If Warren Buffett were the chief of staff of the Army, we likely would be better off, with a military that is more effective in combat, and also with a better selection of leaders. That's the thought that occurred to me while reading his latest annual report. You can learn a lot about how to run a large organization from a guy like Buffett.

First of all, Buffett, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., didn't follow a "zero defects" philosophy during the course of investing his way to becoming one of the richest people in the country. Unlike some Army leaders, he knows that if you aren't making some mistakes, then you aren't trying hard enough. Punishing all errors simply will deter subordinate leaders from taking necessary risks, or even making timely decisions. You want prudent risk taking and you want it done as fast as possible. Time is the great variable in both investing and war, but that isn't acknowledged often enough in the military strategic discussions. Buffett writes that,

We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly -- or not at all -- because of a stifling bureaucracy."

That said, he is quick to go on to describe what he sees as his role in risk taking and other leadership tasks: He and his deputy, he writes, "limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers, and setting their compensation." In military terms, I think that would mean allocating resources and people, deciding where to take strategic risks, and selecting subordinate commanders. Everything else? That stuff "we delegate almost to the point of abdication," he states in his management principles, printed later in the same annual report. Buffett is so serious about limiting himself that in a company with 257,000 employees, his headquarters office numbers just 21. (This is an approach that reminds me of William Slim, the greatest British general of World War II, who insisted that his corps headquarters be able to travel in just a few trucks and jeeps.) Of course, as Buffett notes, he has to be more careful than most to keep his subordinates happy, because they tend to be wealthy people who can walk if they feel micro-managed or mistreated.

A significant part of discouraging a "zero defects" mentality is leading the way in confessing your own mistakes, which Buffett is quick to do. He notes that the chiefs of  GEICO (yeah, he owns that too) opposed his idea of issuing credit cards to the insurance company's customers, a project that ultimately lost about $50 million.

GEICO's managers ... were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO's customers we would get the -- well, let's call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.

I was just older."

Despite his willingness to see mistakes made, Buffett, whose company is bigger than the Marine Corps, is a big believer in accountability. I believe we need more of this in our military, which used to relieve senior commanders quickly (such as 17 division commanders in World War II), but no longer does. In all walks of life, if you screw up big time, you should suffer the consequences. For what it is worth, I agree with him -- too often we have privatized profit and socialized risk, letting the taxpayer pick up the tab when Wall Street's bets go wrong.

This is how he puts it:

If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or a Chief Risk Officer.

In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he's incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it -- with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees -- the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe. ...

The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style."

Unlike many in the military, Buffett also writes clearly and simply, and as George Orwell teaches us, clear writing reflects clear thinking.

Finally, lots of people talk nowadays about how military officers need to thrive on chaos or be comfortable with ambiguity. If you can do that, you can seize on opportunities when they arise. Buffett thrives on turmoil. Listen to the master discuss how he did that during the financial crisis of a couple of years ago, when many people ran for the hills:

We've put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It's been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend."

He isn't kidding. He explains that:

When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help."

In other words, he spent billions on his belief that it was a good time to buy, and so picked up big parts of major companies for a relative pittance. Or, as he summarizes his thinking about that crisis, "When it's raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble."

history.navy.mil

 

JPWREL

4:56 PM ET

April 1, 2010

Here is without a doubt one

Here is without a doubt one of the very best comments Tom has presented us since I have been reading his blog. While many in the business community (executives of the big financials lead the list) have rightly been criticized for a stunning combination of incompetence, an arrogant sense of entitlement and the outright plundering of their corporate treasury’s for their personal benefit there are also those like Buffett whose unique combination of wisdom, common sense, business savvy has made him a transformative icon in our time.

Warren Buffet has managed to weave his way through a maze of shady characters, complex accounting shenanigans and an Alice in Wonderland like economic environment not only supremely successfully but has done so with wit, good fellowship, and a personal sense of proportion. He is not enchanted by his own image and what a tremendous advantage that must be when dealing with the megalomaniacs that inhabit the world of big business.

Sadly, I don’t see anybody like this in the U.S. Armed forces either past or present. Many such as Adm. Chester Nimitz and Gen. Matt Ridgeway possessed as many of Buffett’s best characteristics as you will likely find in the armed forces. Marshall was close but was hindered by a humorless and unapproachable personality very much like his hero Robert E. Lee (the Marble Man).

