Wednesday, April 7, 2010 - 2:42 PM

Exum went and hired away my star piracy columnist, Cdr. Herb Carmen. I'm not gonna get into a bidding war, but the door's open whenever that Tennessee moonshine wears off, Herbal.
Meantime, while Herb mulls his journalistic options, here is a link to the very good statement he wrote for Ex on how an aviation unit can prepare to operate in support of counterinsurgency operations. He has a lot of thoughtful advice, such as:
Bring in guys who have been there to talk about their experiences. Aviators are keenly interested in hearing from the folks that have 'been there.' That knowledge and wisdom is soaked, and aviators build a human connection to the unit they're supporting. JTACS, company commanders, battalion commanders would all make great guests.
Speaking of Ex, he challenges my view that the surge worked tactically but failed strategically. Knock yourself out, Ex Man. (Fwiw, I'd be more persuaded by a chart that didn't begin with the outbreak of a civil war, but rather with the outbreak of the insurgency two years earlier. "Hey, casualties are way down since Antietam!") But luring away the staff...
Actually, the American Civil War's average battle became bloodier and longer in duration after Antietam.
That would be hard, since Antietam remains the single bloodiest day in American history.
Actually, it would be easy since Antietam was a single day battle. As the Civil War progressed engagements had a tendency to draw out somewhat.
On the more general topic of the post, yes, it would be nice to see a chart from the start of the insurgency, but that doesn't invalidate it, anymore than a chart showing battle casualties from 1862-1866 would mean that the Civil War didn't really end in 1865.
The number of deaths in Iraq has dropped spectacularly in the last few years. I realize that doesn't fit into the "Iraq unraveling" narrative, but perhaps the narrative should be adjusted to the facts rather than vice-versa, hm?
Hock loogies in his coffee cup. He'll never know. You could, of course, try putting thumbtacks on his chair - but he would know, and he's an ex-Ranger, and it wouldn't end up well (I think).
An interesting article. But as COIN is tactics - COIN dictates aviators/pilots in direct support, know what's happening on the ground continuously 24/7.
I found the good Commanders focus geared more toward the regional operating area picture as he described aboard ship.
Anyway, good thoughts and a doff of the cap to Commander Herb Carmen.
Antietam uh? Oh well, I have to attend to unwrapping a package of cigars. : )
And the fucking LIFER who thought it up!
GP, you need to take it outside
Or I'm cutting you off.
Best,
Tom
Last month, Abu Exum cited a study presented at a London Conference indicating that CERP (money as a weapon) was highly effective. Does that also mean the Pizza Box money that was out-right stolen, and the $53billion of construction fiascos. Actually, the final Conference report raises significant questions about the underpinnings of WHAM, COIN, and transactional relationships bought by CERP.
Same vein. Take a figure out of context and extrapolate it beyond reason.
I read your book on a flight to Baghdad, and still see it as on point. My humble little piece of the surge was to help frame our departure, and that worked.
We know that many of the real drivers of today's conditions in Iraq include, in different measures, completion of sectarian neighborhood cleansing, millions of outstanding refugees (EDPs and IDPs), and just plain public exhaustion with war.
Did the surge add to the outcomes? Yes.
Is the game over yet? No. (Isn't that what you argued?)
As for the COIN-AS-A-MODEL-FOR-EVERY-PROBLEM-WE-FACE theory, I was pleasantly refreshed to read Bing West's current Op-Ed in NYT: How to Save Afghanistan from Karzai.
All things aside, he is arguing to reduce the mission to Clear, Hold, Turn Over to Afghans. They can build their own newer, better Afghanistan (or not). While, no doubt, US aid and development assistance would continue ad infinitum, the military mission would be defined as just a military one, and the nation building left for others, and other days. That sounds like the successful elements of the Crocker/Petreaus version of the Iraq Surge, but it does little for COIN.
Steve's reference to CERP, locally dispersed money used as a targeted tactical COIN weapon, reminded me of an old VN era saw. The one about how we could have done no worse by just dropping the money it was costing us to bomb the North, the trail and 'bad' villages.
Cdr. Herbal's carrier-COIN agin the Kush seems a pretty expensive way to do armed aerial recon. I'm not saying that close air support isn't due and welcome to the guys trolling for contact, or that we should go back to offering OV-1's and 10's for target practice. But if we go broke in the process of projecting carrier power against Nuristani farmers, how is that advancing the warrior ethos of our great country?
On a basic level, Af-Pak is the screwiest log train since we used B-29's to haul fuel over the Hump. As one of Herb's commenters said, 'know your aircraft, know the terrain.' Or in the words of Dirty Harry: 'A man's got to know his limitations.'
Walking Wounded, the reason for flying the hump was to protect our servicemen from becoming bewitched. What am I talking about you are muttering? The Burma Road from India into China passed of course through Burma (now Myanmar), in which one section of the Ledo Road is in the Kachin state. It is known that once a man looks upon a Kachin women he becomes mesmerized and falls under her spell - therefore useless as a fighting man thereafter.
Part of COIN is understanding the human terrain and I thought it was important for you to know about Kachin women. In my next episode, we will discuss the best way to cook peacock, and roast monkey on a stick over a brazier. : )
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