Here's a report from my CNAS colleague Matt Irvine on a conference he attended Thursday at which Colin Kahl demonstrated that being associated with CNAS sure doesn't mean we march in lockstep:

By Matthew Irvine
Best Defense
chief think tanks correspondent 

The United States and Iraq are on a path towards a peaceful long term partnership and current U.S. military drawdown plans will remain intact, a Pentagon official argued Thursday at a Washington conference.

Speaking at a session held by the Jamestown Foundation, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (and former CNAS senior fellow) Colin Kahl delivered a strong rebuttal to skeptics of the Obama Administration's Iraq policy. However, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and other prominent Iraq hands were cautious to downright depressing about the future of Iraqi politics and security.

Kahl outlined what he called three "myths" regarding the United States and Iraq:

Myth #1: "Iraq is teetering on the edge of chaos and is going to unravel." Peddlers of this myth argue that large numbers of American troops will be required for the long term to prevent a return to the violent days of years past. They cite recent sectarian rhetoric, bombings and high profile political setbacks (such as recent de-Baathification efforts by Iraqi National Alliance) as evidence of Iraq's supposed unraveling. Kahl, by contrast, argues that "this ignores broader trends that Iraq is emerging as a largely self-reliant state." He supported that point with five observations:

First, violent incidents are at the lowest levels since the invasion. The United States has only had one combat fatality in Iraq in the last three months.

Second, there is no evidence of Sunnis and Shi'a returning to militias and insurgencies for protection.

Third, al Qaeda in Iraq is weaker than ever. Kahl went so far as to argue, "Al Qaeda in Iraq is no longer an insurgency capable of maintaining a high tempo of operations or holding territory.... In our assessment it does not represent a strategic threat to the government of Iraq."

Fourth, Iraqi Security Forces have stepped up. For the first time since the invasion there are fewer than 100,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq while violence levels have hit all-time lows.

Fifth, Iraqi counterterrorism forces are robust. So strong, Kahl says, "Iraq probably has the most robust and most capable counterterrorism forces in the entire Middle East."

Myth #2: We aren't paying attention to Iraq. According to Kahl, the administration has focused on Iraq, it's the media that hasn't. This myth comes from essays by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and recent articles in the Washington Times. "Iraq is the only place on Earth that President Obama has appointed the Vice President as a special envoy. Iraq is the only place on earth that the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have all been to."

Myth #3: We define success as disengagement. This myth is a legacy of the 2008 presidential campaign, and ignores the Obama administration's actual policies. Citing the president's February 27, 2009, speech at Camp Lejeune, Kahl outlined the American objective as a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant" Iraq. "With the drawdown our engagement with Iraq will increase." The Strategic Framework Agreement to be worked out with the new government (if there is one) will show this strong bilateral relationship.

Regarding the renegotiation of the SOFA, it is not going to happen. There is much flexibility in the Bush administration's original agreement and the force levels will be just fine. "The timing was recommended by General Odierno and he feels it gives him sufficient capabilities on the ground," said Kahl.

Not everyone at the Jamestown Foundation's conference was as optimistic as Kahl, the only current Pentagon official employee who spoke. Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad speculated that "if the election produces a protracted period for negotiation, and there are various possibilities for things working and not working... then our timetable needs to have the flexibility to do what we can to assist Iraq and it's progress forward."

Reidar Visser, a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs said that, "I've changed from being an optimist about Iraqi politics a year ago and am now a pessimist. . . . People are being intimidated, they don't know if they are going to lose their jobs." Provincial leaders, he added, "are inventing de-Baathification processes every day. This comes from the Iraqi National Alliance, trying to use it to destroy the Dawa. . .  . De-Baathification has been threatening the integrity of the election ever since it came on the agenda a couple of months ago."

There was a clear lack of consensus among participants over how Sunday's election will play out in the coming weeks and months, and where the United States and Iraq stand as partners. The only point of agreement was that the Iraqi civil war of 2005-2008 has not returned yet.

Tom again: Kahl's a smart guy, and also knows his music. I disagree with him. Why? Because I think a lot of Iraqis are just waiting for the Americans to get out of the way so they can start fighting again. And because I think the incentives that have led to violence in the past are still there. That is, none of the basic questions facing Iraq have been answered.

The good thing is that we will now in the coming months who is right. I hope I am wrong. Let's see how the formation of the new government goes.

Bottom line, there are a lot of things going on in Iraq right now that feel to me like early 2006. Let's hope Kahl and the Gang do better than Feith and the Stooges.

***Here's an update with some comments from the Hon. Kahl, and a counter-response from the Hon. Irvine:

Colin Kahl responds:

Two small but important corrections from Matthew Irvine read-out. Matthew writes that I said: "The Strategic Framework Agreement to be worked out with the new government (if there is one) will show this strong bilateral relationship."