 

JAFFIR

5:46 AM ET

April 2, 2010

No victory, no stars

The problem is not with the level of physical courage of Generals or their raw brain power or the schools they attended. Lets assume they have lots of all of it.

The problem is, they are not winning. Or even carrying the argument forward about how to win. Telling us we need a "surge" in Iraq after years of engagement is ludicrous. Guys on the ground knew it on 10 April 2003. Taking credit for some sort of military acumen for doing the obvious is a symptom of a greater illness. This new Afghan thing is the same; spot on, 30k more boots, more fighting, more chai, more conversations. It took ten years to figure it out?

If you were paying for a football team and it lost for a decade, time to reexamine how the coaching staff is working. If you owned a hardware store and it couldn't sell enough nails to pay the rent, time to rethink about the guys running the store.

Sure, war is different. Its grotesque. But if the Generals and Admirals were sitting around in 1950 trying to decide how to push the Imperial Marines out of islands just north of Australia, then maybe you have the wrong stars on the wrong shoulders.

Best,
Jaffir

 

SCOTT SHAW

3:50 AM ET

April 3, 2010

No CSA has had the time that Buffett has at the helm

Please look at a couple of things before crowning Warren Buffett the Ultimate Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)

1. The time that Warren Buffett has had at the helm compared to any CSA since the position was created. Buffett mid 60's to present. Most CSAs 4 years (since the mid 70's almost all) with only Marshall and MacArthur having more than 4.

2. The fact that Buffett answers not to two secretaries (Defense and Army), the President, every taxpayer, a Congress, and over a million Soldiers and their spouses, parents, and children. Not to mention veterans and their groups.

Is Buffett an amazing manager? Absolutely yes. However, if you took his record for the first four years and stacked it up against any CSA, then I would submit that they would be close. Longevity and experience mean something.

Scott

 

HUNTER

5:13 PM ET

April 1, 2010

Buffett

I like the post about Buffett and admire the man, but I shudder to think about some of our military's "best practices" which we try (and usually fail) to adopt from Big Business. Sure there are things you can do to better manage the complexities of a million person force...but most of the stuff we do just falls flat or ends up being just another flavor of the week. (Six Sigma - I am looking at you).

We need to be concentrating on our core business which is "killing people and breaking shit ...and nowadays implementing a necessary COIN strategy to better decide when not to kill people and break shit." Everytime I see someone trying to Lean out an Army organizaiton or determine defects per million in a logistics operation I get squirrely. Sure we need to be efficient, but we also need to be effective. And sometimes some lost efficiency is okay; if you gain effectiveness by not wasting time on things that are not core to the overall mission.

And we waste lots of time on things that are not core to the overall mission.

 

JPWREL

5:47 PM ET

April 1, 2010

Hunter, I agree with your

Hunter, I agree with your sensible point that the military is very unique and lessons from big business are not always transferable. But my impression of Tom’s remarks is that he was looking at the larger picture of the balance between leadership and responsibility. Between innovation and playing it safe. Most things in the military do in fact work and work well but at the other end of the spectrum the military often has difficulty dealing with personnel performance issues, systems integration and institutionalizes an attitude of ‘cover your buttism’ which stifles constructive change. And to throw some gas on the fire and pick up another thesis of Tom’s I do not think the service schools produce the type of intellect who is comfortable dealing with controversy and change.

 

HUNTER

6:44 PM ET

April 1, 2010

JPWREL are you trolling me???

Just kidding, a little.
By Service Schools do you mean CGSC/War Colleges or service academies? I can't defend CGSC (it sucked) or War College (selected, declined, waiting on next chance), but as you have seen before I do like to defend the academies - which Tom does not.

In any case the academies are still entry level schools so they don't seem to align with the operational and strategic levels of military or business that Buffett plays in (or would play in if he were a equivalent high ranking Generalissimo).

As to the other points, I don't like to defend the CYA attitudes of our high-ranking officers - indeed there is no defense for that kind of boorish self-centered careerism. I also don't like risk aversion - I tend to lean pretty far towards the risky side of the business. However I must say that business and military are very different worlds - duh. Buffett has more money than God and he can afford to risk large sums on a daily game of craps or the market (which sometimes seem disturbingly similar). At the end of the day he is just gambling money, mostly his money, money which he can make back the following day. Generals are gambling with lives, lives they care about, other peoples' lives and other peoples' family members, lives that no matter how much you try you can't get back in the next day's trading.

