Why should we expect pirates not to act like capitalists like everyone else?

then Navy in that order?

Navies do not exist to combat piracy. They exist, as a national asset, to do their nation’s bidding. If this course leads them to confront irregular challenges at sea, then so be it. The suggested nexus between irregular threats that navies historically have confronted and Somali based piracy today wants for a narrative of political and economic background that, frankly, does not exist. The noteworthy work of CDR Carmen and Best Defense to explain the roots of Somali based piracy and applaud actions taken by a various of entities to combat it should in no way be confused with research that suggests that Somali piracy is of the level of national interest that would compel a response above the dedicated efforts which NAVCENT and other agencies are currently engaged.

When the USN took to the Mediterranean to combat piracy against the Barbary States, it was because these actions were in line with national interests. Ways (combat piracy through naval action) and means (the procurement of the first frigates) were aligned the ends (unhampered trade in the Mediterranean). They do it out of self-interest; economic self-interest, typically, in matters of piracy (JPWREL pointed out in the last piracy post that 20% of the federal budget was going to Barbary tribute in the early 19th century).

So, while the dialogue about the causes and effects of piracy is enlightening and very useful, a national interest must be demonstrated before suggesting that current counter-piracy measures should be augmented. According to the September 2009 CRS report, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” it is pretty hard to quantify the actual threat that piracy poses.

According to the report, there is an infintesimal economic impact felt by the U.S. consumer. As insurance rates rise (which they actually have not for US flagged vessels), many of the costs are borne by the commercial entities, which then pass them off to consumers. However, these effects are orders of magnitude short of having any real impact on the global or U.S. economy, even given the taxpayer dollars spent on aid and naval operations to combat piracy. As the CRS report shows, the economic impact – to the U.S. or any part of the global system – is in no way significant, and is dwarfed by the historical cases that the CNO implicity refers to in the Navy IW Vision.

Admittedly, piracy is actually revealing some disturbing trends. The CRS report talks about the regional security implications surrounding Egypt, whose state revenue is dependent on Suez traffic. Most disturbing in my mind, is the potential connection between trans-national terrorism and piracy. As the insurance companies pay these $500k to $2million ransoms, it makes Somalia more difficult to govern, and therefore more hospitable to terrorists on the run, and more corrput and dificult to govern as CDR Carmen points out with the UN report. Here, with access to Western nations at stake, may be where a national interest might lie. However, I find it hard to believe that other means short of counter-piracy could and would not be used to prevent TFG Somalia from issuing visas to potential terrorits. At some point, all these trends may shift our policy makers’ decision calculus towards a more comprehensive solution. Maybe the administration is already considering this, but I have not seen anything open source to date that would suggest they should. For the foreseeable future, despite our history of confronting irregular challenges at sea, our response ought to remain status quo: measured, multi-dimensional, and aimed at the root of the political and economic problems while mitigating the effects of the symptom. Piracy, as correctly identified by the UN report, is merely a symptom, and as such warrants the necessary ends/ways/means match. No more. No less.

The CRS report mentioned can be found here: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf Sorry I didn’t embed the link – I am new to blogging.

LT Mike Kessler, USN

The United States Navy has the capabilities needed to counter piracy anywhere in the world. Should piracy ever become a national problem, we're all set.

In the meantime, in the context of national interests, the issue has zero salience: piracy is not a US problem and we should quit proposing solutions (Tom?).

A few comments: I can see the good Commander has a thing about the perception by many that piracy is driven by the illegal fishing off Somalia. Granted, it generally isn't anymore. Though perception can be reality within those traditonal clans associated with it.

However, it originally precipitated it, until it escalated beyond tribute, and was seen as too lucrative of a business to leave in the hands of fishermen. Don't forget that when Jolly (Jaalie) Siad Barre was deposed and the country fell into chaos, the international community turned a blind eye to the poaching going on off shore - cause and effect!

In addition, the 2004 tsunami also hit the coastal areas of Somalia hard and many traditional fishermen lost their boats, gear and livelihood as a result. and drove many young men into the arms of these newer "networks."

Incidentally, the U.S. early-on found if we paid men some extra money they'd jump out of a perfectly good airplane - why would paying more to the first young Somali to board a merchant vessel seem out of the norm?

There is an interesting article in this month's Atlantic on how the world recession, low oil prices, and piracy have reduced traffic through the Suez.. This has hurt both Egypt's economy and national pride.

Some other analysts have pointed out how piracy attacks have been hurt more by the weather than the Nato task force. I'm wondering what is going to happen when the economy recovers, oil prices go back up, and taking the long way around Africa is no longer as ecnomically feasible. Someone with better math skills than I, might want to crunch the numbers on that.

LT Kessler makes some good points about this not rising to the level of national interest, but then again, LTs and Capts don't get to make calls about what it and isn't in our national interest. I'm reminded of the General who made the speech in 2000 about not knowing where we were going next but "we are definitely not going to Afghanistan."