This is not actually not what I said. As you know, the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) exists and does not need re-negotiation with the new government. In my remarks, I noted that the SFA provides the foundation, moving forward, for continuing our strong bilateral relationship, including a strong security assistance and cooperation relationship. The exact quote from my speech was: "The precise contours of that long-term relationship with Iraq, including our security relationship, are beginning to take shape as we move forward in implementing the Strategic Framework Agreement, signed with the Iraq government at the same time as the Security Agreement in November 2008, and will be further defined in the coming months once a new Iraqi government is formed and is ready to have more detailed conversations."

Matthew also reports: "Regarding the renegotiation of the SOFA, it is not going to happen." In my remarks and during Q&A I did not say anything about renegotiating or not renegotiating the SOFA. What I said was that the drawdown of our forces, consistent with the current Security Agreement (or SOFA), was on track, and that General Odierno is comfortable with how the responsible drawdown is proceeding.

Matthew Irvine then responds:

Secretary Kahl is right to point out that the Strategic Framework Agreement has already been inked. However, as he states, much of its implementation remains undefined. The outcome of Sunday's election will determine our Iraqi partners, or lack thereof, in the ongoing SFA process. Kahl was optimistic that the elections and these discussions will demonstrate the strong bilateral U.S.-Iraq relationship. Others are more skeptical of those chances for success.

Secondly, although there was no explicit reference to recent debates over the renegotiation of the SOFA agreement or General Odierno's troop request/non-request, it was my interpretation that Kahl was to have none of it. Myth #1 rejected the assumption that large numbers of troops will be required for the long term. In addition, emphasizing that General Odierno himself recommended the existing withdrawal timelines and troop levels seemed to be a clear refutation of recent media reports to the contrary.

Tom again: Colin's phrase "further defined in the coming months" could prove to be mighty interesting.

defense.gov

EXPLORE:MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ
 
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RUBBER DUCKY

3:34 PM ET

March 5, 2010

Bad Juju

Tom sez "Because I think a lot of Iraqis are just waiting for the Americans to get out of the way so they can start fighting again. And because I think the incentives that have led to violence in the past are still there. That is, none of the basic questions facing Iraq have been answered."

Tom: from these plain truths you conclude that we should double down, increase troop levels, and dig in for the long haul. Why? What changes? How long? What vital American national interest is served? Quoting the current CincCent (CincSand a better label?), tell me how this ends.

You argue for a variety of tactical inputs and alterations with no stated strategy, no clear path to success, no rationale for holding on other than holding on. Makes one believe that those closest to the fray are the least expert on the conflict.

Trees. Forests. There is a difference. Being invested and staying involved are profoundly different things. Back to my pet rock: this is the sunk-cost fallacy ... on steroids. If it feels bad, quit doing it.

 

JWING

4:31 PM ET

March 5, 2010

Why Violence Started In Iraq and Hasn't Gone Up

Violence in Iraq and the ensuing sectarian civil war emerged because the Iraqi state collapsed after the U.S. invasion. That left a power vacuum and Iraqis turned to non-state actors such as the insurgency, Al Qaeda, militias and tribes for protection and security. Those conditions no longer exist in Iraq. Al Qaeda has largely been discredited and reduced to a terrorist outfit. The insurgency is also down to terrorism and is really only strong in Ninewa where they only do hit and run tactics. Sunnis have also increased their participation in government and voted more, and that will probably happen again in this month's election. They will get a seat at the table of a new government, just a junior one, but that's not enough for them to give up and go back to fighting.

The same holds true for the Shiites. As long as the security forces are strong and out in the streets there is no reason for them to turn to militias. The Special Groups only carry out about 5 attacks per month in southern Iraq. Sadr disbanded the Mahdi Army, and its successor has carried out no operations against the U.S. Shiites also run the government and the disputes between the parties are not the kind that will lead to violence right now. Again, no motivation for the Shiites to go back to war.

The Arab-Kurd dispute increased in 2008-2009 but has since settled back to the status quo. even in Ninewa where there is the biggest divide and the Kurds refuse to cooperate with the provincial council there is a stand off with neither side itching for a fight. Also the Kurds will likely be kingmakers in the new government.

Also, I do not get how protected negotiations over a new government is suppose to lead to a renewed civil war. It took 3 months for the provincial councils to be put together after the 2009 elections and attacks and deaths actually dropped throughout that period. Putting together a new government is more important and will take longer, but a dragged out process doesn't equal a war.

Finally, Tom's point that the major disputes in Iraq have not been resolved will lead to a breakdown after the U.S. leaves also doesn't seem compute. The oil law for example has not prevented the signing of new deals. Oil profits get distributed to the provinces by their population. Kirkuk is as intractable as ever, but it hasn't gotten any worse either. There are a lot of lesser issues that don't get deal with either because the parliament is dysfunctional and divided, but again, doesn't mean they will go to war over any of them.

 

ZATHRAS

4:56 PM ET

March 5, 2010

The Basic Questions

The "basic questions" here mostly involve America, not Iraq.