Buffett has it easy.

 

VARTIKA

8:23 PM ET

April 1, 2010

The Shocking TRUTH of Terror in India!!

There isn't an iota of doubt as who is responsible for terrorism in India. It is India itself. Thats right India is busy engaging in terrorism on her own country so she can score brownie points against neighbor Pakistan.

All leading law enforcement agencies openly work for exiled underworld don Dawood Ibrahim - who supposedly is in Sonia

Gandhi's ( former PM's Widow) first circle of close friends.
So much so that even NDTV ( India's leading media house) is hand in glove as well. All senior police officials i.e. Director

General level staff are but employees of this vast underworld network that thrives openly in a lawless jungle state that is

India. And underworld don Dawood Ibrahim operates all of India through his right hand man Muthappa Rai.

And there's one man - an IIM Graduate ( India's Harvard) who is now being chased all over the country by this crime network

in a desperate bid to shut him up from blowing the whistle. And in the process have exposed the most unusually brilliant

psychological alternative means to operate in India. And is the reason why we haven't heard of any underworld story from

India in the past decade and a half. Read this ghastly truth of Terrorism in India on his blog

http://truthbottle.blogspot.com
All incriminating details and show all pics are available on this blog

And he needs your help to save himself and pronounce the whole truth to the world. His whole family has been killed, his job was removed and the gangsters along with Indian Police openly chase him everywhere he goes!

 

GRANT

11:16 PM ET

April 1, 2010

I would find it slightly more

I would find it slightly more credible if you didn't simply post it randomly like this. Also I think it likely that this link of yours is filled with malware.

 

PAUL G

10:25 PM ET

April 1, 2010

Good advice

Good advice for another institution that's been in the public eye recently -- the Catholic Church.

 

GRANT

11:17 PM ET

April 1, 2010

I'm not sure if he would be a

I'm not sure if he would be a good general, but I would like to learn where he was taught strategy (something few officers seem to think is important).

 

AWESOME

2:41 AM ET

April 2, 2010

Really?

Few officers think strategy is important? Could you please back this statement up or is it just a random shot at the Officer Corps from a bitter veteran?

 

GRANT

3:27 AM ET

April 2, 2010

Actually I'm not a veteran,

Actually I'm not a veteran, I'm a former student and currently learning how to be an analyst for security concerns. I base that statement on the fact that A. strategy isn't heavily emphasized in education and B. U.S training for soldiers focuses on the tactical level. That effectively means that soldiers are very good at small unit combat* but they have less understanding of the military/political interests at the higher levels.
Not an army example, but in a conversation with my older brother who is serving as a quartermaster in the navy he could give me excellent details of his ship's tactics during a wargame on asymmetric attacks, but he was unable to give me a satisfactory answer on what the ultimate goal of the fleet was.

*Ironically the Soviets had something of an opposite problem during the Soviet-Afghan war. Their training focused heavily on large brigades and had little advice on how to handle multiple groups of 10-15 men on multiple sides. To some extent they still seem to have this problem in modern day Russia. I would say that both sides need to focus more on what they currently lack. Tactical thinking helps you remove insurgents from a village, strategic thinking helps you decide what will happen to the village a year from now.

 

TYRTAIOS

5:04 AM ET

April 2, 2010

The Oracle of Omaha

Grant, the old Soviet army's problem was that they recognized the limitation of rotating conscripts every two years without a NCO corps, and competent junior officers. It handled this by requiring the operational headquarters to design missions that would be relatively easy at the tactical and smaller unit levels. In Afghanistan they had no way to address the tactical deficiencies when it proved impossible to compensate for them at higher echelons.

We are heads and tails beyond that, and tactics, not strategy will determine a village's fate a year after it is cleared and secured. Strategy will dictate how we find an end to it all brought about by tactics.

In addition, lastly, and very importantly, the Oracle of Omaha has the luxury not afforded to military planners, and that is the ability to reduce his strategic risk by diversifying his portfolio, which makes thinking strategically a little easier and clearer.

