Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

I am not advocating that we adopt an imperial stance, or even that everything the British did was right or even moral. But I do think we can learn from them, which is why I am dwelling this week on Roe's fine book on the British experience in Waziristan.

For example, in 1947, the new Pakistani government invited the former British governor of the North-West Frontier, Sir George Cunningham, to come out of retirement and administer the province, because he was seen as an honest broker. That might be the end-game we should aim for in Iraq, where the American officials eventually subordinate themselves to the Baghdad government and even are seconded to work for it.

That's my lesson, not Roe's. Here are some of his. You'll find more on almost every page:

  • Be prepared to conduct a "constant mapping of political, economic and social information to gain a temporal insight into the views, motivation, and differences among the tribes and subclans."
  • Don't underestimate your enemy. "To take on the tribesman and defeat him in his own hils is a game demanding a lifetime of specialized study."
  • Tribesman will study your tactics and punish lapses or even simple repetitions. "This is one read on why an advance is seldom disputed with vigour, whereas the withdrawal is ferociously harrassed."
  • Political officers must counter the tendency of military commanders to rely on their "instinct and their own values and standards, which often will be mistaken, unsuitable or inappropriate." (Tom: I saw this tendency a lot in Iraq in 2003-06.)
  • "Tolerating ambiguities, shortfalls and inconsistencies must be central to any sustainable policy." (Tom: Hmm, sounds like FM 3-24.)
  • Don't fight the tribal structure. "Employing and, where necessary, reinforcing the existing tribal framework and structures offers the best opportunity for success."
  • Be prepared to pay off the enemy.
  • Local forces should be the heart of your effort, not regular Army troops.

 

THIRDWATCH

1:39 PM ET

March 16, 2010

Luckly...

this was all thought through during the pre-invasion process and we are only debating the subtleties of implementation tactics, now, nine years later.

 

JPWREL

1:55 PM ET

March 16, 2010

The problem I see with a few

The problem I see with a few of Tom’s recommendations is that U. S. field grade officers traditionally rapidly rotate in and out of combat zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan and are never really around long enough to learn the languages and become intimately familiar with the local customs, tribes/clans, and culture on an intimate basis. To remain in country for a significant period of time in order to learn these things would pretty much be a career killer. Before the war many British officers of the Imperial era (particularly those in the Indian Army) could expect to spend their entire careers in ‘India’ (which encompassed India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Bangladesh, Burma and unofficially Afghanistan) with periodic visitations to England for Staff College, leave etc. Such total immersion allowed most of them to sort of ‘go native’ not in the literal sense though that did happen at times, but in the sense that they absorbed the languages, culture and politics of the region with a sort of nonchalant familiarity.

 

LITTLEMANTATE

6:24 PM ET

March 16, 2010

Exactly right, but expertise comes with Imperialism

The lessons Ricks mentions are all valid, but how and why would you use these lessons unless you are an imperial power? That's the main point, isn't it? One doesn't have to worry about tribal reactions unless one is a political force in the neighborhood. But one isn't a political force in the neighborhood unless one is an imperialist. This confusion lies at the heart of the schizophrenia of post-1990 American foreign policy and NATO. If we don't have an empire why the need for a horde of foreign policy experts? Moreover, why doesn't D.C. listen to academics who are regional experts? Is it that they don't want to hear the truth because of arrogance and economics? Rory Stewart said it best:

"They listen politely, but in the end, of course, basically the policy decision is made. What they would like is little advice on some small bit. I mean, the analogy that one of my colleagues used recently is this: it’s as though they come to you and they say, “We’re planning to drive our car off a cliff. Do we wear a seatbelt or not?” And we say, “Don’t drive your car off the cliff.” And they say, “No, no, no. That decision’s already made. The question is should we wear our seatbelts?” And you say, “Why by all means wear a seatbelt.” And they say, “Okay, we consulted with policy expert, Rory Stewart,” et cetera."