If you want to analyze the basic questions to be answered in Iraq, that is fine. You might start with the fact that the place is full of Iraqi Arabs. I don't know what you do with that question, but neither do I see that answering it is an American responsibility.

What is an American responsibility is the weighing of the benefits to be expected from what we do in Iraq against the costs of doing it. There is a certain group of Americans, not all of them originally supportive of the 2003 invasion, who are anxious that years of effort and sacrifice finally lead to an Iraq that Americans can be proud of, and call a success. Frankly, I'd like to see that as well, but the statement is an expression of sentiment only. It does not represent a calculation of American interest.

That calculation, for me, leads to the conclusion that the Iraq adventure was a failure for the United States by 2005 at the latest, and would never be anything else. Nothing we could do there afterward would amount of anything better than damage control in the best case. Welcome as the immediate consequences of the surge in 2007 were from my point of view, they did not alter this conclusion.

Kahl is right. Iraq, at the moment and for the near future, is not at the edge of chaos. It is receiving adequate levels of attention from the Obama administration, which will continue to make what contributions it can to the stability of Iraq and the humanity of its government, consistent with a policy of redeploying American forces out of the country. This last is something the administration must do. President Obama now presides over a government that spends vastly more money than it raises in taxes, over a foreign policy establishment that has long neglected important American interests in favor of a preoccupation with the Middle East, and over a military struggling to define its future while burdened by the need to sustain very large combat commitments on the other side of the world. None of these conditions can be sustained. Each of them raise basic questions for the American government; these cannot be answered only by a withdrawal from Iraq, but will not be answered without withdrawal from Iraq.

There are many things about the state of Iraq now on which Americans may look with dismay. Given unlimited time and resources, it might be possible for us to alter some of them for the better. Unlimited time and resources are not available to us, however, and that is where the discussion must end.

 

JAYDEE001

5:58 PM ET

March 5, 2010

Well said Zathras!!!

Thanks for commenting so eloquently. You have pointed out the most significant argument in favor of withdrawal - we don't really have the resources to continue this fiasco.

I hope we can finally leave Irag to its people, and the sooner the better. It is long past time for the US to end an involvement in that country that never should have been begun.

 

DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

6:06 PM ET

March 5, 2010

Notice how Dr. Kahl doesn't

Notice how Dr. Kahl doesn't even mention Iranian influence in this short posting (although he might have in the conference). I am a bit surprised, especially given the fact that Iran's Quds Force may have been tacitly involved in Iraq's de-Baathification decision. Having an outside power manipulating another country's electoral cycle is not necessarily a good step towards a stable and self-reliant Iraq.

http://www.depetris.wordpress.com

 

NIR ROSEN

6:09 PM ET

March 5, 2010

outside power

as americans we are hardly ones to talk about this, since no other country has been more involved in iraq's political affairs. but no, the debaathification decision was not inspired by iran, it was inspired by iraqi shiite politicians who were sectarian and who also wanted to undermine maliki. too many people make the mistake in seeing the hand of iran in everything

 

JWING

7:56 PM ET

March 5, 2010

Iranians busy with Iran

The latest reports say that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is more involved in internal affairs then Iraq currently. Besides, their main priority is that a Shiite majority rules the country and are friendly with Iran.

Plus you fail to mention that ALL of Iraq's neighbors are involved in its internal affairs and pump in money and provide propaganda to their favored parties in this year's election.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

3:42 AM ET

March 8, 2010

Khalilzad supports 'unravelling' thesis?

That's a red flag. He's got dues to pay before recovering from a deep reputation as a neocon spin-doctor, in AfPak and Iraq. There's blood on those tracks.

Tom darkly suspects 'a lot of Iraqis waiting...', but his writing offers little to no insight to the structure of Iraqi politics, or the internal motivations of the players at the top and bottom of Iraqi society. Regional power politics and intervention capabilities? Sorry, Tom speaks 'marine' and other dialects that are fading out of mesopotamia.

A thesis is fine, but 'unravelling' never gets specific enough to point to which data is relevant to support or weaken a legit theory. On the other hand, 'falling violence levels' is way too general, if Mosul-Kirkuk-KRG is where the Arab-Kurd front is pushing towards a 2010 confrontation. After 25 years of US-Brit intervention in Kurdistan, Tom seems to notice little of the Kurds, their islamist strongman, beleagured dissenters, and 360º border issues.

My guess is that Maliki/GOI wants a monopoly on deadly force beyond the 3 Kurd provinces, putting the IA/IP on a collision course with the two flavors of Pesh. Both flavors of Arabs and Kurds are willing to CONTINUE to play the terror card, as needed, which will show up in Baghdad, home to the many Kurds who did well under the US occupation.

That's the chink in the 'ceasefire' dam that AQI and regional Sunni's are eyeing, while everyone pretends that any terror is Osama or Iran's doing. Meanwhile, Iran is trying to expand access to Iraq's holy sites and oil-fired commerce, without undoing the work of their own domestic 'guardians'.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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