 

JAFFIR

6:29 AM ET

April 2, 2010

comment on the east

First, the Russians did have an NCO system. It was not like ours but, it had advantages. Second, the Soviet's did big operations. They were impossible to stop, or generally, even slow down. However, the Soviet Union was collapsing, thank God, Allah (PBHN), and gentleman with no vowels, and economics. So, the Russians could not carry the fight forward.

Best,
Jaffir

 

SOLDIERSDIARY

9:16 AM ET

April 2, 2010

frame it better

You make agood point, but I think you need to frame it better. It is not that officers don't think strategy is important, it is that they are not focused on strategy until late in their careers. The first school where strategy is really taught is at the War College, for Col. selects, ususally at teh 18-20 year point in their career. So for the first 15 or so years, officers do not learn strategy, nor do they serve at the Strategic level (COCOMS, Service, or Joint Staff, etc...). Second, officers at that level may serve one tour at the stratgic level, but just waiting to get their BCT command, back at the tactical level.
The army, in respects is trying to fix this, and has established a Strategic Functional Area (FA-59), for officers who will work at that level (from about the 9 year point on), to bring continuity and Strategic expertise to these levels of staffs. These officers will not command for the remainder of their careers, think more Widiermeiers, less Eisenhower.
Finally, National Strategy is not just about the military, it is a whole of government issue. DoS, Intelligence agencies, Military, NSS, etc...many of whom are not wearing a uniform.
When the NSS of this administration does come out, look at the authors, see how many wear a uniform to work, and how many wear a suit/dress.

 

GRANT

6:17 PM ET

April 2, 2010

The Soviet military may have

The Soviet military may have been difficult to stop, but I suggest you read 'The Bear Went Over The Mountain' sometime (it's generally available online). In one of the cases mentioned, the Soviets used tanks and infantry closely together to clear an area of land. Unfortunately, the mujahideen simply retreated without any known casualties. To quote the book "...the force blasted its way through 14 kilometers of vegetation and owned it until they left. Then the mujahideen came back." From a strategic perspective they cleared the land and held it, but a lack of tactical success meant that the insurgents simply had to wait.

 

6OGUREZ

2:08 AM ET

April 3, 2010

is interagency thinking= strategic thinking?

soldiersdiary, the same could be said about the State Department (and I suspect the same of our foreign affairs partners) and their crop of FSS/FSOs- so the career progression is not limited to DoD. Are things changing? Yes, but it took years. I had to do a OTJ-initiated crash course in DoD culture myself and saw the benefits from just learning the corporate culture. Captains and lieutenants had no hesitation teaching me and vice versa. EER vs. OER or Fitrep process, career progression, collateral skillsets, etc.

Anyway, whatever the mission it would have gotten done, but that little bit of insight really reduced cultural friction and made things a whole lot easier on us and the locals. But it was bottom up initiated but that kind of inter-agency thinking should be institutionalized much lower than O5.

Unfortunately, if NSS 2006 is any indication it is not a "whole of government issue". Authorship aside I found two mentions (both in the same context) of State in NSS 2006. I don't find that encouraging. When the QDDR from State comes out I hope for less myopia.

In fact I would rather see an inter-departmental report maybe entitled 'Quadrennial Defense, Diplomacy and Development Review' with every member of the NSC or every foreign affairs agency putting their public authorship, thus enforcing their accountability to our nation welfar. but I digress...

You make agood point, but I think you need to frame it better. It is not that officers don't think strategy is important, it is that they are not focused on strategy until late in their careers. The first school where strategy is really taught is at the War College, for Col. selects, ususally at teh 18-20 year point in their career. So for the first 15 or so years, officers do not learn strategy, nor do they serve at the Strategic level (COCOMS, Service, or Joint Staff, etc...). Second, officers at that level may serve one tour at the stratgic level, but just waiting to get their BCT command, back at the tactical level.
The army, in respects is trying to fix this, and has established a Strategic Functional Area (FA-59), for officers who will work at that level (from about the 9 year point on), to bring continuity and Strategic expertise to these levels of staffs. These officers will not command for the remainder of their careers, think more Widiermeiers, less Eisenhower.
Finally, National Strategy is not just about the military, it is a whole of government issue. DoS, Intelligence agencies, Military, NSS, etc...many of whom are not wearing a uniform.
When the NSS of this administration does come out, look at the authors, see how many wear a uniform to work, and how many wear a suit/dress.