The above was quoted extensively, as it should because it is basically the truth. Strategy is decided based on $, ideology, and testosterone; everything after that is just quibbling over tactics.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

8:27 PM ET

March 16, 2010

JPWREL, you are right

The Military Personnel System is outdated and career oriented, it needs to change! 2 years max at a post the you rotate out. Many military leaders leave a PLT OIC in place for 3-5 years and at the Battalion Level 5-8 years. It takes a long time to get to know your men and your job, 24 month change around does not cut it for us professionally or tactically. If we could adopt a lot of the best of what the Brits and Germans have for leadership and individual training, we would be the military we think we are.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

11:46 PM ET

March 16, 2010

Mistake

Should have put that many foreign military leaders get 3-5 years, etc..we only get 2 years in the States.

 

PETE

2:09 PM ET

March 16, 2010

Another "Seconded" Officer

Brigadier Francis Ingall was in the same class at Sandhurst as David Niven in 1927-28. He served most of his career in India and following its Partition was the first commanding officer of the Pakistan Military Academy. He tells his story in the book "The Last of the Bengal Lancers," Presidio Press, 1988.

 

JPWREL

5:42 PM ET

March 16, 2010

David Niven was in the

David Niven was in the Highland Light Infantry, which is now the Royal Highland Fusiliers, the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Scotland (2 SCOTS). 2 SCOTS is currently the standby lead element of the Army. The Battalion has recently returned from Afghanistan after serving as part of 16 Air Assault Brigade alongside 5 SCOTS, 4 SCOTS, 2 PARA and 3 PARA.

 

GRUMPYFSO

7:13 PM ET

March 16, 2010

you don't have to read the book to learn the key lesson

It's right there in the sub-title: 1849-1947. Just shy of a century, with what to show for it? Don't get me wrong, all of the content Tom has excerpted is great and I'm sure the book as a whole is too, but let's not lose the forest for the trees. Realistically, we withdraw before achieving anything approaching stability -- in which case better sooner rather than later -- and take the risk of being attacked in the homeland and/or in third countries, or we accept the need to continuously fight with at least some Afghans as the sunk cost of hegemony for as long as we wish to pursue it and stop pretending that we'll be able to walk away someday leaving behind a self-sustaining state. Or will the Chinese be reading the American version of this book in 150 years?

 

BILL KELLER

9:38 PM ET

March 16, 2010

How does HIV survive and prevail in the target host...

"Don't underestimate your enemy. "To take on the tribesman and defeat him in his own hils is a game demanding a lifetime of specialized study." "

It renders the immune system unable to defeat it.

Interesting instinctual approach without the need for the grand strategy and armada fleets that flow throughout the battle space.

 

PETE

7:52 PM ET

March 22, 2010

Last of the Old Breed

Brigadier John Prendergast

Daily Telegraph
London
Published: 12:01AM GMT 03 Mar 2008

Brigadier John Prendergast, who has died aged 97, won a DSO and two MCs in an adventurous military career which spanned more than 30 years.

In May 1937 Prendergast was serving with the Tochi Scouts in North Waziristan. They were leading an advance on the village of Gariom with the objective of blowing up two of the towers as a punishment for harbouring the wily Fakir of Ipi when they came under heavy fire from rebel tribesmen.

Prendergast, with four platoons under his command, was ordered to take charge. As his small force moved up, they were halted along a lip in the ground.

The tribesmen, 300 yards away, concealed in ilex scrub, could cover every inch of open terrain that separated them and, as he tried to flatten his body into the dirt, the vicious crack of bullets flying past his head was so nerve-janglingly sharp that he had horrid visions of his brains being scattered by the next shot.

"This was terrible," he said later. "I was supposed to be a leader." At school, he had boxed against opponents much bigger than himself and had always believed that he was brave. Then the thought came back, "Well, lead then."

Terrified and with the awful feeling that his legs were made of rubber, he got to his feet, waved his puny revolver and tried to get a charge going.

In a split second, he was covered with dust from the bullets striking the ground at his feet. At the same instant, he saw stark fear in the nearest rifleman's eyes and knew that his men were not going to follow him.

He went to ground again, slid down from the lip and moved one of his platoons round to the left where it could give rapid covering fire from a more enfiladed position. Then, swearing at the other three platoons and getting bayonets fixed, he led them over the edge with a loud Pathan shout of "Halla, Halla." (Attack! Attack!)

