Pace serving coffee?
Was Mattis there as a gratuitous token to show that downstairs had sensitivity for the rough grounds keeper?
Is this all irrelevant in the age of China and the value of the new yuan?
Did the butlers enjoy the joke of providing naval assets across the empire flying anti tyrant bow flags to provide security for wealthy oil tyrannies?
If the Tea Party types change their logo flag to one that says "Don't Spend on Me!" and assault their entitlement cash flow will they remain so taciturn?
Why was this conference important?
Any Good Advice at the Pentagon?
I wonder if Rumsfeld's abrupt advisarial style was his way of finding out who not only had the the nerve and conviction to put forth a strong articulate counter-argument, but a well thought-out one, and felt anyone unable to do so had little worth wasting his time with?
Of course if true, that style would have transcended to his under-secretaries who would have been just as dismissive and insulated the former SecDef even further from good advice, giving the impression to lesser mortals they were marginalized.
Which raises a question in my mind - was Donald Rumsfeld surrounded by anyone senior in uniform that had any good advice?
... Rummy is an a**hole.
Yea, there was a lot of Good Advice. But it was ignored. After all, a draft dodger with a degree in Mathmatics has more idea how to fight a war then any Military Person with 20+ years of experience! Just ask him!
Rummy & his boys made teh same mistake that McNamara made 40 years ago. Failed to let his Generals fight the war!
If the Bushies had been around in WWII, we'd probally be still fighting the war (with contractors, of course!)
Rumsfeld is a war criminal and should have been arrested and tried to the fullest extent of the law.
How can any real army officer be afraid of bonafide war criminals?
Hunter, my comments were not directed specifically at you, but I appreciate your lengthy -- and sound -- response.
If you were in 1AD under Nash we probably have some common history. I'm heading to OSD in a few months, and your post is food for thought.
The Pentagon is somewhere I will thankfully never work, but I wish you well in the endeavor.
I was in 1AD from 94-97, Ready First.
that anecdote about confronting wolfowitz gives me a slightly better impression of myers. He always seemed like a toady to me.
I was in the Bandits from 92-95.
I was a Black Knight in 94-95 and I became a Bandit in 95-97 just in time for the Bosnia trip. Bandit's will not fail those with whom they serve. We likely passed one another like ships in the night, because I don't recognize the initials (if those are initials).
If you remember Black Knight 6 you'll know who I am talking about in the story above. I remember Bandit 6 of your era...I was glad for both of their replacements.
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