 

JAFFIR

2:23 AM ET

April 3, 2010

Good general? or Managers

I would hate to overestimate the effectiveness of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They lost. But Russians got up all the Valleys and had their economy not collapsed, they could have stayed in them indefinitely. The Afghans would have done what they do, sit in the mountains. Compared to what we spend on Afghanistan, the Russians payed less.

I am not sure that our command is moving the discussion forward. We are ten years into two wars. Win them.

Best,
Jaff

 

TYRTAIOS

4:14 AM ET

April 3, 2010

You are correct, the Soviets

You are correct, the Soviets fought in Afghanistan on the cheap, but you seem to have a Russian revisionist sense of history? The Soviets never did control the Panjshir and its important Salang Tunnel, and their presence in Khowst was always re-supplied by air because they could never control the Khowst/Gardez road.

However, the above said, back to the salient issue. Our generals tried to move the discussion forward but were ignored by the Bush administration, at that point, for obvious reasons: Iraq and had no choice but to manage the war in Afghanistan is a side show.

Warren Buffet on the other hand isn’t ignored , since he’s the boss, knows exactly what his assets are, can access them 24/7, and does the ignoring if he chooses. Generals in the end are not the boss, and don't always have control over available assets.

 

TOM RICKS

2:20 PM ET

April 3, 2010

fwiw

Fwiw, the Salang isn't in the Panjshir.
Best,
Tom

 

TYRTAIOS

5:08 PM ET

April 3, 2010

Moushiwake arimasen Tom-san

Sumimasen Tom-san. I've relegated myself to the back of the geography class (going to fast - especially embarrassing because of my background -

Cheers from Tokyo : )

 

GRANT

5:37 AM ET

April 5, 2010

Most impressive. I'll bet

Most impressive. I'll bet that very few people I know could find Afghanistan on a map (and certainly not in under 30 seconds), fewer still actually know the geography of Afghanistan. Or the geography of any other nation or region for that matter.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

3:57 PM ET

April 5, 2010

Salang tunnel and Panshir Valley

The Salang tunnel and Panshir Valley are strategically linked in all my reading. The Panshir seems to form the W. flank of the mountains, a major tributary of the valley at the S. end of the runnel, and mtn passes over tothe N. end.

The tunnel bypassed the Tajik Panshiri's traditional economic position on regional trade routes, I should think. Putting up a simple bridge in that part of the world can be interpreted as an act of economic warfare.

 

AWESOME

2:37 AM ET

April 2, 2010

Insulting

Your premise is insulting. Would the military be better off with Warren Buffet at the helm? Perhaps - perhaps not. But it does a great disservice to the current senior leadership of the Army. Men like General Casey, Petraeus, Chiarelli, and McChrystal who have devoted their entire adult lives to the defense of our nation as opposed to the pursuit of profit.

Warren Buffett possesses strategic vision. But does he possess the other qualities that make a great General Officer? It's easy to make decision when the only thing at risk is your bottom-line. It's quite another when you are sending America's sons and daughters into battle (and leading them as many of these GO's have done in the past).

I would like to see a counter-piece entitled, "Why Wall Street would be better off with ethical leaders such as (insert any of the above General Officers Names)".

Plus, I don't think he could pass the Army's Physical Fitness Test.

 

ZATHRAS

3:53 AM ET

April 2, 2010

I appreciate the thought, but

I appreciate the thought, but the big picture decisions made by someone like Buffett in the business world are most analogous to the policy choices made in government -- not exclusively by civilians but mostly by them.

Whether more senior officers should model themselves after Warren Buffet is arguable. What about the civilians they report to? My Lord, just read Shadow Government for a glimpse of how these people think.

 

SJH71

12:35 PM ET

April 2, 2010

Buffett never invested in any defense companies

Buffett is almost certaintly the best in the world at doing one thing --investing in profitable businesses. He has a fairly simple philosophy for doing so and avoids businesses he doesn't understand. The only reason, for example, he bought Geico was because he understood the business and it was lucrative enough to be worth owning all of it. When he (through Geico, I believe) ventured into the credit card business he lost billions and eventually got out.