Prendergast knew that his stout stature made him a marked man but zig-zagging, he and his Pathans tore across the intervening ground. Some of his men fell, but the tribesmen did not stop to face the bright line of bayonets bearing down on them so swiftly and took to their heels. Prendergast was awarded a Military Cross.

John Hume Prendergast, the younger son of Major General Charles Gordon Prendergast, was born at Lahore on November 15 1910. A performing troupe of monkeys that used to be taken around the British houses had been taught to salute the Union Jack.

When young John tried to teach his pet rhesus monkey to emulate them, raising its paw gently but repeatedly to its brow while holding up a little Union Jack, it turned scarlet in the face and bit off the tip of his finger.

Prendergast was educated at Victoria College, Jersey, and was commissioned into the Special Reserve in 1929. He was posted to 2nd Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment in Karachi and, after taking a Regular Commission in 4/15th Punjab Regiment, he was seconded to the North Waziristan Transborder Armed Police (Tochi Scouts).

Shortly after he won his first MC he was leading a relief column when he was ambushed. He had two carrier pigeons with him and he decided to dispatch them to HQ with an urgent appeal for help.

Crouched in a ditch, with fumbling fingers he wrote out the message, rolled it into tubes and attached it to the pigeons' legs. The two messengers flew a short distance, settled on a rock and started cooing lovingly at each other.

In desperation, Prendergast raised himself from his hiding place and hurled pebbles at them while praying that nobody would shoot him. At last they flew off and within an hour an RAF Wapiti came over and routed the rebels.

In 1940 he took part in the campaign in Norway on attachment to the Irish Guards. Within a short time of disembarking at Mosjoen and after five hours trudging through the snow he laid an ambush for the Germans.

Trapped between a cliff and a reservoir, the enemy sustained losses of more than 50 at the cost of one British soldier. Prendergast was awarded a Bar to his MC.

After the withdrawal to England Prendergast returned to India to take up an appointment as instructor in mountain warfare at the Poona Tactical School. He then raised and commanded 1st Western Tribal Legion, but the irregulars proved unreliable and were subsequently disbanded.

He was then posted to 1/15th Punjab Regiment (1/15 PR) as second in command and took part in the Arakan campaign. There, as he said afterwards, he lived like a prairie dog, never more than a leap from his fox-hole where he could take cover from the incessant air and artillery bombardment.

After a spell in a Calcutta hospital with malaria, he rejoined 1/15 PR for the forced crossing of the Irrawaddy, for which he was mentioned in dispatches, the advance to Mandalay and the Japanese base at Meiktila.

Prendergast was then given command of 3/6th Rajputana Rifles, part of 19th Indian Division. With the capture of Rangoon in May 1945, their role consisted largely of mopping up operations, a process which took almost a year.

The citation for the award of his DSO paid tribute to his unfailing cheerfulness, courage and leadership in stubborn fighting in the arduous conditions of dense mountain jungle and a heavy monsoon.

In 1947, after attending Staff College at Quetta and Camberley, Prendergast transferred to the British Army and moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, as Defence Attaché.

He joined 1st York and Lancaster Regiment in BAOR in 1950, commanded them the following year and accompanied them to Khartoum and the Canal Zone.

Prendergast was posted to HQ 1 British Corps at Bielefeld in 1955 before promotion to brigadier upon taking command of TA147 Brigade in the Midlands.

After retiring from the Army, he became a successful restorer of old houses. This paid for many journeys to India and the Near East; he would leave in the autumn by motor-caravan and return when the snows on the high passes had melted enough to make travel possible.

Prendergast also enjoyed fly-fishing and painting and took an active part in voluntary work for the conservation of Indian wildlife. He was president of the 15th Punjab Association.

He published The Road to India (1977), a guide book, Prender's Progress (1979), an autobiography, and A Plume of Dust (1993), a travel book about Central Europe.

John Prendergast died on February 9. He married, in 1939, Rose Ann (Peggy) Hutchinson, the daughter of Henry Hutchinson, a former Postmaster General of India. She predeceased him and he is survived by their two sons and a daughter.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

Read More