The task of an individual military leader or a secretary of defense is in no way comparable to this idea of doing one thing brilliantly. The comparison is completely fatuous. The military is tasked with doing many things involving many, often un-understandable fields (such as Afghani culture, managing to identify and kill enemies while avoiding innocents and friendlies, or developing new, cutting-edge technologies for weapons systems). Buffett succeeds because he wouldn't touch such activities with your 10-foot pole. Plus the military has many masters -- not just the president but every member of Congress with their own interests in jobs and investment in their districts and their own "ideas" about defense policy.

 

RALPH HITCHENS

2:34 PM ET

April 2, 2010

Accountability

I'm not sure there's much correlation between the principle of accountability and the numbers of generals relieved of command, i.e., during the European campaign in World War II. Omar Bradley was quick to relieve senior officers in his favored 1st Army, while George Patton -- despite his famous temper -- seldom found it necessary in the 3rd Army. I doubt anyone would argue that the 1st was more effective overall than the 3rd. Accountability can be established without constant high-level turnover, I believe. This gets to your point about allowing subordinates to make mistakes.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

5:00 PM ET

April 2, 2010

OODA looping in Omaha

"We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly -- or not at all -- because of a stifling bureaucracy." (WB)

The idea that a cascade of rapid cycling develops more information and benefit than over-analysis of insufficient info seems broadly applicable. An engineer friend offered the wisdom that making the thing and seeing where it breaks is a quicker-cheaper than over-rigorous analytic design. My business-empire building cousin also insisted on sharing mistakes, rather than concealing them ; he offered a cash prize for the biggest screwup shared, and like Buffet, took the prize himself at times.

But if it's MY nephews trolling for contact with mines, with little tangible and no durable benefit developed when one is triggered, then taking known risks without a promise of profit, in order to keep patrol reports rolling up the chain, that's either criminally negligent, or insane. Crazy-making, at the least.

The real Omaha Beach was a cockup, with effective naval counterbattery fire not employed until two infantry waves crossing (the wrong) obstacle strewn fire-swept tidal flats had been all but eliminated. Exhausting the enemies ammunition stores thru repeat exposure of infantry is what Col. Boyd was out to prevent. There, but for the grace of God...

 

JPWREL

12:02 AM ET

April 3, 2010

The rejection by Bradley of

The rejection by Bradley of 11th Armoured's (British) ‘Hobart's funnies' (specialized armor designed for across beach landings) because they were not an American idea compounded Bradley’s stupidity in using infantry to absorb the ammunition stores of the Germans defenders.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

7:30 AM ET

April 4, 2010

the rocket-powered ferris wheel...

That wobbly rocket-powered ferris wheel was pretty scary. According to the news, our Marines finally got their new det-chord firing mine-clearing tank thing working in Marja. I'm not a big fan of SKYNET, but maybe materiél is the way to fight materiél.

 

ALFRANK

4:14 PM ET

April 4, 2010

Some good points, but presumptious

First off, I completely agree with Ricks' criticism of the zero defects culture and the tendency to squash people who go out on a limb, although that has improved lately. It is still very hard to shift institutional culture for large bureaucracies in general without a big kick in the pants and we are no different.

His criticism about accountability misses the mark. There have been a lot of junior officers relieved when they can't handle what's going, but the reason why we haven't been as honest as we could with ourselves runs much deeper than that. It's about how we've ingrained in our personnel certain ideas about how wars are fought that make it difficult for us to figure out what's going on in the complexities of an insurgency.

The training we get does help us cope with chaos to an extent, not as well as it could of course. That's what the more elite schools are for like Ranger and SF.

Saying he would do well as CSA is a bit presumptuous. Managing a several thousand person company is a little different than managing a several hundred thousand large bureaucratic organization with ingrained ways of doing things, in the middle of a war which very few people understand.

 

JAFFIR

8:15 PM ET

April 4, 2010

I don't get it

The process by which the military shifted from "killing people and breaking things" to engaging the locals and using refined targeting was agonizing. Sure, there were policy and interagency issues. Yes, a lot of Officers would have preferred big battalion warfare and long fast flanking maneuvers instead of drinking chai with the local tribal shayk. But at the end of the day, the Army's command is on the payroll to win wars. In this, they have failed. The corporate culture i saw, is one where there is zero tolerance for the mid level officers and infinite patience for the General officers. We end up with the worst of both worlds.

 

SEANROSSI

3:22 AM ET

April 7, 2010

bravo

best thing you've posted in a while.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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